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Abstract 
In the face of the post -Cold War depolarisation of the international system many of 
the external obstacles to regional cooperation have been removed. Additionally, 
there is an increasing demand for the management of security issues at the regional 
level. In this capacity regional communities are now faced with a wide range of sub 
and trans -national security related problems which challenge the traditional roles and 
structures of regional organisations. Though there have been numerous institutional 
developments and transformations on almost every continent since 1990, the actual 
record of regional groupings in attempting to prevent, manage and resolve conflict 
has been rather disappointing. Indeed, the result of regional attempts to control 
internal conflicts in such places as Yugoslavia, Somalia or Rwanda have considerably 
dampened expectations that regional organisations could lighten the conflict 
management burden of the UN or that they could otherwise tackle regional conflicts 
effectively on their own. 
This thesis proposes an evaluation of the regional dimensions of conflict 
management in the early post -Cold War period. It examines different conceptual 
and institutional aspects of regionalism in order to ascertain its relevance and 
potential to the task of preventing, managing and resolving regional or localised 
conflict. It examines older and more recent scholarship on regionalism, 
UN- regional organisations relations, and relevant developments in regional political 
and security arrangements. It also looks at a number of factors currently having an 
impact on the evolution of regionalism. 
This thesis concludes with an argument for a more pragmatic assessment of 
the potential of the regional option for managing conflict. It argues that the 
multiple regional conflicts of early post -Cold War period have stimulated the 
development of more fluid approaches to international conflict control efforts, 
partly as a result of the general disillusionment with the effectiveness of the UN and 
regional organisations in the early 1990s. 
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1 
Introduction 
The current involvement of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) in Kosovo has 
highlighted in the clearest possible form the role played by regional groupings in 
enforcing norms of behaviour against regimes defying the most basic humanitarian 
standards. Some have already hailed NATO's muscular intervention against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as the confirmation that the central tenet of international 
order, the exercise of state sovereignty, should now be weighed against new 
humanitarian norms allowing concerned states the privilege, if not the right, to override 
established international decision -making mechanisms in certain extreme cases. Whether 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo will mark the beginning of a bold new era in 
international politics remains to be seen. However, what is readily apparent is that the 
intervention has rekindled the international debate on the legitimacy of various forms of 
forceful intervention, the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in maintaining 
international peace and security, and the powers of regional groupings in dealing with 
regional conflict. 
It is fair to state that the regional dimensions of conflict and cooperation have 
been a prominent theme of both international politics and international relations (IR) 
scholarship for the last decade. Indeed, in its latest iteration, the renewal of interest in 
these issues came about largely as a result of the end of the Cold War. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, numerous predictions were made about the development of 
regionalism and regional organisations. In 1990, former U.S. National Security Adviser 
Walt Rostow foresaw the coming age of regionalism as the reigning metaphor for the 
post -Cold War international order.1 In the new international environment, Rostow 
argued, the 'regional impulse' would be stimulated by a number of factors: the 
inadequacy of nation- states to handle complex problems on their own, the difficulties of 
generating practical global cooperation across a wide range of issues, the desire of 
regional communities to keep in check large regional powers, and an American 
withdrawal from Cold War military commitments overseas. For his part, Richard 
Rosecrance dismissed the hypothesis that the new strategic environment would herald 
in the development of regional balances and the rise of regional hegemons.2 In a 1991 
article on international governance conspicuous for its lack of reference to the UN's 
rising international role at that moment, Rosecrance argued that regionalism would 
flourish "in participation with rather than opposition to the new centralizing tendency in 
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modern world politics and economics ", a centralizing tendency coming about as a result 
of the agglomeration of power in the hands of a new powerful concert of nations led by 
the United States and a few industrialised nations. 
With the spate of new conflicts developing around the globe at the turn of 
1990s, these broad considerations were quickly distilled into more precise questions: 
Could regional organisations and, more broadly, regionalism play a more effective role 
in preventing, managing and resolving regional and localised conflict? Was the post - 
Cold War environment more likely to facilitate the search for regional solutions to 
regional problems? Could the UN off -load or 'contract out' conflict management tasks 
to regional organisations? 
For anyone attempting to answer these questions the early post -Cold War period 
offered a confusing picture. In 1990, for example, a divided Arab League was unable to 
persuade Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait. Regional diplomacy had failed to 
provide the answer to a major crisis with strategic repercussions for international trade 
and security. The Gulf crisis opened deep wounds in the Arab world between 
conservative governments calling for an Iraqi withdrawal and supporters of the Iraqi 
regime composed of 'have not' Arab states and disenfranchised populations in the 
Middle East. United on the question of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the UN 
Security Council enacted a series of decisive resolutions and had the will to implement 
them under a broad -based coalition led by the United States. Given inter -Arab 
divisions over Kuwait, the Arab League's failure to provide an early diplomatic a 
solution to the Kuwait crisis was perhaps not unexpected. But the crisis also highlighted 
one of the perennial difficulties of regional organisations over the years, that of dealing 
with determined regional powers. 
In different areas of the globe, however, there had been indications throughout 
the 1980s that regional actors wanted to play a more active role in tackling localised 
conflicts. In the early 1980s, for example, a group of Latin American countries initiated 
a peace process in Central America, the so -called Contadora process, which eventually 
led to the signing of two regional peace agreements (Esquipulas I /II). A combination 
of regional leadership, and an American policy reversal regarding support to Central 
American right -wing governments and Contra forces fighting in Nicaragua, effectively 
set the stage for involvement by the UN and the Organization of American States 
(OAS) in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In Cambodia, with a military 
stalemate on the ground and Vietnam looking to withdraw its forces from the country, 
governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sponsored peace 
talks in 1988 which proved to be the opening round of a protracted diplomatic and 
political process which culminated with the 1991 Paris Agreement and the dispatch of 
the most complex UN peacekeeping mission up to that point. Finally, as Liberia was 
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descending into chaos in 1990, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) offered to mediate between belligerent factions and brokered a tentative 
cease -fire in August 1990. The latter fell apart as soon as it was signed, yet a number of 
ECOWAS countries led by Nigeria still dispatched a peacekeeping force to the country. 
These and other events played an important role in reawakening the original UN 
vision of regionalism.3 In 1992, under the rubric of decentralisation and 
burden -sharing, the UN's Agenda for Peace proposed a renewed partnership between 
regional organizations and the UN in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peace -keeping, 
peace -making and post -conflict recovery.4 Moreover, the Agenda highlighted the 
possibility that the UN Security Council could move to give greater legitimacy to 
regional conflict management efforts, thus providing, in the words of former UN 
Secretary -General Boutros Boutros -Ghali, a sense of 'democratisation' in the task of 
maintaining international peace and security. 
Aim and Organization of this Study 
This study proposes an examination of different dimensions of the regional 
organizations issue as it has developed since the beginning of the 1990s. It seeks to 
make a contribution to the literature on the role of multilateral action in dealing with 
conflict, focussing particularly on the role of regional organisations. It reviews several 
propositions about the latter's potential and, more broadly, that of regionalism, to 
prevent, manage, and resolve localised or regional conflict in the context of global 
security efforts and international diplomacy. 
Three broad arguments are developed in this study. The first concerns the 
'regional solutions to regional problems' argument on which regionalism is premised: 
this remains as problematic today as it was during the Cold War. Important geopolitical 
obstacles that previously hindered cooperation may have been removed in many regions 
of the world as a result of the end of the Cold War. However, the performance and 
record of regional groupings in handling a number of recent conflicts in Africa, Europe 
or the Middle East has exposed a number of serious problems and inadequacies which 
derive from competing visions of regional order, asymmetries of power and influence 
within regional organisations, lack of regional cohesion, lack of resources, problems of 
coordination, and structural deficiencies in addressing internal conflicts judged to be a 
threat to regional security and stability. 
There have been some achievements. Indeed, some regional organisations, like 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for instance, have 
gone further than the UN in trying to develop mechanisms facilitating collective efforts 
to control internal conflicts. However, not only are many of the problems which 
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characterised the regional approach to conflict management during the Cold War still 
present today, but new ones have appeared and others have been magnified. New 
regional conflicts are putting more responsibilities on the shoulders of regional 
communities that often lack either the means or the necessary cohesion to offer 
effective collective responses to them. Regionalism can certainly be a positive force in 
world affairs, notably by promoting norms of behaviour and attempting to establish 
new patterns of cooperation. But the belief that regionalism necessarily constitutes an 
effective approach to resolving regional conflicts is simply not supported by recent 
experience. 
Second, in spite of these problems, more regionalist endeavours have been 
launched during the early post -Cold War period than during any other single period 
during the postwar years. This is an aspect of regionalism which the author believes is 
not fully appreciated in the recent literature. Many if not most older regional 
organisations have seen their mandates revised, new forums and organisations of all 
types have emerged or are emerging, and many states have invested considerable energy 
in creating new regional solidarities. This situation can be examined from a number of 
perspectives. For some, it means that regional communities are taking greater 
responsibility in dealing with problems in their own 'neighbourhood'. For others, the 
proliferation of new regional groupings represents a diffusion of interests hitherto 
simplified by Cold War geopolitics. The two interpretations are not necessarily in 
contradiction. Yet we also need to place recent developments in context. 
During the postwar years, regionalism arose as a result of a sense of common 
purpose and shared political outlooks in several regions, the struggle against colonialism 
in Africa or the desire to build a more peaceful order in Europe for example. But it also 
developed as a result of the structural inability of the UN to respond to the particular 
interests of superpowers, regional powers or given subsets of states, either in the 
context of East -West confrontation or in the context of specific regional conflicts. In 
the early post -Cold War period, regionalism has been propelled by new factors: a 
redefinition of global and regional geopolitical boundaries, the elaboration of new 
regionalist schemes and projects, and economic and political pressures in favour of 
creating more integrated regional markets. As a result, some regions which, at least 
from the outside, seemed to make sense as cohesive units during the Cold War, are now 
fragmenting, while others are enlarging. 
The new regionalism in security affairs owes much to shifts in national and 
collective interests and to redefined allegiances to new regionalist projects or ideals. But 
it also comes in reaction to others factors a well, namely the increase in the number of 
localised conflicts with important or potentially important regional repercussions in the 
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early 1990s, and the attempts of a number of regional powers to further their own 
vision of regional order over neighbouring areas. 
Finally, this study will also argue that in order to respond to multiple crises and 
conflicts states are increasingly embracing informal multilateralism - also referred to as 
'intergovernmentalism' by some authors - rather than try to reach solutions through 
existing institutional mechanisms which are often seen as cumbersome or 
unresponsive.s For example, Washington's loss of patience with EC /UN mediation 
efforts in the former Yugoslavia led to the formation of a diplomatic 'contact group' in 
1993 -1994. Similarly, the UN's difficulties in trying to handle internal conflicts in such 
places as Somalia and the Great Lakes region have promoted an increasing resort to 
self -help strategies in dealing with regional or localised conflict in Africa. Contact 
groups and ad hoc coalitions of all sorts have proliferated in the early post -Cold War 
period, not only because institutions often appeared unable to provide timely solutions 
to pressing issues in a setting where only a restricted number of governments had 
incentives to act, but also because many emerging post -Cold War conflicts did not lend 
themselves very well to problem -solving through institutions whose 'rule book' was 
essentially written to handle inter -states issues. Though there exists some literature on 
this particular issue, the author believes this is an aspect of multilateral conflict 
management of growing importance and which has been under -examined in the current 
literature. 
This study is organised in five core chapters. The introductory chapter discusses 
definitional issues as well as attempts to synthesise postwar scholarship on regionalism 
and regional organisations. Chapter 3 discusses the post -Cold War debate on regional 
organisations and brings in different interpretations from IR theory and research on the 
subject. Chapter 4 looks at the relationship between the UN and regional organisations 
in historical, legal and contemporary perspective, the latter primarily by an examination 
of UN debates on the subject during Boutros Boutros -Ghali's (1992 -1996) tenure as 
Secretary- General of the UN. Chapter 5 examines recent developments in regional 
organisations with a particular emphasis put on institutional developments, mandates 
changes, and operational experience. It also highlights factors impairing or enhancing 
cohesion within regional organisations. Finally, Chapter 6 explores different factors 
which will influence the development of regionalism and regional organisations as we 
approach the 21st century. 
Fieldwork for this study was conducted in Washington D.C. and New York in 
May 1995 and June 1996. In Washington, the author participated to an international 
conference on peacekeeping operations in Africa at the U.S. State Department and 
interviewed officials at the OAS. In New York, meetings were held with officials from 
the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Department of 
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Peacekeeping Operations. A year long Fellowship in the Policy Group of the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs in 1994 -1995 also proved invaluable in terms of access 
to information and exchange of ideas with foreign policy practitioners. 
Regionalism and Regional Organisations in the Literature 
The development of regional cooperation frameworks was one of the most important 
issues facing the international state system throughout the postwar years. Not 
surprisingly, the extent of the relevant literature on the subject is enormous, ranging 
from historical case studies and legal analyses to more theoretically - driven research 
emanating from the developing international relations (IR) field. Attempting to cover 
all the literature on the subject is, to say the least, an ambitious exercise. For example, 
the respective bodies of literature on alliances and on regional integration, two 
prominent research themes during the 1960s and 1970s, literally cover hundreds of 
books and articles, to which must be added equally copious amounts of research on 
conflict behaviour and on the dynamics of international organisations.6 The reality is 
that for decades scientific inquiry into the question of regionalism was undertaken 
through different epistemological, theoretical and methodological lenses often barely 
compatible which each other, giving birth to an extraordinarily wide range of 
interpretations. Some works stand out nevertheless, and scholars like Ernst Haas, 
Joseph Nye, Karl Deutsch, and Iris Claude, have made such important contributions to 
the study of regionalism that their ideas remain extremely influential today. To a large 
extent, these scholars mapped out important intellectual 'markers' which contributed 
considerably to the definition and analysis of the extremely heterogeneous phenomenon 
that is regionalism in international affairs. 
More recently, there has been a revival of scholarly interest in questions 
pertaining to regionalism, regional security, and regional security organisations. Part of 
this resurgence stems from important developments in international affairs, first and 
foremost the end of the Cold War and its consequences on the political- security 
dynamics on regions. But it is also motivated by renewed interest in international 
peacekeeping and peacemaking actions around the world, the number and scope of 
which increased markedly in the early 1990s. Again, there are numerous relevant bodies 
of theoretical and empirical research, ranging from research into the changing nature of 
international security, to that on factors favouring or inhibiting success of multilateral 
endeavours, via case studies on various regional institutions or on broad aspects of 
political dynamics in different regions of the world. 
This study will engage both IR theory and relevant empirical research. 
However, it puts neither theory not methodology as its central focus as it is not 
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intended to be a self -reflexive study on the IR field but rather a contribution to the 
study of an important and complex IR phenomenon. In this respect, the author 
subscribes to Gary Goertz's views on the crucial importance of contexts in the study of 
international politics.? Regionalism is one of those big ideas which have many contexts: 
scholarly, historical, legal, and political. In the social sciences, as Goertz notes, the 
positivist and behaviourist traditions have always sought to isolate certain variables in 
order to identify generalizable patterns of behaviour which could then be 'tested' to see 
if they could confirm a theory. But the author believes that isolating just one aspect of 
the regionalism phenomenon, for example its legal -institutional manifestations, in order 
to develop a systematic and generalizable understanding of the phenomenon across all 
regions can only lead to partial and sometimes misleading conclusions. A choice has 
therefore been made for an eclectic methodological approach which not only draws on 
many traditions of the IR field but is also reflected by an organisation of chapters which 
discusses the issue in different contexts. 
Patterns of conflict in the early post -Cold War period 
As I William Zartman reminds us, "it is tempting to assume that international relations 
of conflict and cooperation have been so globalized that they can be conceived of as 
occurring within a single collectivity ".8 In fact, the reality of violent conflict since the 
end of the Cold War has been quite different. The overwhelming majority of armed 
conflicts which took place during the 1989 -1995 timeframe have been localised affairs 
with little or no potential threat to the global status quo. The dimensions of armed 
conflict are becoming increasingly regional and less global. Africa and Asia remain the 
two most conflict -ridden continents, with nearly half of all Asian conflicts being located 
in South and Central Asia. Europe saw sharp rise in the number of armed conflicts in 
the early 1990s, most of them located in or around the territory of the former Soviet 
Union and in the Balkans. In the Middle East, the number of conflicts has remained 
fairly stable while in Latin America it has decreased sharply. 
The end of the decade affords us a chance to look back on the conflicts of the 
1990s with some perspective. Between 1989 and 1997, the number of major armed 
conflicts declined steadily, from 32 in 1989 down to 21 in 1997.9 A peak was reached in 
1992 with 35 major conflicts. There has been a similar decline in the number of minor 
armed conflicts, from 15 in 1989 down to 12 in 1997. Again, a peak was reached in 
1992 with 23 active minor conflicts. Beyond the statistical fact showing that 1992 was 
the worst year in terms of active conflicts, the trend which emerges most noticeably 
from these otherwise grim statistics is that violent internal conflict has been the chief 
producer of conflict- related deaths in the early post -Cold War period, the overwhelming 
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majority of them being civilians rather than military personnel. There were 43 intrastate 
conflicts in 1989, and 52 in 1992. These numbers declined sharply between 1992 and 
1997; only 29 intrastate conflicts were recorded in 1997.1° In all, out of 103 different 
conflicts occurring between 1989 and 1997, 88 were intrastate conflicts, many of which 
were accompanied by a disastrous corollary, so -called 'complex emergencies' combining 
internal conflict with large -scale displacements of population, famine, and disintegrating 
economic, social and political institutions." It bears noting that many such conflicts 
were either caused by trans- border circumstances, and most had catastrophic 
consequences for adjacent states. Internal conflicts are rarely purely internal in nature 
and consequences. 
Given these numbers, and the attendant political crises which struck such 
institutions as the UN, the EC /EU, and NATO in their efforts to come to grips with a 
number of regional conflicts, the question of how to deal with civil wars in 
socially- fragmented or multi- ethnic states can rightly be considered to have been one of 
the central challenges to the existing international institutional order in the 1990s. 
Whether in the Balkans, in the territory of the former Soviet Union, Somaliland or the 
island of Bougainville in Papua -New Guinea, the sort of micro- nationalism which 
emerged in many areas of the globe represented a threat not only to weak political 
regimes, but also to an international order based on 'rules of the road' inherited from the 
Cold War. 
Interstate disputes over territory remain present as well, however. Here the Gulf 
War comes readily to mind. In reality, the majority of such conflicts do not have direct 
global implications and are chiefly local or regional affairs, for example the 1995 border 
conflict between Peru and Ecuador, or the skirmishes between Yemen and Eritrea over 
the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea. Still, others pose a definitive threat to wider regional 
equilibrium and may have direct international implications. The unresolved problem of 
the Kashmir remains an ever present source of tension between India and Pakistan, 
both now nuclear- capable; multiple territorial claims over the South China Sea have 
been the single greatest source of tension between China and its South East Asian 
neighbours in the 1990s; and the dispute over the Northern Territory /Kuries Islands 
still prevents the normalisation of relations between Japan and Russia. The Asian 
continent maintains a conspicuous place in the geography of conflict, making it one of 
the high risk areas in terms of the potential for major armed confrontations in the next 
century. 
In the post -Cold War political environment, it appears that the international 
community and regional communities are confronted with five types of armed conflict12 
First, classical international conflict between states (e.g. the Peru -Ecuador border war of 
1995). Second, intranational replacement conflict, that is, conflict over state governance 
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posing a threat to extant political regimes (e.g. the Rwandan civil war of 1994). Thirdly, 
intranational separatist conflict, violent conflict arising over the pursuit of 
self -determination goals which pose a threat to state integrity and authority (e.g. the 
conflict in Chechnya in 1994- 1996). Fourth, intranational conflicts with ethnic 
undertones that are primarily driven by a competition for wealth, local power and 
resources (e.g. Sierra Leone). Finally, transnational overflows of any of the above type 
of conflict into another. 
A Short Typology of Regional Security Organisations 
Both the end of the Cold War and, to a lesser extent, UN proposals for regional 
involvement in settling local conflicts, contributed to a blurring of the traditional 
distinctions between multipurpose regional organisations, regional defence organisations 
and other types of regional or sub -regional arrangements. Regional arrangements differ 
tremendously in their mandates, capability, track records, and approaches to conflict 
management. Structurally, they range from institutions with elaborate internal 
architectures, such as the OSCE or the OAS, to institutionalised regional dialogues on 
security such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Dialogue organisations such as 
the Commonwealth, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and La 
Francophonie, lack a geographically cohesive base and formal mandates in the peace and 
security field, yet they are often put under the general 'sub -global' political institutions 
category which more formal regional bodies find themselves in» 
In thinking about regional organisations it should be borne in mind that the 
political map is not uniformly covered by such arrangements. For example, Northeast 
Asia and South Asia are for all intents and purposes devoid of effective regional 
political- security cooperation mechanisms. Both regions, however, remain zones of 
potential conflict. Also, it should not be forgotten that the universal values embodied in 
the UN Charter may not be entirely compatible with the values held by certain regional 
groupings. For example, there is a long -standing human rights component in the OAS 
system. However, neither ASEAN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the 
Arab League can be considered agencies which place a premium on respect for 
fundamental freedoms. This underscores the importance of regional norms and values 
as defined (and defended) by governments, and highlights the fact that the rationale for 
collective action can differ substantially between political regions. 
At least three conceptions of regional security organisation can be 
distinguished.» The first is rooted in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and is 
represented by such classic multipurpose regional organisations such as the OAS, the 
Arab League and the OAU. Such organisations represented the original 'building -block 
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to world order' conception of regionalism promoted in the UN Charter. Although such 
bodies were structured differently, settling or resolving intra- regional disputes between 
member states was an objective all shared. To achieve this goal these organisations 
relied chiefly on pacific settlement of disputes methods similar to those spelled out in 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter (i.e. good offices, mediation, arbitration, etc). Measures 
requiring the deployment or use of armed force for were generally considered to be 
either the domain of the UN Security Council or were enshrined in various regional 
collective defence arrangements. It should be added that these bodies also had in 
common the promotion of norms of non -interference in domestic matters and of 
respect for territorial integrity. Not only were these meant to protect governments 
against territorial claims by their neighbours, they were also intended to enhance a sense 
of regional sovereignty and protect against unwelcome external intrusion into regional 
affairs. 
For most of the Cold War quarrelsome regional politics and external influence 
over regional matters in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, precluded the development of 
indigenous regional security instruments which went beyond pacific settlement of 
disputes methods. Other factors, such a state -centered security doctrines, the political 
role of the military in many developing nations, and an intense preoccupation with 
internal stability also impeded the development of cohesive regional security 'thought' in 
many regions. 
A second conception based on the principle of collective self -defense enshrined 
in Art. 51 of the UN Charter was represented by collective defense pacts which were 
originally designed to contain global, regional or systemic threats (e.g. Rio Pact, NATO, 
ANZUS, SEATO, Warsaw Pact, CENTO). These structures were intended to face 
external threats rather than deal with infra- regional disputes. With the exception of 
NATO, which developed both an intricate system of political consultation mechanisms 
and an extensive multinational military infrastructure, most such alliances lacked the 
inward community -building character which is one of the hallmarks of regionalism. 
Indeed, in most cases they were more an expression of the great power security 
concerns than a political vision emanating from within the regions themselves. 
History has not been kind to most of these alliances and only a handful have 
survived. In Europe, NATO remains the leading security organisation after having 
undergone a period of flux in the early 1990s. Considerable political uncertainties 
remain nevertheless, chiefly as a result of the Europe's ambitions to develop an 
autonomous military tole in the crisis management sphere. In the Asia- Pacific region, 
the ANZUS alliance remains a cornerstone of American regional security strategy, while 
the lesser -known Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which links Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand with Malaysia and Singapore, has thus far weathered 
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regional geopolitical changes in spite of an apparent lack of strategic rationale.l" There 
is also an interesting case of sub -regional cooperation in the form of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Although its performance was unimpressive during the 
Gulf War, the GCC still functions as a political- security alliance with a wider mandate to 
promote regional cooperation among the oil -rich regimes of the Arabian peninsula. 
In a third conception, the primary purpose of the regional security organisation 
is the enhancement of the regional stability and security of member states through 
cooperation in the political field writ large. Such organisations share two major 
attributes: 1) broad and inclusive membership, either at the regional or sub -regional 
level, and; 2) consensualism in decision -making. The Organization for Cooperation and 
Security in Europe (OSCE) - a bit of a hybrid since it was recognised as regional 
arrangement falling under the terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in 1993 - 
shares the above characteristics and can be considered the original grouping of this kind. 
Other inter -governmental structures with similar characteristics have been developing in 
recent years. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
which adopted a more formalised political- security role (albeit yet inoperative), now 
unites all the countries of Southern Africa. Similarly, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), set up as a security dialogue process in 1993, groups together almost all countries 
from the Asia -Pacific region and a number from outside it. The need for inclusiveness 
has also inspired various political processes in recent years. The Middle East peace 
process (MEPP), for example, was launched in 1991 on the premise that regional 
stability in the Middle East could only be achieved with the vast majority of Middle 
Eastern states participating in discussion on different aspects of regional stability and 
security. 
Typologies such as the one presented above are important, if only because 
lumping together all regional security organisations and arrangements under one broad 
heading is a problematic exercise. There remain wide discrepancies in terms of 
institutional resources, mandates and functioning. Furthermore, the end of the Cold 
War hasn't pss facto transformed the institutional realities of the past. At present, many 
regional organisations remain under -resourced institutions with little organic capacity to 
deploy anything more than small monitoring or 'preventive diplomacy' missions. On 
the other hand, with the passing of the Cold War, collective defence has been 
de- emphasised as a rationale for regional organisation. Today, the stated objective of 
most regional political- security organisations is to promote stability and security through 
dialogue and, when possible, through collective action. As will be discussed later, 
however, regional organisations also continue to serve as forums for expressing or 
defending, specific regional interests. 
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Controlling and Resolving Regional Conflict: Whose Responsibility? 
With the seismic changes of the turn of this decade in the structure of the international 
system the contextual background of international regionalism has changed 
considerably. The depolarisation of international cooperation patterns and the lifting of 
superpower confrontation over entire regions has generated a gradual movement 
towards the regionalisation of security politics which has already become an important 
factor in international politics. In many (though certainly not all) regions, political space 
has been created for genuinely regional discussions on peace and security issues where 
this was hitherto impossible. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the results have been quite 
remarkable in terms of institutional developments. 
Beyond broad discussions on mandates and institutional developments, 
however, the real debate about the role of regionalism in preventing, managing and 
resolving regional conflict in the post -Cold War hinges on a complex equation between 
national interests, conceptions of collective responsibility, opportunity costs of action 
and inaction in the face of localised problems, and availability of appropriate and 
effective regional instruments. If only by the sharp increase in the number of regional 
conflict management initiatives in recent years, the early post -Cold War period offers 
some degree of evidence that many regional communities are placing an enhanced 
importance on developing a more organised role in fostering regional stability and 
security. Yet the credibility of regional organisations has also been tarnished 
considerably by major setbacks in such places as the Balkans, Central Africa, Haiti and 
elsewhere. Indeed, in recent years the UN has spent much energy trying manage 
situations that regional groupings proved unable to handle on their own. 
In traditional thinking about regionalism and regional organizations, a number 
of advantages were ascribed to regional approaches to conflict control. They included: 
familiarity with the issues and problems of the regional 'neighbourhood', greater 
knowledge of regional actors, a sense of shared conditions, if not of common burden, 
likely to stimulate collective action in case of regional crisis. Many of these arguments 
were invoked as a rationale for regional initiatives in Liberia, where the outflow of 
refugees from the civil war threatened to destabilise Liberia's neighbours, and in 
Yugoslavia, where European leaders sought to demonstrate Europe's diplomatic 
strength and influence in the lead -up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (in 
December 1991). Regional action in these and other conflicts has shown that the issues 
of responsibility and effectiveness of regional responses cannot be determined in the 
abstract. Each conflict has a specific context and particular dynamics which determine 
to a large degree whether or not it is amenable to a regional solution. 
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In the early 1990s another factor was increasingly coming into play. Since 1987- 
1988, the UN had taken center stage as the most important international conflict 
resolution forum, a fact largely attributable to the thaw in Soviet -American relations and 
propitious conditions for UN involvement in helping to put an end to a number of 
long- running conflicts. However, with rapidly expanding UN commitments in 
Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, an over -burdened UN looked increasingly for ways 
to share the responsibility for international peacekeeping and peacemaking with regional 
organisations. 
From the outset, UN proposals to try to enhance the role of regional 
organisations raised considerable skepticism. During the Cold War period regional 
organisations had not proven to be very effective frameworks for resolving regional or 
localised conflict. In Africa, for example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
had very limited success in dealing with inter -state disputes and proved to be largely 
irrelevant to the search for solutions to internal conflicts. OAU norms of territorial 
inviolability, integrity of borders inherited from the colonial period and non- 
intervention in the domestic affairs of states were adopted as a prescription against 
territorial disputes, external support to insurgent groups, and neo- colonial meddling into 
African affairs. However, they also provided repressive African regimes with a shield 
against possible action from the OAU itself. In effect, rather than becoming the force 
of progress and unity its intellectual fathers had hoped for in the early days of 
decolonisation, the OAU came to embody autocracy and collective weakness for most 
of its postwar history. 
In the Americas, the OAS experienced a measure of success in resolving a 
number of minor inter -state conflicts early in the postwar period. However, with the 
United States, the organisation's dominant member, wary of Soviet influence in the 
Western Hemisphere, the OAS soon became an instrument of American hegemony. By 
the 1970s bilateralism had become the order of the day in inter- American affairs and the 
OAS had fallen into such disrepute that it was widely perceived as little more than a 
forum where Washington entertained its anti- communist friends from Latin America. 
Lack of U.S. support for inter -American instruments during the Falklands /Malvinas 
conflict of 1982 further undermined the credibility of the OAS system. The pro -British 
American response to the conflict was a contributing factor to the organisation of Latin 
American peace efforts in Central America outside the OAS framework in the early 
1980s. 
As for the Arab League, the organisation's internal cohesion stemmed 
principally from the development of an Arab identity built upon shared views on the 
political environment: an anti- colonial sentiment, a mistrust of Western intentions in the 
Arab world, and a total rejection of the legitimacy of the Israeli state. After a 
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spectacular ascent, however, pan -Arabism underwent a period of decline following the 
Suez Crisis of 1956 4957. Various inter -Arab political integration schemes failed 
dismally in the early 1960s, and the outbreak of civil conflict in Yemen polarised 
relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Boosted again by Israel's quick military 
victory in the Six -Day War and the reconstitution of a united front against Israel in the 
early 1970s, Arab unity was dealt a dramatic blow when Egypt sued for peace with Israel 
and signed the Camp David Accords in 1978. Egypt, the League's senior member since 
its foundation in 1945, was expelled from the organisation and the League secretariat 
was moved from Cairo to Tunis.17 
There were of course numerous other forms of regionalism during the Cold 
War. In Europe, the European Community (EC) changed the political equation in 
Western Europe by providing a integrative framework for cooperation which 
permanently transformed Franco- German dynamics. The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gave the West a forum through which it could raise 
human rights issues with Eastern Bloc countries when the Iron Curtain was still a 
tangible reality. And in East Asia, the fledgling Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) facilitated the normalisation of relations between regional states and 
permitted Southeast Asia to develop a tentative international voice at a time when 
conflict rather than cooperation best characterised the regional political -security 
environment. Contrary to the Arab League, the OAS, or the OAU, however, none of 
these latter regional bodies were formally mandated to deal with threats to regional 
peace and security. All, however, were subjected, if not captured, by the discipline 
imposed on governments by Cold War geopolitics. 
It was thus against this historical backdrop, and the unexpectedly quick end to 
the Cold War, that in 1992 UN Secretary -General Boutros -Ghali put forward new 
proposals for renewed of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in his 
Agenda for Peace. In the brave new world of the 'New World Order', international 
institutions such as the UN, as well regional organisations, were to seek to provide 
solutions, however imperfect, for all sorts of internal conflicts in Africa, the Balkans and 
in the former Soviet Union (FSU). However, the hypothesis that the end of the Cold 
War had transformed long -standing patterns of regional relations and would change 
what had historically been a troublesome relationship between the UN and regional 
organisations was soon to be tested. 
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Regions and Regionalism: 
Definitional Problems and Conceptual 
Approaches 
The meaning and essence of the concepts of 'region and 'regionalism' have been 
debated throughout the development of postwar international relations, both in political 
practice and in the relevant literature. For a host of reasons, both terms have remained 
ambiguous. In fact the malleability of the concepts is such that, regardless of political 
allegiance or ideological inclinations, statesmen and scholars alike have used them to 
justify, defend, unite, analyse, dissect and discriminate in countless political and 
academic endeavours. 
This chapter attempts to chart the evolution of the ideas of region and 
regionalism through an examination of the postwar and early post -Cold Wax 
foundations of the study of regionalism, with a particular emphasis being placed on 
issues of peace and security. The field is vast and properly surveying the literature on 
the topic requires more than one chapter. The second part of this review, Chapter 3, 
will also examine the literature on regionalism However, its emphasis is slightly 
different from this chapter. It will focus on more recent assessments of regional action 
in the field of conflict management, with reference to earlier studies, and it will examine 
some current issues associated with regional action and regional organisations. 
Definitions: Issues And Problems 
An old debate: what is a 'region'? 
Definitions of the concept of 'region' abound. Reviewing the extensive body of 
literature on the subject leads to the conclusion that a definitive interpretation remains 
as elusive today as when the framers of the UN Charter debated the issue in San 
Francisco in 1945.1 Put succinctly, the concept of 'region' is one that has a variable 
geometry in international relations. This is because the concept is partly a perceptual 
one that has as much to do with geography as it has with history, economics, culture or 
politics. Geographers, for instance, might use the term 'region' in terms of areas of 
physical contiguity presenting similar physical or geological features. But economists 
might use the term to identify areas, or trade blocks, where markets are integrated or 
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certain currencies dominate.2 Not surprisingly, with the establishment of numerous 
regional and sub -regional trade zones in recent years an increasing focus has been 
placed on economic regionalism in the study of international political economy.' There 
can also be important historical or cultural boundaries in the definition of a region. It 
has been noted, for instance, that the term 'Middle East' was coined by the British to 
refer to Arab lands coming under their influence earlier this century, particularly on the 
Arabian peninsula.' Over the years the term 'grew' in geographical scope, particularly in 
the postwar period, to the extent where today the expression 'Near East' denoting the 
area closer to the Mediterranean has nearly disappeared from English usage (though it is 
still commonly used in French as Proche -Orient) 5 As Russett observed in his influential 
1967 study on international regionalism "different definitions and different criteria will 
often produce different regions, and no two analysts may fully agree as to what the 
appropriate criteria are. "6 
The difficulty of agreeing on a definition of 'region' is a problem that has 
plagued both social scientists and legal scholars for a long time. As early as the mid - 
1930s American sociologist Howard Odum noted the difficulty of finding a definition in 
his studies on regional integration in the United States.? Definitional and delimitation 
problems stem from a number of factors. Authors agree that geography, which offers 
obvious physical and political boundaries, helps to define and narrow down the concept 
of 'region'. But it can also be a misleading parameter because, as Inís Claude put it: "the 
world does not in fact break easily along neatly perforated lines. "s Thus, regions should 
be considered more as interpenetrable zones rather than well demarcated areas. 
Subsequent research published by Cantori and Spiegel (1971) and by Buzan (1991) lends 
credence to this interpretation.9 It is interesting to note, however, that some authors 
have used the term 'regional organisation' for institutions that do not a have a truly 
regional membership and hold the geographical criteria to be a relative one.Io 
According to this argument institutions such the Commonwealth, the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) or La Francophonie whose membership is not based on 
geographical considerations constitute intermediate level institutions similar to more 
traditional regional organisations. 
The current UN interpretation of the concept of regional organisation (or 
'regional arrangement' as it is referred to in the UN Charter) is characterised by 
pragmatism. While certain principles guide the recognition of regional arrangements, 
the UN has in many recent instances welcomed the political and /or military role played 
by a wide assortment of regional groupings, both formal and informal. In An Agenda for 
Peace (1992), for instance, former UN Secretary -General Boutros Boutros -Ghali 
reminded the international community that the Charter had deliberately avoided 
defining what regional organisations or arrangements were (para. 61). Indeed, in the 
Agenda we find references to ad hoc groupings such as 'The Friends of the Secretary- 
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General in El Salvador' (para. 62) or to organisations such as the OIC. Similarly, a spate 
of UN Security Council resolutions and documents related to the Somalia crisis make 
direct references to the efforts of the OIC, thus placing this organisation on the same 
footing as the Arab league and the Organization of African Unity. 
As will be seen later in the text there are some problems associated with a very 
broad notion of what constitutes a 'regional arrangement', a notion sometimes so 
flexible as becoming as ambiguous as that of 'region'. By and large, international 
relations (IR) research methodology and international law have dictated a narrower view 
of 'regional arrangement' as a concept in order to facilitate operationalisation and 
analysis. A broad view of what constitutes a region, i.e. one that would not require 
geographical propinquity, was seen by some authors to become so inclusive as to be 
useless as a research tool or as an operational concept.11 This opinion is still held by 
many scholars, reflecting a continued belief in the nexus between regional political 
institutions and fairly well defined geographic areas.72 As seen in the preceding 
paragraph, however, the issue of geographical propinquity is one that seems to be of 
more concern to scholars than to the UN itself. A 1993 UN Disarmament Conference 
study on guidelines for regional approaches to disarmament illustrates the UN approach 
on this issue. It recommended that "states participating in regional arrangements E...] 
should define, as appropriate, the region to which the arrangements among them 
apply "13 
There is a broad consensus in the relevant IR literature on regionalism that 
geography is not, and cannot be, the only defining criterion in identifying regions. A 
number of authors have written about the necessity for a region to be partially defined 
in terms of common goals or objectives. Political scientists and IR scholars in particular 
have found that this is a convenient method which helps to define both 'region' and 
'regionalism'. 
In his 1949 Contribution à l'étude des ententes regionales, Boutros Boutros -Ghali 
suggested 4 elements (indices) which facilitated the definition of a region: 1) natural 
frontiers; 2) economic frontiers; 3) frontiers of civilisation; and 4) political frontiers.14 
Implicit in these criteria is that regions can be fluid and temporal entities, for 3 of the 
elements Boutros -Ghali identified are modifiable by human societies. In his famous 
Swords into Plowshares (first published in 1956) Iris Claude described the difficulty of 
defining the concept of region by the function it should perform: "rational regional 
divisions are difficult to establish, boundaries determined for one purpose are not 
necessarily appropriate for other purposes. "15 Another postwar commentator on 
regionalism, Norman J. Padelford, defined regions as "...spatial areas which come to be 
spoken of as 'regions' as a result of usage stemming from the practices of groups of 
states, utterances of statesmen, or the terms of treaties and agreements between 
states. "16 The political element in this definition is self -evident. The region is then 
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perceived less as a geographical fact than as a political option taken when a 'region' is 
delimited in order to represent certain interests or to perform agreed functions.17 
Joseph Nye's oft -cited definition of the concept of 'region' was one which 
encompassed both geography and a relationship between the units of the region: "a 
region can be defined broadly as a limited number of states linked by a geographical 
relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence ".18 Nye's definition remains 
problematic, however, chiefly because it did not discriminate between units linked by a 
degree of interdependence and those linked by a common regional purpose or function; 
interdependence does not necessarily imply common purpose or common objectives. 
Yet the purposive interconnectedness between states, combined with a degree of 
geographical proximity, has been viewed by some as a basic requirement for a coherent 
region. For example, in what is perhaps an ideal definition, Karl Deutsch described the 
'region' as follows: 
[A region] must cohere in many respects - in many transactions and 
commodities, in the flow of labor, management and capital, in economic 
structure, in education, in culture, in science, in politics, in intermarriage and 
migration, and in still other ways.19 
Despite appearances of sterile debate there is, in fact, more to these issues than 
definitional quarrels. First, as Benjamin Rivlin has pointed out, a number of basic 
difficulties stand in the way of implementing Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of 
the UN Charter, not the least of which is the fact that the concept of 'regional 
arrangement' in the UN Charter and in UN practice is too ambiguous and inchoate to 
provide clear and systematic guidance as to which regional arrangements can be 
expected to play an active conflict management role.20 Far from introducing a well- 
defined division of labour between the UN and regional arrangements, in fact, the 
Charter remains a compromise between the authority of the UN Security Council and 
the autonomy of regional arrangements. 
Second, the advocacy of a decentralised system of collective security relying on 
coordinated action by regional arrangements and the UN is certainly a worthy objective, 
but it remains a prescription rather than a reality in the absence of a clear division of 
institutional labour between the global and the regional level. Such advocacy is 
generally premised on an 'architectural' understanding of multilateralism whereby 
regional institutions, recognising the primacy of the UN, work in harmony with the UN 
Security Council to achieve common objectives. Beyond broad principles, such a level 
of institutional goal -compatibility is very difficult to achieve in practice, particularly in 
times of international or regional crisis when concrete and timely political or military 
actions are called for. 
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Finally, a third point that should be made about the definitional -conceptual issue 
is that, from a political perspective, defining or redefining a 'region can be an exercise 
of considerable import. In the early 1990s the political (re)mapping exercise which took 
place between Australia and East Asia certainly provided one of the most interesting 
examples of this process and warrants a brief examination here 21 Starting in the late 
1980s, the Australian Labour government started promoting much closer association 
between Australia and the countries of East Asia, a region which was regarded by 
Australians for most of this decade as something of a new economic Eldorado. 
Australia played a central role in regional institution- building efforts (e.g. the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation or APEC process) and sought to strengthen bilateral ties 
with Southeast Asian countries and existing regional institutions such as Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 22 Under the Hawke and then the Keating Labor 
governments this process was characterised by a high degree of political symbolism. 
Australian foreign policy and trade discourse made copious references to 'the new 
Asia- Pacific' and 'our common future' to flag its newfound inclinations 23 A further 
rhetorical instrument for promoting Australia's inclusion in the region came later in the 
mid -1990s with the concept of 'East Asian Hemisphere' proposed by former foreign 
minister Gareth Evans, an idea somewhat reminiscent of the notion of 'Western 
Hemisphere' originally coined by the United States in the context of American efforts to 
stem the spread of communism in Latin America.24 
Australia's eagerness to be considered the 'odd man in' in East Asia, however, 
was not shared by all countries in the region.25 As evidenced by Malaysia's off and on 
attempts to establish an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) consisting exclusively of 
core ASEAN countries, there were some reservations as to the extent to which Australia 
(the United States, Canada or Chile for that matter) could claim some common identity 
with Southeast Asia by redefining itself as an Asia -Pacific country. Moreover, as 
Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr noted, "Australians are somewhat ambivalent about 
whether or not they are part of the region; indeed some opinion poll data suggests that a 
majority do not see Australia as an Asian country. "26 Nevertheless, to the extent that 
Australia became an important player in the new Asia- Pacific regionalism it benefited 
from economic and political opportunities that would not have been possible without 
its push for closer involvement with its northern neighbours. 
Examining the meaning of 'regionalism' 
In international relations (IR) literature, regionalism is broadly conceived to be either a 
process of integration, or a process of coordination in specific issue -areas between states 
belonging to a given geographical region 27 However, as with the concept of 'region', 
there is no agreed definition. For instance, regionalism has been defined as the 
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"formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of region; and in the 
doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such formation. "28 Therefore it can be considered as 
much a state of affairs as an overarching objective or a process. In the latter sense it has 
also been described as "a strategy for the focusing of popular loyalties upon the 
institutions, symbols or even, what have been called the icons of the larger area, but it 
does not necessarily do so. "29 The latter description brings in the role of non -state 
actors, a role often underplayed in an IR literature which traditionally places a heavy 
emphasis on the roles and actions of states are unitary actors in the international system. 
Because institution- building and the adoption of common policies are often 
seen as the foremost expressions of regionalism, much of the focus of the study of 
regions has centred on various aspects of institution- building, regional organisation and 
cooperation mechanisms in the political, security and economic spheres. Current 
approaches to defining the concept still reflect this emphasis, but also allow for a 
broader understanding. Alagappa, for example, has defined regionalism as "cooperation 
among governments or non -government organizations in three or more geographically 
proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more 
issue -areas "3° This is a useful definition. It incorporates important aspects of 
regionalism such as institution building and regime -building. It also highlights the 
potential role of non -state actors at the regional level, a facet of regionalism which is 
growing more important not only through the development of regional economic links, 
but also with the development of regional non -governmental organisations (NGO's) in 
all spheres of activities. 
Building some sense of community usually forms an important element of 
regionalist rhetoric and processes. The process was described in detail by pioneers such 
as Karl Deutsch in the 1950s and 1960s in reference to the post -World War II aftermath 
in Europe and the nascent European integration process.31 Deutsch made the now 
classical distinction between those political communities that constituted 'security 
communities' and those that were still dominated by sense of mistrust that prevented 
them from resolving their differences peacefully. A security community, as defined by 
Deutsch, was a community in which there was a real assurance that its members would 
not fight each other physically, but would settle their disputes in some other way.32 
Pluralistic security communities, as opposed to amalgamated security communities 
which ultimately entailed full integration of its constitutive parts, were ones in which 
legal governments retained full independence; Western Europe or the Canada -United 
States nexus being the classic examples. Although the concept of security community is 
now decades old it does remain one of the key concepts in the study of regionalism, not 
least because it has frequently formed an integral part of the rationale behind a number 
of regionalist endeavours. 
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Whether state -led regionalism is always a voluntary process is a moot point. 
There have been instances of 'imperial' regionalism: the integration of Eastern 
European states into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1949) and the 
Warsaw Pact (1955), for example. In other cases regionalism has been an institutional 
façade for a what was really a form of hegemonic control or influence. Seen in this light 
a number of regional alliances can perhaps be grouped with certain political and security 
relationships which evolved out of decolonisation. Here France's special links with sub - 
saharan Africa, its post -colonial pré -carré (back yard) for the better part of the last four 
decades, qualify as a case in point.33 
Does the post -Cold War necessarily preclude the emergence of coerced or 'post- 
imperial' regional groupings or political entities? With the disappearance of the 
East -West confrontation it seemed that hegemonic regionalism had no future. Yet the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the unstable assortment of former Soviet 
republics produced by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, can arguably qualify as an 
example of 'post -imperial' regionalism. Branded by Boris Yeltsin as a "major inter- 
regional organisation ", the CIS has seen Russia attempt to rebuild a centre -periphery 
relationship with its erstwhile federated republics.34 Moscow's controversial 
peacekeeping record in its so -called 'near abroad' leaves no doubt as to how it perceives 
its role as far as the stability of the CIS is concerned, though that role has proven 
unsustainable 35 While situated at one end of the spectrum the CIS example certainly 
underlines the continuing debate surrounding hegemonic influence within 
contemporary regional groupings. Here the pivotal role of the United States in NATO 
and that of Nigeria in ECOWAS are certainly worth reassessing as well. 
An Overview of the Scholarly Debate 
From the mid -1940s to the mid -1970s regionalism in all its forms was one of the major 
themes in the study of IR. As Lynn H. Miller remarked, the end of World War II 
provides a convenient benchmark in this regard because as a modern political 
phenomenon regionalism is a product of the postwar world.36 Because of the 
institutional implications of regionalism this stream of IR research was closely associated 
with the study of international organisations, paralleling the development of regional 
organisations and arrangements during that period. 
The breadth and extent of literature covering the subject of regionalism is vast. 
For the purposes of this study four prominent approaches of the study of regionalism 
will be examined, placing a particular emphasis on issues related to international peace 
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and security. Those four approaches are: 1) regionalism as a building -block to world 
order; 2) hegemonic regionalism; 3) regionalism as an experiment in regional integration; 
and 4) the regional subsystems approach. It should be noted, however, that these 
approaches do not examine exactly the same phenomenon. Some concentrate on 
international law and formal international institutions, others on the criteria for regional 
cohesion and action; some are prescriptive, others descriptive. The common ground 
between them lies in their examination of regionalism through the elaboration of 
frameworks for analysis and broader understanding. 
Before entering into this discussion a few words need to be said about the sharp 
drop of academic interest in the study of regionalism which occurred between the 
mid -1970s and the mid- 1980s.37 When, in 1986, Kratochwil and Ruggie declared 
"today, international organization as a field of study is the area where the action is; 
[although] few would so characterize international organizations as a field of practice ", 
they were voicing the widely held opinion that there was too often a gap between 
research on multilateralism and the practice of international organisation, of which 
regional organisations were a major part.38 They were stating this at that time when 
American support for the United Nations, and indeed for multilateralism, was at a 
particularly low ebb.39 Regional organisations such as the OAU, the OAS and the Arab 
League were widely perceived as being moribund and ineffective institutions; even the 
European Community (EC), the very prototype of the regional economic organisation, 
seemed to be running out of steam and was in dire need of rejuvenation. 
Many factors contributed to this decline of academic interest. Studies on 
regionalism were inconclusive and, as we shall see later in this chapter, sometimes 
contradictory. Various regional organisations and institutions, which had shown 
promise and potential in the early postwar years, were demonstrating a loss of 
dynamism or were in outright decline. In 1975 one of the most influential theorists of 
regional integration and international organisations, Ernst Haas, had voiced the opinion 
that regional integration theory had become obsolete as a "distinct and self -conscious 
intellectual pursuit. "4'3 
Haas' diagnosis was not insignificant. As one of the foremost specialists in the 
field he claimed that what was arguably the most developed empirical and theoretical 
body of knowledge in the study of international cooperation needed to be enlarged 
considerably if it were to account for the changes and processes of international 
cooperation. Haas openly questioned the value of continuing research in regional 
integration theory, because, as he put it: "the doctors quibble about the patients because 
they seem to be surviving despite theoretical ministrations. "41 In other words patterns 
of multilateral cooperation and regional integration schemes were not evolving as 
expected by the political scientists who studied them. The EC, invariably used as the 
default model for regional integration, was suffering from 'spillaround', i.e. a stagnation 
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of its activities, whereas in Africa and Latin America numerous regional integration 
schemes had failed or were faltering. Ten years after Haas' diagnosis, Ruggie and 
Krachtowil were to ask: "how and why the doctors [political scientists] can be thriving 
when the patient [international organisations] is moribund ?" Their answer: "the reason 
is that the leading doctors have become biochemists and have stopped treating and in 
most cases even seeing patients." 42 In fact since the mid -1970s political scientists had 
turned to higher levels of abstraction to try to explain patterns and processes of 
international cooperation; 'interdependence' and 'international regimes' became the new 
buzzwords of the multilateralism research agenda and still remain major themes in IR 
research.43 
This situation was short-lived. In the second half of the 1980s an often highly 
theoretical debate on aspects of cooperation and multilateralism was complemented by 
a strong renewal of interest in regionalism in IR research. This can be attributed to 
three factors: 1) renewed interest in institutional developments in Europe, developments 
which were accelerated with the end of the Cold War; 2) a growing interest in 'sub - 
regionalism' in the developing world, particularly as it relates to areas of growing 
economic and strategic importance; and 3) more recently, the renewed focus given once 
again to regional security and to the role of regional organisations in the context of the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
The regionalism- and -world -order school 
Notwithstanding the problems related to conceptual definition that have preoccupied so 
many scholars, the concept of regionalism has historically taken on a specific flavour 
when it comes to scholarly debate about the UN and world order. In the UN context, 
'regionalism' effectively meant 'regional arrangements or organisations', and the terms of 
the discussions on global and regional order were inspired by the parameters of the UN 
Charter. In many respects, the early 1990s witnessed a return to earlier debates on the 
respective merits of regionalism and universalism in matters of international security, a 
debate which corresponded to the development of liberal institutionalism in IR 
scholarship. 
From the mid -1940s to the early 1970s, a great number of academic studies were 
published on the question on regionalism, largely, but not exclusively, coming from 
American ranks" Studies and essays published by Boutros -Ghali (1949), the 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (1953), Yakemtchouk (1955), 
Padelford (1954, 1955) and Claude (1956) give a good account of the early debates 
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surrounding regionalism in the immediate postwar period.45 These early discussions 
were characterised by a strong emphasis on institutional and legal considerations, 
though some authors also evaluated the effects of the East -West confrontation on the 
UN system of collective security. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the debate between the advocates of 
regionalism and those of universalism was not entirely resolved at the San Francisco 
conference of 1945. An omnipresent consideration in the early literature on regionalism 
was therefore to ponder on the benefits and drawbacks of regional versus universal 
approaches to world order. Two key questions were usually the subject of investigation: 
(1) the role of regional arrangements as 'building -blocks' in the construction and 
maintenance of international peace and security; and (2) the consequences of the growth 
of regionalism on the UN's authority. Beyond the tedious detail of international law and 
the analysis of institutional effectiveness, however, lay a more fundamental debate. 
Liberal internationalist authors foresaw a tension between the universal approach to 
peace embodied by the UN and the growth of regionalism. The list of traditional 
arguments put forward to highlight the pros and cons of regionalism vs universalism 
were synthesised as follows by Plano & Riggs (1967) and Bennett (1991): 
Pro- regionalism: 
1. Regionalism is more effective than universalism because its capacities are 
more realistically attuned to its objectives. 
2. Regionalism involves fewer states than universalism and offers greater 
propensities for consensus because of common traditions, similar political, 
economic, and social systems, and the regional nature of the problems to be 
solved. 
3. Regionalism tends to produce greater support from the peoples of the 
participating states than universalism because of a closer identification of 
common interests. 
4. Regionalism permits a more appropriate handling of administrative, 
technical and functional problems than universalism because the 
organisation's machinery is better matched with the nature and scope of its 
operations. 
5. Regionalism is a necessary precursor to effective global cooperation 
because it lays the groundwork for a broader consensus. 
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6. Local threats to peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by the 
governments of that area than by disinterested states at greater distances 
from the scene of conflict. By resolving local /regional conflicts and 
disputes at their level, regional groupings enhance world order and allow 
true international threats to peace to get through to the UN level. 
7. By combining states into regional groupings a global balance of power will 
be maintained and world peace and security will be promoted. 
8. Universalists fail to take into account the heterogeneity of political, 
economic, social and geographical factors throughout the world that 
militate against global unity. These differences can be more easily 
accommodated within a regional framework. 
Pro- universalism: 
1. Universalism is a more appropriate means of preserving peace than 
regionalism since peace is indivisible; a war anywhere in the world ultimately 
threatens to engulf all. 
2. Universalism encourages a more effective pooling of resources to attack 
economic and social problems; a pooling of African regional resources, for 
example, would result only in a sharing of African poverty. 
3. Universalism encourages a consensus of mankind based on universal 
principles; regionalism encourages conflicts between rival blocs and 
economic groups. 
4. Universalism recognises that disease, hunger, illiteracy, and poverty are 
common to all regions of the world; a common attack carried by a single 
organisation, therefore, will avoid duplication and make the most effective 
use of available resources. 
5. Universalism as embodied in the United Nations already exercises broader 
powers over a greater variety of subjects than any regional organisation; 
hence to speak of regionalism as a necessary precursor to universalism 
ignores contemporary facts. 
6. Regions are imprecise and impermanent. No agreement can be reached on 
a system of regions into which the globe can be conveniently divided. 
7. Only a universal organisation can provide an adequate check on the power 
of a large state that can often dominate the other members of a regional 
organisation. 
8. Sanctions against an aggressor are usually ineffective if applied on a 
regional basis because of sources of aid to the aggressor from outside the 
region. 
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9. The existence of numerous, moderately successful universal organisations 
demonstrates the desire of governments and peoples to cooperate on a 
global basis without the necessity of first using regional organisations as 
laboratories for gradually developing enlarged areas 
of consensus.46 
The regionalist case presented above highlights traditional arguments put 
forward by its advocates. The essential claim is that regional bodies, or cooperation on 
a regional basis, is more likely to lead to the resolution of local /regional problems.47 
Regional actors, it was (and still is) argued, have a greater familiarity with local issues; 
they are better placed to pick up early tremors of instability; their involvement in 
regional issues is less likely to be perceived as external intrusion in regional affairs; and 
they have a greater ability to forge a regional consensus. Advocates of universalism, on 
the other hand, claimed that only organisation on a global level could marshal the 
resources and political will to tackle problems confronting the international community, 
notably in matters of international peace and security where they stressed the 
indivisibility of peace in the nuclear age. 
Such positions were sometimes being taken to dogmatic extremes by their 
proponents. The 'either, or' logic of the universalism vs regionalism debate was often 
put in such terms as to create a yawning gap between the realities of international 
politics and the more philosophical stance taken by advocates of each respective 
position. Many analysts, however, questioned the value of debating these issues in such 
polarising fashion. Positing a choice between universalism and regionalism was a false 
dichotomy, they argued, because both orders existed simultaneously. Boutros -Ghali, for 
example, criticised those who considered regional arrangements as being simply a 
replacement mechanism (mécanisme de remplacement) for universal, i.e. United Nations 
action. He considered that they should complement chapters VII through to IX of the 
UN Charter and that they could play a special role in promoting economic and 
intellectual cooperation (coopération économique et intellectuelle) between member states.48 
Similarly, Yakemtchouk (1955), an advocate of incremental rather than 'pure' 
universalism, similarly wrote of a "coexistence of two juridical orders hierarchically 
organised ", both working harmoniously together.49 Both Boutros -Ghali's and 
Yakemtchouk's support for regionalism were firmly embedded in the belief that 
regionalism should work within a larger framework of universal world order, acting as 
building -blocks for the construction of global peace and prosperity. Minerva Etzioni 
advanced this doctrine further in 1970 with her theory of regional compatibility, 
compatibility between regional and universal organisations being defined as when the 
activities of the latter did not undermine the activities of the former and vice versa.5o 
Perhaps one of the most incisive comments on this classical international relations 
debate was written in the mid -1950s by Iris Claude: 
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Theoretical debate as to the superiority of the regional or the universal approach 
to international organization for the handling of political and security problems 
is a rather sterile exercise, for experience suggests that statesmen need not, and 
do not, choose one these approaches to the exclusion of the other.51 
With the benefit of hindsight, Boutros- Ghali's and Yakemtchouk's contributions 
were more of a normative than pragmatic nature. The relationship between nascent 
regional arrangements and the UN evolved quite differently than they expected. For 
most of the postwar period, many, if not most, regional arrangements actually grew 
away from the United Nations rather than parallel to it. Needless to say, the creation of 
NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), concurrent with the 'pactomania' phase of 
American foreign policy which saw the establishment of a host of regional defense 
affiances, injected considerable ideological flavour into the early postwar regionalism 
debate. However, this was an entirely different sort of regionalism than the one 
intended by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and debated by Boutros -Ghali in his 
writings; it was a regionalism of hegemon -dominated security alliances rather than one 
of multipurpose organisations working in closely with the UN. 
A second wave of studies examining regionalism as a building -block to world 
order emerged during the 1960s. Authors evaluating regional organisations and 
regionalism tended to adopt somewhat more sophisticated analytical approaches than 
their predecessors, reflecting the rapid evolution of IR as a field of study during this 
period. As a whole this second wave of literature was less concerned with normative 
issues than with developments in the political and international security spheres. The 
relationship between the UN, the Charter, and regional arrangements, which constituted 
the overarching framework of much of the previous literature, ceased to be the central 
focus of consideration. Overall, the literature paid more attention to evaluating the role 
played by regional organisations in dealing with regional disputes and in promoting 
regional and international security. The evolution of the Cold War and the 
multiplication of regional security alliances had a considerable impact on the regionalist 
debate. Bipolarity, and its consequences on world order also became central themes of 
the regionalism research agenda. 
As evidenced by the writings of Yalem (1965), Plano & Riggs (1967), Linda 
Miller (1968) and Lynn Miller (1969), there was little optimism as to the likelihood of 
enhancing world order through Chapter VIII regionalism under Cold War conditions, 
and even less so of attaining it through the faltering UN collective security system.52 
There was a general recognition that, as Ronald Yalem put it, regional arrangements had 
become "substituitive [sic] mechanisms for security as replacements for a discredited 
universalism 53 Moreover, For Yalem, the regional approach to security practiced by 
the superpowers amounted to a repudiation of the theory of universal collective security 
because it rejected the major assumption of the theory: the indivisibility of peace.54 
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Regional security affiances, such as SEATO or the Bagdhad Pact for example, 
were not deemed to be entirely compatible with the basic characteristics of stable 
regional systems as enunciated by Boutros -Ghali in 1949.55 Moreover, the subservience 
of regional arrangements to superpower interests was, at least in principle, anathema to 
the purposes of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, many authors argued that the takeover 
of regionalism by major powers became inevitable as a result of gridlock in the UN 
Security Council, the expansion of the East -West conflict beyond Europe, and the 
search for collective self -defense legitimised by Art. 51 of the UN Charter. 
Multi- purpose regional organisations such as the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also 
came under closer academic scrutiny. There seemed to be general agreement that, as 
agents of conflict resolution between states, the capabilities of these organisations were 
rather limited given, among other things, the structural and political constraints under 
which they operated.56 This is not to say that they were completely ineffective in that 
role. The OAS in particular had some measure of success in conflict resolution in its 
early days. However, as a whole, the conclusion that regional organisations were not 
particularly effective vehicles for conflict management constituted a powerful critique of 
the regionalist hypothesis. 
The regulation of internal conflict by regional organisations never elicited the 
same measure of academic interest as the ability of these organisations to deal with 
interstate conflict. To be sure, to expect nascent regional bodies to play an effective 
role in this regard could appear unreasonable since regional groupings were not formally 
mandated to tackle civil conflicts within their membership. Indeed, part of their 
political mandate was precisely to avoid external involvement in their domestic affairs, 
this being buttressed from a legal standpoint by the disposition of the UN Charter itself. 
Not surprisingly, one of the few academics to tackle the issue of third -party involvement 
in trying to control internal conflict, Linda Miller (1967), concluded that the capacity of 
regional organisations was very limited and that they were rather ineffective in this 
respect. Wrote Miller: "the present resources of regional groupings like the OAU and 
OAS permit investigatory activities that present little risk and, too often, are of little 
value in civil strife. "57 
Initially a major focus in the study of regionalism, the regionalism- and -world- 
order school lost much of its direction and purpose in the meanders of the Cold War. 
It is interesting to note here the evolution of this school of thought from the mid -1940s 
on. From a normative and, to a certain degree a prescriptive stance, it became more 
descriptive and shed some of its optimistic foundations. By the mid -1960s there was a 
general consensus in the literature that with respect to providing for regional order 
regionalism had been at best a disappointment, particularly in the Third World. 
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The explanations put forward to explain this were manifold. First, as stated 
before, the Cold War had prevented the UN system from working as intended. The 
ideological rift between the Soviet Union and the United States had transcended the 
work of the organisation and had transformed it into a diplomatic battleground rather 
than an effective vehicle for international peace and security. Deep ideological divisions 
were apparent at the regional level as well, often preventing regional bodies whose 
effectiveness was based on consensual decision -making from carrying out their charter 
functions. 
Second, no effective division of labour was devised between developing regional 
organisations, regional security alliances and the UN. This was as much the result of the 
constitutional ambiguities of the Charter as of the fact that both multipurpose regional 
organisations and regional security affiances were striving to assert their autonomy rather 
than working in close coordination with a polarised UN. 
Highlighting these problems, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs in the U.S. State Department, Francis Wilcox, noted 
that 
The experience of the last twenty years suggests that it is easy to overemphasize 
the effectiveness of regional organizations in the peacemaking process. Physical 
proximity often breeds controversy and in many instances the people of a 
particular region are less well equipped that outsiders to settle their own 
differences. Indeed, where disputes are deep- seated and bitter, the objective 
approach, the neutral facilities and the constructive encouragement of countries 
and organizations outside the region are sometimes more acceptable to the 
conflicting parties than the assistance proffered by neighbouring states.59 
Some scholars took a somewhat different view on the matter, however. In a 
1971 study on the UN and regionalism, Haas came to the conclusion that both the UN 
and some regional organisations were highly legitimate forums for the consideration of 
major disputes, and that it could be validly argued that the development of regionalism 
had not seriously handicapped the work of the UN in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, though Haas added that only the OAS and the OAU seemed to 
possess an independent legitimacy as organs for the preservations of peace.ó° Haas' 
more contemporary studies on this subject will be commented on in the following 
chapter, especially since the conclusion of some of his later studies contradicted his 
1971 findings. Suffice it here to say that the conventional wisdom which emerged in the 
literature on the ability of regional organisations to handle and resolve regional conflict 
was on the whole rather negative at the beginning of the 1970s. 
Realism and Regionalism: the Alliance School 
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The foundations of this very influential, indeed dominant postwar Anglo- American 
school of thought lay in the traditional notion of balance of power and in the inherent 
right to collective self- defense.61 One of the major developments in international 
security affairs in the immediate postwar years had been the emergence of numerous 
treaty -based regional defence pacts and organisations.ó2 Although the UN Charter was 
drafted in such a way as to allow the development of such alliances, it was not originally 
expected that they would become such a dominant feature of the postwar international 
order. However, as was noted above, with the functioning of the UN determined by 
bloc diplomacy as early as 1947 -1948 major powers reverted to the creation of 
regionally -based security alliances to further their strategic interests. Geopolitical 
imperatives were to justify their maintenance until they lost their strategic relevance and 
faded in the background, though some of them imploded because of lack of internal 
cohesion. 
The concept of 'hegemonic regionalism' articulated by Acharya is an apt 
description of the nature of the power relationships within a number of Cold War 
regional security alliances.G3 As Acharya pointed out, this superpower- sponsored 
regionalism stressed the need for Third World countries to anchor their national security 
on the political and military might of the United States since they would not be able to 
maintain regional security on their own. It should be noted here, however, that in 
discussing the concept Acharya referred to formal associations rather than to informal 
zones of influences.64 
Liska's theory of 'Great Power Orbits' (1957) is often cited as the epitome of 
this current of thought which, from the American point of view, drew its underpinnings 
in part from early Morgenthaunian realist thought and George F. Kennañ s advocacy of 
Soviet containment. It synthesised key elements of American postwar foreign policy: 
the need to support Western strategic interests though nuclear deterrence, the global 
fight against communism, and the necessity to maintain regional structures of 
containment. At the heart of Liska's arguments were his doubts as to the effectiveness 
of 'autonomous' regionalism as an instrument of global security. After cursorily 
assessing small -state regionalism, he concluded that such groupings were ineffective in 
providing regional security, hence his advocacy of anchoring them to nuclear powers. 
Wrote Liska: 
Smaller countries are hardly able to contrive regional integration and stability on 
their own; a more promising alternative might be regional groupings anchored 
in the superior resources of a nuclear Great Power. This idea was worked out 
during World War II in theories contemplating a world order based on such 
regions; the vision has been realized in some places.[...] The smaller 
communities [...] stand to gain by transferring to stronger hands the chief 
responsibility for organizing regional security and the Great Powers would also 
profit from having dependable allies within their strategic area.65 
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Liska's 'Great Power Orbits' exemplified the prevalence of security 
considerations in American conceptions of regionalism throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s. Given the international politics of the period, however, Liska's theory, and 
others of the same ilk, was at odds with non -western strategists, particularly in light of 
the increasing effervescence in the developing Third World. For example, K.M. 
Pannikkar, the influential Indian strategist and commentator, had warned as early as 
1948 of the dangers of requiring regional organisations to play security functions as he 
believed that they would inevitably be influenced by external powers, thereby 'usurping' 
what he saw as the security functions of the United Nations. An advocate of 
'autonomous' regionalism under the protection of the UN Charter, Pannikkar had 
proposed the creation of regional councils to deal with regional socio- economic issues 
as well as to act as "guardians of the interests of the lesser units of the area ".66 
Perhaps it is Ronald Yalem, one of Liska's contemporaries, who best criticised 
hegemonic regionalism by pointing out its flaws and shortcomings at a time when the 
rhetoric and practice of American affiance diplomacy was starting to crumble at the 
edges. Yalem disposed of Liska's arguments by pointing out the rather significant 
discrepancies between the theoretical benefits of his proposals and the somewhat 
different realities of hegemonic relationships in matters of security and integration. He 
observed that: 
1. Great powers are unable to guarantee the security of their satellites against 
surprise attacks. 
2. There is often conflict between the great power and its associates who tend 
to resent their power inferiority. 
3. The necessity of maintaining regional solidarity may dispose the great 
power to exert periodic pressure or even coercion on recalcitrant smaller 
powers.67 
To expand on Yalem's arguments, it could be added that peace was not 
necessarily indivisible within the framework of alliances either. The difficulty and 
ultimately, the failure of the Atlantic Affiance (NATO) to deal conclusively with the 
Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members, is a case in point$ 
Nevertheless, hegemonic regionalism remained one of the most enduring features of 
American postwar security policy. Cohorts of American foreign policy analysts and 
influential academics supported the maintenance of a strong 'hub- and -spoke' affiance 
system anchored on American power and leadership. It is debatable, however, whether 
many regional security arrangements constituted regionalism at all. Arrangements such 
as the Inter -American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (otherwise known as the Rio 
Pact), the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO, also known as the Manila 
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Pact) or the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were US- dominated alliances rather 
than true expressions of a regional vision. Moreover, with the exception of NATO, 
which developed both intricate political consultation mechanisms and an extensive 
multinational military infrastructure, their tangible deterrent value was questionable. It 
might be relevant here to highlight the problems encountered by some of these 
affiances. 
The political viability of the 1947 Rio Pact, which ensured American domination 
over hemispheric security affairs, began to wane in the mid -1960s with the rise of anti - 
Americanism throughout Latin America. Following a string of unilateral U.S. 
interventions in the region - the Arbenz affair in Guatemala in 1954, the failed Bay of 
Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and subsequent confrontation with communist Cuba 
over Soviet missiles on the island, and the 1965 American intervention in the 
Dominican Republic - many Latin American countries denounced U.S. heavy - 
handedness in the region and condemned the blatant misuse of the OAS and other 
Inter -American arrangements as a cover for the maintenance of American hegemony. 
In subsequent years, continued American unilateralism in Latin America further eroded 
the credibility and authority of the Inter -American system. By the early 1980s, the OAS 
was regarded as a decaying institution. When Argentina, with the support of many 
other Latin American countries, invoked Rio Pact provisions during the 1982 
Falkands /Malvinas war, not only did the United States refuse to put the case before the 
OAS, but after unsuccessfully trying its hand at mediation between the belligerents, it 
dropped its neutral stance and actively supported London's position in the conflict 
instead.69 Although several Latin American countries were privately concerned with 
Argentina's unilateral use of force, Washington's indifference to calls for management 
of the Falkands /Malvinas problem through inter -American institutions was perceived as 
an affront to Latin America and this effectively sealed the political fate of the Rio Pact 
which now largely regarded as a lettre morte. 
Lack of cohesion also plagued the Bahgdad Pact /CENTO throughout its 
troubled history. Initially created in 1955 at the instigation of Britain (and with only 
lukewarm American support) as a security affiance to shield the Middle East 'northern 
tier' from possible Soviet expansionism, the Pact quickly lost credibility as a regional 
security vehicle because of the internal divisions and deep animosities within its 
membership.7° In truth, neither Washington nor London had fully anticipated the rising 
strength of pan -Arab nationalism nor its impact on their security interests in the region. 
The overtly pro -Western orientation of the Pact severely undermined its political 
legitimacy in much of the Arab World from the start, especially as pan-arab ideology 
dictated a neutral stance between the communist world and the West. Reformed as the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the de facto withdrawal of Iraq from the 
Pact in 1959, the shaky unity of the affiance was further undermined during the 
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India -Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 when it became clear to Pakistan that the United 
States would not support its position. In 1971, the withdrawal of Britain from the 
Persian Gulf and the shift of American policy towards the defence of the Persian Gulf 
oilfields under the 'Twin Pillar' policy confirmed Iran as CENTO's strategic pivot. With 
Iran - a non -Arab state - the chosen regional policeman, Pakistan reassessing the 
benefits of its association with the West, and Arab Gulf monarchies unenthusiastic 
about the prospect of a Pax Iranica, CENTO's cohesion slowly disintegrated. Following 
the fall of the Shah, in 1978, the alliance effectively lost its raison d'être. Iran cancellation 
of its CENTO membership, in 1979, led Pakistan and Turkey to withdraw from the 
organisation and the alliance was precipitately dissolved.7' 
SEATO also suffered from the outset from serious limitations that arose from 
the divergent political objectives of its motley membership 72 Under the rationale of 
collective defence, SEATO reflected the Eisenhower Administration's desire have a 
formal instrument to justify intervention in Asia, unilaterally if necessary, in order to 
contain communism in the region, more particularly in Indochina.73. However, central 
to U.S. policy on SEATO was also the desire to avoid carrying alone the defence burden 
in Asia after the Korean experience. The lack of cohesion of this affiance was 
demonstrated during the 1960 -1961 crisis in Laos when the SEATO Council failed to 
agree on collective measures. In 1964, the Johnson administration invoked its 
obligations under the SEATO treaty to justify U.S. intervention in Vietnam (Australia 
and New Zealand did likewise). However, there would never be any question of 
SEATO collective action; its membership was divided on the conflict and throughout 
the war SEATO remained but a convenient justification for garnering the support of 
U.S. allies in Asia and the Pacific. SEATO did not survive the American débâcle in 
Southeast Asia.75 In 1975 it was collectively agreed to disband the organisation 
(effective in 1977). 
Despite the rather troubled state of the American affiance system in the 
mid -1960s some American academics were still arguing the putative advantages of 
regional alliances. Witness Dinerstein s (1965) arguments: 
In the CENTO and SEATO alliances the hegemonic power has two tasks: first 
to create the conditions for economic growth, which it is hoped will permit the 
establishment of broadly based governments of the West European type in 
which the internal threat is practically nonexistent; and second, as in Vietnam, to 
aid a regime actually engaged in a civil war with Communists. 76 
Fedder (1968) also wrote strikingly similar comments about the economic aims 
of CENTO and SEATO and the struggle against world communism.77 What is most 
surprising about these rather simplistic analyses is an obvious lack of understanding of 
regional political dynamics. In fact, prominent realist scholars raised serious questions 
concerning both the ends and the means of the U.S. anti- communist crusade. For 
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example, Hans Morgenthau, unlike Dinerstein and Fedder, had warned against the 
"delusions of 'universalism' and the over -estimation of power" from the early 1950s 
onwards. He predicted that the United States would not be able to stop revolutionary 
upheavals in the Third World.78 For his part, Henry Kissinger judged in the late 1960s 
that: 
Lacking a conception of common interests, the members of these affiances 
[other than NATO] have never been able to develop common policies with 
respect to issues of war and peace. Had they been able to do so, such policies 
might well have been stillborn anyway, because the technical means of 
cooperation have been lacking. Most allies have neither the resources nor the 
will to render mutual support.79 
As argued above, the record of the U.S. postwar regional security alliances with 
Third World states did not prove to be particularly positive, especially when compared 
to more successful affiances such as NATO, or the Australia, New Zealand, United 
States Treaty (ANZUS).8° They represented the expression of the security concerns of 
the great powers much more than a political vision originating from the regions 
themselves. In particular, they lacked the inward region -building character that in the 
classical Boutros -Ghali vision was one of the hallmarks of true regionalism. It is worth 
noting that none of the regional defense alliances discussed above showed a great 
capacity for adaptation or evolution, as NATO did throughout its institutional history. 
True, when compared to the other regional pacts, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
(WTO) - which has been left out of this discussion thus far - did demonstrate a 
capacity for evolution. But this evolution was of military rather than political nature and 
never jeopardized Soviet political domination of the WTO and its structures.81 
As a consequence of the fact that these affiances were essentially designed to 
face an external or otherwise identified threat (i.e. communism, 'subversion'), 
infra- alliance disputes and 'out of mandate' situations always proved difficult to deal 
with within their frameworks. Miller (1973) argued that the development of 
infra- alliance conflict resolution functions within these groupings might perhaps have 
solidified Western ties to these areas, thereby making credible the assertion of Western 
hegemony.82 It is highly unlikely that it would have, however. Given the political 
dynamics of the Middle East or of Southeast Asia, one cannot see under what 
circumstances Arab countries would have chosen CENTO over the Arab League to 
settle Arab disputes, or how countries such as Malaysia or Indonesia could have 
relinquished their policies of non -alignment to resolve their differences under an 
American -dominated alliance framework.83 At any rate, both CENTO and SEATO 
proved to be ineffective and unwieldy structures for their stated purposes. Perhaps 
these limitations, coupled with the relative ineffectiveness of extant regional 
organisations, explain in part the proliferation of sub -regional arrangements (e.g. 
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ASEAN, SADCC, OECS, GCC, etc.) in developing and under- developed regions from 
the late 1960s on.ß4 
The Regional Integration School 
Regional integration is a third major theme of the regionalism research agenda. 
Arguably, it constitutes the most developed theoretical and empirical body of research 
of the four presented in this chapter. The regional integration school was intent on 
examining the patterns of collaboration, institution- building and integration between 
states at a regional level, particularly in the economic and social spheres. The Western 
European postwar experience provided a unique laboratory in this regard. While 
innumerable studies on regional integration have focused on different African and Latin 
American integration schemes, the European experience provided the central empirical 
and analytical model of this school of thought throughout its development. 
The 'beyond the nation- state' approach central to regional integration thought 
was considered to be conducive to peace by one of its foremost observers, Joseph Nye, 
as its proponents purported to "change the relationships between states ", making them 
less prone to "exercise their sovereign power for violent conflict ".85 Regional 
integration doctrines were implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, designed to foster 
conflict avoidance - peace through cooperation - hence their inclusion in this chapter. 
As will become readily apparent, however, crisis management and conflict resolution (in 
the traditional political -security sense) lay outside the intellectual domain of the regional 
integration field. 
The study of regional integration is closely associated with the neo- functionalist 
school which gained prominence in the late 1950s and throughout 1960s with the 
writings of Haas, Deutsch, Lindberg and Nye. As a theoretical /empirical research 
endeavour neo- functionalism was essentially the product of a critical reexamination of 
the European integration experience in light of David Mitrany's influential functional 
approach.86 Mitrany's writings, it will be recalled, formed one of the early foundations 
of the liberal institutionalist school of international relations.87 
Mitrany, a former League of Nations official, had argued that the development 
of international economic and social cooperation was a major prerequisite for the 
ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war. He believed the principle 
of state sovereignty hindered international cooperation because it effectively advantaged 
the most powerful states and to the detriment of weaker and smaller ones. Inherent in 
his thinking was the belief that social and economic problems were the root causes of 
war, along with institutional under -development and attitudinal predispositions to 
conflict in international politics. His quintessential idea, therefore, was that 
international cooperation should be organised on the basis of common and apolitical 
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functions to be exercised cooperatively outside the control of the nation -state. Mitrany 
believed that cooperative endeavours in science and technology would challenge state - 
based authority and bring a demand for new transnational organisations 88 Interestingly, 
Mitrany did not hail European integration and the goal of a European federal state as a 
shining example of his ideas. He had always criticised the territorial basis of 
international relations and therefore organisation on a regional, i.e. European basis 
contradicted his views. 
The influence of Mitrany on international cooperation is most evident in the 
shaping of the United Nations system.89 That a myriad of UN specialised agencies (e.g 
ILO, FAO, WHO, UNHCR, etc.) were created along the functional principle is, at least 
in part, a testament to the influence of his ideas. Over the years, however, the practice 
of functionalism demonstrated the limits of the theory. Mitrany's belief that effective 
global cooperation in the social and economic spheres could precede the establishment 
of harmonious political relations did not prove to be entirely founded. The UN and 
European experiences with functionalism demonstrated that there were often no clear 
and definite boundaries between political and non -political matters. In effect, 
cooperation in seemingly apolitical fields could never be entirely removed from the 
political influence of governments. As Iris Claude wrote, "the dilemma of 
functionalism is that its ultimate impact upon politics may never be tested because of 
the immediate impacts of politics upon functionalism. "90 This brings us to a second 
point. 
Mitrany did not anticipate the importance of some of the practical /bureaucratic 
aspects of the functional approach. The kind of international cooperation he proposed 
would always need to be heavily financed, yet he did not elaborate on this critical aspect 
of his proposals. Moreover, he did not address the possibility that the international 
cooperation bodies he wanted to create might become entrenched, slow -moving 
bureaucracies, a criticism that became widely voiced in relation to many UN subsidiary 
agencies. 
As stated above, neo- functionalism was an off -shoot of the functional approach. 
Its proponents held that "political institutions and policies should be crafted so that they 
lead to further integration through the process of the expansive logic of sector 
integration ", the so -called engrenage principle.91 We should distinguish here between the 
political forefathers of European integration, statesmen such as Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schuman who promoted neo- functionalist strategies, and the theoreticians of 
neo- functionalism, composed mainly of American -based scholars. The three authors 
most identified with this school, Haas, Lindberg, and Nye, produced considerable 
research on regional integration processes while Karl Deutsch, another influential 
theorist of European regional integration, studied attitudinal changes within the 
European context.92 Deutsch's influential research reinforced the belief that regional 
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integration would come through higher levels of 'transactions' (i.e. political exchanges, 
tourism, trade, transport, communications) and through the development of security 
communities.93 According to Deutsch the development of a greater sense of 
community lead to stronger respect for common institutions and would eventually lead 
to integration. 
The concept of 'spillover' - integration in one sector which was expected to lead 
to integration in another and so on - was a central principle in neo- functionalist 
thinking This is how Nye described the original neo- functionalist model: 
[In the original neo- functionalist model] the important actors are integratíonists- 
technocrats and various interest groups which get governments to create a 
regional economic integration organization for a variety of convergent aims. 
Once done and depending on the degree of initial commitment this action 
unleashes the new forces of sector imbalance or engrenage, increased flows of 
transactions, and involvement of an increasing number of social groups which 
gradually focus their activities at the regional leve1.94 
If this model was followed in linear and systematic fashion, neo- functionalists 
believed the result would be a political process leading to some form of political union. 
This is why Nye called them "federalists in functionalist clothing ".95 
Neo- functionalist theorists and practitioners differed fundamentally from 
Mitranÿ s functional approach on the role of the state in the integration process. Unlike 
Mitrany, they did not advocate bypassing the state in the international cooperation 
process. Neo- functionalist scholars recognised the fundamental importance of both 
governmental and non -governmental elites in the integration process, all too aware that 
politics would play a fundamental part in the path towards integration. As for 
practitioners, they knew too well that integration was a deliberate and highly political 
strategy made possible because governing elites within participating European states 
shared elements of a common vision, an element they recognised as fundamental to the 
success of their ultimate goal of a European federation.96 
The early EC experience proved to be extremely positive for participating 
European countries, so positive in fact that it became a model to be emulated all over 
the world. However, even though this grand experiment was radically changing the 
Western European political landscape, by the late 1960s theorists and practitioners alike 
were finding that the nation -state remained a very obstinate obstacle in the path towards 
integration. The predicted shift towards supranationality in specific fields was not 
occurring as they thought it would, as attests the decidedly intergovernmental character 
of European Community institutions. Spillover wasn't occurring automatically on its 
own momentum; every time a political push was needed to open up new sectors, and 
then more political will was needed to ensure agreement and compliance with common 
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policies. When this did not occur, 'spillaround', i.e. a stagnation of regional integration 
activities, was said to occur. 
Throughout the Cold War period, the forces leading the push toward European 
integration did not prove strong enough to break the wall between socio- economic 
issues and political- strategic issues; the internal logic of integration was confronted to 
the wider context of European security, and more precisely that of the Cold War.97 It 
should be remembered here that the construction of Europe began with the success of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the early 1950s, but also with the 
failure of Western European countries to agree to the creation of a European defence 
system. The five -power Brussels Treaty alliance (1948) - which later became the 
Western European Union (WEU) - was essentially subsumed by the U.S. -led NATO 
once it was created in 1949, and both the European Defence Community (EDC) plan 
(1954) and the Fouchet proposals (1962) failed to win the agreement of Western 
European states. Thus, throughout the Cold War EC members maintained NATO's 
central role in maintaining European security, ensuring an unequivocal U.S. 
commitment to defend Western Europe while at the same time tying Germany to a 
common political- security framework. 
By the late 1960s the neo- functionalists were fundamentally reassessing their 
original models of integration. They resorted to increasingly sophisticated 
theoretical /explanatory analyses to account for the seemingly unending fits and starts in 
the process of integration. A new type of actor, the actor with 'dramatic -political aims' 
(one should really read here Charles de Gaulle) was introduced by Haas to explain some 
of the difficulties of European integration. Later on, he coined the expression 
'asymmetrical regional overlap' to explain how clusters of countries would adhere 
unevenly to certain aspects of the integrationist ideal while simultaneously supporting 
other political arrangements or processes which were seemingly inconsistent with each 
other.98 
By the early 1970s, no amount of elaborate theorizing seemed to explain the 
complex and shifting evolution of regional integration in Europe. If the original neo- 
functionalist model wasn't working on the first patient how could it work in other 
regions? In fact, evidence showed that regional integration schemes in Latin America 
and Africa were faltering. Some suffered from 'spillback' -a reversal of the integration 
process - while others failed spectacularly, as was the case of the East African 
Community in the mid- 1970s.99 The fate of non -European integration schemes in the 
1960s and 1970s certainly brought into sharper focus the uniqueness of the European 
integration experience. They also sounded a clear warning: models developed for 
specific regional circumstances did not lend themselves very well to reproduction on 
other continents.100 
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The setbacks and problems of regional integration attempts had a profound 
impact on the neo- functionalist research agenda. As was noted earlier, Haas - one its 
major figureheads - declared the theory of regional integration "obsolescent [m Europe] 
but still useful in the rest of the world ". He proclaimed the ascendancy of 
interdependence, a somewhat broader analytical paradigm which was to become one of 
the principal theme of the IR theory field in the second half of the 1970s. Haas 
concluded that European integration had "disappointed everybody ", that it hadn't 
produced the expected results and that "efforts at regional integration prove to be far 
more susceptible to influences exogenous to the system created by the participants than 
has been allowed. "101 In other words, there was too often a gap between the rhetoric of 
integration and its measurable accomplishments as political interference often 
introduced 'turbulence' in the integrative process. In effect, neo- functionalist scholars 
came to admit that the internal logic of cooperation was subject to considerable external 
constraints, particularly when issue -areas were highly politicised. Not surprisingly, they 
were criticised by their realist peers for not taking sufficiently into account the 
structuring environment of the international system.102 From a realist perspective, this 
explained why the logic of integration could not easily flow into the political -security 
field; the external constraints imposed on West European states by the Cold War divide 
imposed tangible limits on the logic of integration. 
Lately, the development of economic institutionalism and political- security 
cooperation in Europe appears to have given new relevance to neo- functionalism and 
its 'logic of integratiori.103 Keohane and Hoffmann, however, have expressed doubts 
that spillover could explain these latest developments, particularly in the security field.1°4 
However, they suggested that spillover had been useful in other ways, notably through 
the incentives for institutional change brought about by the enlargement of the EC 
membership in the early and mid- 1980s. Others, like Tranholm -Mikkelsen, seemed to 
take the view that the new dynamism of the EC since the mid -1980s should lead to 
renewed research along neo- functionalist principles.105 
Given that regional trading schemes seem to be à la mode once again, it is 
possible that neo- functionalism could yet find new and fertile grounds for study. It is 
also interesting to note how, in developing new concepts for the prevention and 
management of conflict, certain countries, notably Australia and Canada, seem to be 
reviving elements of the functional approach. For example, as a national contribution to 
the Middle East Peace Process the government of Australia organised a rainfall seminar 
in April 1995, recognising that water shortage is an issue of major strategic concern for 
many countries of the region.106 Similarly, a 1995 statement on Canada's international 
security policy asserted that: 
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[international] stability owes as much to voluntary participation in functional 
arrangements - economic integration, water management, trans- border 
transportation systems - as to more explicit security arrangements such as 
treaties of friendship.1°7 
As intellectually interesting as such concepts as spillover and transactions may 
be, classical regional integration theory offers limited tools for a better understanding of 
conflict /crisis management in unstable regions where fragile states and weak regional 
institutions are often the norm. Peace through cooperation may have been the meta - 
objective of regional integration in Europe, but not necessarily in other regions where 
increased trade, not 'community-building', was the goal of participating states. The idea 
of regional integration is still widely regarded as contributing to the long -term 
prevention of interstate conflict by reinforcing positive patterns of cooperation. 
Whether it necessarily produces these results, however, remains very much a matter of 
debate within the IR field.108 
The regional sub ystem approach 
A fourth research field in the study of regions is the sub -system theme which emerged 
in the late -1950s and 1960s as a subset of the systems approach to world politics 
popularized by Morton Kaplan.109 The development of the concept of subsystem was 
closely associated with the prominent American realist school of IR.11° As with 
neo- functionalism and regional integration, however, the scholarly debate on 
subsystems ran out of steam in the mid -1970s due to contradictory findings and lack of 
consensus. By that time, the quest for the optimal definition of the concepts of 'sub- 
region' and 'subsystem' had degenerated into a methodological exercise of little apparent 
utility. Although the concept remained present in the literature, it did not elicit the same 
level of scholarly interest today as it did in the 1960s. Indeed, a revisionist movement 
questioned the very theoretical premises on which these discussions were predicated.°' 
Old concepts often have a tendency to reappear in the IR field, however. Partly as a 
result of the renewed focus on regions in the literature on international security, the 
subsystem theme has been making a strong return in recent years. 
Researchers in the subsystem school were initially concerned with the 
identification of variables that tie states together as regions, sub -regions and subsystems. 
Using quantitative methodology, Bruce Russett's 1967 behavioural study of the 'political 
ecology' of regions attempted to highlight the degree to which states shared cultural, 
social, economic and political attributes and their potentialities for integration into 
cohesive groupings.uz Russett's study raised more than a few eyebrows because it 
basically came to the conclusion that "the degree of congruence among the clusters 
produced inductively by the various criteria [in his study] would be relatively low, that is, 
the socio- cultural groupings would not closely resemble the political ones, nor the trade 
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groupings, etc. "113 According to Russett there was no region or aggregate. of national 
units that could "in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a 
subsystem of the international system. "114 Gazing in his crystal ball, Russett's prediction 
were that there would be some further integration in certain geographic regions, but not 
any great change in the number or composition of regional coalitions. 
From the point of view of advocates of regionalism these were disappointing 
conclusions. If one accepted Russett's results, defining regions would remain a near 
hopeless task since they didn't appear to act cohesively on a systematic basis. 
Incidentally, this conclusion also supported indirectly Haas's notion of 'asymmetrical 
overlap': there could be different regions for different issue -areas. In his writings about 
international organisation Taylor credited Russett's study as one the reasons for the 
decline of the study of regionalism in the late 1960s.115 The fundamental issue raised by 
Russett is evident: how could social scientists study regions as units of the international 
system if there was no consensus on the object of study? 
In their influential The International Politics of Regions (1970) Cantori and Spiegel 
departed radically from Russett's conclusions. They proposed a new relational method 
of studying the dynamics of regions beyond the parameters of the integrationist school 
taken by Haas.°6 Using a systems analysis framework, Cantori and Spiegel identified 15 
subsystems, what we might term geopolitical regions, which were subordinate to the 
dominant international system, i.e. the patterns of "confrontation of the most powerful 
of nations ". Every state, no matter how small in terms of size, population or power 
belonged to a subordinate subsystem. Each subordinate system was in turn subdivided 
in 'core' and 'peripheral' subgroups which were subjected to the influence of an 
'intrusive' system, that is of influence by outside powers, as well as from infra- system 
conflictual interactions. Cantori and Spiegel came to the conclusion that the fifteen 
identifiable subsystems could be grouped into four types of subordinate systems 
(integrative, consolidative, cohesive, coherent). 
Lynn Miller's attempt, in Canton and Spiegel's volume, to reconcile the 
subordinate systems approach with existing patterns of regional organisation left a 
distinctive impression of a clash between systems analysis and institutional analysis.'" 
Miller himself readily admitted that differences existed between the analysis of formal 
structures and the more sociologically -oriented approach of systems analysis. One of 
the more debatable arguments presented by Miller related to the positive role of 
'cooperative' regional organisations (i.e. OAU, OAS, Arab League) in 'intersubordinate 
system', or infra- regional, relations. Miller asserted that alliances should not be expected 
to serve as particularly effective instruments for the conduct of intersubordinate system 
relations whereas cooperative organisations could. While it is true that many 
hegemon -dominated alliances often proved to be inappropriate vehicles for the 
development of infra- regional relations - indeed such was not their primary function - 
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it can also be argued that neither the Arab League nor the OAU, for instance, effectively 
played the central role in intra- regional relations that Miller suggested. 
Placed in a contemporary context one could argue that Canton and Spiegel's 
study hasn't stood the test of time even if some of their concepts have. The emphasis 
they placed on power politics and on the influence of 'dominant' and 'intrusive' systems 
too easily slid into a justification of the status quo and balance of power approaches in 
international relations. Moreover in revitalising the subordinate systems approach today 
one would have to account for such development in IR theory as transnational political 
approaches or regime theory. Nevertheless, in part as a result of their study, the notion 
of subordinate system has maintained a strong footing in the realist IR school, either in 
the concept of subsystem, or as we shall see below, in the more confined notion of 
security complex. 
Certainly one of the most influential concepts to emerge out of the international 
security scholarship in recent years is the notion of security complex developed by Barry 
Buzan.118 Buzan argued that there were strong grounds, both empirical and theoretical, 
to reject the arbitrary definition of regions. He believed that Canton and Spiegel's effort 
to develop a global and comparative regional framework was too complex and 
cumbersome to develop a general understanding of regions. Focusing on the notions of 
'region' and 'security' through an analysis of security subsystems would therefore 
provides a narrower and more manageable approach for analysis and, he asserted, one 
"with firmer roots in the realities of regional relations than that of the integrationists ".119 
Buzan suggested that, in security terms, a 'region' is where "a distinct and 
significant subsystem of security exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have 
been locked into geographical proximity with each other ".120 He introduced the 
concept of security complex to label such groupings, defining them as a "group of states 
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. "121 In his 1991 
study People, States & Fear Buzan identified 5 security complexes in the so -called Third 
World: South America (excluding Central America), the Middle East (including North 
Africa), Southern Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia (surprisingly, Buzan excluded 
Australia from the latter).'22 Within any given security complex exists a range of 
relational /conflictual possibilities ranging from chaos, regional conflict formation, 
security regime and security community. Up the ladder from security community 
formation is regional integration which eliminates a security complex by transforming 
an anarchic sub -system of states into a larger, more unitary actor within the system.123 
Security complexes are not permanent configurations, Buzan argued. Power shifts and 
changes in patterns of hostility within complexes can lead to internal transformation, 
and external transformation can occur if there is contraction or expansion of the outer 
boundaries of the complex. Finally, Buzan put forward the notion of superpower 
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'overlay', a concept analogous to Canton and Spiegel's 'intrusive system'. Overlay, as 
opposed to external intervention, occurs when external powers alter the 'indigenous 
security dynamics' of a complex, subordinating, or even obliterating it by the larger 
pattern of major power rivalries. According to Buzan's, the diminution of superpower 
influence in previously 'overlaid' regions leads to a revival of dormant regional security 
dynamics.124 
Buzan's framework has gained considerable currency in the literature on regional 
security, chiefly because it provides a cross- region conceptual explanation of regional 
security which puts the emphasis on regional dynamics rather than on the interplay 
between superpower politics and regional security. In that respect, he goes beyond the 
usual analyses proffered in mainstream strategic studies, a field of studies historically 
dominated by American academia and attendant conceptions of international security. 
While considerations of space prevent a comprehensive critique of Buzan's 
arguments to be undertaken here it is nevertheless important to highlight some of the 
premises of his construct. Despite his attempts to broaden the concept of security in 
People, States & Fear, his approach to understanding of regional security is essentially 
based on notions of geopolitical 'weight', balances of power and historical patterns of 
rivalry. States remain the principal actors of regional security and therefore, one would 
presume, the principal actors of conflict resolution. This is essentially why institutions 
play little or no part in his analysis of regional security. In fact, in discussing the role of 
sub -regional institutions, Buzan asserted that they often defined "lines of regional 
rivalry" rather than patterns of regional cooperation.125 There are undeniably a number 
of examples giving credence to this interpretation in the 1980s timeframe: ASEAN vs 
Vietnam, the GCC vs Iran, SADCC (now SADC) vs apartheid South Africa. Overall, 
however, current trends would seem to go in the opposite direction, partly a result of 
the end of the Cold War, partly a result of domestic and regional political changes. For 
instance, Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995 and South Africa has now become the 
dominant player in SADC. Moreover, since the beginning of this decade there have 
been numerous examples in the developing world where regional and sub -regional 
groupings have gone beyond the rhetoric of cooperation and played an more active role 
in the security field. One hastens to add that the new regionalism in security affairs has 
had limited success. But it does highlight emerging patterns of cooperation which 
cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
Buzan also raises the fundamental question of the inherent tension between the 
globalisation and the regionalisation of the world economy and its consequences for 
regional security.126 A strong regionalisation of the world economy, he asserted, would 
reinforce existing regional patterns of security and contribute to the insulation of 
regions from each other; continued globalisation, however, would contribute to dampen 
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such patterns. Buzan essentially leans towards the regionalisation scenario, with some 
caveats attached. 
What is particularly interesting to note here in relation to the Southeast Asian 
security complex is how Buzan's downplays the role of regional economic interaction in 
weaving broader links of regional interdependence and cooperation. His prognosis for 
East Asian security is unambiguously pessimistic, both because of long -standing 
historical enmities and territorial disputes in the region and because of the weakness of 
multilateralism in East Asia.127 This is an assessment which is certainly not shared 
unanimously. Responding to an article on East Asian security authored by Barry Buzan 
and Gerald Segal, Jim Richardson remarked: 
The task of constructing a regional security community [in East Asia] might 
indeed appear formidable, but to allow the present favourable conjuncture to 
degenerate into major wars fought with the weapons of the twenty -first century 
would signify political and diplomatic mismanagement of a high order.128 
However, Richardson also noted that: 
despite the talk of a broader concept of security, it is not clear that the [regional] 
security dialogue is capable of addressing the most serious issues confronting 
the region. Military security in the narrow sense stills claims disproportionate 
attention.129 
Richardson indirectly points to what is arguably the most problematic aspect of 
Buzan's construct. Conceptualising regional security by focussing on geopolitical and 
'hard' security issues is a necessary but probably insufficient exercise for understanding 
regional security. The foci of such exercises remain states and the potential risks for 
inter -state conflict. Prospects for regional cooperation through regime or 
institution -building in the security or the economic field tend to be minimized, and 
sub -national and trans- national issues which might impact positively on a given region 
receive relatively scant attention. 
In spite of these limitations, the security complex concept remains a useful tool. 
By placing the emphasis on the structure of regional security rather than on its 
cooperative manifestations (regional institutions, regimes, processes, etc.) it shifts the 
level of analysis from interaction to environment, highlighting the 'weight' of 
geopolitical factors in the process of regional cooperation. In effect, it forms a 
counterpoint to liberal institutionalist approaches to world order, reminding 
policymakers and scholars alike of the many difficulties of pursuing regionalist strategies 
that are not closely attuned to specific regional environments. 
Concluding Remarks 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 46 
As this chapter demonstrates, the understanding of regionalism is informed by a very 
wide range of ideas and concepts developed during the postwar period, ranging from 
the traditional understanding of regionalism -as- regional -organisation, to the more 
contemporary understanding of regionalism as an organising principle located 
somewhere between state -building and universalism. Within the IR discipline, 
inter- paradigmatic debates and definitional problems have weighed heavily in the 
development of the literature of the subject, with the result that there is no generally 
accepted theory of regionalism today. 
However, beyond academic debates, the postwar literature nevertheless drew 
some conclusions on the potential effectiveness of regionalism First among them, the 
traditional regionalist hypotheses, essentially the regional -solutions -to- regional- problems 
argument discussed by Bennett (1967) and others, are generally considered to be flawed. 
General explanations for the weaknesses of regional arrangements vary considerably, 
however. The quintessential arguments of the realist school is that states, not 
institutions, are the key actors in international politics; and that those institutions and 
alliances that were not central to the global balance of power were essentially weak 
reeds, unable to influence larger political events in their own regions in any significant 
fashion. Liberal institutionalists, without denying some of inherent weaknesses of the 
regionalist approach, have pointed to the strangling effect of the Cold War on regional 
organisations, which, much like the United Nations, were prevented from playing an 
effective role in the management and resolution of conflict because of the larger 
patterns of international confrontation. 
Second, examining the institutional form of regionalism provides answers to 
certain question - mandates, functions, and so on - but certainly not to all. As a political 
project, regionalism cannot be separated from larger historical patterns of global and 
regional interaction that have contributed to mold minds, shape ideas, and form a sense 
of regional belonging or enmity. In this respect the postwar period certainly provided a 
rich tapestry, be it the development of the UN system and the new faith in international 
cooperation that followed the Second World War, decolonisation in Africa and Asia 
with its attendant crises, the Cold War and the development of the American alliance 
system, or regional integration in Europe. 
Finally, as the European integration experience demonstrated in its formative 
years, regionalism is rarely a fully horizontal process, that is, regions may be able 
organize for certain purposes, but not necessarily for others. There a several 
explanation for this. Objective reasons to cooperate may be lacking, the issues that 
need addressing may not be effectively managed through the same regional state 
configurations, and differing political orientations may not permit the formation of 
cohesive `all -purpose' regionalism. Whether in Latin America, Africa, or Asia, several 
attempts to create regional groupings were ultimately thwarted precisely because 
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organizational forms of regionalism never truly reflected the real extent of cohesion or 
compatibility amongst their constitutive membership. 
A final comment is warranted here. The scholarly debate on regionalism 
remains inconclusive and limited in scope for several reasons. First, the literature on 
regionalism is inseparably linked to the larger theoretical and methodological debates 
which have informed the development of IR as a field of study, a field whose own 
shortcomings have come under closer scrutiny than ever before since the end of the 
Cold War.130 Perhaps an unavoidable observation on the literature is the overwhelming 
American influence on postwar IR literature, reflecting Stanley Hoffmanñ s view 
(expressed in 1977) that IR was largely a product of American social science.131 There is 
no doubt that an extensive survey of African, Arab or Southeast Asian postwar literature 
on regionalism would have revealed other concepts and interpretations where such 
themes as national self -determination, the 'Arab Nation' or 'regional resilience' would 
have figured much prominently than in mainstream Anglo- American IR thought. 
Also, looked at with a revisionist eye, the classical literature on regionalism is 
limited by a lack of interdisciplinarity. Perhaps with the exception of some aspects of 
neo- functionalist scholarship, what is missing is a link with important bodies of research 
- such as conflict research, organisational theory or even political anthropology - which 
emerged in the late 1950s and the 1960s. By comparison, more recent literature on 
conflict resolution and international organisations has generally attempted to integrate 
explanatory strands coming from a wider range of research fields. 
Are the conclusions reached above to be considered obsolete interpretations as 
a result of the experience of the 1990s? The following chapter will examine in more 
detail the terms of the post -Cold War debate on this subject. 
NOTES 
See Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism: Readings, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1968, 
P. vi. 
For an overview of the use of the concept of region in different academic and research contexts 
see Melville C. Branch, Regional Planning: Introduction eu Explanation, Praeger, New York, 1988, pp. 
3 -95. 
See, among others, Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton N.J., 
Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 294 -296 and pp. 397 -401; Robert Hormats, "Making 
Regionalism Safe ", Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 97 -108; Marc L. Bush and Helen 
V. Milner, "The Future of the International Trading System: International Finns, Regionalism, and 
Domestic Politics ", in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1994, pp. 259 -276; Andrew Wyatt- Walter, 
"Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order ", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell 
(eds.), Regionalism and World Politics: Regional Organigation and International Order, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp. 74 -121. 
4 Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology, Chicago, 
Rand McNally & Company, 1967, p. 3. 
5 
6 
9 
11 
12 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 48 
The question of Western conceptions of the Orient is discussed at length in Edward W. Said's 
classic, Orientalisnr, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. 
Russett, International Regions, p. 2. The conclusions of Russett's study are assessed later in this 
chapter. 
See Howard W. Odum, Southern Regions of the United States, Chapel Hill N.C., University of North 
Carolina Press, 1938; Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore, American Regionalism: A Cultural - 
Historical Approach to National Integration, New York, Harry Holt, 1938. These works are cited in 
Russett's International Regions. 
Iris L. Claude, Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation, 4th 
Edition, New York, Random House, 1971, p. 104. 
Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice -Hall, 1970; Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear, 2nd ed., Hemel 
Hempstead, Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1991. 
See Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in RegionalOrgarriration, Boston, Little, Brown 
and Co., 1971, p. 8. 
See Oran Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor", World Politics, no. 
21, April 1969, p. 488, cited in Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 8. 
Muthiah Alagappa, for instance, posits that "geographical proximity provides identity as well as the 
interaction context distinguishing regionalism from organisation at other levels" and therefore 
considers that the Commonwealth and the OIC are not regional organisations. See Muthiah 
Alagappa, "Regionalism and Security: A Framework for Analysis ", paper presented at the 
'Economic and Security Cooperation in the Asia -Pacific: Agendas for the 1990's' conference, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 28 -30 July 1993, p. 6 and note 10. 
See UN, Disarmament Conference doc. A /CN.10/1993/CRP.4 (7 May 1993). 
Boutros Boutros -Ghali, Contribution sì l'étude des ententes regionales, Paris, Pédone, 1949, p. 51. 
Iris Claude Jr, Swords into Plowshares, 4 ed., New York, Random House, 1964, p. 104. 
Normand J. Padelford, "Recent Developments in Regional Organizations ", Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law, April 28 -30, 1955, p. 25 cited in Ronald Yalem, Regionalism and 
World Order, Wash. D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1965, p. 15. 
See also Michel Virally, "Les relations entre organisations régionales et organisations universelles" 
in Régionalisme et Universalisme dans le droit international contemporain, Société Française pour le Droit 
International- Colloque de Bordeaux, 20 -22 Mai 1976, Paris, Pédone, 1977, pp. 152 -153. 
Nye, International Regionalism, p. vii 
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives, New York, Alfred E. Knopf, 1969, p. 102. For an 
alternative view on the concept of 'region' see Kenneth Boulding, "Changing Conceptions of 
Regionalism ", paper presented at the Asian Peace Research Association Regional Conference on 
'Peace and Security in the Asia -Pacific region: Post -Cold War Problems and Prospects', University 
of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, January 31- February 4, 1992. 
Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective security and Conflict 
Resolution: A New Road Ahead ? ", International Relations, vol. 11, no. 2, August 1992, p. 108. 
Another such ongoing regional definition process is the the 'Visegrad group' (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) which seeks to create a Central European identity through 
closer economic and political ties amongst its member countries and with Western European 
countries and institutions. 
For a more detailed overview of regional integration efforts in the economic and security fields see 
Stuart Harris "Economic Cooperation Institution Building in the Asia -Pacific Region ", in Richard 
Higgott, Richard Leaver John Ravenhill, Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990's, St Leonards N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin, 1993, pp. 271 -289. 
See Michael Byrnes, Australia and the Asia Game, St Leonardo N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 1994. 
See Address by Senator Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia, to the ASEAN PMC 7 +7 Session, 
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 2 August 1995. 
This expression "odd man in" used here is quoted from P. Kerr and A. Mack, "The Future of 
Asia -Pacific Security Studies in Australia ", in Paul Evans (ed.), Studying Asia Pacific Security, 
Toronto, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies - University of Toronto - York University, 1994, 
Ibid., p. 34. 
Of course, regionalism applies as well to intrastate politics. It has, however, a different meaning. 
At the national level, it is regarded as the practice of redistributing certain central governement 
powers to give to territorial authorities an intermediate position between the central and local 
levels. As with international regionalism, there is a wealth of literature available on this subject. 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 49 
See Vernon Bogdanor, The Blackwell Engclopedia of Political Science, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 
1991, p. 526. 
28 Nye, Iateratianal Regionalism, p. vii. 
29 Paul Taylor, InternationalOrgankation in the Modern World, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 7. 
30 Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis ", Review of 
International Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, October 1995, p. 362. 
31 See, among others, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level- Problems of Definition 
and Measurement, Garden City N.Y., Doubleday &Co., 1954. Deutsch wrote extensively about the 
process of community- building in Europe in a number of other scholarly publications throughout 
the 1950's and 1960's. 
32 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political community and the North Atlantic Area: international oranration in the 
light of historical experience, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 2. See also 
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
33 The recent publication of the memoirs of Jacques Foccart, France's foremost 'Africa hand' for a 
quarter of a century, largely confirms the extraordinary relationship Paris maintained with its 
former colonies and the direct role the French government played in shaping the post -colonial 
political order in francophone Africa. See Philippe Gaillard, Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe 
Gaillard, vol. 1, Paris, Fayard /Jeune Afrique, 1995. 
34 See "Georgia: Shevardnadze Says Abkhaz Peacekeeping Plan On Track" in Reuters Newswire 
[online], 6 June 1994. 
35 A CIS collective security agreement was signed in Tashkent in May 1992. However, it now 
appears as though the agreement is slowly falling apart See Suzanne Crow, "Peacekeeping in the 
CIS: An instrument of Russian Hegemonie desire ?" in Winrich Kühne (ed.), Blauhelme in einer 
turbulenten welt, Baden -Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 351 -375; Teresa Rakowska- 
Harmstone, "Russia's Monroe Doctrine: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Imperial Outreach ? ", in 
Maureen Appel Molot and Harald Von Riekhoff (eds.), Canada Among Nations 1994, Ottawa, 
Carleton University Press, 1994, pp. 232 -265. See also Andrew Katell, "Motive Doubted as 
Russian Troops go 'Neat Abroad' ", Washington Times, 29 March 1994, p. 13. 
36 Lynn H. Miller, "The Prospects for Order through Regional Security" in Richard A. Falk and Saul 
H. Mendlovitz (eds.), Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and 
Company, 1973, p. 51. 
3v Taylor, Internati'onalOrganration in the Modern World, p. 9. 
38 Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: a State of the Art on an 
Art of the State ", InternationalOrgani0ation, vol. 40, no 4, Autumn 1986, p. 753. 
39 In 1987, for instance, the well known American conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer 
wrote an article eloquently titled "Let it Sink!" which was scathingly critical of the UN. See The 
New Republic, 24 August 1987, pp. 18 -23. 
40 Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Tbeoyy, Research Series no. 25, Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1975, p. 1. 
41 Ibid., p. 5. 
42 Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State ", p. 
753. 
43 The following five volumes present the state -of- the -art on these topics: David A. Baldwin (ed.), 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993; 
A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds,), Frameworks for International Cooperation, London, Pinter 
Publishers, 1990; Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds.), Regime Theory in International Relations, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993; John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: the Theory and 
Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. 
4a It must also be be noted however that there was also early French, Belgian, Indian, Arab and Latin 
American academic interest in this issue. See, among others, Pierre Vellas, Le Regionalime 
international et l'Organisation des nations unies, Paris, Pédone, 1946; K.M. Panikkar "Regionalism and 
World Security" in Regionalism and Security, New Dehli, Oxford University Press for the Indian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1948, pp. 1 -6. 
45 Bourrus Boutros -Ghali, Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales, Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace, Building Peace - Reports of the Commission to Study the Organration of Peace 1939- 
1972, Vol. 1, Metuchen N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1973, pp. 265 -292; Romain Yakemtchouk, 
L'O.N. U. - La sécurité régionale et le problème du régionalisme; two studies by Norman Padelford, 
"Regional Organizations and the United Nations ", International Organration, May 1954, vol. 8, no. 
2, pp. 203 -216, and "Recent Developments in Regional Organizations ", Proceedings of the American 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 50 
Society of International Law, April 28 -30, 1955, Washington D.C., American Society of International 
Law, pp. 23 -41; and of course Iris Claudé s Sword into Plowshares. 
46 Jack Plano and Robert E. Riggs, Forging World Orden The Politics of International Organic arion, New 
York, Macmillan, 1967, p. 63; A Leroy Bennett, International Organkation: Principles & Issues, 5th ed., 
Englewood Cliff, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1991, pp. 216 -217. 
47 Former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere put case for regionalism as follows in 1964: 
Certain regional and ideological associations have an advantage over the UN. As a means of 
settling disputes, talking is more productive, and certainly easier, the greater the general feeling 
of sympathy and friendship among the participants[..] 
Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture (Dar es Salaam, 1964), p. 6, cited in Nye, International Regionalism: 
Readings, p. ix. 
48 He also considered that, in the long run, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN 
should play the most important role of all UN organs, and that regional organisations should work 
alongside the priorities adopted by this body. Boutros -Ghali, Contribution à l'étude des ententes 
régionales, pp. 230 -231. One tintes the similarities between Boutros -Ghali's position and the 
proposals of the Egyptian Delegation during the San Francisco conference in 1945 (see Chapter 
3). 
49 Yakemtchouk, L'ONU. - La sécurité régionale et le problème du régionalisme, pp. 266 -267. My 
translation from French. 
50 Minerva M. Etzioni, The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibilidy, Beverly Hill, Calif., 
Sage Publications, 1970, p. 18. 
51 Claude Jr, "The OAS, the UN and the United States" in Nye, International Regionalism, p. 3. 
52 See Yalem, Regionalism and World Order (note 15); Lynn H. Miller, "The Prospects for Order 
through Regional Security" in Falk and Mendlovitz, Regional Politics and World Order, pp. 50 -77. See 
also Linda B. Miller "Regional Organizations and the Regulations of Internal Conflict ", in Nye, 
International Regionalism: Readings, pp. 77 -96, and; Jack C. Plano and Robert E. Riggs, Forging World 
Order. 
53 Yalem, Regionalism and World Order, p. 146. 
54 Ibid., p. 8 
55 Boutros 
-Ghali suggested that 'stable' regional systems were composed of a mixture of necessary 
and sufficient elements. The necessary elements included 1) a treaty for the maintenance of peace; 
2) a treaty based on a particular solidarity (mutual defense, economic matters, etc.); 3) geographic 
contiguity and; 4) an intemational agency of a permanent character. Additionally, regional sytems 
were said to require geographic contiguity (although not necessarily coinciding with geographic 
boundaries), legal equality between member states, free adhesion and more than five signatories. 
See Boutros -Ghali, Contribution à l'études des ententes régionales, pp. 22 -59. 
56 See, among others, Lynn Miller, "The Prospect for Order through Regional Security ", p. 67, and; 
Plano and Riggs, Raging World Order, pp. 295 -298, 303 -306. 
57 Linda B. Miller, "Regional Organizations and the Regulation of Internal Conflict ", pp. 79 -81 and 
p. 96. 
58 Linda B. Miller, "Regional Organizations and the Regulation of Internal Conflict ", pp. 79 -81 and 
p. 96. 
59 Francis O. Wilcox, "Regionalism and the United Nations ", in Normand J. Padelford and Leland 
M. Goodrich (ed.), The United Nations in the Balance, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, p. 443. 
Wilcox's text remains one of the more lucid analyses of this period. 
60 Ernst B. Haas, "The United Nations and Regionalism" in Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), The Evolving 
United Nations: A Prospect for Peace ?, London, published by Europa Publications for the David 
Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1971, pp. 121 -140. 
61 For a classic explanation of what constitutes a balance of power system see Morton Kaplañ s 
System and Process in International Relations, New York, Wiley, 1957. Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy, 
New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, discusses at length about historical balance of power systems, 
their advantages and their failures. 
62 Those are the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Pact (1947); The Western 
European Union (1948); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949); the ANZUS Treaty 
(1951); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954); the Warsaw Pact (1955), and; the Baghdad 
Pact (1955), later known as CENTO. 
63 Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military- Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual 
Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 1, 1992, p. 7. 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 51 
64 Obviously, in a broader sense the expression ' hegemonic regionalism' can be taken as meaning 
formal as well as informal manifestions of hegemonic influence. 
65 George Liska, "Geographic Scope; The Pattern of Integration', pp. 236 -237. 
66 K.M. Pannikkar, "Regionalism and World Security" in Regionalism and Security, pp. 4 -6 
67 Yalem, Regionalirm and World Order, p. 26. 
68 Although many Aflanticists often point to NATO's moderating influence on Greece and Turkey 
on this issue. For an overview of the early proposals for NATO involvement in Cyprus see James 
A. Stegenga's The United Nations Force in Cyprus, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. 
69 See Lars Schoultz, National Securiáy and United States Polipi Towards Latin America, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 180 -181; Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba - 
Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982, Princeton N.J., Princeton University 
Press, 1991, pp. 150 -162.. 
70 Britain's failure to win French and Egyptian support for the establishment of a Middle East 
Defense Organization (MEDO) in 1953 -1955 led to the formation of the more modest Baghdad 
Pact. Washington supported the MEDO plan but showed much less enthusiasm for the Pact, 
fearing that it might compromise is relations with the Arab World. See Victor H. Feske, "The 
Road to Suez: The British Foreign Office and the Quai D'Orsay" in Gordon A. Craig and Francis 
L. Loewenheim (eds.), The Diplomats, 1939 -1979, Princeton N.J. Princeton University Press, 1994, 
pp. 167 -200. For an account of the unsuccessful attempt to set up a NATO Middle East 
Command (MECOM) see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power - National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford Ca., Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 476 -485. 
71 For an account of CENTO's problems see John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East- Problems of 
American Policy, revised edition, New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1960; Guy Hadley, CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance, Sussex, University of Sussex Institute 
for the Study of International Organization, 1971; Joseph A. Kechichian, Security Efforts in the Arab 
World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations, RAND Note N- 3570 -USDP, Santa Monica 
Ca., RAND, 1994, pp. 10 -13. 
72 Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO, along with the United States, 
France, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, although not 
signatories of the treaty, were included under a separate protocol and could invoke its collective 
defense provisions. From a historical perpective it is interesting to note that, following the French 
defeat in Indochina in 1954, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. 
Radford, privately withdrew his support for a Southeast Asia defence pact, a proposal which he 
had earlier recommended. He estimated that, without French and Vietnamese strength, the 
alliance was not viable militarily. The State Department didn't disagree with this assessment. 
However, it judged that the value of a regional treaty would be to advise Chinese leaders that if 
they 'crossed the line', the U.S. would retaliate. See David Lee, "Australia and Allied Strategy in 
the Far East, 1952- 1957 ", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, December 1993, pp. 519 -520. 
73 The Eisenhower administration's failure to win support for pacts amongst the neutral coutries of 
Asia in 1954 momentarily led to a proposal to set up an Asian regional economic organisation 
supported by the U.S. as a means of countering communist influence. The proposal was stillborn, 
however. At a conference in Simla, India, m May 1955, smaller Asian countries were reluctant to 
agree to a proposal which they believed would jeoparise the level of bilateral assistance from the 
United States and subject them to Indian or Japanese influence. See Joseph Nye, "United States 
policy towards regional organization" in Paul A. Tharp Jr, (ed.), Regional International 
Organization / Structures and Functions, New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1971, p. 259. For an overview 
of the 'Pakistan factor' in U.S. -India relations in the 1950's see Ramesh Thakur, The Politics ér 
Economics of India's Foreign Polipi, London, Hurst; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 150 -152 
74 The Eisenhower administration's failure to win support for pacts amongst the neutral coutries of 
Asia in 1954 momentarily led to a proposal to set up an Asian regional economic organisation 
supported by the U.S. as a means of countering communist influence. The proposal was stillborn, 
however. At a conference in Simla, India, in May 1955, smaller Asian countries were reluctant to 
agree to a proposal which they believed would jeoparise the level of bilateral assistance from the 
United States and subject them to Indian or Japanese influence. See Joseph Nye, "United States 
policy towards regional organization" in Paul A. Tharp Jr, (ed.), Regional International 
Organization / Structures and Functions, New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1971, p. 259. For an overview 
of the 'Pakistan factor' in U.S. -India relations in the 1950's see Ramesh Thakur, The Politics dr 
Economics of India's Foreign Policy, London, Hurst; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 150 -152 
75 See Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Stategy, Singapore, Singapore University 
Press, 1983. 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 52 
76 Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Transformation of Alliance Systems ", m Richard B. Gray (ed.), 
International Security Systems - Concepts and Models of World Order, Itasca Ill., F.E. Peacock Publishers, 
1971, p. 69. This article was first published in 1965. 
77 Edwin Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance ", International Skulks Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1, March 1968, 
P. 75. 
78 Jaap Nobel, "Morgenthaú s struggle with power the theory of power politics and the Cold War ", 
Review of International Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, January 1995, p. 76. 
79 Henry A. Kissinger, "System Structures and American Foreign Policy ", in Charles W. Kegley Jr 
and Eugene Wittkopf (eds), Perspectives on American Foreign Polity - Selected Readings, New York, St. 
Martin's Press, 1983, pp. 107 -109. This text was written in 1968. In his famous Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Poliy published a decade earlier, Kissinger had already questioned the effectiveness of 
U.S. alliance policy in the Third World, citing among other things the lack of common purpose in 
such alliances as the Bagdad Pact and SEATO as fundamental flaws. See Henry Kissinger, Neckar 
Weapons and Foreign Polity, Garden City NY, Doubleday, 1958, pp. 198 -199. 
ß0 SEATO's failure contrasts with the relative success enjoyed by the U.S. in its bilateral alliances in 
East Asia (with Japan, Korea, Thailand, Philippines). This success can be attributed to the 
existence of political regimes strongly favourable to American strategic interests as well as to the 
favourable bargaining position of the U.S. in its bilateral security relationships with those 
countries. 
81 As the walls of the Soviet empire were collapsing in eastern Europe, the belated attempts to 
change the nature of the WTO from a military alliance under tight Soviet political and military 
control to a political consultative body were dismally unsuccessful. The WTO imploded and was 
disbanded in 1991. 
82 Miller, "The Prospects of Order through Regional Security ", p. 62. 
83 An interesting and regionally- focussed account of the politics of regional organisation in Southeast 
Asia is presented in Arnfinn Jorgensen -Dhal, Regional Organization and Order in South -East Asia, St 
Martin's Press, New York, 1982. See particularly pp. 9 -44. 
84 See in particular William T. Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World, Boulder, Co., 
Lynne Rienner, 1990. 
85 Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 16. 
86 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966. Mitrany first published 
this essay in 1943. I draw my arguments on functionalism from Iris Claude s penetrating analysis 
of Mitrany's ideas in his Sword into Plowshares, pp. 379 -407 and Clive Archer's International 
Organizations, 2nd edition, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 88 -101. In his own writing Mitrany 
always referred to the 'functional approach', purposefully avoiding the usage of 'functionalism' 
given to his idea by others, notably Claude and Haas, as too doctrinaire. Much of IR scholarship 
has since used both terms alternatively to refer to the same idea. 
87 See Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, 
Divergent Strands ", in Charles Kegley Jr (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory, New 
York, Saint Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 133 -136. 
ß8 Justin Cooper, "Organizing for peace: Mitran}%s Pragmatic Approach to War ", paper presented at 
the 'Functionalism and Conflict Management: Re- examining David Mítranÿ s Contribution to the 
Study of World Order' workshop, Ottawa, 30 March 1995, pp. 5 -6. 
89 See, for example, John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, vol. 1, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979, pp. 72 -73. 
90 Claude, Sword into Plowshares, p. 399. 
91 Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political 
System, 1st ed., New York, Alfred Knopf, 1979, p. 72. 
92 The following is a selection of studies on regional integration. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: 
Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950 -1957, 1st ed., Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 
1958, and; Beyond the Nation- State, Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1964. These two works 
are often regarded as the classic neo- functionalist studies with Leon N. Lindberg's The Political 
Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1963. See also 
Joseph Nye's Peace in Parts, pp. 21 -54, "Comparing Common Markets; a Revised Neo- Functionalist 
Model ", International Organization, vol. 24, no 4, Autumn 1970, pp. 796 -835; "Regional Institutions ", 
in Falk and Mendlovitz (eds.), Regional Politics and World Order, pp. 78 -102, note 38, and; Karl W. 
Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of the 
Historical Experience, note 31, and Deutsch's France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite 
Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics, New York, Charles Scribner & Sons, 1967. 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 53 
93 The expression 'pre- theorist' is used here to highlight the fact that neo- functionalism, 
communications theory and federalist approaches were considered by Haas to be the three 
approaches, or "pre- theories' leading to or explaining the phenomenon of regional integration. 
See Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing ", InternationalOrganigation, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 1970, pp. 606 -646. 
94 Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo- functionalist Model ", p. 799, note 93. 
95 Nye, Peace in Parts, p . 51. 
96 The practitioners perspective is presented in Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. George Ball, Garden 
City NY, Doubleday, 1978. 
97 For a perspective on neo- functionalism and European defence, see Alfred van Staden, "After 
Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European Defence Policy" in Walter 
Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy - The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, 
London, Sage, 1994, pp. 139 -155. 
98 Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration ", pp. 634 -635. 
99 See Jacobson, Networks of Interdependance, pp. 408 -409. 
loo In what can be called the 'nurture vs nature' debate of international cooperation, one notes that 
there is now a similar debate on the replicability of the ASEAN model. See Jörn Dosch and 
Manfred Mols, "Why ASEAN Co- operation Cannot Work as a Model for Regionalism Elsewhere 
-A Reply ", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 2, November 1994, pp. 212 -222. 
101 Haas, The Obsolescence of regional integration theory, p. 39. 
102 See Van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European 
Defence Policy ", pp. 145 -148. 
103 For an overview of European institutional developments in the foreign policy and security spheres 
see Martin Holland, European Community Integration, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, pp. 117 -143; 
Sverre Lodgaard, "Competing Schemes for Europe: the CSCE, NATO, and the European Union", 
Securi ty Dialogue, vol. 23, no 3, September 1992, pp. 57 -68, and; Werner J. Feld, The Future of 
European Security and Defense, Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 1993. 
104 Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Conclusion: Community Politics and Institutional 
Change ", in W. Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration, London, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1991, pp. 289 -290. 
los Jeppe Tranhom -Mikkelsen, "Neo- functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in light of 
the new dynamism of the EC ", Millenium, vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 1 -22. 
106 See CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research, Precipitation Enhancement Workshop - Summary of 
Papers, 24-28 April, Terrigal, Australia. This workshop was conducted under the auspices of the 
Multilateral Water Resources Group in support of the Middle East Peace Process. 
107 Gaetan Lavertu, Directions in Canada's International Securidy Polity, paper presented at the annual 
meting of the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 26 January 1995. Lavertu was then 
Associate Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (Policy) in the Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. 
108 In what is called the relative gains debate, neo- realist scholars often emphasise that states engage 
in international cooperation in order to achieve gains relative to those of other states whereas neo- 
liberal scholars emphasis the absolute gains brought about by international cooperation. For an 
overview of the debate see David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberab }m: The Contemporary 
Debate, New York Columbia University Press, 1993. 
109 See Kaplan, System and process in International Relations (see note 59). 
110 There is a wealth of literature on the regional subsystem theme. For a review of the approaches 
put forth between the late 1950's and 1970 see William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: 
A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 
1, Match 1973, pp. 89 -117. 
111 For a contemporary discussion on systems and sub -systems see Tom Nierop, Systems and Regions in 
Global Politics - An Empirical Study of Diploma1y, International Organization and Trade 1950 -1991, 
Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1994. Chapter 2 presents an interesting discussion on the 
evolution of the concept. 
112 Russett, International Regions and the International System (see note 3). Russen used five criteria to 
delineate regions and then tried to verify the congruence of each given aggregate cluster. His 
criteria were 1) social and cultural homogeneity; 2) political attitudes or external behavior; 3) 
common political institutions; 4) economic interdependance, and; 5) geographical proximity. 
113 Ibid., p, 218. 
114 Ibid., p. 168. 
115 Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World, p. 9, note 30. 
116 
07 
08 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
129 
130 
131 
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 54 
Cantori and Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach, see note 9. There is 
a wealth of literature on the regional subsystem theme. For a review of the approaches put forth 
between the late 1950's and 1970 see William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem ". 
Miller, "The Subordinate System: Types of Regional Organizations ", in Cantori and Spiegel, pp. 
357 -378. 
Buzan, People, States & Fear (see note 8). 
Ibid., p. 189. 
Ibid., p. 188. 
Ibid., p. 190. He also distinguishes between lower and higher level security complexes. A Towel 
level complex is composed of local states whose power does not extend much, if at all, beyond the 
range of their immediate neighbour. A higher level complex contains great powers whose power 
may well extend far beyond their immediate environment (p. 195). 
A first edition of People, States & Fear was published in 1983. 
Buzan, "The Post-Cold War Asia -Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation ? ", in Andrew 
Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia - 
Pacifc Region, St Leonard N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 132. 
See Brian Job, Multilateralism: The Relevance of the Concept to Regional Conflict Management, Working 
Paper No. 5, Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
October 1994, p. 13 
Buzan, People, States & Fear, p. 194. 
Buzan discusses the issue in "The Post -Cold War Asia -Pacific Security Order ", pp. 141 -143 and 
150 -151. 
See ibid. and also Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security", Survival, vol. 
36, no. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 3 -21. 
Jim Richardson, The Asia -Pacific: Geopolitcal Cauldron or Regional Community?, Working Paper 1994/6, 
Dept. of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra, November 1994, p. 18. Richardson was responding to the Survival article 
cited in the preceding note. 
Id. 
John Lewis Gaddis, in "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", International 
Security, Vol. 17 No 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 5 -58, presents a mordant and elaborate critique of 
mainstream theoretical approaches to international relations. 
Stanley Hoffmannn, "An American Social Science: International Relations ", Dædalus, vol. 126, no. 
3, Summer 1977, pp. 41 -59. 
3 
Regional Conflict Management in the 
Post -Cold War: Perspectives and 
Prospectives 
The ability of international institutions to cope with armed conflict has remained at the 
forefront of the international agenda throughout the 1990s. At the beginning of this 
decade the UN peace and security system was put under enormous pressure, and 
expectations about its capacity to deal with erupting conflicts - particularly internal 
conflicts - were continuously raised. Not surprisingly, this resulted in disillusionment 
and criticism of its role and performance in a number of locations, most notably in the 
former Yugoslavia, in Somalia and in Rwanda. 
Given the UN's problems in trying to shoulder the burden of global security 
there have been persistent calls for greater regional involvement and responsibility for 
preventing and managing violent conflict. Disagreements abound, however, regarding 
the appropriate mechanisms through which this can be accomplished. Analysts of 
international relations have basic, theory -derived disagreements about the effectiveness 
of regionalism in bringing about peace and security. Moreover their analyses of the 
implications of the end of Cold War for the management of regional conflicts vary 
widely. 
This chapter examines this ongoing debate. The first two substantive sections 
examine realist and liberal readings of post -Cold War regional conflict management. A 
ttird section draws some conclusions on collective conflict management from a number 
of empirical studies. The final section presents some propositions on the possibilities 
for regional action. 
The Current Debate on Regionalism and Security 
Various analyses on the theme of the regionalisation of security politics have been 
proposed in recent years. At the risk of over- simplification, one may point to two basic 
interpretations. The first holds that as a result of the end of the Cold War the regional 
dimensions of security are taking on a much greater importance in the overall 
international security equation. However, the means through which regional security 
will be managed will continue to depend largely on the interests of concerned states, be 
they local players or 'outsiders' holding special regional interests. It also holds that 
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major powers will be less inclined to intervene in areas of diminished strategic 
importance and that emerging regional powers will therefore take on a greater role as 
determinants and arbiters of regional order. From this perspective, individual states 
rather than regional or global institutions are, and will remain, the most important actors 
in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. 
A second view holds that regionalism will play an increasing role in the post - 
Cold War order, not only with respect to regional security but also in relation to the 
maintenance of international order. Its proponents agree that the regional dimensions 
of security are becoming more salient as bipolar superpower confrontation has receded. 
However their essential claim is that, with the end of the ideological divisions that often 
paralysed both regional organisations and the UN, the possibilities for effective 
collective action at the regional level are now improved. Therefore a devolution of 
security tasks to regional organisations should be encouraged in order to lighten the 
burden on the UN and to encourage greater regional responsibility in matters of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. In many ways, these views represent 
something of a return to early postwar thinking on regionalism: regional problems 
should be solved at the regional level, and global problems at the global level. 
There is little disagreement between the proponents of these two positions over 
the effect of the Cold War on regional politics. As a result of geopolitical competition 
between the superpowers the Cold War spilled over into many regional and local 
conflicts, restraining the intensity of regional disputes in some cases (e.g., Middle East); 
exacerbating them in others (e.g., East Asia, Sub -Saharan Africa, Central America). 
Similarly, there seems to be little disagreement that there has been a fundamental shift in 
the nature of global strategic environment as a result of the end of the Cold War. The 
possibility of a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, the most serious 
threat to international security during the Cold War, is now extremely remote. Regional 
confrontations fuelled by global ideological divisions, so -called wars by proxy, now 
seem virtually unthinkable. The former Soviet Union has lost its superpower status and 
with it its capacity to be a key 'mover and shaker' in international affairs. The United 
States has considerably downgraded many of its large overseas military installations, and 
by and large - though with exceptions - the levers of influence of the major powers 
have shifted towards the economic realm. 
The long -term implications of these transformations are currently the object of 
heated debate in the IR field, as are indeed the nature of the new threats to international 
security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and 
sectarian conflict are regularly cited as the most immediate and potentially destabilising 
global threats. However, issues such as transnational crime, environmental degradation 
and climate change, and large -scale population movements are also beginning to take 
their place on the new global security agenda. 
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Realist Perspectives on Regional Conflict Management 
Many scholars associated with the broad church of realism have tended to analyse the 
post -Cold War in terms of changes in the structure of the international system, from 
loose bipolarity to diffuse multipolarity, and their potential impact for the international 
role of the major powers. In an early analysis, Huntington (1991) saw the post -Cold 
War security environment as characterised by changes in the distribution of power.I 
Famous for his alarmist Clash of Civilizations essay published in 1993, Huntington 
expected Japan to continue its rise as a global economic power with Germany becoming 
the pre -eminent European power. He also foresaw a general diffusion of economic and 
military capabilities in the 'Third World' that was to be coupled with the rise of locally 
dominant regional powers.2 In a similar vein, Kenneth Waltz, the leading theorist of 
structural realism, has argued that the end of the Cold War would see the development 
of regional blocs organised around leading regional economic powers - Japan in East 
Asia, Germany in Europe, and the United States in North America - thus signalling an 
era of increased inter- regional competition.3 Waltz also saw Japan and Germany likely 
"to replay roles in some ways similar to those they played earlier" in the next century, a 
controversial view with thus far remains unsubstantiated.4 
Speculations on the global distribution of power bring us to a second element of 
realist outlooks, the expected resurgence of regional dynamics previously 'dampened' by 
the systemic constraints of the Cold War. For some this means the return to traditional 
patterns of confrontation unmitigated by the stabilising influence of superpowers. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Barry Buzañ s argues that multipolarity and the 
diffusion of power toward 'regional states' will herald in a shift towards 'indigenous' 
patterns of regional security.5 For others, the decentralisation of international security 
will see the resurgence of regional subsystems and the drive toward more regional 
autonomy in international politics. Consider, for instance, Thomas Perry Thorntoñ s 
views: 
The key to the broad development lies not [...] primarily in the organizational 
forms [i.e. regional organizations], which may be ephemeral, but in the dynamic 
that underlies them, a dynamic that must be conceptually understood as prior to 
the organizational form. That dynamic, in its broadest form, is the search for 
autonomy, that is, the exclusion of powers external to the region - generally the 
superpowers - from a management role in regional security and political 
matters. Such exclusion takes on particular meaning when one realises that loss 
of autonomy has in the past resulted - and could again result - in the merging 
of regional problems into the rivalries of the global system. When that happens, 
the Third World states are rarely long -term winners.' 
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Thornton highlights a key feature of the realist interpretation, a marked 
tendency to downplay the potential role of regional institutions and norms over state 
interests and regional configurations of power. In particular, prospects for effective 
regional conflict management are often represented as a function of a reordering of 
geopolitical interests of the major powers. Benjamin Miller's analysis essentially sums 
up the current neorealist 'common wisdom' on the role of the latter in managing 
regional conflicts: 
[...] systemic transformation, with the end of bipolarity and the disintegration of 
the USSR, could make the task of regional crisis management /war termination 
much more difficult than used to be under postwar bipolarity, especially in the 
former Second World, but potentially also in certain parts of the Third World. 
In general, the problem of crisis management will be especially acute in those 
regions from which the powers disengage. Disengagement is most likely, in 
turn, from those regions in which the powers (especially the US as the leading 
Great Power) do not seem to have vital interest in the post -Cold War era 
(Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Somalia might be examples)? 
Both of these views deserve critical inspection. Contrary to Thorntoñ s claim that 
regional groupings will seek to exclude great powers from regional politics, however, 
most of the significant developments in major regional organisations (e.g. OAS, 
CSCE /OSCE, ASEAN -ARF, OAU) have, in fact, taken place with the support of 
major international powers. As for Miller's arguments, they are certainly fashionable, 
but they also fail to stand up to closer scrutiny. The United States and the UN did 
indeed beat a hasty retreat from Somalia in 1995. However there has been no 
comparable blanket disengagement from the United States and other leading 
international powers from places such as the Caucasus and Yugoslavia. In fact, there 
has been more international engagement in both regions than ever before, with a major 
NATO stabilisation force deployed in Bosnia (since 1995) and more international 
interest in the fractious Caucasus region than in any other period since the beginning of 
the 20th century. 
While Miller's views seems fairly representative of mainstream realist views, 
other realist scholars have been particularly critical of the new 'institutionalism' of the 
early post -Cold War. Foremost amongst a small but influential group of hardcore 
realists, John Mearsheimer has argued that both policy makers and institutionalist 
scholars have placed undue expectations on multilateral institutions as agents of stability 
and international peace.8 His central, and rather unqualified proposition is that 
"institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour and thus hold little promise for 
promoting stability in the post -Cold War world ".9 Therefore policies based on 
institutionalist theories - which he incorrectly describes as liberal internationalism, 
collective security and critical theory - are bound to fail since, in his opinion, they "do 
not accurately describe the world ".10 For Mearsheimer, the real determinant of 
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international politics remains anarchy (or the threat thereof) in the international system, 
not international institutions. And in this system states still enjoy a considerable 
freedom of action, including that of endangering the other units of the system or that of 
threatening the global status quo. 
Mearsheimer's vision of the post -Cold War world is very much the stuff of 
realism à la Hobbes, Machiavelli and E.H. Carr. The international system remains 
constituted by states largely unrestrained by either international regimes or institutions; 
in an anarchical world American interests, and those of "vulnerable people around the 
globe" continue to be threatened by instability; extant international institutions remain 
too weak to play the role of international sheriff effectively ( Mersheimer cites as 
examples the failures of the League of Nations and those of the EC and the UN in the 
former Yugoslavia). However, where Mearsheimei s analysis is at fault is in his selective 
use of examples that only support his views and his disregard of those that do not. 
Moreover, his inability to formulate any alternative visions as to how the international 
community could function without those institutions raises serious questions as to the 
validity of his assessment.11 There is also a logical flaw in his argument; if international 
institutions are essentially the creatures of states - a proposition few would dispute - 
then governments surely bear a large part of the responsibility for their weaknesses. 
Indeed, as some commentators have noted, the 'institutional failures' Mearsheimer is so 
keen to illustrate have been more often than not the result of lack of cohesion amongst 
key international players or that of a fundamental reluctance on their part to get 
involved in complex or politically unpopular situations» 
This being said, Mearsheimer's views certainly represent a strong and persistent 
undercurrent in conservative American foreign policy thinking. International 
institutions, particularly international political institutions, are often regarded as 
hindering the fulfilment of the American national interest.13 Thus, the UN is frequently 
viewed with suspicion if not outright contempt, and other institutions where American 
leadership is challenged or diluted are regularly criticised for their indecisiveness. Given 
prevailing American political attitudes towards multilateral institutions in general and the 
UN system in particular, opinions such as Mersheimer's will no doubt continue to be 
voiced and invoked. What is arguably more important, however, is the extent to such 
ideas will influence U.S. policy in the future. 
If Mersheimer's concerns are very much in the tradition of 'big picture' realism, 
other scholars who straddle the line between realist approaches and more traditional 
liberal concerns have argued that a domestic level approach is necessary for the 
understanding of local and regional instability. In particular, they have strongly argued 
for the continued relevance of the 'Third World' as an analytical category for the analysis 
of national and regional security.14 The emphasis of these analyses is not regional 
security per se. However, they hold that regional (in)stability is often the result of 
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domestic insecurity within Third World States. As Mohammed Ayoob argued, "fragile 
polities, by definition, are easily permeable. Therefore, internal issues in Third World 
societies [...] get transformed into inter -state issues quite readily'.15 
This interpretation has obvious implications for regional conflict management in 
what has fashionably come to be known as the 'zones of turmoil', that is, the zones 
most likely to be affected by conflict and instability.16 Insecure regimes are less likely to 
seek assistance from regional organizations or encourage regional solutions to local 
problems because of fears of enhancing the position of regional rivals. For the same 
reasons, insecure regimes seek to avoid regional intervention into their affairs, even if 
such avoidance means seeking external affiances or making ad hoc compromises for the 
purpose of maintaining a regional balance of power. 
Ayoob, a prominent proponent of 'Third Worldist' approaches to security 
studies, argues that Third World regimes are obsessed with state security. He posits that 
they are unable to effectively respond to the societal demands generated by the 
state -building process, a problem that is compounded by their lack of control over their 
international environment, or ability to insulate their state- making processes from 
international systemic pressures.17 Third World states, therefore, are caught between 
the imperatives of state -making which are protected by those international norms 
supporting juridical statehood and state sovereignty, and the external pressures brought 
upon them by developing global social, economic and political norms (i.e. human rights, 
market liberalisation, democratisation, etc.), norms which, Ayoob asserts pessimistically, 
Third World states will be unable to meet for many decades to come.ls 
A subtler, perhaps more theoretically potent argument on the same theme was 
developed by Brian Job who posits that Third World states are confronted by an 
insecurity dilemma fundamentally different from the classical notion of security dilemma 
developed by Robert Jervis in the late 1970s.19 It differs in that "there is no singular 
notion of national security and no dominant externally oriented security dilemma for the 
typical Third world country ".20 Under the 'insecurity dilemma', a metaphor by his own 
admission, he argues that threats to security originate from contending forces within 
Third World societies themselves, forces which are competing to advance their own 
security. The resulting competition has wholly negative effects since it results in 1) less 
effective security for all part of the population; 2) less effective capacity of centralised 
state institutions to provide services and order; and 3) increased vulnerability of the state 
and its people to influence, intervention and control by outside actors, be they other 
states, communal groups or multinational corporations.21 
It is difficult to accept some of the generalisations on the Third World theme 
present in both Job's and Ayoob's analyses, not least because the 'Third World' as both a 
concept and political reality is rapidly losing its relevance in the post -Cold War era (as is 
the concept of 'neutral and non -aligned'). One notes here that the expression is now 
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seldom used in official circles, the Third World's status as a Cold War 'mega -region 
having disappeared. Another observation relates to the argument presented in the 
preceding paragraphs. Job's ad initio acknowledgment that the insecurity dilemma 
metaphor does not describe all Third World states somewhat undermines the utility of 
his description of the 'typical' Third World state, and Ayoob's generic portrayal of the 
'security predicament' of Third World states sometimes borders on caricature.22 The 
fact is that at least some of the attributes Ayoob ascribes to Third World countries, 
notably an obsession with possible threats to internal security, were present in different 
forms in developed countries as well during some periods of the Cold War. 
One contentious aspect of 'Third Worldist' approaches to security relates to 
their application at the regional or sub -regional level. The logical corollary of Job and 
Ayoob's description would be groups of insecure regimes mutually supporting each 
other's right to be left alone (at least in principle) in order to pursue state -building 
policies unimpeded by the threat of intervention from their neighbours or outside 
powers. One could make solid case for arguing that this was precisely the rationale for a 
number of OAS, OAU, Arab League and ASEAN norms adopted over the past 
decades. However, since the end of the Cold War there have been too many regional 
institutional and political developments to be able to sustain this line of argument 
further at a general leve1.23 Indeed, regional norms and experiences now differ so widely 
that it seems increasingly inappropriate to group together large groups of 
underdeveloped or developing states as the 'Third World' according their modes of 
governance, their internal political situation or their level of socio- economic 
development 2Æ 
To sum up, the realist view is generally characterised by a perception that 
regional systems and regional dynamics are becoming more salient elements of 
international security. Strong regional powers may (re)emerge, and, in time, some of 
them may present a threat to the global status quo. Linked with this view the belief that 
regional configurations of power will be much more relevant to the management of 
regional conflict in the future and that major international powers will be less prone to 
intervene where their (diminished) strategic interests are not at stake. 
There appears to be no consensus among realist scholars on the problem of 
disintegrating or inherently unstable states. They do recognise the problem and its 
symptoms. However, beyond notions of preventing instability from spilling over into 
larger areas, realism offers limited insights on how to deal with such problems. This is 
because the realist school essentially deals with states as the primary unit of international 
relations, not with ethnic minorities, religious groups or other sub -national and /or 
trans -national forces. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the formulation of 
concepts for understanding this issue and policies designed to deal with it has come 
mostly from the more liberal and militant side of the international relations field.25 
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The question of failed or weak states presents important challenges to realists 
arguments regarding the potential stabilising Iole of regional powers. In many recent 
cases of internal strife (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia) the main 
players among neighbouring states have either proved unable to deal with the problem 
on their own or have directly or indirectly contributed to it. In such cases the realist 
hypothesis that regional powers can fill the power vacuum left by the strategic 
withdrawal of the superpowers appears to have little relevance. 
Liberal Internationalist and Neoliberal Perspectives 
on Regional Conflict Management 
Scholars and policymakers closer to the liberal tradition initially drew different 
conclusions than the ones discussed above. Essentially, they differed from realists in 
that they have tended to analyse post -Cold War changes more optimistically, not only at 
the global level but also at the regional level. A central feature of the liberal 
internationalist view -a view which was more prominent at the turn of the 90s decade 
than it is closer to the end of the century - has been the assumption that the end of the 
Cold War signalled the definitive demise of the major remaining ideological challenge to 
liberal democratic values.26 As Peter Lawler notes, the liberal internationalist 
assumption of the increasing entrenchment of democratic principles and the belief in 
the "impending domestication of international relations" through the emergence of a 
more principled world order had profound implications.27 First, it tended to reinforce 
the view that the international security environment would become more benign than 
during the Cold War. Second, it buttressed claims that international cooperation could 
now proceed forward without the ever present East -West divide frustrating the work of 
multilateral institutions.28 
This interpretation gave rise to a wide range of security concepts in recent years, 
notably the idea of cooperative security. It is not the intention here to discuss this 
concept in elaborate detail. That has been done elsewhere.29 Suffice to say here that the 
concept of cooperative security is characterised by a multi- dimensional understanding of 
security which emphasises multilateralism over bilateralism, inclusion over exclusion; 
and institutional as well as non -institutional solutions to security problems. 
Furthermore, cooperative security places a central value on creating 'habits of dialogue' 
on a multilateral basis as the preferred method through which to manage security issues. 
The liberal vision has also been heavily influenced by the so -called democratic 
peace theory.3° Democracies do not go to war with each other, or so the theory holds.3' 
So strong is the belief of some authors in this proposition that some see it as perhaps 
the only demonstrable empirical law in the field of international relations.32 From both 
theoretical and policy perspectives, promoting democracy and supporting 
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democratisation processes are increasingly presented as major contributions towards 
building and reinforcing peace, and, not surprisingly, a debate on the 'right to 
democratic governance' is now emerging in policy circles.33 To be sure, international 
electoral observation and assistance missions have proliferated in recent years, and 
internationally supervised elections have become a fairly standard component of multi- 
dimensional peacekeeping operations. UN experiences in Namibia, Cambodia and 
Mozambique, and the more recent OSCE experience in Bosnia -Herzegovina have 
shown that elections can be carried through even under the most difficult 
circumstances. 
Whether such exercises lead to effective democratic governance is open to 
debate, however?' As a societal practice, democratic governance cannot be created 
overnight, and neither can it be imposed from the outside through international 
assistance and supervision. International pressures or assistance may well be 
indispensable to give a boost to viable and responsible statehood. Ultimately, however, 
the responsibility for nurturing that process forward lies not with the UN or any other 
international body, but rather with governing elites, political movements and civil 
society within the countries themselves. Moreover, proponents of 'global democracy' 
often tend to forget that states undergoing a transition towards political liberalisation are 
often the object of important (and often deadly) internal turmoil 35 The 1991 Algerian 
elections which would have given power to the fundamentalist Front Islamique du Salut is 
a case in point. After it became clear that the first round of legislative elections had 
delivered an outcome which the Western -backed Front de Libération National (FLN) 
government would not accept, Western calls for a more democratic Algeria suddenly 
evaporated. The tragic case of Burundi, with its political system polarised along ethnic 
lines, also provides an example of a democratic process astray, its latest relapse into 
sectarian warfare corresponding with its most recent (internationally supported) attempt 
at representative democracy (1993- 1996). 
Conflict and multilateralism in the post -Cold War 
The liberal interpretation is certainly not univocal in content. Many currents traverse it, 
ranging from the classical liberal internationalist vision of a rules and institutions -based 
international order in which international organisations playa central role, to more state - 
centric neoliberal institutionalist approaches in which multilateralism plays a more 
instrumental role.36 Robert Keohane, perhaps the leading theorist of the latter 
approach, is quick to point out that: 
[neoliberal) Institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical 
positions of authority over states: on the contrary, such regimes are established 
by states to achieve their purposes. Facing dilemmas of coordination and 
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collaboration under conditions of interdependence, governments demand 
international institutions to enable them to achieve their interests through 
limited collective action 37 
This interpretation of international cooperation might appear to be a return to 
more state -centric thinking compared to earlier notions of complex interdependence 
and transnational relations put forth by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s.38 However, 
Keohane posits that complex interdependence remains the operative principle of 
cooperation within the 'zone of peace', an area which corresponds roughly to the 
OECD area.39 Within this zone, international regimes will continue to provide the 
favoured frameworks for the management of both interstate and transnational 
relationships. However, in the 'zones of conflict', which encompass large portions of 
Africa, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and Asia, weak states and divided 
loyalties will continue to be the sources of local /regional instability and conflict; 
regional security will still be conditioned by the persistence of security dilemmas; and 
international regimes will not be as salient in the management of local or collective 
problems as they are in the zone of peace.40 Moreover, Keohane's view links up with 
that of some realist scholars when he argues that powerful democratic countries will be 
reluctant to intervene for the purpose of reestablishing order in the zones of conflict, 
though they will "seek to prevent threats to their security from developing [and] threat 
control may replace both balance of power and collective security as the major principle 
of security ".41 
However conflicting the liberal and neoliberal approaches to international 
cooperation may be at times, they indubitably cohabit in practice at the UN and in all 
manner of more sectoral or limited institutions, regimes or mechanisms. For varying 
reasons, both approaches have strong constituencies in the international state system. 
In the field of international security they are representative of a cooperation rhetoric in 
which collective decision -making and collective action are privileged. Applied to the 
question of regional security proper, what flows from this outlook is a broad orthodoxy 
that emphasises the new or renewed possibilities for global -regional cooperation and 
accentuates the need for greater coordination between the UN and regional 
organisations.42 
The project described above, especially in some of its more vigorous liberal 
internationalist forms, becomes somewhat problematic when one considers that the 
pursuit of power politics and hegemonic relationships is under carried out under the 
rubric of international cooperation. The somewhat ahistorical vision of an international 
system that can be transformed through the diffusion of liberal democratic values is also 
open to question. As Lawler argues, it is easy "to slide from observations about the 
development of institutionalism as both perspective and practice to presumptions about 
the convergence of national foreign policy outlooks towards a universal liberal means ".43 
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In effect, there is an inherent tension between the idea of cooperation as development 
of interstate dialogue, and the promotion of Western liberal values (human rights, 
democratic governance, rule of law, etc.) which ultimately entail social and political 
change within states. 
Whether the enmeshment of security problems in complex multilateral webs can 
effectively resolve major security problems, or even be an appropriate approach for the 
lesser task of crisis management, is highly questionable. One can certainly construct a 
potent argument to the effect that, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the 
extraordinary multiplicity of decision -making fora inhibited rather than facilitated the 
development of a coherent external response to the conflict 44 Yet at the same time, 
nowhere on the globe is the political environment so rich in institutions, regional norms 
and regimes as it is in Europe. 
Two observations should be made here, the first relating to the relationship 
between regional politics on the one hand, and economic and security cooperation on 
the other, and the second relates to the ends and means of the new multilateralist 
agenda embraced by so many liberal internationalist scholars and policymakers. First, 
the 'habits of dialogue' idea present in so many discussions about cooperative security 
can be read at different levels. If the primary objective of developing a regional security 
dialogue is to increase confidence, reduce security dilemmas and develop some sort of 
collective understanding of the key security issues facing a given region, then promoting 
'habits of dialogue' can play a useful role. At least two examples come to mind. The 
now defunct North Atlantic Cooperation Council created by NATO in 1991 (replaced 
by the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council in early 1997) paved the way for a greater level 
of cooperation between NATO countries, Russia and Eastern and Central European 
countries in the early stages of post -Cold War Europe. Similarly, the recently created 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has played an important role in launching multilateral 
Asia -Pacific talks on a wide range of security- related issues. Another reading of the 
'habits of dialogue' idea, however, is that this benign form of multilateralism reinforces 
if not enhances other aspects of regional cooperation. Here, the idea is considerably 
more ambitious and is the object of a long -standing controversy between liberals and 
realists who aver that the possibilities for cooperation in the security field are much 
more restricted than in the economic field because the costs of 'betrayal' and 'defection' 
can be much higher, and sometimes more immediate, than in the economic field.45 
Realists do not consider such cooperation to be impossible; after all, the EC and NATO 
joined together historic enemies. However, as Joseph Grieco puts it, cooperation is 
possible under anarchy, but it is "harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more 
dependent on state power than is appreciated by the institutionalist tradition". 46 
The debate on the relationship between economic -security cooperation is more 
than likely to go on for some time. However, few analysts would disagree with the 
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proposition that regional cooperation in security matters remains heavily contingent 
upon the nature of state actors (e.g. liberal democratic regimes, ultra -nationalist or 
fundamentalist regimes) and on the compatibility of their regional interests. Likewise, 
few would dispute the view that such cooperation is, or can be heavily influenced by 
patterns of infra- regional and extra -regional relations. 
It may be the case that in Latin America, for example, conditions are ripe for the 
logic of cooperation to take hold more firmly than in the past. The resolution of civil 
wars in Central America and the gradual entrenchment of democratic governance 
norms in Latin America have allowed the development of a greater sense of regional 
cohesion.0.7 This has been both the effect and cause of the movement towards 
economic integration as well as some measure of regional cooperation in the 
political- security sphere.48 By contrast deep political cleavages continue to inhibit the 
development of a sense of regional cohesion in South Asia and the Middle East. In 
Africa, where efforts to reinvigorate the OAU have been under way since the early 
1990s, the process of continental cooperation is considerably hampered by numerous 
internal conflicts, long -standing bilateral animosities, weak levels of continental 
economic interaction, and by the lack of a common vision by key African governments. 
Regional cooperation is more important than is usually appreciated, but it is organised 
along sub -regional lines, often in an ad hoc manner. Finally, in Northeast Asia, the 
development of mechanisms that would enhance regional cooperation remain 
hampered by the lukewarm, if not hostile response of some key regional players to 
proposals for sub -regional organisation.49 The least that can be said about chances of 
successfully implementing blueprints for economic -security cooperation is that such 
endeavours must confront widely different regional contexts, some of which are more 
propitious to cooperation than others.30 
With respect to the second observation raised above, the answer of liberal 
internationalists is grounded in the belief that in the post -Cold War era the international 
community can muster both the collective will and the sufficient resources to prevent, 
manage and ultimately resolve conflict, including internal conflict. It should come as no 
surprise, therefore, that not only have they generally supported the conflict management 
framework proposed by Boutros Boutros -Ghali in his Agenda for Peace, but they also 
sought to build upon it. Witness, for example the elaborate proposals put forth by 
former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans in his Cooperating for Peace (1993), 
influential reports on UN reform by the Commission on Global Governance (1995) and 
the Ford Foundation (1995), and innumerable books and journal articles. 
This being said, the question of international mediation and intervention in civil 
wars remains extremely problematic. In recent years such conflicts have dominated the 
agenda of both the UN and a number of regional organisations, and great efforts have 
been made to develop better mechanisms to prevent, and where prevention fails, to 
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manage them, with some limited successes. However the claim that the way towards 
more effective management of such conflicts lies with more appropriate techniques and 
concepts elicits skepticism. Not that such concept are not needed. They have been 
important in fostering a better understanding of the different phases of conflict and of 
the functional capabilities needed to deal with them. However, absent political will and 
a clear sense that national interests are being furthered by intervention in faraway places, 
they are clearly insufficient on their own. Indeed, experiences in Somalia, the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have shown that externally- generated prescriptive solutions and 
formulas which appeal to rational logic can all too often run counter to the 'ground 
truth' and the chaos of sectarian or internal conflict. 
Beyond the consensual gloss of UN documents and declarations on preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace -building, what is much more significant from both 
the perspective of the intervening third- parties and the disputants is how those concepts 
and principles are played out in actual conflicts. Given the intrinsic idiosyncrasies of 
each specific situation, over -reliance on a conceptual 'recipe book' approach to conflict 
prevention and resolution could prove ineffectual, if not dangerous. 
Perhaps a good example of the liberal internationalist vision of the role of 
regionalism was to be found in the well -publicised 1995 report of Commission on 
Global Governance, an internationalist manifesto reminiscent of the work of the Palme 
Commission published in 1982.51 Though the Commission attempted to develop a 
multi -actor, multi -level project of global governance, its very title reveals its intrinsic 
bias for a global and UN- centred view of post -Cold War security in which the security 
of regions is part of a seamless web between the 'security of people' and 'the security of 
the planet' 52 In its report, the Commission judged that the "end of the Cold War 
opened up new possibilities for the involvement of regional organisations in responding 
to local conflicts in conjunction with the UN" and optimistically assessed that the 
actions taken by a number of regional organisation in support of peace in Southeast 
Asia, Central America and the former Yugoslavia "pointed to a tremendous potential ".53 
Its prescription for relieving the burden of UN in dealing with localised conflicts will 
sound familiar: 
One way to deal with certain conflicts could be to delegate the actual 
implementation of an operation to a regional organization or arrangement, but 
to maintain Security Council control over enforcement action and its over -all 
political leadership. This has already been done in some cases, but it could be 
developed further. Political authority must be maintained at the global level, to 
ensure international control over any given situation 5a 
However, the report also sounded the following warning. 
The relationship between the UN and regional organizations needs to be 
clarified in the light of recent experience. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
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has led to a number of Security Council resolutions with explicit references to 
Chapter VIII and the active involvement of the EU, NATO, and the WEU. 
But there have been problems of co- ordination between the UN and regional 
organizations. Although some flexibility must be maintained, more structured 
mechanisms of co- operation are needed.55 
If the last statement acknowledges that the project is not unproblematic, the 
actual project remains the same nevertheless: the necessity of more structured relations 
between regional organisations and the UN in order to lighten the burden of the world 
organisation.56 Skeptics will not fail to note that at the time of the publication of this 
report (early 1995) all relevant UN political bodies had already debated these issues 
extensively and, one hastens to add, inconclusively. Perhaps even more difficult to 
understand, however, is the Commission's assessment of regional organisations showing 
'tremendous potential' when a number of recent and admittedly extremely complex 
cases (e.g. Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, etc.) have, it seems, highlighted the 
major limitations of regional organisations rather than their advantages. 
Many scholars associated with the international organisations research field have 
drawn far less optimistic conclusions than the Commission on Global Governance as 
regards the current potential of regional organisations.57 Weiss and MacFarlane, for 
example, have concluded that "there is good reason to doubt the will and the capacity of 
regional organisations to perform well in the management of conflict within their areas ", 
noting that the end of the Cold War had done little to change their views on the 
matter.58 Other analysts have gone further in their assessments. Beyond problems of 
political will and capabilities yet another line of argument relates to the very nature of 
intergovernmental organisations and their ability to cope (or not) with fluid, rapidly 
developing situations such as civil wars. Consider Touval's viewpoint: 
Decentralizing mediation efforts by making greater use of regional organizations 
might ease the plight of the overburdened U.N. Security Council and Secretariat 
[...]. [Yet] such a course is unlikely to be an improvement. Most of the 
problems that hamper the United Nations also impede regional organizations. 
They, too, are hindered by complex decision- making procedures, the inability to 
effectively commit usually scant state resources, and hence insufficient flexibility 
and leverage. By their very nature as intergovermental organizations, they are 
incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible, and dynamic negotiations guided by an 
effective strategy.59 
Part of the solution, Touval asserts, lies in giving states more responsibility in 
the peacemaking process rather than to continue to 'dump' problems on cumbersome 
intergovernmental organisations (IGO's). Acting as mediators, capable states should be 
allocated conflicts in which they have a special interest as well as some leverage on 
disputants. Oversight and mandates for such 'allocated mediations' would be granted by 
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the UN Security Council, or, one assumes, other political bodies such as the OSCE or 
the OAU. 
There are many problems with Touval's arguments. First, formally anointing 
states with the role of peacemaker would no doubt be perceived in some quarters as a 
reduction of the legitimate role of the UN and /or regional organizations, and it could 
arguably undermine their authority and credibility in the long run. Second, disputants 
might feel uneasiness or even hostility towards the allocated mediator state at different 
stages of the peacemaking process, a process contingent upon recognition of their role 
by the disputants in the first place. Finally, mediator states might seek particular 
outcomes conflicting with those of the disputants, raising questions about their 
impartiality and ultimate motives. For these reasons it is highly unlikely that Touval's 
proposal of allocated 'mediator states' can be adopted and implemented on a systematic 
basis. 
This being said, his prognosis remains interesting in that he highlights 
deficiencies and problems with institutional approaches to conflict resolution that do 
exist and are tacitly recognised by the international community. Moreover, Touval 
indirectly points the finger towards two important trends in international /regional 
conflict management: ad hoc peacemaking efforts, and intervention- cum -peacemaking 
interventions by great powers. From a theoretical perspective, what is significant about 
these approaches is that they are consistent with a 'self -help' logic which can be seen as 
supporting either some form of 'benign realpolitik' or neoliberal institutionalist 
principles of collective action whose ultimate goal is the preservation of international 
peace and security. Moreover, in both cases this interested self -help logic effectively 
circumvents the traditional conception of regionalism as an effective basis for conflict 
prevention and management. Indeed, what is viewed to be much more determinant is 
the strength and /or influence of the coalition of interests behind preventive or 
peacemaking efforts, coalitions which may include regional as well as extra -regional 
players. 
As evidenced by the above discussion, there is at present little unity within the 
liberal school as to ends and means of regional conflict management in the post -Cold 
War. Indeed, there is a divergence of views between those who see the post -Cold War 
order as characterised essentially by a liberal core and an unstable periphery, and those 
who hold that greater regional order and cooperation will come through strengthened 
regional and global processes (admittedly with many shades of grey in between). The 
first interpretation has won over many neoliberal as well as some realist scholars. 
However, it can be criticised for its rather reductionist approach to the 'periphery', a 
tired euphemism for casting aside the 'have nots' of the international system which 
reduces a priori the possibilities of regional cooperation. The second embodies some of 
the classical arguments of liberal internationalism, with its internal tensions between 
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core liberal values (i.e. self -determination, human rights, etc), on the one hand, and 
international cooperation, on the other hand. It leaves us with an inchoate theoretical 
picture in which ideals are often conflated with analysis, and interesting concepts with 
proven methods. 
One particularly remarkable aspect of the liberal 'world view' (writ large) is the 
unease with which the question of regional identity is treated. Liberal values are widely 
portrayed as global values. This often translates into a 'what is good for us is good for 
you' attitude amongst liberal scholars and Western policymakers. Obviously, it would 
be difficult to argue that increased trade, closer interstate cooperation and higher 
compliance with good governance norms would not benefit the more impoverished 
regions of the world. The fundamental question for analysts, however, remains whether 
regional organizations can contribute usefully and effectively to security. 
Some Perspectives from Conflict Research 
Weiss and MacFarlane's doubts about the capacity of regional organisations in the post - 
Cold War raise a number of interesting questions, the first of which must be: what 
precisely is the record of such organisations in managing armed conflict? Part of the 
answer to this question is provided by the findings of conflict research, an eclectic field 
which covers a broad range of scholarship and whose roots are located in the 
behavioural tradition of the IR research field.G° The basic assumption of conflict 
research field is that there are enough similarities between the different types of 
conflicts to warrant their worthwhile study as a class of human behaviour.61 A logical 
policy- related corollary of the study of conflict is, of course, the study of international 
conflict management, a subject which has attracted the interests of scholars ever since 
the development of IR as a field of study and even more so over recent decades.62 
Over the last 25 years a fairly large contingent of analysts have focussed their 
attention on the role of regional and international institutions as 'managers' of conflict. 
Perhaps best known amongst the early studies on this subject is Joseph Nye's 1971 Peace 
in Parts which was referred to in the previous chapter.63 In this study Nye examined 45 
violent conflicts that took place between 1958 and 1967, 20 of which were internal 
conflicts He concluded that there was empirical evidence to support the hypothesis 
that macro -regional organisations (OAS, OAU, Arab League) had, in certain 
circumstances, contributed to controlling conflict within their respective membership. 
They had done so either by 1) helping to isolate the conflict; 2) by helping to end the 
fighting; 3) by helping to abate the conflict, or 4) by helping to settle the conflict.G4 
They had been most successful in helping to isolate conflicts and contributing to the 
abatement of fighting, and least successful in stopping fighting and in settling conflicts. 
Nye also concluded that their capacity to manage conflict had been inversely 
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proportional to the intensity of conflict, underlining the demonstrable fact that the UN 
had consistently dealt with the hardest, most 'intense' cases.65 Moreover, he noted that 
regional organisations had been completely unsuccessful in dealing with cases of 
primarily internal conflict, yet presciently remarked they would probably become the 
most important type of conflict in the future.66 
In a study published in 1979, Mark Zacher examined the performance of the 
UN and the three macro -regional organisations (OAS, OAU, Arab League) in managing 
interstate conflict during the 1946 -1977 timeframe.67 One of Zacher's central 
hypotheses in this study was that the likelihood of organisational intervention and 
success in conflict [management] is significantly determined by the nature of the 
coalition configuration prevailing in the system in which a given conflict occurs.ó8 The 
conclusions of his study were more elaborate than Nye's and, given the previously stated 
hypothesis, also emphasised more fully the 'alignment' variable (i.e. pro -western, pro - 
socialist, neutral or non -aligned). However, Zacher's conclusions were also limited in 
that he did not examine institutional involvement in intrastate conflict on the grounds 
that they were not formally mandated to deal such types of conflict. Moreover his 
definition of institutional success, defined as compliance with an organisational 
resolution, gave a rather imprecise account of the result of institutional action on the 
conflicts studied.69 
Keeping these limitations in mind, Zacher's conclusions did not substantially 
depart from Nye's with respect to the performance of both the UN and regional 
organisations. He found empirical evidence supporting the view that in some cases 
institutions had been 'successful' in managing conflict, although only in a meagre 
combined score of 18% of all 116 cases analysed. Moreover, there was institutional 
involvement, both from the UN and regional organisations, in only 35 % of the total 
number (116) of conflicts examined.70 The performance of the OAS was far above that 
of the Arab League and the OAU, whereas the UN had been the least successful 
institution. In noting that regional organisations had been confined largely to managing 
conflict in which there was a challenge to a consensual norm Zacher made a point that 
is still extremely relevant today.71 
Ernst Haas also made substantial contributions to research on the issue. The 
findings of his 1971 study on regionalism and conflict management. were already noted 
in the previous chapter.72 He published two other studies, in 1986 and in 1993, that are 
elaborate and deserve first -hand reading if justice is to be done to them.73. Their 
respective conclusions are summarised below. 
In his 1986 study Haas analysed the performance of the UN and macro -regional 
organisations in managing 319 interstate 'disputes' during the 1945 -1985 timeframe.74 
Organisational involvement in intra -state conflict was not examined. Success and failure 
were determined by the ability of institutions to either 1) stop hostilities; 2) settle 
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disputes; 3) isolate disputes, or 4) abate disputes that were formally referred to one, or in 
some cases, two of the institutions examined. 
Haas found that neither the UN nor regional organisations had been successful 
in stopping ongoing hostilities with any consistency since the 1960s and that their 
record in settling disputes had "almost always been dismal" 75 Furthermore, he found 
that while there had been a general decline in institutional effectiveness in managing 
conflict over the years, regional organisations had shown less decline in effectiveness 
than the UN. However, he demonstrated that they generally proved ineffective in 
managing serious disputes, (i.e. disputes that involved fighting and military operations) if 
only for the simple reason that such disputes were usually referred to the UN.76 On a 
more positive note, Haas found that regional organisations had been somewhat more 
successful in isolating and in abating disputes, in certain cases even more so than the 
UN.77 These conclusions are consistent with Nye's own 1971 findings and suggest at 
long term trend. 
Amongst many of Haas' conclusions in this study, two stand out as being 
particularly important. Firstly, although he found that the UN usually ended up with 
the 'harder', most intense cases, he concluded that there had been no global division of 
labour between the UN and regional organisations during the 1945 -1985 timeframe. 
The reason: after 1965 the profiles of disputes referred to the UN and regional 
organisations did not differ systematically. In effect, both levels competed for the same 
tasks.78 Secondly, he also concluded that poor institutionalisation of conflict 
management functions within the UN was not the main 'problem'. For Haas, the real 
issue was that the UN "is and always has been viewed by its members as an instrument 
of national foreign policy ".79 Therefore, adaptive success - the UN's institutional 
capacity to 'adapt' to emerging issues or changing situations - was essentially determined 
not by the development of new mechanisms, procedures or bureaucracies, but by the 
"salience of the UN to the advancement of whatever national interests are funnelled 
into the organisation ".80 The same logic no doubt applies to regional organisations as 
well; presenting a powerful counterpoise to the view that institutional development can 
in and of itself provide the answer to more effective regional conflict management. 
Haas' 1993 study was essentially an update of his 1986 findings. He examined 
43 disputes that took place during the 1986 -1990 timeframe. This period corresponds 
with the advent of Glasnost in the Soviet Union, the historic thaw in Soviet -American 
relations, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's successful second term at the helm of the UN. 
His objective was to ascertain whether there was empirical evidence to suggest a new 
era was emerging in terms of the collective management of international conflict. Not 
surprisingly, he found evidence that the UN was reversing the downward trend in 
'authority' and 'relevance' that had plagued the organisation since the early 1960s.81 
However, the overall role of regional organisations declined during this period. 
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Essentially, they were largely overshadowed by UN activities in situations where they 
were called upon to manage conflict jointly.82 After examining what he called the 
'spotty fortunes' of regional peacekeeping throughout the late -1980s and early 1990s, 
Haas opined that "the main justification for seeking better regional conflict management 
- escape from global meta -issues and big power hegemony - are no longer valid ", and 
therefore did not share the hopes that a revival of regionalism was either possible or 
desirable.83 Wrote Haas: "any conceivable future for the familiar regional organisations 
in local conflict management rests on the abstinence of powerful nations from regional 
military intervention [including interventions under UN mandates] ".84 
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the studies discussed 
above. Firstly, some observations concerning their past performance. 
Generally speaking, regional organisations did not prove to be effective 
managers of armed conflict during the Cold War, not only in cases of interstate 
conflict but particularly so as managers of internal conflict. However, their 
overall 'success' score was not significantly lower than that of the UN, which 
was also low. Some regional organisations (e.g. the OAS before the 1960s), 
however, on occasion fared better than the UN itself. 
During the Cold War period (pre -1984) regional organisations generally dealt 
with conflicts that were of lower intensity than those taken up by the UN. More 
serious disputes were consistently taken up by the UN, often (but not always) at 
the initiative of the members of the Security Council. This suggests that the 
Great Powers had a limited faith in the ability of regional organisations to deal 
with serious regional disputes, particularly if they threatened international 
security or their own geopolitical interests. Moreover, with very few exceptions, 
the UN, rather than regional organisations, provided the necessary legitimacy 
and the institutional machinery for international peacekeeping forces. 
In term of outcomes, the record of regional organisations indicates that their 
actions have been more successful in isolating disputes or abating fighting than 
stopping hostilities or resolving disputes. The fact remains that none of the 
major regional conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s were resolved through regional 
or sub -regional organisations. The legalistic pacific settlement of disputes 
mechanisms enshrined in their respective charters' were seldom used to full 
effect, particularly when regional conflicts were fuelled by superpower 
competition in their area. Historically, regional organisations were used 
principally to restrain disputants, avoid the spread of conflict, or try to ensure 
compliance with regional norms such non -interference in internal affairs and 
respect for territorial integrity. 
Beyond the fact that between 1945 and 1984 more high intensity disputes went 
to the UN than to regional organisations, there is little evidence to support the 
view that a clear division of labour between the two levels existed during this 
period. Between 1984 and 1990, the pattern of referrals is more muddled, and 
regional organisations remained largely ineffective. The conclusion that emerges 
from these observations is that, from a historical perspective, Chapter VIII of 
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the UN Charter was never used in any consistent manner as a guide for regional 
dispute settlement.fl5 
Some observations about the criterion for determining institutional success are 
also in order. Both Nye and Haas judged institutional success in terms of the ability of 
organisations to abate conflict, isolate conflict, stop hostilities or settle conflict.86 All of 
these relate to the effect of institutional intervention after a dispute or a crisis has 
erupted. By contrast, in current liberal internationalist thinking about conflict 
management the bar has been set higher. Not only should success be determined by the 
capacity of global /regional institutions to do all of the above, but also by their ability to 
prevent both interstate and internal conflict and restore infra -state harmony (post- conflict 
peace -building), often after long and destructive wars.87 As the experience of recent 
years as demonstrated, this places a extraordinarily heavy burden on the shoulders of 
both international and regional organisations 
Continuity or Discontinuity? 
Regionalism and Conflict Management in the post -Cold War 
Does regionalism hold any promise for the possibility of more effective regional conflict 
management? The author submits six propositions on the issue, followed by a few 
comments on the wider explanations for the current trends. 
The regionalisation of security politics: Institutional consequences 
The first proposition is that the end of the Cold War has given way to an unprecedented 
of level of regional institution- building. With the seismic international changes of the 
turn of this decade the 'contextual' background of international regionalism has changed 
considerably. The depolarisation of international cooperation patterns and the lifting of 
superpower overlay over entire regions has removed some of the external obstacles to 
more effective regional organisation. In turn this has generated a gradual movement 
towards the regionalisation of security politics which will become increasingly salient in 
years to come. 
In many - though not all - regions, political space has been created for regional 
discussions on peace and security issues where this was hitherto impossible. In terms of 
institutional development the results have been quite significant. Witness the 
institutional development of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in Europe; the revival of the OAS in Latin America; changes in the OAU 
structure; and the emergence of an institutionalised security dialogue in Southeast Asia 
in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Similarly, the Atlantic Alliance, 
which not so long ago was considered by many to be a relic of the Cold War, has made 
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great strides in trying to move from a collective defence rationale towards a common 
security orientation. 
Institutions remain only one part of the equation 
In spite of all the institution building of recent years, the fact remains that the 
capabilities or regional organisations vary widely across the spectrum of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution functions. These differences in capabilities and 
track record have been recognised by scholars and policymakers for decades. The 
obverse proposition is perhaps more interesting to examine from an analytical 
perspective; different conflict prevention, management and resolution functions place 
different demands upon regional systems and regional organisations. 
In those regional systems demonstrating a high or an increasing degree of 
interstate cooperation (e.g., Europe, North America, Latin America) there seems to be a 
developing consensus around certain functions to be exercised collectively, functions 
such as trying to prevent conflict, strengthening democracy and civil society or 
increasing regional confidence. This is demonstrated by the evolving mandates of a 
number of institutions, such as the OSCE and the OAS. The transatlantic community, 
however, still demonstrates a higher level of commitment to collective problem- solving 
than any other region. By contrast, in those regional systems dominated by division if 
not confrontation (e.g., Middle East, South Asia) even the least demanding collective 
conflict management functions, building regional confidence for example, remain 
extremely problematic. Existing regional arrangements are either too weak to play a 
useful role or the level of regional mistrust so high that existing regional 
dispute -settlement mechanisms remain under -utilised by their own membership. 
As argued above, there is a direct link between the level of regional cohesion 
and the capacity of regional arrangements to exercise progressively demanding conflict 
management functions. However, this relationship cannot be regarded as a 
straightforward principle applicable in all circumstances. Solidarity within a political 
community is often fragile, even amongst more cohesive regional groupings. Moreover, 
the regionalist principle does not necessarily restrain states from pursuing foreign policy 
interests unilaterally. For instance, the 1991 German decision to recognise Slovenia and 
Croatia dealt a fatal blow to EC peace efforts in Yugoslavia in 1991 -1992. In 1994, the 
United States finally bypassed the OAS and sought a UN mandate to intervene military 
in Haiti. And Indonesia's 1995 bilateral security treaty with Australia indicated to its 
Southeast Asian partner's that its pivotal position within ASEAN did not necessarily 
prevent it from pursuing its own security interests outside the organisation's framework. 
Managing internal conflit A major challenge for regional organisations 
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As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, internal conflict is the most prevalent 
form of violent conflict today. Yet, as inter- governmental organisations based on state - 
state relations, most regional organisations are ill- equipped to deal with internal conflict. 
The reasons for this are well known. First, in spite of some evolution in UN practice in 
recent years, intervention in the domestic affairs of states often remains a regional 
taboo, particularly for those regional bodies primarily composed of weak states and 
insecure regimes. Second, many regional organisations still lack a formal mandate and 
accompanying framework to deal with intrastate conflict. Thirdly, many of them cannot 
bring any significant political, economic or military pressure to bear and can launch little 
more than small 'preventive diplomacy' missions or low -key peacemaking efforts.88 
These limitations do not a fortiori preclude occasional accomplishments. Overall, 
however, the recent performance of regional organisation in civil wars leaves much to 
be desired, most particularly in those cases where intense fighting or protracted 
ethno -political violence is taking place. 
Where regional approaches might perhaps stand a better chance of addressing 
internal instability in the future is with respect to domestic crises that are primarily 
constitutional in nature which jeopardise regional norms, especially norms concerning 
governance. Such efforts, however, require a strong political consensus around certain 
norms and standards as well as a consensus on the collective instruments necessary to 
apply them. However, those conditions are brought together in only very few regional 
institutions. 
New inter- American norms upholding the primacy of democratic governance in 
the Americas provide an example of what can be done through this approach. 
Following the coup which deposed the Aristide government in Haiti, in September 
1991, the OAS imposed sanctions on the new junta for having breached the so -called 
Santiago Commitment to Democracy which is had just adopted in June 1991.89 
Although UN involvement, and American intervention later became necessary to 
remove the Haitian junta, the Santiago Commitment proved to be a significant 
instrument in the OAS arsenal, allowing it to take political action on internal issues 
which were previously considered outside the purview of its Charter. Since the Haitian 
coup, the OAS has taken similar action to uphold democratic principles (with more or 
less success) m a number of Latin American countries. 
Managing inter -state conflicts: The limits of regional collective security 
In those regions where cooperative forms of interstate relationships are weak, the ability 
of relevant regional organisations to deal collectively with interstate conflict remains 
weak. The failure of the Arab League to present a united front against Iraqi during the 
Gulf War is a case in point.90 Similarly, continued Indo- Pakistani rivalry inhibits the use 
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a vehicle for 
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regional collective security. Conversely, in those regions in which cooperative forms of 
interstate relationships are strong or strengthening, regional organisations often carry 
more moral and political weight and are regarded as essential vehicles for collective 
action. 
By and large, however, the lack of effective military instruments of regional 
organization poses real limits to their ability to perform peacekeeping or peace support 
missions, let alone collective security tasks. Proposals to develop such capabilities 
within established regional structures have proven to be controversial in recent years, 
not only because they would represent an important departure from tradition, but 
perhaps more importantly because they would also require a strong consensus amongst 
states that have historically had a limited political capital to invest in regional 
organisations. 
There is nevertheless one trend that should not go unmentioned. Since the early 
1990s a number of state coalitions have been forming sub -regional or multinational 
peacekeeping forces outside existing regional structures. In 1994 -1995, for example, the 
three Baltic States formed the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion to be eventually used by the 
UN. In Central Asia, West Africa and Southern Africa, other coalitions have launched 
similar endeavours. Are these significant developments? This question will be 
discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
UN- Regional organisations cooperation: Essential but difficult 
Despite numerous recent examples of UN- regional organisation cooperation only 
limited progress has been made on the important division of labour issue. As will be 
seen in the next chapter, both states and regional organisations are reluctant to adopt 
formal mechanisms of coordination that would go beyond the broad principles of the 
UN Charter concerning the role of regional arrangements.91 Given the wide range of 
regional responses to the UN's own efforts in this respect, it is difficult to put forward 
one all- encompassing reason why this has been the case. Two factors stand out, 
however. First, states are wary of losing flexibility through formal mechanisms of 
coordination, and for the same reason they want the regional organisations to which 
they belong to retain autonomy vis -à -vis the UN. Second, there is considerable 
scepticism amongst governments as to the desirability and practicability of a clear -cut 
division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. Recent experiences, 
notably in Bosnia (UN -NATO) and Central America (UN -OAS), have shown that 
coordinating joint institutional action can be both a difficult process and a major source 
of friction between the UN and some its member states. 
The rise of'contactgroup'politics 
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Given the perceived inflexibility and uncertainty of outcome of institutional approaches 
to conflict prevention, management and resolution, ad hoc approaches and contact 
group politics are bound to proliferate. In recent years states have been increasingly 
resorting to non -institutional mechanisms for dealing with conflict, a development 
which historians of international relations might very well see as a return to old style 
diplomacy if not to concert -style arrangements. Whether in Central America with the 
Contadora Group, in Cambodia with the Indonesian JIM talks and the subsequent 
Australian -French -American diplomatic waltz, or in Bosnia with the Contact Group and 
the subsequent US- sponsored Dayton peace plan, adhockery has yielded some major 
peacemaking successes.92 These approaches offer a number of advantages. They can 
provide states interested in peacemaking with a framework for coordination when 
institutional approaches are insufficient, ineffective or deadlocked. They place a 
premium on flexibility and timeliness rather than confining problems to (often) 
unwieldy institutional structures. Moreover, they are often non -committal, thus 
allowing mediating parties to 'save face' should their effort fail to reach a solution. 
There are, however, limitations and drawbacks to such peacemaking approaches. 
Without some form of acknowledgment by the UN or relevant regional organisations, 
ad hoc peacemaking can suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Moreover, it raises the 
possibility that regional or even major powers will use 'ad hoc' peacemaking to further 
their own foreign policy objectives, resulting in the possible (re)assertion of zones of 
influence. It is fairly clear, for instance, that UN observer missions in Liberia 
(UNOMIL) and Georgia (UNOMIG) were designed not only to assist local 
peacemaking efforts, but also to provide some modicum of international oversight over 
the activities of Nigerian -led ECOMOG forces and Russian peacekeeping troops. 
Another limitation to ad hoc approaches is also that while they have played an 
important process role in a number of recent conflicts, the fact remains that the burden 
of implementing major peace agreements still rests on the shoulders of extant 
international or regional institutions. Thus the Cambodian peace was negotiated outside 
UN structures but its implementation handed over to the UN. Similarly, the Dayton 
Peace process was piloted by the United States, and then handed over to NATO, the 
OSCE and other agencies for implementation under a multilateral political authority, the 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Should ad hoc approaches go forward without 
the imprimatur, formal or otherwise, of relevant international institutions, its seems 
unlikely that key international players will want to support them fully, and that support 
may be precisely what is needed to carry the efforts forward 
Possible explanations for regional variations 
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It is obvious by the above propositions that there have been considerable variations in 
regional 'performance'. Beyond the differences in structures and capabilities between 
extant regional bodies, a likely initial explanation for variations may be found via the 
examination of the practice of multilateralism in regional contexts. More precisely, 
some analysts have argued that the particular characteristics of regional systems are 
central determinants of the extant forms of regional conflict management.93 In 
ascending degree of 'cooperativeness', the latter range from balance of power, concerts, 
collective defence, collective security, security community, and integration. As Job 
argues, these forms of multilateral arrangements (some are institutionalised, some are 
not) can be arrayed over two dimensions: commitment (deep or shallow) and scope of 
membership (narrow or broad).94 For example the OSCE has a 'broad' membership (53 
states), but the institution entails fairly 'shallow' commitments on the part of its member 
states. By contrast the ANZUS Treaty has a narrower membership, but it entails deeper 
commitments on the part of its members, particularly in terms of collective defence. 
The analytical approach presented above also posits that different forms of 
conflict management structures may evolve through incremental and cognitive 
transitions.95 This is reflected by the recent enlargement of mandates /functions within 
certain regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, ASEAN /ARF, etc.) and also by the 
simultaneous existence of different forms of conflict management within given regional 
contexts (e.g. NATO and OSCE) 
Analytically, Job's approach is useful in differentiating regions across various 
forms of collective conflict management. By placing the focus on regional contexts 
(and the differences between them) without denying the possibility of external influence 
from external actors, it constitutes a major step forward in trying to come to grips with 
the structure of regional security in the post -Cold War. 
A second plausible explanations of the variance in effectiveness of different 
regional orgnanisations derives from Ernst Haas' When Knowledge is Power (1990), his 
groundbreaking analysis of inter -governmental institutions (IGO's) as learning 
organisations.96 In it, Haas presented some important insights into how IGO's can 
either adapt to contextual changes in their environments or learn from them. Learning 
organisations make better institutions, Haas argues. Adapting institutions, on the other 
hand, are usually the victims of contextual evolution; reactive rather than proactive 
towards their environment. Is it not possible to think of the early post -Cold War period 
as a period when regional organisations, confronted by the challenge of relevance, are 
undergoing a process of learning and adaptation (and perhaps regression in some cases) 
that may last for some time? 
I have alluded earlier in the text to Sadia Touval's rather negative assessment of 
IGO's as managers of conflict. Touval's arguments indirectly join Haas' in highlighting 
the conservatism with which major international institutions manage change within their 
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structures and decision -making procedures. At the same time, however, an examination 
of the major regional organisations must acknowledge that institutional change has been 
managed in quite different ways since the end of the Cold War. The rapid evolution of 
the OSCE, for example, created new possibilities for conflict avoidance and conflict 
prevention, including intra -state conflict prevention, which were difficult to contemplate 
just a few years ago. This contrasts with the Arab League, an institution which has 
shown very little sign of institutional adaptation since the end the Cold War.97 
Finally, a third possible explanation for variance involves applying Starr and 
Most's idea of 'opportunity' and 'willingness' to regional conflicts.9$ Opportunity is a 
variable referring to the system /environment, and willingness relates to 
decision -making /process variables. Changes in global 'opportunity' have undoubtedly 
removed some obstacles to regional cooperation. However, without corresponding 
'willingness' on the part of regional states to respond to the opportunity, such changes 
do not necessarily translate into more regional cohesion or effective collective action on 
security issues. The same logic applies in regional contexts as well. Changes in regional 
'opportunity', for example, the enlargement or deepening of security functions within a 
regional body as a result of consensus on a new conflict management function, does not 
(pro facto translate into effective regional action in a given local dispute. 
The foregoing remarks suggest that institutional evolution should not be 
considered as the pivotal benchmark in evaluating the role of regional organisations. 
Rather, assessments of what makes them effective in preventing, managing and 
resolving localised regional conflicts should be measured against a demonstrated ability 
to alter the position of belligerents parties or disputing states so that a positive or at least 
a less negative outcome emerges. Viewed in this light, it is clear, for example, that the 
OSCE Assistance Mission in Chechnya (sent in early 1995) cannot be considered 
successful since it neither restrained the belligerents nor provided an effective 
peacemaking vehicle for the settlement of the conflict. The same can be said about the 
MIOB, the OAU observer mission in Burundi (sent in early 1994), which went in 
country with so few observers and under such a vague mandate that all it could 
realistically accomplish was to report on incidents back to OAU headquarters.99 
These explanations should be seen as complementary. Each one could be 
developed further and used to explain one aspect of regional security or conflict 
management at the regional level. Put together, however, they present a rather untidy 
picture lacking any elegant theoretical line of argument. Like any complex reality, 
however, a proper understanding of regionalism and conflict management can only be 
achieved by drawing on and integrating a range of plausible explanations. The issue is, 
and will continue to be informed by an understanding of domestic, regional as well as 
global politics. These levels interact differently across time and space, and, therefore, 
attempts to provide explanations of regional conflict management solely through the 
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examination of one level (e.g. the institutional level, the system level, etc.) can only yield 
partial answers. 
Concluding Remarks 
It has become somewhat of a cliché to state that the end of the Cold War has compelled 
us to take a look at regional issues like never before. Despite what can only be 
described as a general lack of consensus in the IR field on the prospects for increased 
regional peace and stability in the post -Cold War era, most interpretations actually start 
from the same premise. Not only is it recognised that the dimensions of conflict are 
increasingly shifting downward towards the regional and the local, but it is also 
recognised that states are increasingly resorting to regional mechanisms and strategies to 
try to deal with them. However, a fundamental question remains: to what extent will 
regional security and regional conflicts be amenable to management through strictly 
regional solutions? 
Thus far, the record does not support the hypothesis that in the post -Cold War 
finding regional solutions to regional conflicts will be any less difficult than during the 
Cold War. Beyond that statement, it is difficult to make generalisations that apply to all 
conflict situations. Indeed, as argued in this chapter, the management of regional 
conflict cannot be easily reduced to one single explanation based on realist or liberal 
assumptions of the dynamics of international relations. A variety of factors need to be 
taken into account: the nature of the conflict or dispute in question, the nature of 
international, regional and domestic interests at stake, the presence or absence of 
effective regional institutions, the nature of collective tasks to be performed, and so on. 
Most of these issues raise the question of collective action across different regional 
contexts. To a large extent, these different contexts determine whether regional 
collective action can be both possible and effective on a given issues.'°° 
The overall assessment that regionalism does not at present, or for the short to 
mid -term, constitute a reliable basis for solving regional conflict carries important 
consequences for the elaboration of a post -Cold War cooperative security order, some 
of which are already being felt. After a period of optimism lasting until 1993 -1994, 
ideas of a revamped hierarchical structure of international security based on the UN and 
regional organisations have been shelved once again and there has been somewhat of a 
rediscovery of the virtues of traditional state diplomacy in the conflict prevention and 
peacemaking process, albeit often in the form of ad hoc groups and coalitions. 
Some analysts have argued that a global system of cooperative security designed 
to reduce regional conflict will only function under some form of Russian -American 
concert, or at least by the incorporation of Russia into the 'concert of global states'.101 
This is a disputable view. Though Russia has successfully lobbied for a seat in the G7 
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alongside the leading economic powers, Russian foreign policy has been conspicuously 
absent from major peacemaking ventures outside the CIS, the former Yugoslavia or 
Iraq. Moreover, both its past record in the developing world and its current inability to 
exert international economic leverage due to its disastrous economic situation make it 
an unlikely international peacemaker for the foreseeable future. 
Second, given that institutions can at present provide only a limited answer to 
the pressing demands of conflict management, there is something of a learning cycle 
taking place amongst the actors involved in managing regional security. Both big and 
small states are rediscovering the value of concerted diplomatic action both outside and 
within intergovernmental institutions. For smaller states, this often involves the 
development of closer mechanisms of coordination either for the promotion of local 
interests (e.g., the Baltic states, Central Asia) or as compensatory /complementary 
mechanisms to weak regional institutions. The latter are most evident in Africa with 
ECOWAS, IGADD, SADC and the East African coalition that tried to restore some 
measure of stability to Central Africa. 
Finally, the regionalisation of security politics, combined with the very serious 
problems encountered by global and regional organisations in handling regional conflict, 
has led to a third important development. Western countries are actively promoting a 
much greater degree of regional responsibility in handling regional conflict, to the point 
of extending substantial diplomatic and /or financial support for the development of 
regional mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution (both 
institutional and non -institutional). Again, this is most obvious in Africa where the 
United States and European countries are lining up to help the OAU and a number of 
African states to improve their capacity to contribute to collective conflict management 
efforts. It is also evident in Southeast Asia where the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
could not have been created without Western support. Whether out of consideration 
for greater international order, such as lightening the burden on the UN, or motivated 
by more self -interested reasons, such as supporting greater regional effectiveness as a 
substitute for Western intervention, this appears to be an underlying and long -term 
trend. 
In the fluid and amorphous environment described above, values often clash 
with interests, and multilateral processes with national objectives. The fundamental 
question will not be whether the UN or a regional organisation should intervene, but 
rather which form of multilateral or national action is best placed to perform a certain 
function at a given moment in the development of a dispute or conflict. Regional 
organisations and the UN will rarely have vertical 'ownership' of a conflict management 
process. A multiplicity of institutions and coalitions will often have to work together at 
different stages of a conflict, making the issue of coordination - coordination between 
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institutions and coordination between coalitions and institutions - an increasingly 
critical aspect of regional conflict management for years to come. 
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4 
The UN and Regionalism: Historical and 
Contemporary Debates 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the pivotal role played by the UN Security Council 
during the Gulf War was perceived by many as heralding the political rebirth of the 
United Nations. Coming after a string of UN successes in the late 1980s, the Gulf 
War rekindled the venerable ideals of collective security enshrined in the UN Charter. 
In January 1992, following a period of extraordinary consensus between the world's 
leading powers, the UN Security Council had met in an extraordinary heads of state 
and government session and had requested that the UN's new Secretary -General, 
Boutros Boutros -Ghali, outline plans for updating and improving the organisations 
role in the field of peace and security. Boutros Boutros -Ghali tabled his An Agenda for 
Peace the following June. The Agenda presented bold proposals for enhancing the 
organisation's conflict management and conflict resolution capabilities, among which 
were the Secretary- General's calls to improve the relationship between regional 
organisations and the UN and to make greater use of regional arrangements for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
Given the unprecedented increase in UN peace operations since the end of 
the 1980s, the question of regional arrangements did not initially elicit as much 
attention as other aspects of Boutros -Ghali's proposals. Those designed to strengthen 
and consolidate the organisation's peacekeeping capabilities, an enduring object of 
debate at the UN, came under intense scrutiny yet nevertheless attracted the support 
of large sections of the international community.1 In particular, there was wide 
interest in the conceptual framework for conflict management proposed in the Agenda, 
a framework that ranged from 'preventive diplomacy' to 'post -conflict peace -building'. 
Boutros- Ghali's suggestion that 'peace -enforcement' units composed of volunteers be 
available on call to the UN, however, was received much more cautiously, notably by 
the United States, which has been traditionally opposed to the idea of a supra -national 
UN military force.2 
Not unlike Dag Hammarskjold at an earlier time, it seemed Boutros -Ghali was 
willing to go beyond well -trodden paths in order to place the UN squarely at the 
forefront of international security. He wanted to recapture the central role for the UN 
envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter, but denied to the organisation because 
of nearly 45 years of superpower confrontation. 
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One important aspect of the original UN vision for international peace and 
security was, of course, regionalism. Boutros -Ghali was no stranger to this question. 
He had authored a doctoral thesis in international law on regional arrangements in 
1949 and had published extensively on the subject throughout his distinguished 
academic career.3 As the first Secretary- General of the post -Cold War period 
Boutros -Ghali remained a stalwart supporter of regional approaches to peace and 
security, and during his tenure as chief UN executive he would accord more 
importance to this particular issue than any of his predecessors .4 
This chapter examines the UN debate on regionalism and conflict 
management as it unfolded after the publication of An Agenda for Peace. It is divided in 
two principal sections. The first section provides the necessary background for a 
historical understanding of the regional arrangements provisions of the UN Charter 
and discusses some of the problems and ambiguities associated with them. The 
second section focuses on the current debate on the UN and regional organisations as 
it evolved during the 1992 -1996 timeframe. 
Regionalism and the UN: Historical and Legal Perspectives 
Any examination of regionalism and the UN Iogically starts with a review of Chapter 
VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter. It is in this section of the Charter 
that the relation between regional arrangements and the UN is articulated. However, 
as a prolegomena to a short review of the substantive aspects of Chapter VIII it is 
essential to highlight the circumstances which originally led to the inclusion of a 
section on regional arrangements in the UN Charter. 
Early debates on the role of regional arrangements (1942 -1943) 
In January 1942, 26 allied countries convened in Washington and declared themselves 
to be the United Nations, pledging to employ their full national resources to win the 
war against Germany and Japan.5 The succession of international conferences and 
wartime summits that ensued were to lay the bases of the postwar international order. 
The United States and Britain began examining possible postwar security structures in 
late 1942 when the concept of a United Nations organisation was still inchoate. With 
the outcome of hostilities in Europe and Pacific still uncertain, neither government 
committed itself to specific blueprints. However, the weaknesses of the League of 
Nations loomed high above these early debates. 
By the second half of 1943, a consensus was emerging between the United 
States, Britain and a number of influential allied powers, notably Canada. The postwar 
system of international security was to be embodied by a strong world organisation, 
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and this organisation was to be tasked with a wide range of functions: relief and 
rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons, regulation of the postwar 
international monetary system, international civil aviation, etc. Defining the shape and 
powers of a future world organisation was to prove both problematic and 
controversial, however, especially with regard to the fundamental issue of peace and 
security. 
The question of regional arrangements figured prominently during early 
British -American discussions. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in particular 
had raised the possibility of a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia consisting of a 
number of sub -regional blocs, a proposal, or variations thereof, which he was to voice 
often during the remainder of the war. However, the Roosevelt administration was 
not very enthusiastic about a regional basis for postwar international security. 
The interwar experience of the League of Nations with regionalism - Article 
21 of the League's Covenant stipulated that regional arrangements whose purpose it 
was to secure "the maintenance of peace" were admitted as legitimate under League 
rules - had been unsuccessful.6 Although there was a general agreement that regional 
arrangements consistent with the aims of a world organisation should be permitted, 
the United States stressed the need for a strong universal body for the making of 
international security policy, a body to which such arrangements would be 
subordinate. Realising that his scheme for regional councils would not carry the 
support of the United States, Churchill later came to acknowledge the necessity of a 
global decision -making body. Nevertheless, he remained favourable to the concept of 
regional security structures. He found potential allies in Australia and New Zealand 
which in January 1944 had signed the ANZAC Pact of Mutual Assistance calling for a 
Southwest Pacific conference on regional security to be held "as soon as practicable ".7 
This proposal was not well received by the Roosevelt administration, which held the 
view that an agreement on a postwar international security system should be reached 
before binding regional security agreements were concluded. 
Dunbarton Oaks (1944) and the lead -up to the San Francisco conference 
The question of regionalism came to a head during the two defining events in the 
development of the UN peace and security system: the Dunbarton Oaks Conference 
of August- October 1944 and the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization (otherwise known as the UNCIO), which took place in San Francisco in 
April June 1945. In late-1943, well before Dunbarton Oaks, the US State Department 
had assembled a group of officials and academics to flesh out options for a postwar 
international organisation. Known as the Informal Political Agenda Group, this body 
laid the ground work for what was later to become Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
In the spring of 1944, it drafted a number of preliminary recommendations on the 
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issue of regionalism 1) regional agencies should be free to promote and facilitate the 
pacific settlement of disputes; 2) they could use non -military and military measures for 
enforcement actions provided they were used in accordance with the purposes of the 
future world organisation and kept the Executive Council (as the future UN Security 
Council was then termed) fully informed of its activities; 3) the Executive Council 
should have a right to determine whether the measures undertaken were consistent 
with the purposes of the organisation and if the latter were adequate to prevent a 
serious breach to international peace, reserving a right to take action on appeal or of 
its own initiative if they were judged as inadequate; and 4) the Executive Council 
should use local and regional agencies for enforcement actions, or authorise such 
actions.$ 
At Dunbarton Oaks, representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet 
Union and China assembled for preliminary discussions on a future world 
organisation.9 American and British proposals dominated the talks, which eventually 
produced the United Nations Dunbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International 
Organization.10 During the conference there was general agreement that regional 
arrangements should be "auxiliary to, consistent with, and under the supervision of" a 
global organisation in matters of international security ?1 Britain and the United 
States, however, held differing views on the role of regional arrangements. Britain 
placed emphasis on their potential security value rather than on their wider political 
role, while the United States insisted, inter alia, on their potential usefulness for the 
pacific settlement of disputes. It was judged that both views were not incompatible, 
and they were therefore enfolded in Section VIIIC of the Dunbarton Oaks proposal 
which covered issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Overall, the proposals placed fairly strict controls on regional arrangements, giving a 
right of veto to the Security Council over regional enforcement actions. 
In the months preceding the San Francisco Conference, it became apparent 
that the Dunbarton Oaks provisions on regional arrangements were becoming 
controversial. Wishing to protect the autonomy of the inter- American system, Latin 
American countries insisted on greater autonomy for regional arrangements. Their 
opposition to the strict control of the Security Council became even more 
pronounced following the Inter -American Conference on Problems of Peace and War 
held in Mexico City in February -March 1945. While Latin American countries 
recognised the supremacy of a future general international organisation, they also 
believed that the Conference's final act, known as the Act of Chapultepec, would give 
them a legitimate juridical framework for regional collective security.12 At the time, 
there was great pride in the Pan American Union (PAU), then the oldest and most 
elaborate regional organisation. For Latin American governments, the Inter -American 
Conference was designed as a demonstration of political maturity; the gathering sent 
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the message that Latin America was capable of taking care of its own problems at a 
time when the United States was more preoccupied with events further away from its 
shores.13 
There were similar calls for increased regional autonomy from Australia whose 
Labour government let it be known before the San Francisco Conference that it 
thought regional arrangements should keep a 'right of action' if the Security Council 
proved unable, or unwilling to take measures for the maintenance and restoration of 
international peace and security. Delegations from European countries, Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, and Turkey in particular, also proposed changes to the regional 
arrangement provisions of the Dunbarton Oaks text, suggesting that Security Council 
approval of regional enforcement measures be lifted in cases where suspension of 
such action might cause 'irremediable delays'. 
Perhaps the second most important challenge to the regional arrangements 
provisions of the Dunbarton Oaks proposal beside the one mounted by Latin 
American countries came from France and the Soviet Union. Both countries 
mounted separate campaigns to seek special exemptions from the Dunbarton Oaks 
proposals in order to keep an unencumbered right of enforcement action against 
Germany should a threat re- emerge from that country. The Soviet Union was 
particularly concerned that potential action through its bilateral defence pacts might 
be subjected to Security Council oversight, as were regional arrangements, after the 
extinction of the special rights accorded to the wartime victors under the transitional 
arrangements provisions (Section XII) of the Dunbarton Oaks proposals. 
UNCIO debates on regional arrangements 
The UNCIO debates on regional arrangements surely rate as one of the more epic 
aspects of the San Francisco Conference. What became clear for the United States 
was that failure to strike a compromise with Latin American countries on regional 
enforcement action - they then made up two -fifths of the 51 nation UN membership 
- could imperil the success of the conference and harm the U.S. relationship with its 
southern neighbours. To a degree, the United States had shown some sympathy 
towards the Soviet and French positions. The German question had received special 
consideration at Dunbarton Oaks and the United States understood that however 
strong its desire for a powerful universal organisation, its latitude for negotiation on 
the issue was limited by the views held by the latter two countries. But the 
unexpectedly strong opinions of Latin American governments on regional 
enforcement presented American negotiators with a dilemma Europeans had indeed 
been granted special rights in dealing with the possibility of a resurgent threat from 
Germany. However, in the name of universalism, the nascent inter- American security 
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system - of which, iconically, the United States was the most prominent and 
influential member - could have its actions stunted by a veto of the Security Council. 
This proved to be unacceptable to Latin American countries. 
During the UNCIO the position of the United States delegation to Committee 
III /4 (regional arrangements), led by the pro -PanAmerican senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, eventually converged with that of Latin American states. Despite the 
overriding American desire for a strong universal organisation, the United States 
found strategic reasons for leaning towards the position of its Latin neighbours. The 
State Department realised that should a serious Latin American dispute require United 
States military involvement, and should another member of the Security Council veto 
action by the pertinent inter- American security arrangements, the United States might 
be placed in the impossible situation of contemplating the use of force thus 
disregarding a Security Council decision, something which might quickly spell the end 
of the UN's credibility. 
After a tortuous and sometime acrimonious debate on the exceptionalism of 
regional enforcement action, the conundrum was finally resolved. The United States 
introduced a proposal developing the concept of a right of collective self -defence 
partly inspired by a pre -conference French amendment on the right of individual 
member states to "act in the interest of peace, right and justice ".14 The proposal 
allowed individual states, or states which were members of defence pacts or regional 
security alliances, to act in self -defence until the Security Council took the necessary 
measures to restore international peace and security. After further refinements to the 
text, considerable negotiations with the British and the Soviets, and backdoor 
discussions between the American and Latin American delegates, the American 
amendment eventually satisfied all key players on this issue. It was to become Article 
51, one the pivotal peace and security provisions enshrined in the UN Charter.15 
A major political hurdle had been crossed with the agreement on regional 
enforcement action; the principle of universalism had been upheld while at the same 
time providing for exceptions in cases of self -defence. Still, a number of states 
continued to raise important issues. For instance, New Zealand proposed that not 
only should regional arrangements be consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter, 
but also that the UN also should approve them. The proposal was rejected (though a 
more or less formal recognition process emerged in UN practice thereafter). France 
and the Soviet Union continued their drive to ensure that they would have 
unrestricted right of action in the event of a renewal of German aggression. For their 
part, Latin American countries, led by Colombia, raised the fear that in cases of pacific 
settlement of disputes the UN Security Council could bypass a regional arrangement 
before the latter had the chance to demonstrate its effectiveness. This led the 
Colombian delegation to submit an interpretation of the proposed Article 52 of the 
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Charter to the effect that where a regional arrangement exists for the purpose of 
peaceful settlement of disputes, the Security Council should limit its actions and let 
regional procedures run their course until the moment the latter were demonstrated to 
be ineffective. Only then would the Security Council have the freedom to propose 
measures for the settlement of the dispute. However, in the case where pacific 
settlement of dispute measures proved ineffective and an armed attack upon a state 
member of a regional arrangement occurred, self -defence, either individual or 
collective, could be invoked until such time as the Security Council could restore 
peace and security. Both elements of the Colombian interpretation were accepted by 
the Committee." 
Egypt was also to play a notable part in the discussions on regionalism. As the 
host country of the recently formed Arab League (the League was formed in March 
1945) and self -appointed leader of the Arab world, Egypt saw itself as the natural 
defender of Arab interests at the UNCIO. But unlike Latin American countries, it 
found few allies in Committee III /4 and was particularly unsuccessful in having its 
proposals accepted. Egypt took the position that the section of the Charter that dealt 
with regional arrangements was not intended to cover military pacts, but rather 
regional arrangements of a general nature such as the Pan -American Union and the 
Arab League. It had insisted early in the conference, without success, that social and 
economic aspects of regional activities should be incorporated into the regional 
arrangements provisions of the UN Charter. Amongst a number of Egyptian 
amendments was the following proposal to define what constituted a permanent 
regional arrangement: 
There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a 
permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries 
which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, 
linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible 
for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and 
for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the 
safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and 
cultural relations.l» 
The Egyptian delegation twice introduced this amendment and both times it 
encountered the opposition of the United States, supported on this point by other 
influential national participants in Committee III /4. The American delegation argued 
that no definition could cover all possible types of arrangements, and that, in any 
event, the important issue was not what constituted a regional arrangement but rather 
whether or not such arrangements were consistent with the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter. Underlying this position was no doubt a desire of other national 
delegations that supported the U.S. position to keep the door open for regional 
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arrangements which might be strictly political and military in nature rather than 
multipurpose. 
The final text of the UN Charter section on regional arrangements, Chapter 
VIII, represented substantial modifications to the Dunbarton Oaks proposals. It was 
a political compromise between advocates strong universalism and effective 
regionalism based on the specific interests of states expressed during at the time of the 
UNCIO. The UN Security Council, with its exclusive enforcement powers, was to be 
the ultimate authority for the maintenance of international peace and security. But 
regional arrangements or agencies could play an important, indeed prominent role in 
the pacific settlement of disputes; they could be used by the Council for enforcement 
action; and under the collective self -defence provisions of article 51 they could initiate 
military actions in self -defence until the Security Council could restore peace and 
security. As discussed in Chapter 1, this proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the 
supporters of a strong universal body. The prominent regional arrangements which 
emerged during the Cold War were not those claiming to come under Chapter VIII, as 
the UN Charter had originally intended, but rather regional collective defence 
arrangements which effectively institutionalised Article 51 by the formation of 
permanent structures such as the North Atlantic Affiance, SEATO, and the Warsaw 
Pact. 
The ambiguous Chapter VIII 
Debate of a legal nature on the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement has not been a central feature of the post -Cold War debate on the 
role of regional organisations. Rather, the focus has been placed on assessing their 
institutional capabilities in the field of conflict management and trying to enhance 
their capabilities in that respect. Nevertheless, highlighting some of the ambiguities in 
the UN Charter on this issue remains important for two reasons. First, because since 
the publication of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, many commentators and policymakers, 
not least Boutros -Ghali, have called for a 'revival' of Chapter VIII and a greater 
involvement of regional organisations in the prevention, management and resolution 
of regional conflict. And second, because the failure of European and African 
regional organisations to act decisively in such places as the former Yugoslavia, the 
Horn of Africa or Central Africa has cast serious doubts on the possibility of 
achieving an effective division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. 
As seen in the preceding section, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides 
the normative framework for the role of regional 'arrangements and agencies' in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, along with Articles 33 and 37 
(Chapter VI) and Article 51 (Chapter VII). It is not the intent here to present a 
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comprehensive article -by- article interpretation of Chapter VIII. Numerous analyses 
have been proposed in the past and launching into such an exercise would not add in 
any particular way to a contemporary understanding of the problems of regional 
organisations and arrangements in the field of conflict management.18 Neither is the 
intention to describe all the circumstances in which the Security Council has invoked 
provisions of Chapter VIII in the last few years. Chapter VIII has had a complex and 
chequered history since the heady days of the San Francisco Conference, notably in 
relation to American -led OAS actions against Cuba and OAS decisions regarding the 
crisis in the Dominican Republic in the mid- 1960s.19 However, despite what is 
indisputably a very significant growth in regional actions in the first half of the 1990s, 
an examination of early post -Cold War Security Council decisions would fail to 
produce controversial cases that have truly tested Chapter VIII. Indeed, what seems 
most remarkable about recent Council decision -making in relation to the role of 
regional organisations is how relatively seldom Chapter VIII provisions have been 
directly invoked (most references by the UNSC to Chapter VIII were made in 1992 
and 1993).20 
Before examining the ambiguities of the UN Charter on the issue of regional 
action, it is pertinent to remind the reader of the relevant sections (in abbreviated 
form) of the Charter regarding regional arrangements. 
Chapter VI 
Art. 33(1): Parties to any dispute which are likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security may resort, among other 
means, to regional agencies or arrangements to settle their differences 
through peaceful measures. 
Art. 37(1): Should the parties to a dispute fail to resolve their differences 
through the measures indicated in Art. 33, they shall refer it to the Security 
Council. 
Chapter VII 
Art. 51: Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self -defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of 
the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by member 
states in self -defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
to take at any time actions it deems necessary to maintain and restore 
international peace and security. 
Chapter VIII 
Art. 52(1): Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies provided they are consistent with the purposes 
and principles of the UN charter. 
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Art. 52(2): Regional organisations should make every effort to achieve 
pacific settlement of disputes before referrng them to the Security 
Council. 
Art. 52(3): The Security Council shall encourage the development of 
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or 
by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or 
by reference from the Security Council. 
Art. 53(1): The Security Council shall, where appropriate, use regional 
organisations for enforcement purposes under its authority, but no 
regional organisation or arrangement can undertake enforcement actions 
without the Council's authorisation. 
Art. 54: The Security Council shall be kept fully informed of the activities 
undertaken or in contemplation by regional arrangements and agencies for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
A careful reading of the Charter raises several important questions relating to 
regional arrangements and agencies, questions that have both a juridical and practical 
impact. Firstly, while the absence of a definition of what constitutes a regional 
arrangement in the Charter certainly provides interpretive flexibility, the issue 
obviously bears on the division of labour between regional arrangements and the UN. 
If the Charter does not provide specific guidance as to what constitutes a regional 
arrangement, and consequently on how such arrangements are to be recognised, under 
what circumstances, then, are such arrangements bound by the provisions of Chapter 
VIII? 
A review of UN practice demonstrates that even though there may not be a 
formal, i.e. UN Charter- based, process whereby regional arrangements are recognised 
as Chapter VIII organisations or arrangements, there does exist, nevertheless, a 
political recognition process. This process is based on (1) the fulfilment of certain 
requirements (e.g. consistency with the aims of the UN Charter, regional character, 
presence of an organisation), and (2) on the political recognition of the arrangement 
by the Security Council or General Assembly through its resolutions. It is in this 
manner that in the past such classic multi- purpose regional organisations as the OAS 
and the OAU were recognised as Chapter VIII organisations. The Arab League is 
also considered to be an arrangement falling under Chapter VIII. Because of the 
anti- Israel stance of its membership early in the postwar period, however, recognition 
of this claim originally proved to be problematic 21 With respect to the more recent 
experience of the UN, it is fair to say that the Security Council retains very wide 
discretionary powers on such matters, and over the last decade it has sanctioned all 
manner of regional actions and initiatives in the peace and security field. 
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A second important, indeed fundamental, issue arising from the Charter 
concerns the division of labour between the United Nations and regional 
organisations. The UN Charter relies heavily on the voluntarism of regional 
organisations when it comes to the pacific settlement of disputes, encouraging them to 
settle local disputes at the regional level before referring them to the Security Council. 
At the same time, the Security Council has a right to investigate any dispute at any 
stage (Art. 34 and Art. 36 of the Charter) and has the authority to decide on the 
existence of a threat to international peace and security (Art. 39 of the Charter). 
Moreover, the Charter states that any member of the UN may bring any dispute to the 
attention of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) or the Security Council (Art. 35 of 
the Charter). Thus, we find that the Charter states a general principle in Chapter VIII 
that may, in principle, be circumvented at any stage either by a UN member state or 
by the Security Council on its own initiative. 
Notwithstanding the particular circumstances that led to the development of 
Chapter VIII in 1945, the provisions of the Charter regarding regional arrangements 
and dispute resolution can either be regarded as allowing considerable flexibility or be 
so open -ended as to preclude the development of a clear division of labour between 
the UN and regional arrangements. States unhappy with regional conflict settlement 
procedures may bypass a regional organisation and bring their grievances directly to 
the Security Council (which may or may not decide to consider them formally) They 
may ignore regional dispute settlement mechanisms altogether and go directly to the 
General Assembly or the Security Council, and although Chapter VIII directs states 
who are parties to regional organisations to make every effort to settle their disputes 
through these organisations before referring it to the Security Council, the dispute in 
question may be taken up simultaneously at the regional level and at the UN. Thus, 
one can probably conclude that the original Colombian interpretation of Chapter VIII 
was in reality only one amongst a number of possibilities allowed in the Charter. 
Issues related to enforcement action are similarly very complex. According to 
Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, the "Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize 
regional organisations for enforcement action under its authority ". Several aspects of 
Article 53 remain problematic, however. Firstly, given the contemporary tendency 
toward a blurring of the traditional difference between traditional peacekeeping and 
enforcement in many recent UN and regional peace operations, the use of the term 
'enforcement' in Article 53 begs clarification. Where do 'robust' peacekeeping 
operations cease to be peacekeeping and become enforcement actions? This thorny 
question has caused the UN innumerable problems in the last few years and it is no 
less problematic for regional organisations undertaking, or contemplating, 
peacekeeping actions. 
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Perhaps an even more fundamental problem with Article 53 is that it is be 
politically very difficult, if not impossible, for the Security Council to direct an regional 
organisation to carry out an enforcement action. Why? First, because such a 
momentous decision may not carry the support of the members of the regional 
organisation in question, or they may strongly disagree with the approach and 
decisions of some of the members of Security Council regarding a given crisis. And 
second, because the vast majority of extant regional bodies, particularly those in the 
developing world, are neither equipped nor structured to carry out military operations, 
nor do they have strong constitutional powers allowing them to impose economic or 
other sanctions against their membership. 
The financial aspects of this question are extremely important. The UN's 
chronic difficulties in funding new peace operations in recent years have clearly 
demonstrated that financial considerations cannot be dismissed as secondary issues. 
Such considerations have in fact become issues of primary importance. If the 
Council, on its own volition, were to mandate - as opposed to agree to or authorise - 
a military enforcement action through a regional organisation, it is more than likely 
that the UN would be under heavy pressure to bear the cost of the operation.n Yet in 
the UN's history there are no precedents for UN- assessed contributions financing 
non -UN commanded operations, be they in the form of multinational coalitions or 
through regional organisations. The possibility of such an occurrence, therefore, 
appears fairly remote if one considers that record. Again, the Charter appears to rely 
on the voluntarism of regional organisations rather than on a clear definition of 
obligations between the UN and regional organisations. The implications of the 
foregoing analysis should not be under -estimated, particularly in light of the views put 
forward to the effect that the UN should 'sub -contract' conflict management tasks, 
including peacekeeping and enforcement tasks, to regional organisations. 
Two other aspects of the Charter remain particularly problematic as regards 
regional organisations and arrangements: (1) the long -standing debate surrounding the 
specific conditions under which self -defence, including collective self -defence, can be 
invoked, and; (2) the complex issue of sovereignty and intervention in internal 
conflicts. 
Trying to define what constitutes self -defence has long been a grey area of 
international law, especially in light of the fact that Article 51 of the Charter does not 
spell out in detail what constitutes that right and how it can be exercised. Tom Farer 
has remarked that through their persistent invocation of the possibility of self -defence 
in cases other than clear violations of territorial integrity, the United States and other 
major powers have, over the years, "occupied the interpretive space the founding 
fathers left" on this issue, thus widening considerably the boundaries of the concept of 
self -defence 23 Most authors agree that necessity and proportionality are the two 
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fundamental elements of self -defence. But over the years there have been many 
interpretations, both restrictive and expansive, of how and when that right can be 
exercised. 
The issue that arises as far as regional organisations and arrangements are 
concerned is the ambiguity between Article 51 and Article 53. On the one hand, the 
Charter authorises collective self -defence (Art. 51), while on the other hand it states 
that no enforcement action shall be taken without the authorisation of the Security 
Council (Art. 53). Given the wide scope of cases where self -defence has been invoked 
during the postwar and post -Cold War periods, one presumes regional arrangements 
and coalitions could avail themselves of the 'interpretive space' discussed above and 
take decisions on the use of force without going to the Security Council. It was 
certainly the case during the Cold War that military alliances coming under Article 51 
of the Charter, such as NATO or ANZUS, were not bound to prior approval by the 
Security Council for the exercising of self -defence. In fact, an obligation to the 
contrary would have made a mockery of the concept. Has the end of the Cold War 
made it more difficult for regional organisations to make decisions on the use of force 
without prior approval of the Security Council? Recent experience in such places as 
Liberia and Bosnia, and more recently in Kosovo, has shown that this issue is more 
ambiguous than ever. This is particularly the case when peacekeeping forces or 
monitoring missions are deployed in situations of internal conflicts. On the one hand 
there is a duty of impartiality, on the other, a duty to ensure the fulfilment of a 
mandate or to defend certain principles, often with marginal or conditional support 
from warring parties on the ground.24 
Another ambiguous area of the Charter with regard to international peace and 
security is the long -standing controversy surrounding the question of state sovereignty 
and non -interference in the internal affairs of states, most particularly in reference to 
Article 2(7), but also, by extension, to Article 2(4).25 Although not specifically related 
to the question of regional organisations and arrangements, the issue obviously 
informs their scope for action. If, for example, regional arrangements can only carry 
out enforcement action with the authorisation of the Security Council, then the 
Council has to make an a priori judgment on the compatibility of the action being 
contemplated with the obligations of the UN vis -à -vis Article 2(7). 
In recent years, conventional legal theory on this issue has been largely 
overshadowed by the willingness of the UN Security Council to authorise 
peacekeeping or humanitarian action within states, either with or without the consent 
of the conflicting parties on the ground.26 Of the two cases, the former can be 
considered as being by far the most preferable situation. Acting with the prior 
consent of former disputants, for example, the UN has been recently called on to help 
rebuild states after years of civil war in Cambodia and Mozambique. Prior agreement 
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from the conflicting parties also permitted the UN to play an important role in 
facilitating the transition to peace in Central American countries. Conditions of lack 
of consent or limited consent, however, usually make for far more problematic and 
potentially divisive situations. As the interventions in Somalia and in the former 
Yugoslavia demonstrated, the humanitarian impulse that motivated international 
action did not in and of itself prove sufficient to sustain decisive international action 
on the broader political- military situation. 
Notwithstanding the serious problems associated with some of the latter 
interventions, a strict reading of Article 2(7) is now considered anachronistic by most 
Western governments, a fact that was amply demonstrated by the Security Council's 
creative (re)interpretation of the UN Charter when it authorised the dispatch of a 
humanitarian Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia in December 1992.27 Perhaps a 
Canadian diplomat best summed up Western opinion when he stated that "the 
mantras of non -intervention are becoming increasingly ritualistic ".28 The problem, 
however, is that this view remains controversial amongst a large number of developing 
states which, at least from a declaratory standpoint, cling to a much more orthodox 
notion of state sovereignty. For historical as well as geopolitical reasons, major 
regional powers such as Brazil, China, India and Nigeria are especially concerned that 
a relaxation of the norm of non -interference might hurt their sovereign status and 
justify greater international pressure, if not intervention, in what they regard as strictly 
domestic matters. 
In essence, the question presents itself not in the form of legal debate, but in 
the question of attitudinal dispositions towards the notion of collective responsibility. 
The adherence of some governments to a traditionalist conception of state sovereignty 
certainly presents weighty obstacles to the development of more effective regional 
organisation for the prevention and management of infra -state conflict. On the other 
hand, and as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, there are also indications that some regional 
communities are, at least from a declaratory standpoint, willing to entertain a greater 
collective role in preventing and managing internal conflict. 
The Role of Regional Organisations: UN Debates (1992 -1996) 
From the UN's perspective, the early 1990s seemed to indicate a growing willingness 
on the part of regional organisations to play a more direct role in the management of 
regional disputes. Whether in Liberia, Central America or Yugoslavia, regional and 
sub -regional institutions were either taking the lead in conflict management or acting 
in collaboration with UN efforts. Thus, it should not be surprising that in 1992 the 
new UN Secretary -General would look towards reviving Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. 
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In the four years that followed the publication of An Agenda for Peace, an 
important debate took place on the issue, both within and outside the confines of the 
UN. Like so many other aspects of the Agenda, it was heavily influenced by 
developments in such places as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda where 
international and regional institutions were found wanting, and concepts such as 
preventive diplomacy and peace -building proved extremely difficult to apply in 
practice. Still, numerous developments took place. Many went relatively unnoticed, 
for example, the plethora of UNGA resolutions regarding regional organisations, 
while others such as the very open disagreements between NATO and the UN over 
the use of force in the former Yugoslavia in 1994 -1995 brought into sharper focus the 
complex nature of the issues involved. 
For analytical clarity the following sections focus solely on the regional 
arrangement issue within the framework proposed in the Agenda. While this question 
is admittedly inseparable from some of the other aspects of Boutros Boutros -Ghali's 
proposals, it is worthy of a separate and detailed treatment, both because of the 
distinctiveness of the issues involved and because the question of regional 
arrangements in the recent literature has been largely overshadowed by the wider 
debate on the UN's own conflict management role. 
Regional arrangements in An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros -Ghali called for a revival of Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter under the rationale of lightening the burden of the Security Council and 
contributing to a sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in world 
affairs. His proposals could be broken down into three basic propositions. The first 
one was essentially a statement of fact. The Cold War impaired Chapter VIII from 
working as originally intended and, in some instances, regional arrangements had 
undermined the effectiveness of the UN. The second proposition gave the direction 
of his vision on regional arrangements. With the end of the Cold War, a new sense of 
cooperation and solidarity could be developed, particularly if regional arrangements or 
agencies acted both in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the 
UN Charter and if their relationship with the Security Council was governed by 
Chapter VIII. The third proposition identified the instruments for the realisation of 
this vision: early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement and post -conflict peace -building. These were the different conflict 
management concepts and instruments that Boutros -Ghali elaborated on in An Agenda 
for use both by the UN and by regional organisations. 
The haziness of the proposals was noteworthy, especially when compared with 
the more specific nature of some of the other proposals contained in the Agenda. In 
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effect, their basic thrust was that in the post -Cold War period, regional arrangements 
and agencies could, in certain circumstances, play a useful role in the maintenance of 
peace and security, especially when the Security Council supported their action. In 
and of itself this hardly constituted a revolutionary proposition. Moreover, 
considering the long -standing problems surrounding the division of labour issue - 
problems which at the time of the publication of the Agenda were more than evident 
in numerous locations where the UN and regional organisations were jointly involved 
- the lack of a more detailed discussion on the subject was surprising It either 
reflected a calculated reluctance to engage the issue in detail for fear of putting off 
balance certain regional bodies, or it represented an attempt to flag the issue in a 
diplomatic manner, with the expectation that it would eventually be raised in ensuing 
debates (which it was). 
Another puzzling aspect of the Agenda relates to the statement: "should the 
Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or 
organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to 
lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort" (para. 65). 
Undeniably, UN Security Council support for a given regional effort, even if only 
declaratory, may increase its perceived legitimacy (though not necessarily its 
effectiveness). However, what is rather surprising about this statement is that it 
appeared to imply that regional organisations need the authorisation of the Council in 
order to take the lead in addressing a regional crisis. Yet, as seen in a previous section, 
Art. 52(2) of the UN Charter strongly encourages regional action before referring a 
dispute to the Security Council. Moreover, given the inconsistency with which the 
Security Council has applied the UN Charter's rules concerning the use of force by all 
types of regional organisations - notably in relation to regional action in Liberia, the 
former Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union - it would appear that the traditional 
argument that there is an absolute need for them to gain the Council's approval under 
Art. 53 is only applicable under specific conditions. Here the problem lies with the 
new circumstances under which force is exercised, more often than not peace or 
stability operations in situations of internal conflict, whereas the founders of the 
Charter had in mind the more conventional collective security notion of repelling 
inter -state aggression by an invading state. 
In spite of the rather vague statements of An Agenda for Peace on regional 
arrangements, there was nonetheless a novelty value in putting forth these proposals. 
The Agenda recognised the growing activism of regional organizations in the peace and 
security field and put the crucial question of Chapter VIII of the Charter and the 
relationship between the UN and regional organisations on the UN agenda, an issue 
that had been left dormant for decades. Here the personal interest of Boutros -Ghali 
on these matters should not be viewed merely as an interesting footnote. It became 
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obvious in 1992, and more particularly in 1993 in the context of the debates on An 
Agenda, that the UN Secretary- General was the major driving force behind the renewal 
of UN thinking on the question of regional arrangements.29 With his eagerness to 
promote greater cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, and his 
emphasis on the need for greater regional responsibility, Boutros -Ghali continually 
attempted to push the issue forward. 
While in 1992 the level of interest in regional arrangements at the UN could 
be characterised as healthy, in 1993 the debate on the Agenda was essentially overtaken 
by events far from UN headquarters in New York. By the middle of that year the 
worsening situation in both Somalia and Yugoslavia had had a profound impact on 
international opinion. In both cases, the UN had attempted to operationalise every 
conflict management concept found in An Agenda, including cooperation with 
regional arrangements, and yet in both cases the situation had deteriorated. In mid - 
1994, this situation was further compounded by the disastrous turn of events in 
Rwanda, which for many epitomised the inherent weakness of the UN peace and 
security system. For many governments, as well as for the UN, these crises had 
brought home the considerable political and practical difficulties of implementing the 
UN's 'new thinking' 30 
Responses to An Agenda for Peace 
The following sections examine the responses to Boutros -Ghali's proposals on 
regional organisations through recent UN debates. References will be made to 
relevant developments in UNGA, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat in 
New York. The responses from regional organisations to the UN proposals are also 
examined. 
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
Anyone familiar with the inner workings of the UN knows that the UN General 
Asembly is a rather unwieldy body for the formulation of UN policy. At each of its 
annual sessions, it adopts literally hundreds of floridly worded resolutions, which, on 
paper, make it appear as though it were a powerful body with the power to alter the 
course of international relations. International politics has dictated otherwise, 
however. The permanent members of the Security Council retain an overwhelming 
influence on the UN's peace and security agenda, whereas the Assembly remains an 
essentially deliberative body that oversees the UN's work and adopts broad priorities 
for the organisation and its myriad of specialised agencies 31 
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From time to time, certain peace and security issues have attracted the support 
of such a high number of UNGA members that the UN has been compelled to put 
them on its agenda, often despite the reluctance of major powers. Such was the case 
of the nuclear weapons free zone concept in the 1970s, for example.32 Still, one 
cannot escape the fact that the practical relevance of the General Assembly's work has 
been questioned for decades. Today its overloaded annual agenda remains cluttered 
with dozens of repetitive or procedural items, which take up valuable time and often 
prevent it from playing a more relevant and timely role in current issues and problems 
facing the international community. 
While UNGA has played a role in the initial review of An Agenda for Peace 
through an 'Informal Open -Ended Working Group' which was supportive of the 
Secretary- General's proposals, it is difficult to conclude that it has been at the 
forefront of UN policy development on conflict management issues. Rather, it has 
sanctioned already existing proposals and consolidated ideas put forth both by the UN 
Secretariat and individual member states. Nevertheless, regarding regional 
organisations specifically, there have been a number of recent resolutions that give the 
flavour of UNGA direction on this matter. 
In December 1992, the Assembly adopted Resolution 47/120 on preventive 
diplomacy which, inter alia, called on the Secretary -General and the Security Council to 
consult, as appropriate, with regional organisations, in order to develop appropriate 
strategies for the peaceful settlement of disputes.33 The wording of the resolution is 
ambiguous in its reference to the external /internal nature of disputes; the words 
settlement of disputes between 'parties' and 'states' are both used. But the resolution 
also states that the General Assembly "may recommend measures for the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which is deemed likely to impair the 
general welfare or friendly relations among nations." Resolution 47/120 also called on 
regional organisations to "play a leading role in developing confidence -building 
measures appropriate to the region concerned and to coordinate their efforts in this 
regard with the United Nations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the 
United Nations." 
A year later, in December 1993, UNGA adopted Resolution 48/42 on a 
comprehensive review of peacekeeping which, inter alia, requested the Secretary - 
General to "review and improve arrangements for training civilian, police and military 
peace -keeping personnel, using the appropriate capabilities of Member States, regional 
organizations and arrangements, in accordance with their constitutional mandates and 
Chapter VIII of the Charter [...] ".34 The resolution encouraged the involvement of 
regional organisations and arrangements, as appropriate and "in accordance with their 
respective areas of competence", 'and welcomed efforts by the UN Secretariat to 
develop, in consultation with member states, a set of guidelines governing cooperation 
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between them and the UN. Finally, it also called on the UN to consider ways to 
provide advice and assistance to regional organisations and arrangements in order to 
enhance their capacity to cooperate with the United Nations in the field of 
peacekeeping operations. 
Another relevant resolution adopted by UNGA in December 1994 emanates 
from the Special Charter Commíttee.35 The Declaration on the Enhancement of 
Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements and Agencies in 
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security' (Resolution 49/57) is the final 
result of a Russian -sponsored draft declaration on which discussion first began in 
1992.36 This is a comprehensive statement covering most aspects of the conflict 
management spectrum (i.e. confidence building, early warning, fact finding, preventive 
diplomacy, peace observation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, enforcement, peace - 
building). Essentially, it reiterated the broad principles of Chapter VIII of the Charter; 
it sought to enhance cooperation and coordination between regional organisations and 
arrangements, and it encouraged the use or development of regional early- warning, 
conflict prevention and pacific settlement methods, as well as the development of 
regional capabilities in the field of peace observation, fact fording and peacekeeping. 
Two other important aspects of this document are noteworthy. First, in its 
preamble the declaration underlined the necessity of respecting the principles of state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non -intervention. Second, 
the document stated that "cooperation between regional organisations or 
arrangements and the UN should conform to the formers respective mandates, scope 
and composition, and should take place in forms that are suited to each specific 
situation, in accordance with the Charter." It appears that this formulation has been 
adopted as a central operating principle by the UN Secretariat and the Security 
Council in light of the many coordination problems that surfaced in the 1992 -1994 
time frame between the UN and regional bodies. 
There are, of course, a plethora of other recent UNGA resolutions or 
documents mentioning the role of regional organisations and arrangements. 
Attempting to list all of them here would be a pointless exercise. Of note is the 
long -standing UNGA practice of adopting declarations of cooperation between the 
UN and specific regional organisations, declarations that are adopted annually with 
almost predictable regularity. Of particular interest in this regard is the addition in 
1993 of the CSCE (now OSCE) to the list of regional organisations that have 
formalised their relationship with the UN 37 The recent evolution of the UN -OAU 
relationship is also noteworthy. An examination of 1994 and 1995 UNGA documents 
indicates that the OAU became the object of considerable UN attention in the 
conflict management field, having been singled out by the UN Secretariat and a 
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number of major states as one of the regional organisations most in need of 
international support 38 
Finally, a statement by the 49th UNGA Session President, Amara Essy of the 
Ivory Coast, is also worthy of mention in this section.39 Speaking at a UN seminar in 
Salzburg, Austria, in July 1995, the then president of the General Assembly made the 
remarkable suggestion that relations between the UN and regional organisations in the 
field of peacekeeping should be institutionalised along the lines of Article 63 of the 
UN Charter.4c Article 63, which defines how a number of UN specialised agencies are 
brought into formal relationship with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
states that "[ ECOSOC] may co- ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies [...] ". 
In essence, Essy argued for a much deeper formalisation of UN- regional organisations 
relations, with, one presumes, the Security Council as the hub and regional 
organisations as the spokes of the UN international security system. 
It appears extremely unlikely that any existing regional organisation would 
agree to such an approach, either now or in the foreseeable future. If the logic of 
Article 63 were to be followed, then Essÿ s proposal would have the effect of reducing 
their autonomy vis -à -vis the UN. However, the inescapable reality appears to be that 
those proposals that would have precisely this effect are essentially doomed to 
irrelevance. It can also be noted that Essy s proposal did not exactly run parallel with 
the UN Secretariat's own thinking on the issue. Nevertheless, his suggestion was 
certainly not an isolated one. There have been other calls, particularly from the 
academic world, for a more formalised relationship between the UN and regional 
organisations. 
The UN Security Council 
In recent years, the Security Council has both acknowledged and welcomed the 
growing role of regional organisations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace 
and security. Be it in relation to specific conflicts in Central America, Africa, the 
Former Yugoslavia, the CIS, and others, the Council has generally embraced regional 
preventive diplomacy actions and regional peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in 
dozens of its resolutions. In their May 1993 final statement on the examination of An 
Agenda for Peace, the members of the Security Council called upon regional 
organisations and arrangements to "consider ways and means of enhancing their 
contributions to the maintenance of peace and security ".41 In the same document, the 
Council also expressed its readiness to "support and facilitate, taking into account 
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specific circumstances, peace -keeping efforts undertaken in the framework of regional 
organizations and arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter." 
Individually, all the permanent members, bar China, have actively contributed 
to the UN debate on the matter.42 An examination of recent P5 Heads of State and 
Foreign Ministers speeches at opening sessions of the UN General Assembly reveals 
that the role played by regional organisations in dealing with regional conflict has 
become an important issue. France and the United Kingdom have been especially 
concerned with the development of European regional organisations and the 
improvement of African conflict management capabilities.43 For its part, Russia, 
which initiated the 1994 Declaration of Cooperation between the UN and Regional 
Organisations discussed in the previous section, has been eager to have the CIS 
recognised as a Chapter VIII organisation.44 
Here a comment on the CIS is in order. Despite its wishes, Russia has been 
unsuccessful in its bid to have its peacekeeping troops granted 'blue -helmet' status by 
the UN, and it has thus far failed to reach an agreement with the OSCE on so -called 
'third party' forces engaged in peacekeeping. Western countries have been extremely 
reluctant to grant Russian peacekeeping troops an exceptional status without some 
form of international oversight. Russia, on the other hand, has been generally 
opposed to UN or OSCE oversight on the grounds it constitutes interference in its 
affairs. 
Tom Farer has argued that "nothing of consequence turns on the designation 
[as a Chapter VIII organisation] ".45 Russian diplomacy obviously believes otherwise, 
namely that such recognition does in fact put a legitimising blanket over Russian 
peacekeeping within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, and that the formal 
recognition of the CIS at the UN (which was arguably granted in 1994) could 
constitute a basis for claiming UN financial assistance. Relevant precedents exist, for 
example, UN fmancial assistance (on a voluntary basis) to the Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, and UN technical 
and fmancial assistance to the OAU's conflict management mechanism. The fact that 
ECOWAS, a Western African sub -regional organisation, is not generally recognised as 
a Chapter VIII organisation, probably makes it an even more relevant example from 
the Russian perspective. 
The U.S. position towards regional organisations is summarised in the 
unclassified summary of PDD -25, the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive on 
multilateral operations. The document stated: 
In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to 
involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN 
as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping 
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operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve 
regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities.46 
The same document also set a number of conditions for U.S. support for 
regional peacekeeping operations: 1) adherence to the principles of the UN Charter; 2) 
consent of the parties; 3) formal Security Council oversight; and 4) finite renewal 
mandates. Interestingly, the document expressed the view that requests for UN 
blue -helmeted operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union will be 
considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors outlined previously. 
This could only be interpreted as an oblique statement to the effect that the United 
States was unwilling to accord special peacekeeping privileges to Russia. In practice, 
however, American policymakers have been restrained in their criticism of Russian 
peacekeeping, in part because they want to avoid damaging U.S.- Russia relations at a 
time when democratic forces in Russia are fairly weak, and also because the United 
States tacitly recognises that Russia does indeed have legitimate security interests in its 
so -called 'near abroad'. 
Expressions of support for an enhanced role for regional organisations have 
also come from the G8.47 For seven years in a row (1992 -1998) G7/G78 summit 
declarations have supported various regional initiatives related to preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.48 Although the G8 is not technically an 
international agency with operational responsibilities, its powerful membership has a 
considerable say in the setting of the international security agenda, and its annual 
summits contribute to an important extent to the direction taken by what is referred 
to as the 'international community' on matters of high politics. Moreover, with its 
active role in the search for an end to the Kosovo conflict, this body is now seen as 
having considerable diplomatic potential. Apart from the four members of the 
Security Council now taking part in G8 political discussions (in 1995 Russia secured a 
seat in G7 political discussions, group explaining why the group is now referred to as 
the G8), it should be remembered that two other G8 members, Germany and Japan, 
are strong contenders for a seat at the UN Security Council if and when an 
enlargement of the Council becomes a genuine possibility.49 
To leave the above overview at this point would be both insufficient and 
simplistic. It would be difficult to argue that the apparent embrace of the Security 
Council towards regional organisations has always represented a true vote of 
confidence. Praising regional efforts may make for good declaratory diplomacy, but 
recent experience indicates that many such demonstrations of institutional good 
neighbourliness have often masked institutional rivalries and political differences, or 
have led to unrealistic expectations as to what regional organisations and arrangements 
are really able to accomplish. 
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The fact is that in recent years, the Security Council has spent considerable 
time and effort reacting to situations which regional organisations or arrangements 
proved unable to resolve on their own despite the Council's backing of their efforts, 
be it in Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. While 
it's true that in most of these situations it was never suggested that regional bodies 
should have 'ownership' of the conflict management process, in others it was. The 
EC's failed intercession in Yugoslavia (1991- 1992), which was enacted on the principle 
that in the post -Cold War European states, through their common institutions, were 
best placed to solve European problems, is now a notorious example of the latter 
case. 
The whole issue of Security Council support for regional action is further 
complicated by the knowledge that despite the Council's overture towards regional 
bodies, there has, in fact, not been a single example of an unequivocal Chapter VIII 
enforcement mandate given to a specific regional organisation in the 1990 to 1998 
period. As seen earlier in this chapter, regional organisations are not formally required 
to obtain Security Council approval for undertaking peacekeeping operations. In 
principle, however, they do need it before undertaking enforcement actions. On that 
count, the recent practice of the Council, at least in the Bosnia case, has been to seek 
approval of the Council to authorise limited or specific enforcement actions by 
NATO under Chapter VII of the Charter. One hastens to note, however, that this 
was done after the NATO membership had already decided to contemplate such 
action; a reality that simply underlines the national interests behind much of the UN 
Security Council's decision -making 
Responses from regional organisations 
In January 1993, the Security Council invited Secretary -General Boutros -Ghali to seek 
replies from regional organisations and arrangements on the proposals of the Agenda 
with a view to promoting the ideas contained therein and to solicit proposals on how 
to improve inter -institutional coordination.50 A wide variety of organisations 
responded to the Secretary -General's calls, but it is relevant to note that some 
important regional groupings, such as ASEAN and the GCC, did not, to the 
knowledge of the author, present submissions 51 
The replies received from the major regional organisations followed an 
interesting pattern. Transatlantic and European organisations (CSCE, NATO, EC, 
WEU) recalled their recent activities in the field of conflict management, particularly 
in the former Yugoslavia. They expressed general support for the ideas contained in 
An Agenda; and they stressed that their activities had, in many cases, been undertaken 
in support of the UN or the CSCE (now OSCE) mandates or decisions. The CSCE 
highlighted the need for better cooperation amongst European organisations in order 
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to make full use of available resources, while both it and the EC mentioned the need 
for flexibility in dealing with each specific situation. Both NATO and the CSCE 
suggested improving the flow and quality of communication with and from the UN. 
NATO, the OSCE and the EC /EU have had to rapidly adapt their structures 
in the context of what can only be qualified as an uncertain, but evolving, European 
institutional environment.52 While these developments are still under way, with 
NATO grappling with the enlargement issue, the EC /EU assuming greater security 
responsibilities, and the OSCE consolidating its activities, all three organisations did 
enfold in some way or another the general concepts of An Agenda for Peace in their 
respective mission statements, though their implementation in real situations often 
proved extremely problematic. 
The response of the Arab League and the OAS contrasted with those from 
transatlantic and European organisations. In its curt reply to the UN Secretariat, the 
League failed to produce a substantial response to An Agenda but stressed that its 
position, apparently to be communicated to the UN Secretariat 'at the appropriate 
time' would be based on the principles of its 1945 Charter, particularly those that 
affirmed the right of every state to 'sovereignty and freedom'.53 For its part, the OAS 
went to considerable lengths to reassert the autonomy of the inter- American system 
vis -à -vis the UN, its reply to the UN Secretariat stating: 
[The] OAS could not be a mere executor of decisions issuing from the United 
Nations. Any attempt to establish collaboration on the basis of prescription 
by one organization to the other would vitiate the concept of cooperation. [...] 
The potential conflict between the desired collaboration and the instruments 
suggested for establishing it would be even greater if the United Nations ever 
came to define the fields of action and /or the procedures or instruments of 
the regional organization. Such normative definitions would generate greater 
controversy if it were attempted to apply them to existing organizations with 
their own structures, legal basis and modes of operation.54 
The rigidity of the OAS statement was unsurprising given the origins of 
Chapter VIII. Still, in the immediate post -Cold War period where the UN was at the 
centre of international attention, the OAS response was a strong reminder of that 
organisations traditional desire for autonomy and of the caveats of adopting a centre - 
periphery approach to UN cooperation with regional organisations. 
Contrary to the Arab League and the OAS, the OAU took the Secretary - 
General's proposals on board with more enthusiasm, as they corresponded to its own 
institutional efforts, through the development of its new 'Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution' to improve its organic capabilities. The 
success of the OAU Mechanism was said to "require the OAU to cooperate and work 
closely with the United Nations, not only with regard to issues relating to peacemaking 
but, and especially, also those relating to peace -keeping ".55 Given the OAU's chronic 
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lack of financial resources, the organisation based its response on a comparative 
advantage concept. The OAU's original thinking was that the UN was best equipped 
to carry out peace operations on the African continent while the OAU should carry 
out less financially draining tasks such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. In 
light of the Security Council's failure to intervene more forcefully in Rwanda, 
however, the OAU Secretariat subsequently revised its position and is now advocating 
greater African responsibility in keeping peace on the continent.56 
The first UN- regional organisations summit (August 1994) 
The result of the first exchange of views on An Agenda did not prove to be particularly 
fruitful in terms of specific proposals for improving coordination between both levels 
of organisation. Still, the issue had been declared an area of priority by the Security 
Council and Secretary -General Boutros -Ghali was keen to make progress on the issue. 
The institutional dialogue was therefore taken a step further with the holding of the 
first ever summit between the UN and regional organisations in August 1994. Ten 
regional organisations (five of them European, none from Asia) were represented at 
the senior or Secretary- General leve1.57 The UN was represented by Boutros -Ghali 
and the then Undersecretary- General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding. 
In a forthright speech to the delegates Boutros -Ghali presented his revised 
vision of UN /regional organisations cooperation after two years at the helm of the 
world organisation.58 He emphasised that the UN could not act in all situations and 
that the time had come to make full use of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. Therefore he set as the goal of the meeting the study of ways to improve the 
planning of joint activities. 
He identified three areas where regional organisations "should play a more 
active role ": 1) the peaceful settlement of disputes; 2) peacekeeping in the broad sense 
of the term (including preventive diplomacy, peace -building and confidence building); 
and 3) the possible implementation of coercive measures. His speech stressed the 
need for cooperation, decentralisation, delegation and democratisation between the 
UN and regional organisations. Yet at the same time he reaffirmed the primacy of the 
authority of the Security Council with regard to coercive measures. When undertaken 
by regional organisations, he stated, such activities "should be conducted with the 
permission, under the control and on the authority of the Security Council ".59 
Boutros -Ghali concluded that there was a need for 'real' guidelines of cooperation 
between the UN and regional organisations in three areas: political cooperation, 
operational cooperation and financial cooperation. 
Judging by the response of regional organisations during the meeting, the 
agenda set by the Secretary- General seemed overly ambitious. A summary of 
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discussions prepared by the UN Secretariat lists a series of intervention or comments 
by specific regional organisations.60 Few decisions were taken during the meeting and 
only broad conclusions were agreed to. For example, on the division of labour issues, 
participants agreed on the need for flexibility, pragmatism and a case -by -case rather 
than universal approach to institutional cooperation. This had been the custom over 
the years and did not represent a particularly novel point of view. On the issue of 
responsibility for securing world peace, participants were in broad agreement that the 
UN, and in particular the Security Council, bore the primary and ultimate 
responsibility for world peace. Intimations to the contrary would have been quite 
surprising On the issue of resources, many participants saw the lack of financial and 
other resources as the single most important obstacle to promote the launching and 
maintenance of regional activities to promote peace.61 Again, insufficient funding of 
peace -related activities is hardly a new issue for many regional bodies, and it is 
certainly not for the UN itself. 
One area where the meeting seems to have been more productive concerns 
the question of the exchange of information. Many delegations agreed that the key to 
closer and better cooperation between the UN and regional organisations lay in a 
smoother exchange of information. A number of concrete suggestions were made in 
this respect, many of them stemming from the experience of UN- regional 
organisations cooperation in the former Yugoslavia.62 On the whole, however, the 
meeting fell short of the UN Secretariat's aim of establishing more precise guidelines 
for cooperation. In reality, the opposite result would have been surprising. It is 
difficult to envision high -ranking officials committing their institutions to financial, 
operational or political guidelines without first referring them to their respective 
memberships. 
The UN Secretariat 
Within the UN Secretariat, the functions outlined in An Agenda for Peace (early warning, 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, etc.) are performed by different 
responsibility centres.63 Responsibility for liaising with regional organisations rests 
primarily with the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).64 Following the 1992 
reorganisation of labour within the UN Secretariat, the DPA was charged with 
preventive diplomacy and peacemaking functions, whereas the DPKO was given 
responsibility for the planning and implementation of military, civilian and electoral 
aspects of peacekeeping operations.65 
While the UN bureaucracy is in charge of implementing or developing policies 
that have been broadly decided upon by the Security Council or the General 
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Assembly, the drive to enhance the role of regional organisations at the UN was in 
large measure imparted by Secretary -General Boutros -Ghali himself, not the UN 
bureaucracy. In many respects, the issue remained one of the Secretary -General's 
favourite 'hobby horses', and on a number of occasions Boutros -Ghali placed 
over- optimistic expectations on the potential of regional bodies to prevent or manage 
crisis situations. 
There is evidence to suggest that some of Boutros- Ghali's most senior 
bureaucrats did not fully share his enthusiasm for the regional approach to resolving 
conflict. Marrack Goulding, then Undersecretary -General for Political Affairs and 
former head of peacekeeping at the UN, privately admitted that he did not believe that 
regional organisations had the capacity to react quickly and decisively to crises that 
threatened international peace and security, identifying the exercise of consensus 
decision making, lack of financial and material resources, under -equipped secretariats, 
and lack of impartiality as major problem areas for many of these organisations.« 
Another high- ranking DPA official with experience in UN field operations told the 
author that some regional organisations often regarded the UN as a rival rather than a 
collaborator.67 He identified the 'need for distance' as a major consideration; regional 
organisations were often too close to the problem to take effective action. He also 
cited inter -institutional coordination as a major problem area, highlighting the cases of 
the UN Operation in Central America (ONUCA) where UN -OAS relations 
apparently proved so poor that a decision was made to make ONUCA's offshoot, 
ONUSAL, a purely UN operation, and the management of UN -CSCE relations 
regarding the situation in the Caucasus (specifically, in Georgia and 
Nagorno- Karabakh), where there had been poor coordination between the two 
organisations. 
There is further evidence that the UN bureaucracy was not altogether 
optinustic as to the prospects for effective regional peacekeeping. In 1993, the 
DPKO undertook what it called an 'analysis of regional organisations involved in 
peacekeeping'.68 The result of this project, which was completed in April 1994, was an 
unofficial report entitled Regional Organisations and Peacekeeping.69 The report covered 
the broad principles of UN peacekeeping and examined the involvement of three 
regional organisations (OAS, OAU, ECOWAS) in that field.70 Interestingly, there was 
no discussion of the peacekeeping role of European /transatlantic organisations. The 
author of the report concluded that prospects for effective regional peacekeeping were 
generally not very good, and that the disadvantages of regional peacekeeping often 
outweighed possible benefits. Prospects for joint UN- regional action were also 
deemed problematic; the best scenario for joint cooperation was a situation where a 
preference was expressed for regional peacekeeping, but with UN support. 
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Special UN support for African peacekeeping 
As discussed earlier, the UN's relationship with the OAU was the object of 
considerable attention during Boutros- Ghali's term in office. Given the extent of UN 
involvement in trying to resolve African conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s, 
and the strong personal interest of Boutros -Ghali for African affairs, this is perhaps 
not surprising. Since the Somalia and Rwanda debacles, however, there has been a 
major decline in international support for UN interventionism on the continent. 
Donor fatigue no doubt contributed to this trend, the UN having reportedly spent $5 
billion on peacekeeping activities in Africa, most of it in Somalia, between 1991 and 
1995.71 More than anything, however, Western countries were stepping away from 
getting directly involved in African civil wars under the UN flag. Their earlier 
enthusiasm for intervention on the continent had led to such controversy that 
international support for 'robust' UN peacekeeping operations in Africa effectively 
dissolved. 
In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, supporting the development 
of African conflict resolution capabilities became priority issues for the UN and many 
Western countries. However, evidence shows that major powers were initially more 
eager to launch national initiatives than to work through the UN on this issue. Great 
Britain announced an African peacekeeping initiative in September 1994. France and 
the United States followed suit separately shortly thereafter.72 In early 1995, the UN 
Secretariat redoubled its efforts in this matter, prodded along by Security Council 
members trying to keep the momentum going on trying to improve African conflict 
resolution capabilities.73 
In March 1995, the DPKO produced an internal concept paper, entitled 
Improving Preparedness for Peace -keeping in Africa: An Informal Note.74 It discussed various 
measures that could eventually be undertaken to support the development of African 
peacekeeping capabilities, including such issues as personnel and training, equipment, 
planning, support to the OAU Mechanism, and fmancing. An expanded report on the 
same subject was submitted to the General Assembly by Secretary -General 
Boutros -Ghali in November 1995.75 In it Boutros -Ghali reasserted the centrality of 
the UN role in keeping the peace in Africa. However; he proposed a more direct UN 
involvement in the improvement of African peacekeeping capabilities, both on a 
national basis and through support for the OAU or other African sub -regional 
organisations. If one read between the lines, this report reinforced the prevailing 
post -Rwanda perception that African states should play a larger military role in 
keeping the peace on the continent as key western nations were simply not prepared 
to intervene further militarily on a systematic basis. 
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Recasting the Vision: The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995) 
In early January 1995, two- and -a -half years after submitting his original Agenda for 
Peace, the UN Secretary- General submitted his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace to the 
Security Council.76 The UN's 50th anniversary year seemed an appropriate moment 
for the Secretary -General to review the work of the organisation in its most crucial of 
functions, the maintenance of international peace and security. The Supplement was an 
attempt to update the Agenda in light of the considerable experience gained since 1992. 
It also came after two extremely difficult years for the UN, which had led to a 
sobering reappraisal of Agenda for Peace concepts in many national capitals. Although 
the UN had had presided over some major conflict management successes during that 
period, the political fallout of successive setbacks in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, 
Rwanda led to a growing rift between the UN Secretariat and the members of Security 
Council. 
Most of the Supplement was dedicated to a reassessment of what Boutros -Ghali 
termed the 'instruments for peace and security', those concepts and measures he had 
proposed in An Agenda for Peace: early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
post -conflict peace -building, etc. It is perhaps particularly important to highlight the 
report's conclusion on enforcement because of its potential significance regarding 
regional organisations. In the Supplement, Boutros -Ghali candidly admitted "neither 
the Security Council nor the Secretary -General at present has the capacity to deploy, 
direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very 
limited scale ".77 Given his earlier proposals to create UN peace- enforcement units 
and his eagerness to intervene forcefully in Somalia, this can only be seen as an 
admission of failure. Still, he reasserted his belief that an organic UN enforcement 
capacity would be desirable in the long -term. 
Whether the UN should have an organic enforcement capability - a 'UN army' 
as it is often simplistically proposed - is the object of a long- standing debate amongst 
scholars and practitioners.78 There is one unswerving political reality that cannot be 
escaped, however; P5 countries do not at present support such a proposal nor are they 
likely to do so in the foreseeable future 7° Responsibility for enforcement actions, 
therefore, remains guided by the political will and interests of the permanent members 
of the Security Council acting either through regional agencies or, more likely, through 
coalitions. 
The Supplement cited Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia as examples of the coalition 
approach, an approach not dissimilar, in fact, to the approach adopted by leading 
international powers in mustering support for military deployments in Korea 
(1950 -1953) and in Kuwait (1990 -1991). Although the Secretary -General raised some 
caveats about resorting to such measures, such as their possible impact on UN 
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credibility and legitimacy, the Supplement effectively endorsed what has often been 
called the 'willing and able' model of enforcement action in the absence of a UN 
enforcement capability. 
In its section on coordination, the Supplement treated the ongoing problems of 
the UN in lucid fashion. The document discussed the range of pressing challenges: 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace -building: coordination 
with informal groups of states, coordination with regional organisations, coordination 
with non -governmental organisations, and coordination amongst UN agencies and 
departments. Of all these issues, the question of regional organisations received the 
most comprehensive treatment and the document constitutes a milestone in the 
evolution of the post -Cold War UN debate on regional organisations. No other UN 
document up to that point had gone this far in attempting to clarify the organisation's 
relationship with regional groupings. 
Basing itself on past and current UN experience, the Supplement identified five 
different forms of UN- Regional organisations cooperation: 1) consultation; 2) 
diplomatic support; 3) operational support; 4) co- deployment; 5) joint operations.80 A 
sixth category, technical support, was later added to this list by Kofi Annan, then 
Undersecretary -General for Peacekeeping Operations.81 
What was of fundamental importance about this categorisation is that, first, it 
was based on actual experience and precedents rather than on prescription, and 
second, it demonstrated the range of possibilities for cooperation. Moreover, even 
though it did not address the critical question of qualitative effectiveness, it went a 
long way toward disarming the arguments of the proponents of a 'sub- contractant' 
relationship between the UN and regional organisations by effectively demonstrating 
that this had not been the direction taken in the recent past. The Supplement 
recognised that regional organisations have varying capabilities, mandates and 
decision- making processes which made a universal model of cooperation 
inappropriate.S2 Therefore, the report suggested, cooperation ought to be based on a 
set of principles rather than tied to a specific formula. Those principles included: 
Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established, but need not be 
formal; 
Respect for the primacy of the UN on peace and security issues; 
A clearly defined and agreed upon division of labour on specific conflicts; 
Consistency by members of the UN as well as by members of regional 
organizations, in dealing with common problems. 
The first two principles are fairly uncontroversial. The latter two, however, are 
much more problematic. The division of labour issue is clearly an area where major 
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problems have arisen in the recent past, whether in the former Yugoslavia, the 
Caucasus or Central America. And if the past is any indication of the future, such 
problems will arise again, especially in highly volatile situations where a pre - ordained 
division of labour might become irrelevant due to rapidly changing developments on 
the ground, a situation all too familiar to the UN. One should also note that in the 
Supplement the UN seems to be advocating a division of labour after a problem has 
been identified. This can only be viewed as a sensible strategy. However, it obviously 
depends on the existence of a political consensus on which institutions should play 
which role. As the Yugoslav conflict clearly demonstrated, that consensus may take 
quite some time to develop. 
The question of consistency also remains a contentious issue. The Supplement 
argued that states belonging to the UN as well as to one or many regional 
organisations should seek to be more consistent in dealing with problems of common 
interest, citing peacekeeping standards as one such area.R3 The problem is obvious: 
the principles that have underpinned the deployment of past and present regional 
peacekeeping efforts have not always run a parallel course with the UN's own 
principles in that field. This obviously raises the larger question of compatibility 
between the UN and regional approaches to security. Certain states may agree to UN 
statements regarding UN /regional cooperation while at the same time pursuing 
different agendas at the regional level. As for peacekeeping proper, lacking a clear and 
unequivocal commitment from regional organisations that they will adopt UN 
peacekeeping principles, one wonders exactly how consistency in that field is to be 
achieved in practice. The Supplement did not advance any specific proposals on this 
important matter. 
In April 1995, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping (the so -called 
C -34) took up the issue of consistency during its annual session. Some countries 
belonging to the Neutral and Non -Aligned Movement (NAM) who were present at 
the session suggested that a declaration of UN peacekeeping principles be developed 
based on the NAM Cairo Summit declaration of June 1994 that spelled out a set of 
guiding principles for peacekeeping. However, several of the NAM guidelines were 
judged to be too restrictive by a number of Western countries, notably those related to 
international intervention in situations of internal conflicts. 
The Supplement remains an important document. But even more important is 
how its recommendations will be implemented in the future. Following its publication 
the Security Council held a debate with 40 delegations present (including the 15 
members of the Security Council) in mid- January 1995. Most of the discussions 
focussed on preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping issues, and little time was 
devoted to the coordination theme. Nevertheless, it appears that recommendations 
on coordination were endorsed by a majority of delegations even though many of 
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them stressed that a majority of regional organisations, with the exception NATO, 
lacked the resources to play a major role in peace support operations.84 Later in 1995, 
a working group was formed as a follow up mechanism to the Supplement. It was 
divided into a number of sub -working groups, each examining one or more themes 
found in the Supplement. preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, enforcement, 
post -conflict peace building, sanctions, coordination, etc. These different groups were 
to prepare a number of recommendations and present them to the UN General 
Assembly in 1996. 
The second UN- regional organisations summit (February 1996) 
The second UN- regional organisations summit took place in February 1996, a year 
after the publication of the Supplement.85 In his opening statement to the delegates 
present, Boutros -Ghali noted that the UN was facing the most severe financial crisis 
in its history, making the search for a division of labour between the UN and regional 
organisations more urgent than ever. He called on delegates to move beyond 
discussion on general principles in order to consider more immediate and practical 
aspects of UN- regional organisations relations 86 
A summary of discussions held at the meeting lists few such suggestions, 
however.ß7 The discussion focussed mainly on four different topics: the different 
forms of UN- regional organisations cooperation, the principles of cooperation 
enunciated in the 1995 Supplement (on which there was general agreement), the need to 
agree to clearly defined institutional responsibilities, and the apparent weakness of the 
link between conflict prevention /resolution and post -conflict recovery efforts. 
Furthermore, regional organisations present accepted that in principle there should be 
a consistency of standards in the execution of different conflict management activities. 
Overall, the conclusions of the second UN- regional organisations meeting did 
not depart substantially from the 1995 discussion on the Supplement. In its summary of 
the regional organisations issue, the sub -working group on coordination (chaired by 
Norway) tabled a provisional text in early July 1996 that essentially summarised the 
elements found in the 1995 Supplement and in the February 1996 discussions.88 
By that time, it is fair to say that there was a general loss of interest in the 
consultation /discussion process.89 The combined effects of the Rwanda disaster and 
of UN helplessness in Bosnia had severely damaged the political credibility of the 
organisation, and the UN's acute financial crisis was having very negative 
repercussions on the UN's peace agenda and, importantly, on the morale of UN 
staffers in New York. Furthermore, the UN's membership itself was decidedly 
unenthusiastic about more prolonged discussions on peace and security issues. This 
was particularly true of developing countries that lamented the neglect of the UN's 
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social and economic agenda while peace and security issues had gotten the lion's share 
of the West's attention since the beginning of the 1990s. Considering the evolution of 
UN outlays dedicated to peacekeeping between 1990 and 1995 this was not an entirely 
inaccurate perception. The UN peacekeeping budget increased more than tenfold 
during this period, whereas its general budget - which deals with social and economic 
programs as well as general administrative expenses - stagnated as a result of the 
zero- growth policy insisted upon by industrialised countries, and more particularly by 
the United States. Indeed, the Secretary -General's Agenda for Development, tabled in 
1994, did not generate anywhere near the level of interest from Western countries in 
comparison to peacekeeping -related issues. 
Concluding Remarks 
The relation between the UN and regional organisations remains an extremely 
complex issue. To try to reduce it simply to a question of comparative advantage, or 
to a hierarchy -based model of conflict management where the UN acts a 'director' 
organisation, contradicts the evidence presented in this chapter. Many factors affect 
the UN- regional organisations relationship: legal, political and military. Often the 
influence of these factors is clearly identifiable. In other circumstances their influence 
is subtler, having more to do with historic contexts or long -term political trends than 
with organisational logic. Here we can only remind ourselves that the question of the 
role regional organisations issue has a long history in the context of the UN, and that, 
still today, that context looms high above official discussions on the matter. 
The shape and substance of the current debate on regional organisations has 
nevertheless pointed to some possible future directions, especially with the publication 
of the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace in 1995. First, the question of institutional 
resources, both financial and otherwise, has been recognised as a major issue. Few 
regional organisations have the financial means to sustain expensive peacekeeping 
operations or undertake costly post -conflict recovery projects. Many of them, in fact, 
are simply not organised to undertake such tasks. Second, given these shortcomings, a 
majority of regional organisations have acknowledged the experience of the UN in 
carrying out conventional peacekeeping. Though the paradox here is that more and 
more of them are getting involved in the peacekeeping field at a time when the 
importance of traditional peacekeeping is subsiding somewhat. And finally, decisions 
on major enforcement actions are still largely made and carried out by a small group 
of powerful nations. This remains as true today as it was in the early postwar years. 
The general consensus that seemed to emerge from the UN debate on regional 
organisations in the early 1990s is that the potential strength of regional institutions 
was located in the lower ranges of the conflict management spectrum; in early 
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warning, in trying to prevent conflicts before they erupt, and in certain cases in 
peacemaking processes. However, recent experience in the Balkans and in Central 
Africa seem to demonstrate that immutable rules do not really exist in such matters, 
and that the existence of a 'potential' regional capability does not easily translate into 
effective regional action. 
The UN debate on regional organisations should be seen as one aspect of a 
much larger debate on regionalism and international governance. Each regional 
system is different, and the influence and power of initiative accorded to regional 
bodies varies widely. Some regional organisations have become involved in 
peacekeeping where the UN would not. Others have failed dismally to prevent or 
manage conflicts in their own area in spite of apparent strengths. The following 
chapter will present a detailed examination of the evolution and experiences of 
regional organisations in the 1990s. 
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5 
Recent Developments in Regional 
Organisations 
In what can be viewed as a post -Cold War wave of institutional re- engineering, most 
extant regional organisations have seen an expansion of their responsibilities in the 
peace and security field. These developments have been paralleled by the emergence of 
a proliferating array of regional and sub -regional forums purporting to address political 
and security issues. In Europe alone, for example, established transatlantic and 
continental institutions are now complemented by a burgeoning collection of 
'mini -lateral' groupings, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
framework, the Visegrad group, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The 
European setting is unique in terms of institutional wealth. However, whether in Asia, 
Africa or Latin America, new regional /sub -regional organisations have been developing 
at an accelerated pace as well. 
In principle, regional institutions should bring legitimacy, impartiality and moral 
authority to efforts to control and manage conflict. In practice, however, their political 
and institutional capabilities vary widely. Their mandates and conflict resolution 
mechanisms differ tremendously, as do the range and scope of resources they can bring 
to play in their respective geographic areas. 
This chapter presents twelve case studies. It highlights trends in regional 
organisations, with a special emphasis placed on charter and institutional developments 
as well as on recent regional conflict management experiences. The selection of 
institutions presented therein is based on two criteria. First, on the importance of the 
organisation for the region concerned. Second, on the crisis /conflict management role 
played by the organisation in recent years. 
European /Transatlantic Organisations 
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
The OSCE - known until December 1994 as the CSCE - is an institution best known 
today for its innovative use of civilian missions to monitor human rights and defuse 
ethnic tensions in volatile areas. With its broad membership (fifty -four states), it is also 
widely regarded as an important instrument for furthering democratisation and 
transparency in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) and those of the 
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former Soviet Union (FSU). While these are important functions, they also represent a 
much diminished role vis -à -vis earlier proposals to make the organisation the 
articulating framework for European security. 
The end of the Cold War, and internal conflicts in Yugoslavia and in the FSU, 
were in large part responsible for providing the impetus for institutional reforms in 
1991 -1992. For more than half of the 1990s decade, however, the key players of 
European security were unable to agree on whether OSCE should remain a low -key 
process- oriented forum or become a more institutionalised intergovernmental 
organisation) As a result, the OSCE was propelled through a cycle of functional 
contortions which produced numerous OSCE institutions, an unending catalogue of 
special mechanisms, and ever -widening mandates, but little change in the way the 
OSCE operated ever since its Cold War debut in 1975: through dialogue and consensus 
amongst all member states. 
Evolution of the CSCE /OSCE 
With its steps towards setting up a more formal structure and its efforts to consolidate 
fundamental freedoms in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), the Paris 
summit of November 1990 heralded the birth of the post -Cold War CSCE.2 The 
summit took place at a time of tremendous uncertainty as to the make up of the future 
European security architecture. If Europe was to become a security community from 
'the Atlantic to the Urals', what were the roles of existing institutions and what how 
should their responsibilities change? 
EC countries attempted to answer part of that question for themselves over the 
following months. Eager to demonstrate leadership and cohesion after their disunited 
performance during the Gulf War they took it upon themselves to find a European 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis, obtaining the imprimatur of the CSCE and the UN to 
do so. The Bush administration, singularly preoccupied with maintaining NATO's place 
in Europe, but uninterested in taking the lead in Yugoslavia, could only applaud; it had 
been urging European governments to show more interest in the Yugoslav problem 
since late summer 1990.3 
Throughout 1991 the CSCE was confronted with events that highlighted what is 
generally regarded as its greatest weakness: its inability to take timely and effective 
measures against violators of its principles which result from its consensus decision - 
making rule.¢ The crisis between Russia and the Baltic states, and later the failed coup 
in Russia, had shown the difficulties of using CSCE mechanisms in the disintegrating 
Soviet Union. The feebleness of the CSCE response to the unfolding events in 
Yugoslavia crisis, however, was arguably even more damaging for the organisation, 
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leaving many European leaders, notably those of ECE countries, disillusioned about its 
potential as a collective security organisation.5 
By early 1992, the most pressing issues on the CSCE agenda were clear: 
enhancing the decision -making ability of the organisation and trying to deal with the 
thorny problem of national minorities in post -Cold War Europe. In January 1992, 
CSCE members amended the rule requiring unanimity and adopted the so- called 
'consensus minus one principle in cases of massive and gross violations of human 
rights. This rule provided the basis for the suspension of Serbia from the Conference in 
1992. 
At the Helsinki II summit of July 1992 further steps were taken to improve the 
organisations effectiveness. It was declared a regional arrangement coining under the 
terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, with the authority to undertake peacekeeping 
(but not enforcement) actions within the CSCE region with the support of NATO, the 
EC, the WEU or the CIS.6 The summit launched the process of upgrading the 
organisations decision -making organs, a trend which culminated with the establishment 
of a Permanent Committee at the CSCE Rome summit of December 1993 (now 
Permanent Council).? A position of High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) was created with a specific mandate to provide "early warning and, as 
appropriate, early action" in areas of ethnic tensions.s CSCE members endorsed the use 
of small fact -finding and monitoring missions as new instruments in the CSCE toolbox, 
a trend which began in 1991 and early 1992 with missions in Yugoslavia and Nagorno- 
Karabakh. Finally, the summit also established the Forum for Security Cooperation 
(FSC), charged with the daunting task of addressing arms control negotiations, 
confidence and security -building measures, security enhancement and cooperation 
within the CSCE /OSCE framework. The FSC produced numerous agreements over 
the next two years, notably a Code of Conduct on Politico- Military Aspects of Security 
(1994) that, inter alia, promoted standards on the use of force by national militaries in 
internal security missions. 
The Helsinki summit highlighted the preference of the CSCE membership for a 
low -key, consensus -based, and flexible approach to conflict prevention rather than an 
institutionalised 'coerce and enforce' approach to conflict management. The paradox, 
of course, was that CSCE members, at the urging of Germany, declared the CSCE a 
Chapter VIII arrangement under the UN Charter. It was, in fact, Chapter VIII redux 
since they shied away from adopting new provisions allowing coercive measures. None 
of the key players of European security favoured developing the organisation into an 
enforcement agency. Such a move would have called into question the authority of 
other European bodies (e.g. NATO, CIS, WEU) and, at any rate, would have demanded 
major changes to the organisation's decision -making rules for which membership -wide 
support was non -existent. 
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In spite of numerous structural developments the CSCE's role remained 
somewhat unclear throughout 1993 -1994. Beyond its traditional arms control role, its 
preventive diplomacy functions, and its human rights and democratisation mission 
attracted consensus; there was agreement for its sanctions monitoring role (jointly 
organised with the EC) in Yugoslavia, but little more. Attempts to use it as a 
legitimising agency for individual state action were mired in controversy (e.g. Russia's 
failed bid to have CSCE approval for CIS peacekeeping) and Western states, almost by 
default, turned to the UN Security Council for hard decisions. Furthermore, Serbia's 
refusal to prolong the CSCE monitoring mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in 
1993 patently demonstrated the limitations of the 'softly, softly' approach adopted in 
Helsinki. 
For many, the Budapest CSCE summit of December 1994 epitomised the 
organisation's inability to deal with serious conflict. The summit's lengthy final 
document (known as the CSCE Budapest Document) saw the official transition in 
status from that of conference to that of organisation (becoming the OSCE); it 
discussed various OSCE initiatives; and it clarified the different levels of responsibility 
within the burgeoning OSCE structure.9 However, the Budapest Document did not 
refer to the situation in Bosnia, the most important European conflict since the Second 
World War. Russia and the Bosnian government both blocked the adoption of a 
declaration on the conflict, and the summit ended in acrimony and cynicism.rn 
In December 1995, the annual OSCE Ministerial Council in Budapest 
concentrated its efforts to the crucial role the organisation was to play in Bosnia as part 
of the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement; electoral organiser, human rights 
monitor, and arms controller. This was a political rehabilitation of sorts for the OSCE. 
Never before had it faced a challenge of this scope. Still, the role it was entrusted to 
fulfil effectively confirmed its position as complement to 'harder' regional and 
international security mechanisms. It also marked a momentary halt to the numerous 
proposals to transform it into a more formal and legalistic collective security agency. 
The 1995 Council summit also launched anew the OSCE's Common and 
Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty -First Century, a project 
somewhat moribund since it had been proposed by Russia during the 1994 Budapest 
summit. The Model, which was officially adopted at the 1996 OSCE summit in Lisbon, 
is a comprehensive article of faith in common security, good neighbourliness and 
respect for OSCE guidelines and procedures. It also launched a lengthy diplomatic 
process leading to the drafting of a new OSCE Charter on European Security (expected 
to be completed in time for the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul). 
Whether these documents and processes make a real difference to the future of 
European security remains unclear. On the one hand they may contribute to articulate a 
common vision of security for the OSCE area that could perhaps provide the basis for 
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the development of new methods of collective action. On the other hand, it should not 
be lost that the NATO vision of European security has been much more influential in 
shaping the regional security environment than OSCE declarations, and that, at any rate, 
the Charter for European Security exercise is only likely to codify current OSCE 
practice as perceived by the majority of its membership. 
A mixed record 
Overall, the OSCE record during the 1991 -1996 period presents a decidedly mixed 
picture. The organisation has played a key role in promoting standards of good 
European citizenship and military transparency, and it has gone further than any other 
regional organisation in devising flexible tools for looking into intra -state conflict so as 
to attempt to defuse internal instability before it occurs. It should be noted, however, 
that the organisations operational activities have been mainly concentrated in the 
Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. Attempts to use OSCE mechanisms ín other 
European hot spots, in relation to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, for example, have 
thus far proven unsuccessful. 
It is fair to say that many OSCE missions have helped to stabilise a series of 
potentially dangerous situations, and that in some cases, in Moldova, for instance, it 
contributed to create an environment conducive to negotiation. As many analysts have 
noted, however, the OSCE's modus operandi and the modest size of its institutions 
effectively ensure that it is unable to address anything but fairly localised situations. 
Moreover, the impact of OSCE measures is often limited when not followed through by 
direct diplomatic involvement on the part of the OSCE's most powerful states. 
Possessing neither the decision -making structure to make 'hard' political decisions nor 
coercive instruments which could be used to restrain disputants, many feel that the 
OSCE is not very well equipped to deal with conflict once it has reached at certain 
threshold. Yet many governments consider that the organisations strength is precisely 
the non -threatening nature of its instruments that have often allowed it to act as a 
monitoring and facilitating body in situations where opposing parties would have 
rejected involvement by any other inter- governmental organisation. 
If there is agreement that conflict prevention should be one of the organisation's 
primary tasks, such is not the case for using it as a vehicle for traditional peacekeeping. 
The Helsinki II summit provisions on peacekeeping have proven to be considerably 
more problematic than originally envisaged, not least because the debate on the ultimate 
source of legitimacy for launching peacekeeping operations in the European region - 
either the UN or the OSCE - remains unresolved. Moreover, despite the creation of a 
temporary military staff in 1995 in order to prepare for a mission in Nagorno -Karabakh, 
the OSCE remains ill- equipped to carry out peacekeeping operations. The fact remains 
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that that the United States and most European countries regard the UN or NATO as 
much more credible peace operations structures. This does not mean that the OSCE 
will never be used as a political vehicle from which to launch peacekeeping operations; 
as noted earlier it does, in fact, have a mandate to do so. But it is certainly the 
understanding amongst a majority of OSCE members that the organisation's organic 
capabilities remain extremely limited as far as mounting military operations are 
concerned, and that, therefore, an enhanced civilian peacekeeping role is likely to be the 
way of the future for the OSCE. 
Over the years the work of the FSC has come under closer scrutiny as well. 
Some critics of the FSC process pointed early on that in, the absence of effective 
provisions for ensuring compliance with FSC agreements (which are not international 
treaties) the latter would "be useful in organising various [OSCE] commitments but not 
much more than that. "11 During the Chechnya conflict, for instance, neither the OSCE 
Code of Conduct (adopted in 1994), nor the presence of an OSCE mediation mission 
had any restraining influence on the Russian military's indiscriminate use of force 
against civilian areas. Unsurprisingly, at the 1996 OSCE Lisbon summit, Western 
countries insisted on strengthening the body of FSC agreements.t2 Beyond their 
confidence -building rationale, however, questions remain as to their ability to help 
prevent conflict, and more particularly the kind of internal conflict seen in the Balkans 
and the FSU since the end of the Cold War.13 
Continuity in tradition 
Through practice, the OSCE has carved up an important niche for itself in performing 
certain functions falling within the range of early preventive action, peace -building and 
confidence -building. It is also making a discrete but important contribution to 
European security by helping to strengthen legal institutions, democratic processes and 
civil society throughout ECE states and in the CIS. However, the experience of the last 
few years has also demonstrated that the OSCE acts a complement to NATO and to 
the EU. It is hardly Europe's pivotal security institution. Indeed, there often appears to 
be an inverse relationship between the intensity of the conflicts it is called on to deal 
with, and its ability to take effective action. 
The OSCE's position relative to that of other European institutions will remains 
a critically important issue in years ahead. The organisation operates in a very crowded 
institutional environment- and, despite the rhetoric on interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing institutions, NATO and the EU are generally perceived as more important 
forums for European security and stability. Having acquired neither the political, 
military or economic clout of these two organisations, it should not be surprising, then, 
that the OSCE muddles its way forward in its long -standing tradition of quiet 
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consensualism and its ability to remain a very flexible diplomatic instrument. Here its 
broad European membership can only be an asset, not a liability. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
NATO's post -Cold War foray into the management of European conflicts has evolved 
largely in reaction to a wide range of internal and external pressures, among them the 
urgent need to define new roles for the Alliance, pressures to enlarge NATO while 
managing a difficult relationship with Russia, and accommodating to calls for a stronger 
European voice within the Affiance. The evolution from collective defence to 
'collective defence plus' has been neither smooth nor easy. However, NATO has thus 
far demonstrated a far larger measure of flexibility and innovation than the critics who 
forecasted its downfall envisaged just a few years ago.14 Rather than withering away, in 
fact, it has consolidated its position as the most important security organisation in 
Europe. 
NATO is not a multipurpose regional organisation falling under the purview of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the Yugoslav case, though, it did act as the 
enforcer of UN Security Council resolutions. That ambiguous relationship is unlikely to 
change. The United States fundamentally objects to Alliance decisions being subjected 
to a possible veto of the UN Security Council, a point on which NATO's European 
members agree. NATO countries have invested considerable political and military 
capital in developing the Alliance's crisis management capabilities over the last few 
years, capabilities which include the ability to deploy forces 'out of area' for peace 
support operations and for preventive actions. Crisis management and peacekeeping, in 
fact, now constitute two major justifications for maintaining significant NATO forces in 
Europe. 
Charting a new course, take one 
The central plank of NATO has always been Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949), 
which provides its membership with an unambiguous commitment to collective defence 
in the case of armed attack. However, with the eclipse of the Warsaw Pact came the 
recognition that collective defence function no longer ranked as NATO's most urgent 
task.15 In 1990 -1991, NATO countries quickly begun to downsize their standing forces 
in Europe and shifted Alliance strategy towards a defence concept based around a mix 
of rapid reaction and reinforcement forces.16 
The new Europe posed a major challenge for an institutional order essentially 
designed to manage East -West relations. For NATO in particular, suggestions of an 
extension of its role 'out of area' - that is, outside the territory covered by the NATO 
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treaty - presented a weighty problem. With a mandate that restricted the exercise of the 
Alliances primary function to the territory of its membership, an unreconstructed 
NATO appeared unable to provide the kind of framework necessary to deal with future 
European conflicts. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that so many European 
policymakers and legislators pondered aloud on the necessity for a new, more European 
framework for security policy. 
Throughout 1990 -1993 the outlook for NATO remained very uncertain. The 
organisation searched for new roles that would preserve its legitimacy while Western 
policymakers struggled to come to grips with changes in the European political 
landscape. At the Rome summit of November 1991, NATO's first comprehensive 
effort to define its future role, western leaders adopted the Alliances new Strategic 
Concept. The Concept restated that the primary purpose of the Affiance was to 
safeguard the freedom and security of its members.17 But it also promoted a new, more 
cooperative approach to security in which dialogue and cooperation with all European 
states would play a vital role. The Concept also elaborated a rationale for NATO 
operations out of area, raising the possibility that economic, social and political 
difficulties, ethnic rivalries or territorial disputes could develop into crises affecting the 
security of Alliance countries. 
The very idea of an expanded military role in Europe for NATO not only went 
against the sweeping tide of post -Cold War troop reductions and cuts in defence 
expenditures among NATO countries, but it also raised thorny political questions. 
Under the authority of which agency, for example, would this role be exercised? Would 
the leaders of a disintegrating, but still nuclear -capable, Soviet Union ever accept 
NATO military operations in non -NATO countries? These questions would haunt 
NATO leaders as they examined the military options for intervention in Yugoslavia. 
The Rome summit would also prove to be an important event in term of 
U.S.- European relations. European governments and the Bush administration papered 
over important differences for unity's sake. But a sense of growing rift existed between 
the United States and its allies. In 1990 -1991, the articulation of Franco -German plans 
for laying the foundations of a common defence policy on behalf of Europe had piqued 
Washington as well as atlanticist- oriented EC governments.18 Taken aback by various 
schemes for reorganising continental security, the Bush administration reiterated its 
position that NATO was, and should remain, the cornerstone of security in Europe. 
The thorny question of the 'europeanisation of European defence was thus left 
essentially unresolved. 
Cooperation with the East: conflict prevention as inclusion 
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As part of its new outreach effort towards the East, in December 1991 NATO held the 
first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a new high -level 
security forum whose main objective was to establish links with Russia and ECE 
countries.19 The NACC was useful towards establishing a rapport between NATO and 
its new counterparts in the East. It quickly became apparent, however, that a number 
of ECE countries aspired to much more than dialogue; military cooperation with the 
West and NATO membership was their ultimate objective. 
NATO countries were all too aware that a precipitous decision on expanding 
the Affiance might have dire consequences at a time when Bons Yeltsiri s fragile 
presidency was threatened by ultra- nationalist forces in the Russian Duma. Moreover, 
an internal NATO consensus on enlargement did not yet exist (and would not until 
1995). Nevertheless, by 1993 the damage to NATO credibility as a result of the tepid 
reactions to Eastern appeals for membership and lack of leadership in Bosnia was 
becoming an increasingly serious problems. Criticised for its passivity towards European 
security problems, the Clinton administration put forth two major initiatives in October 
1993 which sought to respond to the demands of ECE states as well as to those of 
Western European countries vying for a stronger European defence role. The first 
initiative was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, a military cooperation scheme 
with NACC countries and OSCE members on matters primarily concerned with 
peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. The second was the 
proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which will be discussed below. PIP 
was formally endorsed at the important North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit of 
January 1994 alongside an interrelated commitment to enlarge the Alliance 20 The 
timing of enlargement, the 'who' and the 'when', however, remained open. 
PIP was designed in large measure as a training /proving ground for prospective 
NATO members21 Even though the program did not extend formal security 
guarantees to prospective members it quickly managed to attract interest from all 
corners of the OSCE region, including from the faraway Central Asian republics. By 
June 1994, twenty states had joined the scheme, including a reluctant Russia which 
erroneously believed PfP would forestall NATO enlargement. Seven other nations 
joined later. 
Since its inception the PfP program has become a NATO success story, proving 
to be an extremely valuable mechanism for honing the skills of inter- operability between 
NATO and PfP militaries 22 Furthermore, the value of the scheme has gone beyond the 
military field into European politics proper. For instance, PIP proved to be particularly 
helpful in facilitating the participation of non -NATO countries to the NATO 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia. In light of PIP achievements to date a 'PfP +' follow -on 
program was approved by NATO in 1997. As for the NACC, it was formally 
disbanded and replaced by the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in early 1997. 
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The EAPC is to provide the overarching framework for cooperation between NATO 
and non -NATO countries. 
Going out of area, in theory 
Although it had been the object of intense speculation ever since 1990 the institutional 
debate surrounding the Alliance's out of area role can be traced back to the first half of 
1992 when European institutions ran out of options in Yugoslavia. Here we must 
distinguish between the complex negotiations on institutional development, and 
NATO's reactions to the unfolding events in Yugoslavia. The following paragraphs 
discuss institutional developments. They are followed by a section on NATO's role in 
Yugoslavia. 
At the Oslo North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit of June 1992, which was 
followed soon thereafter by the CSCE summit in Helsinki, NATO countries stated their 
preparedness to support peacekeeping activities on a case by case basis and under 
NATO procedures, under the responsibility of the CSCE. This decision had come 
largely as a reaction to calls for NATO involvement in Yugoslavia. The following 
December, NATO's Defence Planning Committee (DPC) formalised Affiance support 
for UN and CSCE peacekeeping by including 'peace support' as a NATO mission. 
After discussions lasting more than half of 1993 during which the NATO Military 
Committee examined possible Alliance roles in peace support operation, a general 
policy document was adopted in August 1993.23 Known as MC 327, the document 
provided a standardised terminology for different peace support tasks, as well as 
accompanying principles for their conduct within the framework of NATO 24 
Important developments came in the fall of 1993 with the American proposal 
for the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, and its endorsement by NATO 
countries, at the Brussels NAC summit of January 1994. From a military perspective, 
CJTF's were designed to allow task -tailored NATO forces, with potential PfP member 
participation, to fulfill non -collective defence (i.e. non -Article 5) missions. CJTF 
discussions also fulfilled a number of political objectives, such as mollifying the calls of 
the U.S. Congress for greater defence burden -sharing with Europe, and giving more 
substance to the European role within the Affiance. 
By endorsing the development of the CJTF concept Europeans countries 
effectively moved the WEU closer to the ambit of NATO. Moreover, the fact that 
France was ready to discuss CJTF's signalled a warming of France's position towards the 
Alliance.25 This shift was confirmed following the election of Jacques Chirac as France's 
new president in 1995, but it would have a price. Supported by Germany, France 
proposed that a new transatlantic bargain be struck between the United States and 
Europe. Later on, Paris would insist that Washington give up its authority to appoint 
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the NATO Southern Command commanding officer.26 From France's perspective, 
neither of those issues has been satisfactorily resolved. 
'Tension between Paris and Washington were particularly evident throughout the 
process of devising implementation arrangements for CJTF's and differences quickly 
emerged over political authority and military command arrangements. From the outset 
American officials saw CJTF's as a NATO -led mechanism for carrying out 
non -collective defence missions. This clashed against France's view that CJTF's should 
allow European countries to organise out of area actions through the WEU, supported 
by NATO military assets. At the Berlin NAC summit of June 1996, after two and a half 
years of often frustrating negotiations, the United States finally agreed to let the WEU 
lead possible CJTF operations should European countries express that will, albeit under 
the understanding that they should be formed within the context of the Atlantic 
Affiance and according to NATO standards and procedures. 
Yugoslavia: interests, responsibility or image? 
In a recently published study on European security, Catherine McArdle Kelleher argued 
that CJTF's may be a military- operational solution to what is essentially a political 
problem. In her opinion, CJTF's can provide the 'how' but may not be able to address 
the 'why' nor the "political divisions that promote action or inaction" in cases of out of 
area contingencies?? An examination of NATO involvement in Yugoslavia largely 
bears her out. Divided on key policy aspects, European countries and the United States 
played the humanitarian and the diplomatic card until the UN confronted the prospect 
of an ignominious withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia in mid -1995. 
From September 1992 on NATO countries proved willing (if often reluctant) to 
commit military resources to UN efforts in Yugoslavia, but only in the context of UN 
sanctions and humanitarian- cum -peacekeeping efforts. As the conflict was spreading to 
Bosnia, in March -April 1992, NATO military planners had looked into a number of 
military measures that could be used to send 'restraining signals' to the Bosnian Serbs?$ 
Their political masters, however, remained too wary of getting sucked into the conflict 
to put them in motion. In effect, the internal nature of the Bosnian war and the 
absence of overriding Western interests in Yugoslavia had ruled out direct NATO 
military intervention. 
Major national differences would be at play throughout the conflict, preventing 
decisive NATO action until 1995. European NATO members and Canada strongly 
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favoured a EC /UN- brokered solution, though they also showed that they were not 
always willing to back up UN Security Council decisions, the disastrous UN 'protected 
areas' policy being a case in point, with sufficient and effective military means.29 
Furthermore, in the absence of American troops on the ground in Bosnia they 
steadfastly rejected U.S. proposals to undertake retaliatory strikes against Bosnian Serb 
forces, fearing direct reprisals against their lightly armed troops. The U.S. 
administration, for its part, oscillated between a rhetorical position of overt assistance 
for the Bosnian government, half -hearted support for EC /UN efforts, the contact 
group approach, and, in a policy reversal occurring in the Spring of 1995, found itself 
arguing against the very 'lift and strike' policy it had advocated on a number of 
occasions 30 
The shift from peacekeeping to enforcement finally came in mid -1995 when the 
rationale for peacekeeping in Bosnia collapsed. In the fall of 1994, NATO planners 
began to examine the military requirements of a UN withdrawal. The increasing resort 
to limited, but apparently ineffective, NATO air strikes, exasperating problems of 
command and control between NATO and the UN, and very strict UN rules of 
engagement, had taken their toll. In the absence of a political settlement between the 
warring Serbs, Croats and Muslims, France and Britain, the two leading European 
players in Bosnia, were rapidly coming to the conclusion that their troops ran 
unacceptably high risks, and that, in the end, UN neutrality was no longer sustainable. 
Publicly, no NATO government was willing to call for a UN withdrawal. What is less 
well known, however, is that by the spring of 1995 NATO was actively preparing to 
send a massive covering force for the withdrawal of UN troops. 
Ultimately, it would be the outrageous actions of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) 
in May July 1995 that turned the course of the conflict. In May and June, BSA actions 
against UN troops compelled France, Great Britain and the Netherlands to set up a 
heavily -armed protection force in Bosnia, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). As the 
force was being deployed, however, the eastern Bosnian enclaves of Zepa and 
Srebrenica, two UN 'safe areas', fell to the BSA under tragic and controversial 
circumstances, leaving Western troop cóntributors to UNPROFOR and the United 
States scrambling for a coherent response.31 
The London conference of July 21, 1995 - which was marred by serious 
divisions between Russia and NATO governments over the use of force in Bosnia - 
issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb leadership. It was quickly followed by an 
American diplomatic campaign Ied by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke 
designed to 'decouple' the Bosnian Serb leadership from its Serbian caretakers in 
Belgrade. Following more BSA actions against UN troops, and yet another murderous 
Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo (August 28, 1995), Western governments could 
procrastinate no more and finally gave their go -ahead for a NATO air. campaign 
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(Operation Deliberate Force). The offensive air operation crippled the ability of BSA 
forces to conduct major military operations and allowed Bosnian government forces to 
recapture a major portion of the territory lost to the BSA in 1995. The Dayton 
proximity talks followed in November, leading to a peace agreement and the dispatch to 
Bosnia of the NATO Implementation Force (later renamed the Stabilisation Force), 
which received the imprimatur of the UN Security Council.32 The fact that there has 
been no renewal of hostilities in Bosnia is certainly attributable to NATO's continued 
military presence. However, the final makeup of the Bosnian state is still uncertain and 
many of the key dispositions of the Dayton peace agreement, such as the return of 
refugee populations to their original dwellings, have not been fully implemented. 
The Lessons of Bosnia 
Many important lessons can be drawn from the pre -Dayton NATO experience in 
Bosnia, an experience which constituted NATO's first out of area test in its history. 
First, NATO can mobilise considerable political and military resources in support of 
collective conflict management efforts, more so than any other European /transatlantic 
institution. The Affiance has clearly evolved into something more than a collective 
defence alliance, but although is did act an the implementing agency for UN decisions it 
is by no means an organisation subservient to the authority of the OSCE or the UN. 
Second, maintaining NATO solidarity is seen as far more important than risking 
deep intra- alliance rifts over conflicts posing little threat to core NATO countries, even 
if the resulting policy paralysis is itself highly damaging to NATO's image. Throughout 
the conflict, for instance, NATO countries expressed indignation and moral outrage 
towards the 'ethnic cleansing' taking place in Bosnia, yet they were at the receiving end 
of constant criticism for doing little to stop it. Why? Essentially because it would have 
required a dramatic shift in their commitment, from peacekeeping to direct intervention, 
which would have seen the probability of significant western casualties increase 
exponentially. No support existed for that option. As Hayes and Weitz observed in 
1995, Western policymakers had concluded that if attempting to prevent a Serbian 
victory in the conflict would risk destroying NATO, then Alliance solidarity should 
receive priority.33 
Finally, NATO has shown considerable adaptability in organising for various 
military peace support tasks. However, the quintessential question remains 'why' and 
'when' that potential should be exercised. As most analysts have concluded, NATO is 
unlikely to be a determinant player if U.S. leadership is not fully engaged, or where other 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 140 
options, such as OSCE missions and mechanisms, for instance, have not already run 
their full course. 
NATO's glowing future? 
It remains to be seen whether CJTF's will provide the solution to the division of labour 
between Europe and the United States on out of area crises. Though the political cost 
of not participating to a CJTF operation could be high for any of NATO's core 
members, there remain clear distinctions between the national obligations flowing from 
Article 5 of the NATO treaty and those flowing from a less stringent commitment to 
contribute to peace and stability outside the territory of NATO members. This being 
said, the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia is certainly a major demonstration of the 
Alliance's willingness to play a stabilising role in Europe outside its traditional Article 5 
responsibilities. Though, it needs to be reiterated that this was only made possible 
because of the centrality of the U.S. role within the Alliance. 
In the wake of the dispatch of the NATO forces to Bosnia the question of 
enlargement has been the single most important issue facing the Affiance. Throughout 
1995 to 1997, enlargement was largely sold on the premise that it constitutes a 
fundamentally desirable conflict prevention measure; that it would reinforce stability 
and democracy in ECE countries and prevent a return of balance of power politics in 
Europe.34 There are solid grounds to believe that this may be the case, but only if other 
conditions are met. First, both the security interests of Russia and its perceptions of 
Western intentions must remain a major consideration. Second, both the United States 
and EU countries need to remain committed to NATO as the principal framework for 
European security. Finally, the EU must finally move forward on its own hesitant 
enlargement process. 
Needless to say, enlarging NATO is a historical (and controversial) decision, one 
that was only possible as a result of a carefully orchestrated diplomatic campaign 
towards Russia.35 However, the basic decision to enlarge does not mean unequivocal 
NATO consensus on all aspects of enlargement. For instance, no sooner had Moscow 
signed an agreement creating a Permanent Russia -NATO Joint Council (May 1997) than 
NATO governments were bickering amongst themselves over who should be invited to 
join Similarly, new defence spending incurred as a result of enlargement has already 
become a transatlantic sore point.36 
Supporters of enlargement are also keeping their eyes on the U.S Congress. 
Thought the Congress did endorse NATO enlargement plans in 1998, an important 
number of American legislators remain unenthusiastic about an expanded Affiance. 
Without a clearly identifiable threat to European security, expansion is perceived to be a 
political imperative rather than a military necessity. However, it is an imperative that 
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entails extending U.S. commitments in Europe. This is not a popular idea for an 
American Congress intensely reluctant to see U.S. troops get involved in ethnic 
brushfires. 
Enlargement will also mean more voices around the high table. In some 
quarters this is seen as complicating the search for common ground and diluting U.S. 
influence in Europe. Expanding the Atlantic Alliance may complicate decision -making, 
particularly with respect to out of area issues. However, given the express interest of so 
many ECE states in joining NATO, the costs of a decision not to enlarge would have 
been incalculable, not only jeopardising the transatlantic link in the long -term but also 
leaving the impression NATO countries wanted to maintain a strategic glacis in Eastern 
Europe. Here a review of European history this century should weigh at least as much 
in the minds of policymakers as a balance sheet account of the costs of enlargement for 
the next twenty years. 
The European Union (EU) 
Is Europe condemned to be an "economic giant, a political dwarf and a military 
worm"j37 For much of this decade this question has haunted those European 
policymakers who have favoured a greater foreign policy and defence role for the EU.38 
Collectively EU governments have found it extremely difficult to transform what was 
primarily an economic integration framework into a united political force able to act 
cohesively in peace and security matters. Common EU actions in the field of foreign 
affairs are possible. However, the goal of building a European foreign and defence 
policy is now essentially on hold. As ever, the fundamental problem resides in the fact 
that there is no agreement on what the end point of the European project should be: a 
United States of Europe, or a union based on a mix of supranational and national 
powers. 
The start of monetary union - which began in January 1999 with eleven 
participating countries - followed closely by what is sure to be a protracted and 
controversial EU enlargement process, will no doubt create a new dynamic in European 
politics. Many fear that the introduction of the single currency will threaten the EU's 
political cohesion and that EU enlargement, with the difficult reforms to EC policies it 
will entail, might dilute the European political project even further. Only time will tell 
whether these forecasts are correct. In the meantime, what seems clear is that the EU's 
ability to be a cohesive foreign policy player acting beyond its membership's borders will 
remain very much in doubt. 
The CFSP: Europe's rhetorical foreign policy 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 142 
In February 1992, with the signature of the Treaty on Political Union as part of the 
overall Maastricht agreement, EC members established a new framework for 
formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which would become the 
second pillar of the European Union (the first being economic and monetary union, and 
the third, justice and home affairs).39 Bar certain long -term objectives, such as the 
eventual framing of a common defence, the CFSP was not originally designed as a 
specific set of policies. It was rather conceived as an enabling framework requiring EU 
members to inform and consult one another on matters of foreign and security policy 
and also allowed them to formulate common positions or take common action on 
relevant matters4° The Maastricht treaty also enshrined two important obligations: 
mutual loyalty and solidarity for CFSP actions and positions, and restraint in taking 
actions that might be contrary to EU interests.41 
In many quarters these measures were heralded as historic steps towards the 
creation of a more politically active Europe; a continuation of Europe's longue marche 
towards the formation of a European super- state. Indeed, combined with the historic 
agreement on economic and monetary union (EMU), some saw in Maastricht the rise of 
a new 'metropolitan colossus' that would challenge U.S. leadership in world affairs.42 
This early optimism was short -lived. 
The record of European policies in the early days of the Yugoslav conflict 
(1991 -1992) strongly suggested that European attempts at forging common foreign 
policy positions would remain a disorganised complement to the national policies of the 
core EU countries: Britain, France, and Germany.43 Since then, the hypothesis of a 
convergence of European foreign and defence policies has been tested on many fronts: 
on the issue of WEU -EU relations (see section on the WEU); on NATO's future role in 
Europe; in Africa during the 1993 South African elections and in the ongoing crisis in 
the Great Lakes region; in Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East with the 
tentative promotion of the EU as a regional actor; following the resumption of French 
nuclear testing in the Pacific; on UN reform; in the Balkans once again following the 
Dayton agreement; and, more recently, following the collapse of state control in 
Albania. 
What emerges from this experience is the fact that the EU wields considerable 
influence as a voting and proposal bloc within bodies such as the UN and the OSCE, 
and it has become a leading international player in the humanitarian and disaster relief 
field. It has also known some discreet diplomatic successes, notably the 1995 Pact on 
Stability in Europe, a French proposal adopted by the EU as a common action initiative 
under CFSP rules. Overall, however, the body of policies that constitute the embryo of 
a European foreign and defence policy reflects an unsatisfactory lowest common 
denominator approach that was evident throughout the Yugoslav conflict. There the 
EU played a pivotal humanitarian relief role. But European countries couldn't agree 
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amongst themselves on a common strategy to end the conflict and constantly looked 
towards the UN and NATO for decisive measures. 
Parallel roads? EU external action and national interests 
One could speculate at length about the procedural /institutional framework of the EPC 
or the Maastricht treaty to explain the lacklustre performance of Europe as a foreign 
policy actor between 1991 and 1997.44 Rightly or wrongly, CFSP requirements for 
unanimity, continuity problems posed by the six -monthly rotation principle of the EU 
presidency, and the lack of a dedicated political analysis and planning unit within the 
EU Commission, have all been pointed to as contributing factors for the feebleness of 
the CFSP. There are, however, more fundamental issues. 
The first one is the paradox on which the CFSP was founded; a conventional 
notion of foreign policy and defence based on inter- governmental consensus, whereas 
the whole EC edifice is historically based on an unconventional notion of international 
cooperation which transferred some elements of national competence to supra -national 
authority. Is this paradox a determinant issue? Undoubtedly. Consider the conclusions 
of the EU Reflection Group, a high -level consultative body set up in the lead up to the 
1996 Inter -Governmental Conference (IGC) reviewing the Maastricht treaty. Its final 
report noted that the EU's most effective instruments for external action were those 
flowing out of common EC policies (the EC remains an integral part of the larger EU 
framework) rather than from the CFSP, which, the report stated in uncharacteristically 
frank manner, had "a long way to go ".45 
The second point flows from the first; the CFSP does not preclude the pursuit 
of national foreign and defence interests and can only function when EU members 
agree that an issue can best be dealt with collectively. Then again, because foreign 
affairs and defence ultimately remain a matter of national competence, states retain the 
privilege to opt out or even 'defect' from the CFSP framework. Thus, just as it was 
about to sign the Maastricht treaty, in December 1991, Germany went ahead with its 
disastrous policy of 'preventive recognition' of Slovenia and Croatia, a move that 
effectively short -circuited EC peace efforts in Yugoslavia. In a similar vein, Greece 
blocked EC recognition of Macedonia and held its European partners hostage to its 
national position because Greek parliamentary approval was vital in securing the 
survival of the Maastricht treaty. Both cases demonstrated how specific historical 
associations could prove stronger than the EC /EU framework of collective decision - 
making. Germany was openly supportive of Croatia's bid for independence well before 
the EC was tasked with drawing up a common policy on the recognition of the 
secessionist Yugoslav republics, and Greece was ready to go to war with Yugoslav 
Macedonia over the republic's name, seen by Greece as an appropriation of Macedonian 
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identity (Macedonia is also the name of a Greek region). More recently, in 1995, the 
resumption of French nuclear testing in the Pacific despite universal opprobrium again 
showed how the exercise of 'higher national interests' could undermine the EU's 
credibility as an international actor. 
The pursuit of national interests is also a leading factor behind the growing 
foreign policy 'sub -groupism' within the EU membership. Amongst all of the EU 
countries, for instance, France and Germany were the most enthusiastic promoters of a 
European defence identity throughout the early 1990s Similarly EU countries which 
have important Mediterranean interests, France, Spain and Italy, are at the forefront of 
the EU's Mediterranean initiative. Scandinavian countries, which have a long history of 
regional cooperation, represent another special cooperation cluster, and, it should be 
noted, remain cautious bystanders in the EU's global foreign policy agenda. In effect, as 
Robin Niblett notes, the principal actors of 'EU foreign policy' are grouped by 
coalitions of the "willing and able, the able but unwilling, and the unwilling with regards 
to certain parts ".4G 
European leaders are increasingly open in their acknowledgment that the EU is 
a 'multi- speed' (if not 'multi- track') construction. Consider the French government's call, 
in 1996, for a recognition of the coopération renforcée principle, enhanced cooperation 
amongst given EU members on given issue -areas (the special relationship between 
France and Germany being the classic example).47 In 1997, this proposal was taken up 
by the Dutch presidency of the EU under the heading of the need for a more 'flexible' 
union.48 However, introducing too much flexibility might well result in a Europe à la 
carte where individual states increasingly pick and choose what they want to do under 
the EU framework. 
Amsterdam treaty amendments 
One of the key objectives of the 1996 IGC was to fmd ways to improve the coherence 
of EU external action and examine how the functioning of the CFSP could be 
improved. Reflecting on the EU's external policy role since the adoption of Maastricht, 
the EU Reflection Group concluded in 1995 that the EU should give itself "the means 
appropriate to more effective and more coordinated external action" 49 IGC 
negotiations began in Turin in March 1996 and lasted until the spring of 1997. The real 
negotiations, however, took place closer to the deadline of June 1997 for agreeing to 
revisions to the EU treaty: 
The CSFP came up as a topic for discussion at the post -IGC Noordwijk summit 
of May 1997. The new British Labour government reiterated its opposition to plans for 
a WEU -EU merger backed by France and Germany, as did Sweden and Finland which 
proposed a compromise plan. France nevertheless pushed ahead with its proposal for a 
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'Mr. CFSP', a new post of EU representative for foreign affairs. In spite of an apparent 
urgency to deal with Europe foreign policy coordination, however, the CFSP did not 
prove to be the dominant issue of the summit. The increasing tensions over Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) weighed much more heavily on the agenda, as did the 
unrelenting unemployment crisis in continental Europe, and the unfinished business of 
defining a more precise timetable for EU enlargement, a extremely complex process 
hastened by NATO's decision to go ahead with own enlargement process. 
The June EU summit 1997 in Amsterdam resulted in the signing of a revised EU 
treaty which, like Maastricht, is the quintessential example of compromise in the 
EC /EU tradition; complex, ambitious and ambiguous on many points.50 It is not my 
intention here to discuss the treaty in elaborate detail. I will therefore limit my 
comment to certain aspects of the revised CFSP procedures as the latter have a direct 
bearing on the ability of the EU to play a regional /international political role. 
Overall, the Amsterdam treaty represents an attempt to clarify (but, alas, not 
simplify) CFSP procedures and objectives in light of recent experience. Some elements 
were introduced with a view to enhance the EU's decision -making process and its ability 
to play a more coherent international role, notably in regard to possible European 
humanitarian/peace support operations, others were adopted in order to circumscribe 
more precisely the responsibilities of signatories under the treaty. Three new measures 
appear particularly important. 
First, the CFSP is to be personified by a High Representative of the CFSP, a 
function exercised by the new position of Secretary General of the EU council (Art. J.8 
of the Amsterdam treaty). The six -monthly rotating EU Presidency, however, will still 
be the EU political voice between EU Council meetings, and will be responsible for the 
implementation of CFSP decisions. The EU Presidency will also present common EU 
positions in international organisations and conferences. EU decision - making is likely 
to remain laborious and complex, more so than many would like. However, it is hoped 
that the position of High Representative of the CFSP, having a higher status than 
ordinary EC commissioners, will improve the EU's ability to undertake effective public 
and private diplomacy. 
Second, CFSP decisions will still be taken on the basis of unanimity (Article 
J.12). However the treaty provides for 'positive abstention', that is, a country which will 
abstain from voting on a CFSP issue will not be able prevent the adoption of a CFSP 
decision at the EU Council and will have to refrain from taking any action likely to 
conflict with or impede EU action on that decision. Moreover, by derogation, the treaty 
provides for qualified majority voting when adopting joint actions or joint decisions on 
the basis of a common strategy, or when adopting decisions on the implementation of 
joint actions or decisions. Qualified majority voting, it is important to note, will not 
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apply to decisions having military or defence implications Unanimous agreement will 
therefore be required before any military action is launched under the EU flag. 
Finally, the treaty clarifies somewhat the role of the WEU vis -à -vis the EU. 
Building a common defence policy remains a CFSP objective, but with the new and 
important proviso "should the European Council so decide" (Art. J.7). Few observers 
think this is a realistic possibility anytime soon. What is probably more important for 
the short to mid -term is the approval of the Swedish -Finnish proposal to enfold the 
WEU's Petersberg tasks (see section on the WEU) as falling within the purview of 
CFSP. This measure establishes a direct link between EU political authority and 
decisions of the WEU Council. As observers will note, however, these tasks were 
precisely the object of NATO negotiations on CJTF's and on NATO /WEU command 
authority in 1994 -1996. One might expect, therefore, that the United States will carry 
an important voice in any EU decision to launch a major peace support mission should 
transfers of NATO military assets to the WEU be required. 
The Amsterdam treaty - which, like Maastricht, will need parliamentary 
ratification by all EU members before it enters into force - will perhaps make marginal 
improvements to the functioning of the CFSP. However, CFSP fundamentals will 
remain essentially the same: all EU countries will have to get on board before big 
decision are made. The introduction of majority voting as the basis for all CFSP 
decision -making would have been a radical change. EU leaders, however, have decided 
that unanimity, with the possibility of positive abstention, (which existed de facto before 
Amsterdam in any case) was a more pragmatic and politically sustainable option. 
Broken ambitions? 
Given the EU's disappointing foreign policy record since the signing of Maastricht it is 
difficult to argue against the view expressed by some that EU external policy is better 
equipped collectively in deploying economic instruments.$] These effectively constitute 
the EU's greatest comparative advantage vis -à -vis other European institutions. The EU 
is not a regional security organisation per se, but it nevertheless continues to be an 
important provider of regional and, to a certain extent, international stability. It can 
probably be argued that its most important contribution to preventing conflict and 
peace -building lies in what it represents for its neighbours and the international 
community at large: a leading economic and financial bloc, a major aid provider, and a 
community of values which, despite its internal shortcomings and contradictions, 
remains a powerful magnet for Europe's surrounding regions. 
Perhaps what is even more significant in the long term, however, is that the 
European political project appears to have been shifted to the background under the 
weight of its internal contradictions. For Germany, historically the leading advocate of 
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European federalism, it has become more difficult to sustain at home the argument that 
the European project is about war and peace. Not only do important segments of the 
German political elite see upcoming EU reforms as potentially threatening to the 
German sozialstaat, but as the largest financial contributor to the EU, Germany is now 
keen to put a cap on its contribution to ever growing EU budget. As for France, its 
efforts to create a new European security order in which the Franco -German tandem 
would play the leading role ran into the ground in the killings fields of Yugoslavia. The 
conflict demonstrated that the United States remained the key player in European 
security affairs, that post -Cold War Germany was unwilling to play the role of European 
policeman, and that, for the moment, there were no alternatives to a strong,NATO. In 
late 1997, France half -heartedly tried mount a new challenge to U.S. leadership by 
attempting to form a European 'troika' with Germany and Russia, a sort of European 
directoire outside the EU framework.52 However, with a difficult economic situation at 
home, the Kohl coalition government did not appear particularly interested in any grand 
new diplomatic schemes. Initiatives such as these do not leave smaller EU members 
indifferent, and anything resembling turn -of- the -century great power diplomacy 
between major European countries is usually viewed by them with considerable 
suspicion, if not outright disdain. 
The inability of EU governments to define and agree on the end point of the 
European project has not prevented them from forging ahead with what is indisputably 
the most significant European undertaking since the Treaty of Rome: monetary union 
and the adoption of a new common currency. It is, by any measure, a tremendous 
gamble whose consequences for European economies and domestic politics is not yet 
fully known. There are plenty of forecasts, both optimistic and pessimistic. What 
seems clear, however, is that in the short to mid -term the future of l'Europe politique has 
been staked on the success of economic and monetary union rather than on a what has 
been thus far a very disappointing Common Foreign and Defence policy 
The Western European Union (WEU) 
The WEU was formally established by the Modified Brussels Treaty, signed in Paris in 
1954, in the aftermath of the demise of the European Defence Community (EDC) 
plan.53 Meant to express Western European solidarity and facilitate Germany's entry 
into NATO, it was a defensive affiance without any military forces of its own, nor with 
any real responsibilities in matters of collective defence. Not surprisingly it quickly 
faded in the shadow of NATO, though it maintained a role as an inter- parliamentary 
forum on defence issues for European legislators. 
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In 1984, following the Franco -German rapprochement on security and defence 
begun two years earlier, the WEU was reactivated at the initiative of the French socialist 
government. The controversy surrounding the deployment of new American 
intermediate -range nuclear weapons in Europe, and French -led attempts to breathe new 
life into the moribund EC political agenda, provided new impetus for Western 
European dialogue on matters of continental security. As well, the WEU was 
increasingly seen by some EC leaders as a promising forum for Western European 
defence cooperation. In 1987 -1988, the threat to oil tankers in the Persian Gulf 
provided a first chance to WEU members to show collective resolve and a European 
naval task force was dispatched to the Gulf for escort and de- mining duty. 
Europe's poor collective showing during the 1990 -1991 Gulf war was an 
important factor in the WEU's revival. The conflict strengthened the French 
government's views on the need to develop an independent European military 
capability. However, the ensuing Yugoslav conflict impacted very negatively on the 
credibility of the WEU and provided critics with ample demonstration of the rather 
shallow nature of EC /EU rhetoric on European security. Perhaps more importantly, 
the conflict in Yugoslavia compelled EC /EU countries to make hard choices in matters 
of security policy which have tended to reinforce NATO's position in Europe rather 
than of the WEU. 
A defence organisation for whom? 
To a large extent, the inter- governmental debate over the WEU's post -Cold War role 
has mirrored existing political fault lines over the establishment of a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) under the European flag. Led by France and Germany, 
proponents of political integration promoted the WEU as the defence component of 
the future European Union throughout the early 1990s. France's socialist government, 
singularly obsessed by U.S. prominence in world affairs, ultimately wanted to see the 
organisation develop as a coequal partner to NATO (if not its replacement) with its own 
military forces and related agencies. Germany's position was considerably more 
ambiguous, if not outright confusing. Caught between its French and American allies, 
the Kohl government said yes to the WEU, yes to NATO, and then proceeded to put 
its weight behind a strengthened CSCE. Britain's Conservative government, on the 
other hand, held a clearer, if more predictable position. As the standard bearer of 
atlanticism in Europe it opposed any moves which would weaken NATO, and only 
timidly approved of the strengthening of the WEU's capabilities, but only as NATO's 
'European pillai 54 
The 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) proved to be a jewel of 
creative ambiguity between these views. On the one hand, the treaty enshrined the need 
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to develop a EU security identity, including "the eventual framing of a common [EU] 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence "(Art. J.4.1 of TEU), and 
it designated the WEU as the implementing agency of decisions and actions of the 
Union which have defence implications (Art. J.4.2). However, the treaty stated that 
these previous provisions did not prejudice the security and defence policy of EU 
member states under NATO, not should they impede them from developing closer 
cooperation within the WEU or NATO framework (Art. J.4.4. and J.4.5). 
The different positions presented above have been hotly debated throughout the 
first half of this decade. However, after a few years of confusion, the situation has 
become somewhat clearer. The goal of developing an independent European defence 
policy and creating a 'European army' has been put aside (once again) because of the 
overarching need to maintain translatlantic unity. Furthermore, given the opposition of 
many EU countries to the formal integration of the WEU in the EU, the WEU is no 
closer to being a subsidiary agency of the EU than it was back in 1990. In fact, as a 
result of NATO negotiations on CJTF's there has been a closer level of institutional 
cooperation between NATO and the WEU than between the EU and the WEU. Only 
recently have we seen moves to strengthen political cooperation between the latter two 
bodies. 
A rapidly evolving structure 
There is no doubt that the WEU is a considerably more capable organisation today than 
it was just a few years ago. Both from a constitutional and institutional point of view 
the WEU has acquired mandates and capabilities which were virtually non -existent 
during the Gulf War and at the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict. Consider the 
following developments. 
In June 1992, in Bonn, WEU members adopted the Petersberg Declaration 
which, inter alia, defined the organisation's role in relation to collective security. The 
so -called ' Petersberg tasks' stipulated that military units of WEU member states could 
be employed for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and combat tasks in 
crisis management, including peace enforcement, in support of the UN or the CSCE. 
The WEU then moved to create a stronger crisis management capability at its new 
headquarters (it moved from Paris to Brussels in 1993) by establishing a WEU planning 
cell. 
In May 1993, the WEU adopted the concept of Forces Answerable to the WEU 
(FAWEU), national or multi -national units which could be put at the disposal of the 
WEU. Since then a number of military formations have been designated as FAWEU, 
many of them theoretically 'double- hatted' between NATO formations and the WEU. 
The same year, the WEU belatedly opened a satellite data interpretation centre in 
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Torrejon, Spain, largely established in reaction to Europe's dependence on American 
satellite intelligence means during the Gulf War 55 Given the unfavourable economic 
situation in EU countries, however, the two acknowledged leaders of the European 
satellite program, France and Germany, have found it increasingly difficult to justify 
spending vast amounts of public funds on costly military programs, and as a result the 
scope of the European military satellite program has had to be curtailed 
In January 1994, EUROGROUP, formed in 1968 as the European consultative 
grouping within NATO, was disbanded and its previous activities divided up by the 
WEU and NATO. The following May, in Kirchberg, Luxembourg, the WEU Council 
adopted a new four -category system of membership, partly as a political reaction to 
NATO's own openings towards Eastern and Central Europe.56 The WEU is currently 
composed of twenty seven European countries, ten of which are full members.57 
At the Lisbon WEU Council meeting of May 1995, WEU defence and foreign 
affairs ministers approved the establishment of a new politico- military analysis group to 
support the WEU decision - making, as well as the establishment of a new situation 
centre and a new intelligence centre as part of the organisations planning cell. Then, in 
November 1995, the WEU Council unveiled a comprehensive European security 
blueprint which, inter alia, acknowledged the importance of WEU -NATO cooperation 
in matters related to peacekeeping and other contingency operations.58 
In May 1996, the WEU signed a cooperation agreement with NATO on sharing 
intelligence information. In June 1996, after nearly three years of debate, the North 
Atlantic Council gave its long -awaited agreement to the Combined Joint Task Forces 
(CJTF) concept which would allow 'coalitions of the willing' within NATO, to launch 
out of area, non -collective defence operations with NATO's military support, but not 
necessarily with the participation of all NATO members.59 
Common structures, yes, but common policies? 
As a French observer of European politics put it, "the real world of real crises must be 
reconciled from the abstract world of institutional debates ".60 Perhaps the real post - 
Cold War test for the WEU was never in the chimera of an independent European 
defence organised outside the transatlantic framework, but rather in its capacity to 
organise a collective European response to out of area crises. This raises the crucial 
issues of political support and military capabilities for such contingencies. 
Whether during the Gulf War, the Yugoslav conflict or the crises in Central 
Africa, however, the European record does not inspire a great deal of confidence in the 
capacity of European states to mount military operations under the EU flag. As Philip 
Gordon notes, there is little indication that the subset of NATO which may support a 
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contingency operation out of area will necessarily correspond to the WEU 
membership.61 
The WEU's quandaries are by- products of three essentially political dilemmas. 
First, the WEU remains wedged uneasily between competing visions of European 
security, some of which are mutually compatible, others less so. Second, irrespective of 
the NATO enlargement process and the June 1997 Amsterdam treaty revising the 
Maastricht treaty, the WEU remains a junior partner to both NATO and the EU. And 
third, beyond the statements of a few enthusiastic politicians, it has become blatantly 
clear that, collectively, EU governments have neither the inclination nor the financial 
means to invest the vast funds required to create an independent European defence 
system, particularly at a time of stagnating growth and high unemployment in core EU 
countries 62 Though, as a counterpoint, both the downward trend in defence spending 
in Western Europe and increased commercial competition from U.S. defence industries 
have been driving a wave of industry mergers in the European defence sector. This is 
arguably a necessary, if commercially driven, step to take on the road to a more 
coherent European defence policy. 
Yugoslavia serves as a potent reminder of the WEU problems. Without any 
operational land formations or command structure of its own, the organisation's real 
contribution to conflict control efforts was extremely limited. In 1991 and 1992, 
proposals to send a European interposition force in Yugoslavia were repeatedly 
rebuffed. Britain and other European NATO members rejected French -German 
proposals on the grounds that WEU peacekeeping was impossible in light of the 
situation in Yugoslavia and that, at any rate, the WEU was unprepared to play such a 
role.63 WEU members, however, did agree on more limited measures. 
In July 1992 European ships started patrolling the Adriatic under the WEU flag 
in order to enforce UN sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia. European navies had 
previously played a similar role late in the Iran -Iraq war as well as during the Kuwait 
conflict, which, m the latter case, turned out to be an infelicitous experience. In June 
1993, the WEU naval operation in the Adriatic Sea was combined to NATO's own 
naval force to form a joint NATO /WEU operation (Operation Sharp Guard) under 
overall NATO command From June 1993 onward European countries also provided 
elements for the WEU police and customs operation on the Danube organised jointly 
with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Finally, a small WEU police element was 
dispatched to Bosnia as part of the ill-fated EU Administration of Mostar (1994- 1996). 
It has become obvious that European countries hold varying levels of allegiance 
to the European defence and security ideal. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain are all keen to promote a stronger European defence identity 
and are all actively involved in the establishment of various 'euro- forces', for example 
EUROCORPS and the Mediterranean- oriented EUROMARFOR and EUROFOR 
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maritime and land forces. On the other hand, Europe's neutrals, nearly all of whom are 
EU members, are opposed to the type of 'Euro- defence' which was envisaged off and 
on by French policymakers and other proponents of a higher level of European defence 
cooperation.64 They do agree in principle that Europe should be able to launch 
humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping missions - these roles, in fact, where 
enfolded in the 1997 Amsterdam treaty - but they do not agree on integrating national 
defences under the EU framework. As for Britain, it worked steadfastly against the 
development of the WEU outside the NATO framework for most of the 90s. The new 
British Labour government initially made it clear that it was no more interested in a 
militarized EU, or a WEU /EU merger, that its Conservative predecessor. However, as 
a result of Europe's disorganized diplomacy in Kosovo, the British New Labour 
government has fundamentally revised its position and is now favourable to the 
development of an autonomous European military capability, albeit under the condition 
that it not undermine transatlantic solidarity.65 
To complicate matters further, many northern European countries are strong 
supporters of UN rather than regional solutions to peace and security problems and are 
piloting their own separate initiatives in the field of peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations. For instance, some Nordic countries, in conjunction with Austria, Canada, 
the Netherlands and Poland, are currently spearheading the creation of the Stand -by 
High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) which is essentially a command structure to be 
used by the UN for conventional (i.e. Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations. 
In light of this extraordinary mélange of national policies, it is perhaps not 
surprising the WEU is still searching for a clearly defined role. The Secretary General of 
the WEU, Jose Cutileiro, asserted in October 1996 that the WEU is the framework "for 
European countries to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in cases where 
the Americans have no interest in taking part ".66 That may well be the goal. Yet it is 
also true that over the last few years the development of the WEU was led by a small 
group of true believers rather than the whole of Western Europe in unison. 
Politically time may well be running out for the organisation. Recent events in 
Kosovo have demonstrated once again how 'theoretical', and ultimately unusable, its 
military potential is. As a result, a growing number of European leaders are coming out 
in favour of outright integration of the WEU into the EU. There may be more to this 
trend than a repeat of 1997 debates on the subject. With a new coalition government in 
Germany eager to reform European institutions, and a British government ready to 
invest political capital under EU's name, the WEU looks likely to be integrated into the 
EU, and thus disappear as a wholly separate organisation, in the short to mid -term. 
Whether EU countries are politically and financially ready to invest the resources 
necessary to develop a truly autonomous European defence capability, however, is not 
altogether clear. 
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The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was hastily established in December 
1991, as the Soviet Union was formally dissolved Initially consisting of Russia, Belarus 
and Ukraine, it quickly expanded within a few weeks to include 11 of the former 15 
republics. Since then, CIS membership has been far from stable. Azerbaijan 
temporarily withdrew in 1992 only to come back to the CIS fold in October 1993 after a 
striking a deal with Russia. It has now announced its intention to withdraw from CIS 
collective security structure. Similarly, Georgia joined the CIS in late 1993 in a 
controversial quid pro quo with Russia allowing Moscow to maintain military bases in the 
country. More recently, in 1996, both Kazakhstan and Georgia threatened to leave the 
Commonwealth if their independence was threatened. 
The CIS has been gradually developed into a web of coordinating institutions 
and sectoral regimes. The main CIS decision -making organs, the CIS Council of the 
Heads of State (CHS) was established early on. On the political- security side, a CIS 
Collective Security Council (CSC) was set up in December 1993 as the supreme defence 
decision -making organ of the Commonwealth pursuant to the 1992 Collective Security 
Treaty somewhat sidelining the CIS Council of Defence Ministers (CDM) was 
established earlier on in order to deal with the immediate requirements of CIS military 
cooperation. By 1995, Russia was reported to have already signed more than 200 
military agreement with CIS governments.G7 Most of these agreements, however, have 
either focussed on trying to maintain infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era or 
have simply never been acted upon because of lack of resources.68 Russian efforts to 
create an integrated defence space unified under the CIS framework have proved 
particularly contentious, and many of the New Independent States (NIS) emerging from 
the defunct Soviet order have adopted an increasingly selective approach towards 
political- security cooperation with Moscow. 
CIS economic cooperation has also been an important priority for Russia, which 
has spent considerable energy trying to organise a CIS economic and customs union 
loosely modelled on the EC. However, even though hundreds of economic 
cooperation agreements have been concluded between CIS countries, many were, in 
fact, never implemented. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic 
growth and production in the NIS declined sharply. As a result of drastic economic 
changes and of the disorganization of post -Soviet economic order, real incomes in many 
of the republics quickly plummeted and the internal CIS economic union sought by 
Russia never really materialized (perhaps with the exception of the Russia- Belarus 
relationship).69 Today many NIS countries remain heavily dependant for credit and 
finance on international financial institutions and other international lending agencies, 
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and most have actively tried to attract non -CIS sources of investment and capital to 
boost their economies. 
Russia indisputably provides the 'glue' that binds the CIS together. However, 
that bond has been weakening ever since the CIS was established. Given the scope of 
Russia's own economic, political and military problems and the volatility of Russian -CIS 
relations, it is not at all clear that the CIS can ever constitute the strategic and economic 
'buffer zone' Russian leaders had originally hoped for. It is, at best, an unstable regional 
arrangement, and at worst, a symbol of Russia's decaying influence in its immediate 
periphery. 
The CIS and collective security 
The basic elements of the CIS collective security system are enshrined in a collection of 
agreements signed in 1992 and 1993: the Agreement on Groups of Military Observers 
and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS, signed in Kiev in March 1992; the 
Treaty on Collective Security signed in Tashkent in May 1992 (not signed by the 
Ukraine, Moldova or Turkmenistan, the latter having signed a special bilateral defence 
agreement with Russia), and; the CIS Charter, adopted by CIS Heads of States in Minsk, 
Belarus, in January 1993.7° Part III of the of the CIS Charter reiterates elements found 
in the previous two agreements on the use of collective peacekeeping forces within the 
CIS, as well as stipulations concerning collective self -defence under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter.71 More recent agreements on defence and security are characterised by 
their bilateral nature. Russia has signed a number of agreements with Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova dealing with Russian military bases, 
maintenance of air defence systems, and border control. 
This collection of agreements needs to be examined in context. Russia's 
interests towards its immediate periphery, the so -called 'Near Abroad', were formally 
articulated by the Russian foreign ministry in its Concept of Russian Foreign Policy 
belatedly adopted in March 1993 after nearly a year of infighting between nationalist and 
liberal factions in the Russian Duma and the foreign policy /defence establishment. The 
control and curtailment of conflict around Russia's immediate periphery and the 
protection of ethnic Russians communities living in the near abroad (estimated at 25 
million) were listed as top priorities.72 The policy effectively affirmed what Russia had 
already been doing since the turn of the decade in response to the alarming number of 
secessionist /ethnic conflicts in and around Russia. Russian claims went much further, 
however, to the extent that they sought to legitimise the development of the CIS as an 
anchor tying the newly independent republics to Russia's economic and security 
interests. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 155 
CIS Peacekeeping 
As ex- Soviet troops were withdrawing Eastern and Central Europe, Russia's military 
doctrine was reoriented towards maintaining stability in the CIS. The new doctrine 
placed a heavy emphasis on rapid troop deployments and preparedness to use a high 
level of force to protect Russian interests.73 Russian military leaders and policymakers 
have dismissed the notion that the country's 'peace restoring' activities in the CIS should 
be guided by traditional UN peacekeeping principles. In light of Western criticisms 
towards Russia's approach to CIS peacekeeping, for example, (former) Russian foreign 
minister Andrei Kozyrev is on record as having called for a 'realistic' approach to 
conflict control in the former republics, a euphemism for letting Russia act as it saw fit 
in order protect its national interests in the CIS.74 
Thus far Russian /CIS 'peacekeeping' troops have operated in four locations: 
South Ossetia (since July 1992), Moldova (since July 1992), Tajikistan (since December 
1992) and Abhazia (since June 1994). Russia is the leading player in all these operations, 
also contributing the majority of the military personnel involved. In South Ossetia and 
Moldova, Russian troops operate in local coalitions integrating troops from the 
disputing parties in the peacekeeping force.75 Neither operation has been sanctioned by 
CIS decision -making bodies. By contrast, the missions in Tajikistan and Abhazia have 
been endorsed, ex post facto, by CIS decisions. In Tajikistan, a small Central Asian 
brigade operates alongside a much bigger combined Russian Army /Ministry of Interior 
contingent. In Abhazia, a Russian force separates Georgian government forces and 
Abhaz separatist rebels whom Georgia believes to be covertly supported by Russia in 
order to maintain a rationale for its continuing presence in the country. Overall, the 
record of the last few years tends to confirm the view that the protection of Russian 
interests is the determinant factor as far as peacekeeping operations in the CIS are 
concerned. 
The one exception to date to Russia's bid for peacekeeping supremacy in the 
CIS is m the long -running Nagorno -Karabakh conflict between oil-rich Azerbaijan and 
Karabakh Armenians /Armenia.76 In May 1994, Russia successfully brokered a ceasefire 
between the disputants, bypassing the OSCE's own moribund mediation attempts (the 
so -called Minsk process). Despite OSCE discussion lasting throughout 1994, however, 
Russia failed to obtain OSCE endorsement for its CIS peacekeeping missions.77 With 
Azerbaijan uninterested in Moscow's own proposal for a peacekeeping force, and 
OSCE members (including CIS countries) refusing to grant Russia exceptional 
peacekeeping privileges, it looked as if the ceasefire would not be consolidated with a 
more comprehensive plan. 
At the OSCE summit of December 1994 a last minute compromise was agreed 
to by Russia and the United States. Moscow would co -chair the OSCE Minsk Group - 
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an implicit recognition that no solution could be found without Russian approval - but 
Russia would have to accept an OSCE -led peacekeeping mission in Nagorno -Karabakh 
in which, ironically, it was likely to play a major role. As of early 1999, the OSCE 
peacekeeping mission had yet to be deployed and was unlikely to be for the foreseeable 
future. 
Living with uncle Russia 
Among the many factors which may affect future collective security operations in the 
CIS, three stand out as particularly significant: the shaky cohesion of the CIS, the rapid 
degradation of Russian military potential, and continued Western insistence on Russian 
transparency and accountability in its CIS affairs. 
The dramatic decline of the Russian military is having a major impact on 
Moscow's ability to maintain regional order in the CIS.78 The disastrous showing of the 
Russian armed forces in Chechnya in 1995 -1996 simply highlighted the accelerating rate 
of decay of what was once considered the world's mightiest army.79 Throughout 1996 
Russian political and military leaders redoubled their calls for closer military cooperation 
with the CIS Republics. That call has gone largely unheeded. In effect, Russia may well 
have lost the military means to fulfil the ambitions set out in its 'Near Abroad' policy 
and is desperately seeking ways to redistribute the defence and peacekeeping burden 
with the republics in a new 'CIS military partnership'.8° 
One readily apparent problem, however, is that none of CIS republics, bar 
Belarus, is enthusiastic about military (re)integration with Russia. Ukraine has 
succeeded in developing a special relationship with NATO and other European 
institutions and has been at odds with Russia on several security -related issues (e.g 
Crimea, Black Sea fleet); Azerbaijan rejects CIS military integration and believes Russia 
is actively hindering its efforts to exploit its considerable oil reserves; and Georgia 
accuses Russia of meddling in its internal affairs, both for the purpose of justifying its 
military presence there and for checking Turkish political and economic advances in the 
Caucasus region.81 These three countries, along with Moldova, and joined recently by 
Uzbekistan, have formed the so- called GUUAM group (Georgia- Ukraine- Uzbekistan- 
Azerbaijan -Moldova) which is essentially a diplomatic caucus meeting on the margins of 
the OSCE. Similarly, with the exception of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the former 
being for all intents and purposes a Russian protectorate, the Central Asian republics 
have opened up towards -the West, including to NATO, and are trying to reduce their 
economic dependence on Russia through increased regional trade within the framework 
of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), the regional economic arrangement 
which bridges the countries of West Asia and Central Asia.82 
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Unlike the UN Secretariat, which has extended de facto recognition to the CIS as 
a legitimate regional organisation, most Western countries individually regard the 
Commonwealth as little more than an extension of Russian foreign policy.83 They have 
repeatedly dismissed Russian demands for UN and OSCE funding of CIS peacekeeping 
operations, and their actions are invariably designed to promote the independent 
character of the NIS, or to hold Russia to higher transparency in the conduct of its CIS 
affairs.84 To a certain extent this has played in the hands of many CIS republics which 
do not consider the Commonwealth to be the exclusive framework for conflict 
resolution in the territory of the FSU, hence their intermittent appeals for OSCE or UN 
involvement to help them mitigate Russian influence.S5 Yet, after two chaotic years 
(1992 -1994) of international conflict control efforts in the FSU, there has also been a 
muted acknowledgment that Russia holds legitimate interests in the stability of the CIS 
and that Russia may at times be best placed to deal with regional conflicts. 
Since 1992, both the UN and the OSCE have been fairly active in conflict 
control efforts in the CIS. However, poor coordination, if not competition, between 
the two bodies have at times created problems, notably in Georgia.86 On other 
occasions UN or OSCE initiatives have been sidelined by Moscow or have effectively 
legitimised Russia's dominant role in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Such was the case 
of the peacekeeping operation in Abhazia /Georgia, for instance, the only Russian 
peacekeeping operation endorsed by the UN Security Council (SC Res. 937 of 21 July 
1994).87 Overall, however, Russian reluctance to be supervised by international bodies 
and Western reluctance to get involved directly in CIS conflicts have considerably 
narrowed the scope and nature of external involvement. 
As relations between the former soviet republics and the West develop, the 
United States and Western European countries are likely to demand that Russia be more 
accountable for its peacemaking ventures in the CIS. The debate over OSCE 
peacekeeping in Nagorno -Karabakh and the dispatch of UN observers in Georgia and 
Tajikistan, for instance, certainly point in this direction. At a time when Russian leaders 
are tremendously concerned about the consequences of NATO expansion, however, 
Western countries also recognise that antagonising Russia could be counter- productive. 
A low -key, cooperative approach through multilateral bodies, even if imperfect, is 
therefore likely to remain the preferred option for some time to come. However, the 
possibility of Western initiatives in the political- security sphere with selected NIS is 
likely to grow in parallel with the latter's desire to demonstrate political -diplomatic 
independence from Russia. 
African Regional Organisations 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
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Attempts to set up effective OAU structures for managing and resolving African 
conflicts have encountered serious obstacles ever since the organisation's founding in 
1963. The original OAU organ established for dealing with inter- African conflicts, the 
OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), created in 1964, 
was stillborn and never became operational. Absent such structures the organisation 
developed a culture of adhockery and a reliance on so -called 'eminent persons' as 
mediators in its efforts to address conflicts on the continent. This approach seldom 
proved effective, and for more than two decades the OAU remained the very 
embodiment of the status quo in Africa. 
The establishment, in June 1993, of a new OAU conflict management 
mechanism was a very significant step for the organisation. It arguably constitutes the 
most important institutional development since its establishment. Thus far, however, 
this structural change has had little impact on the OAU's ability to prevent and manage 
major African conflicts, let alone resolve them. In fact, throughout the first half of the 
1990s, the UN, not the OAU, played the lead role in African conflict management 
efforts. One readily apparent problem is that the OAU lacks a strong political 
constituency, a core of influential African states which champion its cause. Major 
African powers such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa prefer sub -regional rather 
continental solutions to African problems. Without the appropriate combination of 
power and responsibility, however, the OAU remains handicapped and only likely to 
play a role where the interests of major African countries are not directly involved. 
The birth of the OAU Mechanism 
The genesis of the recent wave of OAU reform dates back to the early 1990s and owes 
much to the vision of Salim Ahmed Salim, the Tanzanian Secretary General of the 
organisation who took up that post in 1989. At the July 1990 OAU Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government African leaders had called for a speedy resolution of all 
conflicts in Africa, opening the way, in principle, to some form of OAU involvement in 
the resolution of infra -state conflict. In May 1991, the Kampala Conference on 
Security, Stability and Development in Africa (CSSDA), a unique NGO- organised 
gathering of African policymakers, provided added impetus to the movement towards 
reforming African institutions. 
A first OAU restructuring exercise culminated with the creation of a small 
division of conflict management within the OAU Secretariat in March 1992. 
Simultaneously, political consultation took place in order to determine the wider 
framework through which new OAU conflict management activities were to take place. 
In June 1992, Secretary General Salim laid out the options to the OAU Council of 
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Ministers in Dakar.88 Two options were quickly discarded: 1) the revival of the CMCA, 
and 2) the creation of an African Security Council.89 What Salim proposed was the 
establishment of an new OAU Mechanism with a dual mandate of conflict prevention 
and conflict resolution headed by the OAU Bureau of the Summit. He also envisaged 
the possibility of OAU peacekeeping with the reactivation of the OAU Defence 
Commission which would have been entrusted, among other things, with setting up of a 
inter- African peacekeeping force loosely modeled on the UN stand -by forces system." 
The ultimate results of these discussions were somewhat different from Salim's 
original proposal, but remained extremely ambitious.91 Meeting in Cairo in June 1993, 
the 29th OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments established the OAU 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (henceforth referred 
to as the Mechanism).92 The objective of the Mechanism is to "anticipate and prevent" 
conflict.93 In circumstances where conflict has occurred, the Mechanism is called on to 
undertake "peace- making [i.e. mediation] and peace -building functions ".94 However, 
peacekeeping was deemed to be out of the reach of the organisation because of financial 
reasons.98 
Officially, the principles underlying the operation of the Mechanism are the 
sovereign equality of member states, non -interference in the internal affairs of states, 
their right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the 
inviolability of national borders. The Mechanism nominally functions on the basis of 
consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict. Thus, rather than offering 
major changes m the way the OAU operates, the Mechanism remains grounded on the 
organisation's principles enshrined in its charter, a document which does not 
constitutionally provide for enforcement measures nor, as is also the case of the UN 
Charter, for peacekeeping forces. 
The executive arm of the Mechanism is the Central Organ, a rotating council of 
15 states elected annually and headed by the annual chair country of the OAU96 The 
Central Organ assumes overall direction and coordination of the activities of the 
Mechanism between ordinary sessions of the OAU Assembly. The second most 
important component of the Mechanism is the Office of the OAU Secretary- General 
which is given executive powers related to decisions taken by the Central Organ and is 
tasked with early warning and preventive diplomacy, a function that will in principle be 
facilitated by the recent addition of a new U.S.- funded crisis room at OAU headquarters 
in Addis Ababa. 
As originally planned, the activities of the Mechanism were to be funded by the 
new OAU Peace Fund made up of financial appropriations from the regular OAU 
budget, voluntary contributions from OAU member states as well as other funding 
sources in Africa 9" However, the OAU Secretary General reserved the right, with the 
approval of the Central Organ, to accept contributions from sources outside Africa. In 
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the three years following the establishment of the Mechanism this last provision proved 
absolutely crucial to OAU mediation efforts, particularly in Burundi, as well as to OAU 
capacity development. 
The 'Mogadishu' effect 
Over the last few years, two events have considerably heightened international 
expectations on the OAU and African states as regards conflict management: the 
political failure of the American -led UN mission in Somalia, and the powerlessness of 
the UN during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The events of mid -1993 in Somalia were the 
root cause of a major reassessment of U.S. policy towards the UN's post -Cold War 
interventionism. Before UN forces were finally withdrawn from that country, in March 
1995, the Clinton administration placed stringent conditions for future American 
participation in UN peace operations, a position tacitly endorsed other Western 
countries as fax as military interventions in Africa were concerned.98 This severely 
curtailed UN options on the continent, making it very unlikely that the Security Council 
would soon again sanction a UN operation in an ongoing African conflict manned by 
principally by non -African troop contributors. 
The Rwanda crisis essentially confirmed this state of affairs. Neither the OAU 
nor the UN had sufficient leverage to make the August 1993 Arusha Accords 'stick' 
between the Rwanda Government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).99 With 
neither the mandate nor the personnel to enforce a cease -fire the UN Assistance 
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent to oversee the implementation of the Arusha peace 
plan essentially became a bystander as the accords unraveled in early 1994, followed in 
April of that year by the start of the tragic massacre of an estimated 800,000 Tutsi 
civilians under the apathetic eye of the UN Security Council, and later by the extremely 
controversial (but UN- sanctioned) French intervention in Rwanda.'°° 
If Rwanda was a disaster of the highest order for the UN, it was no less so for 
the OAU whose newly revived 'African solutions to African problems' rhetoric had 
proven to be rather shallow.101 Yet the crisis brought home a clear lesson for African 
states: after the Somalia and Rwanda crises, neither Western countries nor the UN could 
not be relied upon to take decisive measures to stop the kind of chaos these crises gave 
rise to. 
Post -Rwanda initiatives 
A flurry of policy activity intended to enhance African conflict management capabilities 
has been evident ever since the Rwanda conflict. First, in the immediate aftermath of 
genocide the United States, Great Britain, France launched separate African conflict 
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resolution initiatives with a view to reinforcing the capabilities of the OAU as well that 
the peacekeeping readiness of African militaries.102 In light of the multiplicity of 
proposals, however, the U.S. State Department decided to launch an international 
consultation process in May 1995 in order to develop a more coherent Western 
approach.103 If anything, however, these discussions highlighted the lack of consensus 
between the United States and Europe, and the objective of coordination was never 
fully achieved. 
In 1995, both the EU and the WEU expressed a strong interest on the issue of 
African conflict management.104 However, attempts to organise concrete EU or WEU 
initiatives on this issue have proven to be more declaratory than substantive, and 
national -level initiatives have been far more significant. After the Rwanda genocide, for 
instance, Paris called for the establishment of an African peacekeeping force. The 
project quickly ran into serious political trouble and appeared stillborn for more than 
three years. However, it resurfaced with French support for sub -regional efforts to 
manage the internal conflict in the Central African Republic. For its part, Britain ran a 
peacekeeping assistance program in 1995, having carefully selected partner countries 
across English- speaking Africa, most notably Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. As 
of late, some Scandinavian countries were also considering providing peacekeeping 
training to the armed forces of some SADC members in Southern Africa. 
Second, following the launching of these initiatives, consultations began in early 
1995 at the UN aimed at developing a global multilateral response to the problems of 
managing African conflicts.105 Given post- Somalia attitudes, the main assumption of 
these discussions was that African states and institutions would have to play a much 
greater role in policing the continent. Therefore, consultations centered on how to best 
focus external multilateral assistance. The issue was taken up by the UN Secretariat, 
leading to the presentation of full recommendations to the General Assembly in 
November 1995.106 
Finally, in the first half of 1995, the OAU Secretariat cautiously mooted a 
change of direction on the issue of peacekeeping. In a report presented to the June 
1995 OAU Summit in Addis Ababa Secretary General Salim acknowledged the financial 
and material difficulties of mounting OAU peacekeeping operations, but he opined that 
"the need for Africa to prepare to take some degree of responsibility in peacekeeping is 
even greater today than is has even been before ".107 A year later, in June 1996, the first 
ever OAU military summit endorsed the principle of stand -by arrangements and the 
earmarking of national military units to serve under the UN, the OAU, or sub -regional 
arrangements on a voluntary basis.108 
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Rhetoric and reapolitik: Burundi 
During the summer of 1996, the rapid degradation of the situation in Burundi 
heightened fears of a Rwanda -like scenario repeating itself.t09 For nearly two years UN 
efforts had overshadowed those of the OAU in Burundi, with UN Special 
Representative Ahmedou Ould Abdallah playing an important role in brokering what 
turned out to be unstable power - sharing arrangement following an aborted coup by the 
Tutsi- dominated Burundi military in October 1993. Since 1994, the OAU had deployed 
a small observation mission in the country, the MIOB (Mission de l'OUA au Burundi), 
sent to Burundi under a extremely vague mandate. Burundi's military and radical Tutsi 
elements both regarded the OAU mission as outside interference in the country's affairs 
and had succeeded in limiting the number of OAU observers. The role of the MIOB 
was therefore extremely limited. About all it could effectively achieve in its two -year 
stay was to help with small reconstruction projects and report on increasingly frequent 
massacres to OAU headquarters. 
In 1995 -1996, after the Rwanda tragedy, Western nations increasingly supported 
regional diplomacy as a way to resolve ethnic strife in Burundi. In effect, this 
constituted their response to UN Secretary -General Boutros- Ghali's calls for direct UN 
military intervention. By mid -1996, however, peace talks led by former Tanzanian 
leader Julius Nyerere on behalf of East African governments were crumbling, his 
impartiality questioned by hard -line by Tutsi elements. With an upsurge in ethnic 
killings and the new coup by the Tutsi- dominated military, in late July 1996, OAU 
Secretary General Salim took the unprecedented step of threatening military 
intervention.110 This turned out to be an awkward bluff. For weeks before the coup, an 
East African 'technical committee' had been examining plans for sending an African 
peacekeeping force in Burundi under the framework of the OAU- supported Arusha 
peace process. Yet, not only was it obvious that the OAU could not fund such an 
operation and that Western countries were not interested in paying for it, but the new 
situation undermined the very rationale for peacekeeping in the country. Instead, East 
African states imposed economic sanctions on the new Burundi junta in order to try to 
force a return to constitutional government, a gesture that received the imprimatur of 
both the OAU and the UN.111 
The Burundi coup was perhaps a fortuitous turn of events for the OAU. An 
OAU -led military intervention in Burundi might have not only become a military 
quagmire, but it could also have led to a serious crisis within the organisation.112 
Nevertheless, the imposition of regional sanctions on Burundi marked an important (if 
largely symbolic) step. As Glynne Evans notes, for the first time the OAU endorsed a 
coercive action by a group of countries against one of its own.113 The crisis also sparked 
a new U.S. initiative. In late September 1996, the Clinton administration proposed to 
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organise, train and equip an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).114 The United 
States was reportedly prepared to shoulder half of the estimated cost of US$ 25 million 
for setting up a 10,000 strong all -African peacekeeping force, proposing that the EU 
make up for the difference.115 
Initially, the African response to the ACRF proposal was extremely reserved. 
Though some countries showed interest in the initiative, a number of others, foremost 
among them South Africa, criticised the fact Washington seemed to be telling African 
how to organise themselves, bypassing the UN and African institutions in the 
process.176 A bellicose Nigerian regime called the scheme "a package aimed at 
recolonising Africa and the developing nations ".117 The American proposal was also 
subjected to diplomatic sniping by France, which had proposed an analogous plan in 
November 1994.118 In the end, the Clinton administration was effectively sent back to 
the drawing board and the original ACRF initiative now appears to be a lettre morte. 
Washington has opted instead to offer peacekeeping training services - under the 
renamed African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) - to a small but growing number of 
African militaries vying for U.S. military assistance.119 It is also proposing to fund a new 
African -based think tank which will examine peace and security issues on the continent. 
African problems, African solutions: with or without the OAU? 
Though a number of positive developments can be identified in terms of OAU 
capacity -building, the rhetorical support of African states for the 'new' OAU has simply 
not been matched by action. Since the Rwanda crisis, they have been increasingly 
prepared to take matters into their own hands without waiting for effective OAU (or 
UN) action. Whether in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone or the 
former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) coalitions of interested African 
states have either played a role as mediators and peacekeepers, or have otherwise 
actively supported change through a mix of coercive means. While some of these 
efforts have received the imprimatur of the OAU ex post facto, as is the case in Burundi 
with regional sanctions imposed by East African states, others have actually undermined 
OAU initiatives. Direct Ugandan and Rwandan support for, and participation to, the 
Zairian /Congolese rebellion, for instance, made a mockery of joint UN /OAU attempts 
to mediate between the crumbling dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel forces 
led by Laurent Kabila.12° 
The OAU Mechanism has yet to prove its worth as regards serious African 
crises, and for the foreseeable future the OAU is only likely to play a marginal role in 
managing African conflicts.121 The absence of consistent and vigorous diplomacy by 
some of Africa's most influential states within the framework of the OAU structure 
remains the organisations Achilles heel. There are, however, other reasons for this 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 164 
assessment. The organisations perennial financial difficulties constitute a major 
obstacle and make the OAU dependent on external assistance for almost any major 
undertaking. There are also problems of institutional effectiveness within the 
organisations secretariat which point to the difficulties of developing a new 
problem -solving culture within the organisation. 
Any realistic assessment of the OAU, however, needs to take into account the 
UN's own difficulties on the continent. Given the scope and magnitude of the 
problems at hand, no single institution - whether the UN, the OAU or a sub -regional 
organisation - can realistically provide the political direction and resources to deal with 
Africa's conflicts. If the OAU is to be taken more seriously as an institution able to 
provide some sense of security for both the populations and governments of the 
continent, then African countries and international actors will have to establish a much 
greater level of coherence between their different levels of action (national, sub -regional, 
regional, global). Otherwise, they will simply have to accept the consequences of 
'self -help' as a way to deal with conflicts and instability in Africa. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Established in 1975 with a view to forming a West African economic community, 
ECOWAS has become better known in recent years for the peacekeeping role it played 
in Liberia and more recently in Sierra Leone.122 In 1993, the then Executive Secretary 
of ECOWAS, Abass Bundu, had hailed the regional intervention in Liberia as the 
"finest demonstration thus far of African initiative, African responsibility and African 
capacity in resolving an African problem ".12 In reality, few recent cases have illustrated 
the potential problems associated with regional peacemaking and peacekeeping in 
situations of internal conflict as distinctly as the ECOWAS intercession in Liberia, and 
later in Sierra Leone. 
Nigeria: strong leadership or weak hegemony in Nest Africa? 
ECOWAS is a hybrid organisation: an economic cooperation framework combined 
with two mutual defence agreements. Its original and primary goal was the 
improvement of infra- regional trade and the construction of a West African common 
market by 1990.124 Early on, however, participating states also saw ECOWAS as 
mechanism for fostering regional political stability. Two ECOWAS protocols related to 
non- aggression (1978) and mutual assistance in case of threat of or actual armed 
aggression (1981) were thus signed between member states.125 
The official arguments for moving the grouping toward a security role were 
straightforward: in a region prone to instability, economic development could simply 
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not take place without a regional commitment to security. However, some analysts have 
argued that these measures were in fact concerned primarily with regime security rather 
than regional security.126 Given that the main threats to the region's governments were 
ethnic instability and mutinous militaries, and the fact that the 1981 protocol did not 
differentiate between internal and external sources of threat or aggression, this is an 
eminently plausible assessment. 
As an economic organisation ECOWAS can claim few real achievements. 
Throughout its history it has suffered from a number of problems which have severely 
hampered its economic and political objectives.127 Its founding treaty, modeled loosely 
on EC principles, has been called "a study in laissez -faire principles of integration ".128 
By the mid -1980s the common market scheme was running well behind schedule and 
many analysts considered it to be a deeply flawed project. In fact, throughout the 1980's 
a number of serious and destabilising disputes between ECOWAS member states 
vitiated the very concept of a working and integrative regional community.12' 
With a population of 112 million people and an oil -driven economy which 
currently accounts for over 46% of West African GDP, Nigeria is both the largest 
sub -regional actor and a major player on the African political scene.13o Yet despite its 
economic weight it remains an incomplete regional power, a vast and unstable country 
ruled, at least until very recently, by powerful military cliques, and divided by religion, 
ethnicity and vast socio- economic cleavages. Moreover, the failure of democratic 
governance in Nigeria has considerably undermined the African leadership role that 
successive Nigerian regimes have claimed for themselves.131 
Nigeria's de facto regional predominance has consistently raised fear of hegemony 
in West African francophone states. Partly as a result of this 'Nigeria factor', 
francophone states have developed regional institutions which overlap with their 
membership in ECOWAS, institutions such as the Communauté économique de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest (CEAO) and the Union monétaire ouest- africaine (UMOA, now UEMOA). More 
Recently, they revived the 1977 Accord de non -aggression et d'assistance en matière de defense 
(ANAD) with a view to forming a new sub -regional ( francophone) peacekeeping 
force.132 
Liberian peacekeeping: what model ? 
ECOMOG, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia, was first deployed around the 
Liberian capital, Monrovia, in August 1990. There has been considerable debate as to 
the real motivations behind West African intervention in that country ever since. Two 
interpretations dominate. The first is that ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia as a 
peacekeeping- cum -humanitarian force in order to put an end to a brutal civil war and 
reestablish constitutional order. The second is that Nigeria intervened in Liberia under 
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the multilateral cover of ECOWAS at a critical moment of the conflict in order to 
prevent Charles Taylors National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from taking power 
and upsetting a balance of power favourable to Nigerian interests. Whatever the real 
motivations, the fact remains that the operation was mired in controversy from the start. 
The ECOMOG force, which was principally composed of Nigerian troops, was 
deployed without the consent of the NPFL and soon found itself fighting Taylor's 
forces alongside a baroque assortment of ethnic militias, local armies, and disgruntled 
factions, many of which were composed of teenage youths. 
In a damning indictment of the ECOMOG experience, some observers of 
African politics have concluded that the enforcement strategy adopted by ECOMOG 
commanders early in the conflict had contributed directly to an outcome the 
intervention had purported to prevent: the regionalisation of the conflict to 
neighbouring states, notably in Sierra Leone.133 After repeated UN and American 
intercessions between 1993 and 1996, and innumerable failed peace plans, some of the 
problems associated with ECOMOG (e.g. consent, composition, financing, regional 
support) were gradually addressed. However, locked in a deadly power struggle, the 
Liberian factions often reverted to terror tactics against civilians and humanitarian 
organisations, and continued engaged in open conflict with their opponents in order to 
control small sections of territory. Overall, it is fair to say that the ECOMOG 
experience was a clear demonstration of the dangers of regional intervention in civil 
wars without full local consent, strong international backing, and unanimous support 
from neighbouring states. 
In 1998 there was little evidence that ECOWAS would be better prepared to 
face another Liberia than it was in 1990. Although the possibility of formalising 
ECOMOG as a regional conflict management mechanism was raised by the former 
ECOWAS Executive Secretary as well as by Nigerian leaders, it appeared unlikely that 
the countries of the region would soon agree to embark on an endeavour of similar 
scope under Nigerian leadership.134 
In May 1997, with the rebel -led coup that overthrew the fragile government of 
President Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone, Nigeria lost an important regional ally. The 
rebels eventually allied themselves with pro -Taylor Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
forces and effectively put a stop to fragile UN peace efforts in that country. Nigeria, 
supported by Sandlines International, a private mercenary firm paid for by the Kabbah 
regime, and with the tacit support of the UK government, devised a plan to oust the 
rebel Junta. In January 1998, Nigerian forces stationed inside Sierra Leone, initiated a 
series of attacks against the rebels. In early March they succeeded in reinstalling 
President Kabbah (which was the putative motive of the Nigerian intervention) at the 
helm of Sierra Leone. However, this only proved to be a new phase in a tragic internal 
war that left UN peace efforts in tatters and found Nigeria heavily involved in Sierra 
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Leone, but this time with limited support from other ECOWAS members.135 Heavy 
fighting ensued for most of 1998 -1999, eventually leading to a ceasefire agreed to by 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh in May 1999. Hostilities have continued since, however. 
ECOMOG and the regional option 
The ECOWAS /ECOMOG experience raises several critical issues in relation to the 
regionalist thesis. Did ECOWAS' intimate knowledge of local issues provide it with a 
special advantage in terms of bringing about a resolution of the conflict? On this point 
the answer must be negative. From the beginning of the conflict, Liberia's neighbours 
either supported specific Liberian factions, or were hostile to the main challenger to 
power in Liberia, Charles Taylor and his NPFL. Moreover, ECOWAS countries were 
divided along francophone- anglophone lines. Ivoirian and Burkinabe support to the 
NPFL poisoned early mediation efforts led by ECOWAS anglophone states.136 
Burkinabe support, which reportedly facilitated Libyan arms shipment to Taylor's 
forces, continued even after the UN had sent observers to Liberia to implement the 
Cotonou peace plan brokered by a joint UN /OAU /ECOWAS team in July 1993.137 
Moreover, the NPFL allegedly benefited financially from business contacts with France, 
which was known to be 'irritated' by the Nigerian intervention and generally regarded 
the ECOMOG intervention as a Nigerian attempt to establish regional hegemony in 
West Africa.138 
Another critical issue is the track record and mandate of ECOWAS. ECOWAS 
is first and foremost an economic cooperation framework. Can weak institutions 
primarily oriented towards economic cooperation suddenly reinvent themselves as 
conflict resolution mechanisms with the institutional capabilities, knowledge and 
resources to deal with civil wars? The answer, in this case at least, must be negative. 
ECOWAS does not have an institutionalised political -military interface, its member 
states have widely different foreign and security policies, and the organisation is 
perceived to be thoroughly dominated by Nigeria. The revised ECOWAS treaty (1993) 
places greater emphasis on conflict resolution, maintenance of regional peace and 
peaceful settlement of disputes. In and of themselves, however, these new treaty 
provisions do little to transform the capabilities of its member states. 
Following UN involvement in Liberia in 1993, neighbouring francophone states 
showed increased support for ECOWAS efforts. Overall, however, they have remained 
wary of increased political. cooperation with Nigeria, particularly so because the military 
junta headed by General Abacha was ostracised internationally because of its abysmal 
human rights record and its failure to restore legitimate constitutional order in Nigeria 
itself. Nigeria's self -proclaimed image of benevolent African peacemaker was tarnished 
by the actions of its military in neighbouring West African states, and its military is 
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widely believed to have profited handsomely from the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone.t39 The fact that Charles Taylor, Nigeria's arch- ennemy in the early 1990s, is now 
officially the elected Liberian head of state is not the smallest of paradoxes. Many 
observers think Taylor's rather surprising political rehabilitation in 1995 -1996 was 
possible only because he struck a deal with Nigerian leaders desperate to save face after 
years unsuccessful ECOWAS peacemaking efforts in Liberia. 
One question which has often been raised about the ECOMOG experience is 
whether or not it validates the 'contracting out' model of UN- regional organisation 
relations. This is not a helpful way to view the Liberian case for a number of reasons. 
First, in 1990 the UN never formally 'contracted out' the management of the Liberian 
conflict to ECOWAS. Rather, without any overriding strategic interests at stake in the 
region, most Western countries simply acquiesced ECOWAS' role. Indeed, some 
African governments insisted early on at the UN that Liberia was purely an 'African 
problem'. True, the UN Security Council, in its resolution 788 (19 Nov. 1992), did 
endorse ECOWAS efforts, recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
A year later, however, the UN initiated a joint ECOWAS /OAU /UN mediation effort 
in recognition of the fact that ECOWAS efforts on their own were probably doomed. 
Second, ECOMOG repeatedly used large -scale force without the approval of 
the UN Security Council, as is required by Chapter VIII of the Charter. Although 
Chapter VIII was invoked ex post facto by ECOWAS states as justification for regional 
action, one can find few international jurists who would readily agree that ECOWAS is 
a Chapter VIII organisation; it has neither been officially recognised as such by the 
members of the UN Security Council, nor has it formally claimed this status for itself. 
Finally, the 'contracting out' model implies some relation of authority between 
the UN Security Council and regional organisations. Yet, ECOMOG and the 
UNOMIL observer force (sent to Liberia in late 1993) were never hierarchically 
organised; that is, ECOMOG was never under the command or the control of the UN, 
and working relations between the personnel of the two organisations were not 
particularly good.140 The 'sub -contractant' model, therefore, appears to be of little 
relevance to the ECOWAS intervention. The fundamental issues raised by this case are 
rather those of the conditions under which regional 'self -help' can be exercised, and 
whether the UN, or indeed individual states, can or should provide support and 
legitimacy to flawed regional conflict management efforts when no other realistic 
alternatives exist. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Formerly known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), the organisation was founded in 1979 (established formally in 1980) as a 
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sub -regional economic cooperation structure by the so -called Frontline States (FLS).141 
Its principal objective was to reduce regional dependence on the South African 
economy.142 During the 1980's, however, SADCC's economic objectives were 
considerably undermined by South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation which 
sought to weaken regional support for the African National Congress (ANC) and to 
bring Southern African states closer to its economic orbit.i43 Consequently, SADCC 
economic achievements during that period were at best limited. In 1992, partly as a 
result of EC external aid policies towards Southern Africa, SADCC countries opted for 
an increasingly integrationist agenda.144 The SADCC name was dropped and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) was born. 
The post- apartheid SADC 
By 1993 -1994, the end of the apartheid era in South Africa had all but eliminated the 
raison d'être of the FLS. It was already clear that South Africa would come to play an 
important if not central role in any future regional political arrangements. In July 1994, 
SADC states moved towards a policy of closer cooperation with South Africa. The FLS 
was formally dissolved before the important SADC Gaberone (Botswana) summit of 29 
August 1994, paving the way for South Africa's entry in the organisation. The 
Gaberone summit was an important moment in SADC history, not only would South 
Africa become a member, but its members endorsed a proposal to establish a so -called 
'sector' on political cooperation, democracy, peace and security. 
At the very moment these changes were taking place, events in the small country 
of Lesotho were highlighting the new sense of regional cooperation brought about by 
the ANC electoral victory in South Africa. Following the dissolution of parliament and 
the imposition of martial law by Lesotho's King Letsie III (17 Aug. 1994), Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe acted jointly and successfully pressured the Lesotho 
monarch towards restoring parliament (14 Sept. 1994), an action supported by the EU 
and the United States who also threatened to impose sanctions.145 This experience was 
quickly followed in October 1994 by a post -elections crisis in Mozambique in which 
South Africa and Zimbabwe helped keep the UN- sponsored peace process on track. 
Between 1994 and 1996 a debate arose over the form and content of regional 
security cooperation. One proposal given serious consideration throughout 1994 -1995 
would have seen the FLS replaced by an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) 
which would not be part of SADC, but would report to SADC Heads of Government 
summits. In the end, it was decided that SADC was the most appropriate framework 
for regional political cooperation rather than a separate body. At their June 1996 
summit in Gaberone, SADC countries formally established the SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security. After an internal debate over who should chair this new 
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body, Zimbabwe obtained the chairmanship of the SADC Organ.146 This was viewed 
by many as a South African concession to regional concerns that Pretoria might 
accumulate too much influence within SADC. 
The terms of reference of the new SADC Organ are surprisingly far -reaching. 
The main objective of the Organ is to "protect the people and safeguard the 
development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and 
order, inter -state conflict and external aggression ".147 SADC states have thus adopted 
an instrument which has both an intra -state and inter -state mandate. The establishment 
of the Organ was reported to be the first stage of further regional security cooperation 
which might include a mutual defence pact, collective security measures, and the 
development of a regional peacekeeping force. The latter is already starting to take 
shape. In March 1997 the first ever SADC peacekeeping manoeuvres (exercise Blue 
Hung:ve) were held in Zimbabwe.148 
It is much too early to judge SADC's success in matters of regional security. 
However, the measures adopted and /or envisioned by SADC governments represent, at 
least on paper, an advanced example of political- security cooperation in a developing 
region. One potentially significant aspect of the new 'political' SADC is that regional 
governments appear to be moving towards a position of zero tolerance as regards the 
overthrow of democratically elected governments in the SADC area. However, whether 
SADC countries adhere wholeheartedly to this ideal is certainly open to question. In 
1997, for example, Angolan troops helped former Congolese leader Denis Sassou 
N'Guesso overthrow the Congolese government. Moreover, the reaction of some 
SADC members to the developing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the 
DRC was granted membership in SADC member in 1997) certainly suggests that 
democratic governance is not a requirement for entry into the organisation. 
To a large extent, SADC's economic and political future remains tied to South 
Africa. As Booth and Vale rightly note, South Africa dominates the Southern Africa 
sub -region by every conventional indicator.149 Realist scholars might even argue that 
the country is a natural leader in a security complex that is fairly well defined, both in 
economic and political terms. However, the image of South Africa as a regional or even 
a continental hegemon is one the ANC government has sought to avoid.550 Indeed, in 
its few couple of years in office it has demonstrated a considerable reluctance to play the 
role of 'African policeman' in spite of considerable pressures on South Africa to 
contribute forces to various peacekeeping operations on the continent.151 With a heavy 
domestic burden to carry and a military undergoing a difficult transition from the 
apartheid era, this was perhaps not an unreasonable position. 
As of late there been have signs that South Africa might be willing to play a 
more active political role outside in African politics, particularly in relation to the 
conflict in the DRC. In 1997, South Africa's (unsuccessful) mediation efforts heralded 
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in a new era in its continental diplomacy. A year later, however, it has become apparent 
the situation in the DRC had created a rift between more interventionist SADC 
governments led by Angola and Zimbabwe, and moderates led by South Africa. This 
has highlighted the latent fragility of infra -SADC politics and underlined the fact that 
some countries within SADC are far from willing to defer to South African leadership 
as a matter of course. 
The Inter -Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 
Established in 1986, IGAD is a small sub -regional organisation headquartered in 
Djibouti which was established partly as a result of UN efforts to stimulate regional 
dialogue and cooperation on resource and environmental issues in the Horn of 
Africa.152 This theoretically apolitical organisation has been involved in a number of 
sub -regional conflict management efforts. In April 1988, meetings held under its aegis 
produced a disengagement between warring Ethiopian and Somalian forces.153 
However, IGAD has become better known in recent years as the locus of sub -regional 
efforts that seek to resolve the Sudanese conflict, one of Africa's deadliest and longest 
running internal conflict. 
Under the chairmanship of Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, IGAD 
convened a first meeting with the Sudanese factions in Kampala in September 1993. 
Four other IGAD meetings were held between January and September 1994, at which 
point negotiations stalled.154 IGAD countries nevertheless kept the dialogue open. 
Meeting again on Sudan in January 1995, they asked for international support for their 
initiative. The UN agreed to send an observer to future negotiations.155 The following 
February, the Netherlands, the United States, Norway, Canada, and Italy quickly agreed 
to form a 'Friends of IGAD' group under Dutch stewardship as a way to highlight 
international support for the initiative. 
Various proposals for an IGAD peacekeeping /observation mission in the Sudan 
have been raised during this period. In March 1996, IGAD countries moved towards 
formalising the conflict management role of the organisation and IGAD Charter was 
amended in order to include new functions, among them conflict resolution.156 
Regional Organisations in Asia, Latin America, 
and The Middle East 
ASEAN /ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The establishment, in July 1993, of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the most 
recent step in what can be characterised as a slow and incremental evolution towards a 
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more explicit regional security role for that organisation. Established in 1967 in the 
aftermath of the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963- 1966), ASEAN was 
to be a Southeast Asian forum with an inward- looking mandate for promoting regional 
cooperation and building regional confidence.157 At its inception, therefore, ASEAN 
was neither a defence affiance, nor a regional organisation coming under the terms of 
the UN Charter. Many of its members, in fact, remained signatories of pro -Western 
security alliances.158 
In many ways, ASEAN's unique status was indicative of the particular approach 
towards regionalism adopted by Southeast Asian countries, a consensual approach in 
which political dialogue was favoured over legalistic procedures and military 
commitments.159 ASEAN's intra -mural conflict management norms reflect these 
inclinations. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (which is currently being 
revised by ASEAN countries) emphasised respect for territorial sovereignty, non- 
interference in the internal affairs of member states, and a renunciation of the threat or 
use of force.160 Rather than being called to act collectively in the event of a member 
state coming under attack or threatened by a neighbouring state, ASEAN members are 
required to prevent disputes from arising between them, or settle those disputes through 
a voluntaristic approach relying on the consent of disputing parties.161 
The birth of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
With the end of the Cold War and the push towards the formation of more cohesive 
Asia -Pacific community, ASEAN has now taken a political role that goes beyond the 
boundaries of Southeast Asia. Between 1990 and 1993, uncertainties surrounding of the 
future shape of the balance of power in East Asia led to a growing regional consensus 
on the desirability of developing an Asia -Pacific wide security dialogue. In a part of the 
world where multilateralism was traditionally weak, or based on hostile coalitions of 
interests, ASEAN had the advantage of being perceived as a success story as well as 
presenting an informal and non -committal model of inter -governmental dialogue, 
notably through the annual ASEAN Post -Ministerial Conference (PMC) which joins 
ASEAN countries to a number of ASEAN 'interlocutors'.162 
In mid -1990 separate Canadian and Australian initiatives proposing the 
establishment of CSCE -like processes in Asia had been criticised as inappropriate both 
by the Bush Administration and regional leaders.163 In a remarkable turnaround, 
regional attitudes shifted perceptibly the following year when ASEAN governments, 
supported by Japan, started to voice an interest in establishing a regional security 
dialogue. Between 1991 and 1993, ASEAN leaders successfully led a process allowing 
the creation of a new ASEAN -based security forum with would in time include the six 
ASEAN countries, the seven PMC dialogue partners, as well as China, Laos, 
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Papua -New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam.i64 In May 1993, a first tentative discussion 
agenda was agreed to in Singapore, and the following July, again in Singapore, all 
eighteen countries concerned moved to the establish the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARP') as the security component of the extended ASEAN -PMC talks, with yearly 
meetings to be held between the foreign ministers of participating states.'65 
The ascendancy of ASEAN as the locus of a new regional security forum can be 
explained by a number of factors, the first being the settlement of the Cambodian 
conflict. Though unsuccessful, ASEAN's peacemaking attempts in Cambodia in the 
1980s not only strengthened the internal cohesion of its membership, but it also 
contributed significantly to building up its regional and international credentials 166 In 
1989 -1990 the shift from regional to international peacemaking in that country proved 
to be instrumental in fulfilling one of ASEAN's founding objectives, the elimination of 
major armed conflict from the sub -region, an objective shared by all the major power 
brokers of the region.167 
Second, as the Cold War wound down in the Pacific, both Japan and the 
ASEAN states were concerned by the long -term consequences of a gradual military 
disengagement of the United States from East Asia. While the United States initiated a 
reduction of its Pacific forces in 1990 -1991, it basically maintained a strategic posture 
based on its traditional alliances with Japan, Korea and Australia. Yet, the days when 
the United States could dictate alone the terms of the Pacific -wide security architecture 
were effectively over, and Washington had to acknowledge the calls for a regional 
security dialogue coming from its allies. In early 1993, the new Clinton administration 
indicated a modicum of support for a new regional security forum.168 
Third, an ASEAN -based forum was selected because that option essentially 
presented the path of least resistance. The ASEAN option already included key regional 
players through the organisation's annual ASEAN -Post Ministerial Conference 
(ASEAN -PMC); it presented a model of cooperation based on dialogue rather than 
formal agreements; and the process leading to its formation was largely initiated by core 
Asian nations rather than extra -regional powers. 
Thus far the ARF has held five annual meetings. Arguably the most significant 
to date has been the August 1995 meeting in Brunei during which participants agreed to 
a concept paper outlining a gradual evolutionary approach for the forum.169 Stage I 
would see the promotion of confidence -building measures and Stage II the 
development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Stage III, the development of 
conflict resolution mechanisms, was seen as, "an eventual goal that ARF participants 
should pursue ".170 In 1995, ARF participants also agreed to expand the scope of ARF 
activities by instituting an inter -sessional support group (ISG) on confidence- building as 
well as holding inter- sessional meetings (ISMS) to discuss a range of security issues (e.g. 
peacekeeping, search and rescue, non -proliferation, etc.). The ISG /ISM proposals 
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effectively formalised the process of inter- governmental consultations and seminars 
which had begun the previous year. 
Trust building' or diplomacy as usual? 
The development of the ARE thus far suggests that it is a useful forum for 
government -to- government dialogue on an ever -expanding range of matters related to 
regional security. In effect, the forum has been able to inch its way forward precisely 
because it hasn't been established as a decision -making mechanism. Thus, as Michael 
Leifer observes, the ARF is essentially an extension of the ASEAN model of conflict 
avoidance and 'peace through cooperatioñ.i71 Yet, being neither a full- fledged regional 
security organisation, nor a collective security regime, the ARF currently offers precious 
little by the way of concrete measures for conflict prevention and crisis management. 
The ARF's 'trust building' approach undoubtedly offers many advantages. It can 
be argued that in the absence of an Asia -Pacific regional organisation, the ARF process 
is slowly building a common security agenda were none existed before; that it may 
extract collective commitments - even seemingly minor ones - on a whole range of 
issues; that it fosters a gradual change of national perceptions and 'socialises' 
governments into working together. It can also be argued that it contributes to build a 
regional consensus on global norms and regimes (e.g. peacekeeping standards, the UN 
arms register, non -proliferation), and that it makes a necessary contribution, along with 
the intellectual contribution of a bevy of regional think tanks, to the emerging 
architecture of what still remains a rather inchoate Asia- Pacific community.172 
In many respects, however, the ARF does not constitute an entirely satisfactory 
framework for building Asia -Pacific security. It is not at all clear that an arrangement 
such as the ARF, which is overlaid over a complex network of regional and bilateral 
security affiances, can overcome regional tensions through intermittent dialogue. 
Legitimate questions can also be raised about the validity of extending the ASEAN 
model, through the ARF, to the whole of the Asia- Pacific region. The ARE process is 
driven mainly by an internal rationale, a desire to improve regional confidence and 
cooperation, as was ASEAN at its foundation. Unlike the early years of ASEAN, 
however, the forum's cohesion is not buttressed by common threat perceptions or a 
shared colonial experience. Here we can only note that the idea of a common 
Asia -Pacific destiny is much more present in the political and economic rhetoric of 
Western policymakers than that of Asian leaders. 
Another key issue with the ARF process is its leadership structure. An 
ASEAN -controlled process for building Asia -Pacific security is a mixed blessing as the 
ARF can only be considered a largely irrelevant instrument for the management key 
regional relationships (e.g. China -United States, China- Japan). Washington and Beijing 
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- neither of which are particularly enthusiastic about a multilateral approach to regional 
security - have adopted a rather passive position towards the forum, signifying through 
their actions or policies that it plays a rather marginal role in the conduct of their 
regional affairs.173 
Developing a substantive security agenda which can accommodate the security 
perspectives of the ARF's membership - which include China, Japan, the United States, 
Russia, and now India - will require extraordinary diplomacy yet by its very nature risks 
recreating the sort of interminable and largely unproductive dialogue that characterised 
the early years of the CSCE in Europe.174 Irrespective of the merits of inclusiveness, 
some of the ARF's Western members already feel some frustration over the pace of 
ARF development. A key issue here is that if the forum does not move towards actual 
problem -solving the United States is unlikely to regard it as anything other than a 
regular diplomatic conclave.175 Yet moving toward a more demanding form of regional 
security cooperation is precisely what China as well as some ASEAN countries seek to 
avoid.176 Furthermore, with neither Taiwan or North Korea participating in the 
process, thus making ARF discussion of the two most serious conflicts in the region 
effectively impossible, and big players like China and the United States only marginally 
interested, the ARF is decidedly of limited relevance to Northeast Asia. 
Finally, the ARF is most unlikely to play a role in internal matters which might 
have an important bearing on the regional political outlook, including amed conflict like 
that over East Timor. In recent years, issues such as human rights, labour standards, 
freedom of the press, or system of government have been a perpetual sources of tension 
between Western and Asian governments.177 The debate over the political situation in 
Burma at the July 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta illustrates very well the limitations of the 
ARF regarding those issues. Responding to Western pressures for a tougher stance 
against the Burmese junta, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, backed by China and 
the other ASEAN countries, made it clear that he did not see democratisation and 
human rights as appropriate topics for discussion in the forum.17e 
ARF and the China factor 
More than any other single factor the direction taken by China, as the main pretender to 
great power status in the region, will be the central determinant of the future stability of 
the Asia -Pacific region. Since 1993, China's position towards the regional security 
situation in Southeast Asia has shifted sightly. After a period of tension with ASEAN 
states over the Spratly Islands in 1994 -1995, Chinese diplomacy seemed to recognise 
that alienating its southern neighbours might be detrimental to its diplomatic and 
strategic interests. However, recent events on Mischief Reef (a shaol in the Spratly 
Island group claimed by the Philippines) suggest that China is unbending in its territorial 
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claims in the South China sea. Should it pursue its claims too vigorously against other 
claimants to the Spratly Islands, the risks for China are clear fuelling a fear of Chinese 
intentions which might lead to the creation of a tacit or even overt anti -China 
coalition.179 This is a development China could ill- afford at a time when it is seeking 
much greater regional leadership role and increased participation in the regional and 
international trading system. 
On the other hand, the level of mistrust between China and the United States 
remains high. China seems to perceive U.S. intentions in East Asia as fuelled by an 
instated policy of strategic confinement. On the other hand, the United States tacitly 
regards China as the principal challenger to its leadership position in East Asia, a 
competitor whose full economic and military potential will develop fully in the next 
century. The state of US -China relations remains the dominant aspect of any overall 
security outlook in East Asia. The ARF, however, can only play but a relatively small 
part in the political dynamic between these two behemoths. 
The Arab League 
In March 1995 the Arab League - otherwise known as the League of Arab States (LAS) 
- celebrated its 50th anniversary in an atmosphere of uncertainty about its role and its 
future.780 Once a powerful force united by anti- colonialist sentiment, pan -Arab 
ideology and a collective hatred of Israel, the Arab League is now widely regarded as 
something of a political dinosaur. This is a remarkable decline for an organisation 
which was once seen as the central pivot of Arab unity and which launched one of the 
very first regional peacekeeping operations, the Arab Security Force in Kuwait 
(1961 -1963).181 
The problems of Arab regionalism 
The internal problems with have bedevilled the League are well known.182 Fundamental 
political, economic and religious issues divide its membership. These divisions pit a 
secularist vision of the Arab state against Islamic fundamentalism, 'progressive' Arab 
states against conservative Arab regimes, petroleum -rich states against resource -poor 
states, and supporters of peace with Israel against hard -line Arab states. The League's 
cohesion is also hampered by the fact that its membership straddles three sub -regions, 
each with their own specific problems, power configurations and interactions with 
adjacent areas: North Africa, the Near East and the Gulf states. 
Given the League's many problems it is perhaps not surprising that Arab states 
have complemented various forms of 'sub -groupism' to disunited Arab regionalism. In 
1981, reacting to the sudden change of regime in Iran which brought Islamic 
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fundamentalists to power, Arab Gulf monarchies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). It weaknesses as a defensive alliance were patently demonstrated at the onset of 
the 1990 Gulf War and to this day GCC states rely on Western military commitments to 
protect the Persian Gulf and the oil fields of the Arabian peninsula. However, because 
of their immediate proximity to Iran and Iraq and their influence in the Organization of 
Petroleum- Exporting Countries (OPEC), GCC states remain the most important 
interlocutors to both countries in the Arab world. Another sub -regional organisation, 
the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), was created in 1989 with a view to strengthen North 
African economic cooperation and present a stronger North African front against EC 
trade policies. However, the UMA's performance to date can only be qualified as 
modest)" Yet another regional arrangement, the short-lived Arab Cooperation Council 
(ACC), represented a failed attempt by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein to build a 
counterweight to the GCC in which the other 'senior' participant, Egypt, saw an 
opportunity to build an Arab economic pole which marginalised Syria and Saudi Arabia. 
The ACC collapsed almost as soon as it was created with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. 
The Gulf War and its aftermath 
The end of the Cold War started very inauspiciously for the Arab League. It was deeply 
divided by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Iraq and a number of North 
African states sympathetic to its position were pitted against a more conservative group 
led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia that favoured action against the Iraqi regime. Following 
the Arab League's peculiar custom of voluntary cooperation whereby League resolutions 
are only binding on those states actually participating in the voting, only thirteen of the 
League's then twenty -one members attended the organisation's emergency session of 2 
September 1990)ß4 Though many Arab states went on to participate to the US -led 
coalition against Iraq, the League's own collective military instrument, the Joint Defence 
Council, was never activated. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War there were signs that a small group of Arab 
countries would support the creation of an Arab peacekeeping force (as opposed to an 
Arab League force) to maintain security in the Gulf region. Meeting in Damascus in 
March 1991, the six GCC countries, Egypt and Syria (known since then as the 
Damascus Declaration States) officially proposed the creation of such a force. 
However, the plan was shelved almost as soon as it was agreed to. The unequivocal 
U.S. commitment to defend Kuwait, as well as tensions between Egypt and Syria over 
the Middle East peace process (MEPP) - which, as noted in a previous chapter, 
bypassed the Arab League altogether - no doubt contributed to this outcome. 
Nevertheless the 'Damascus Declaration States' remain part of the fragmented Arab 
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political constellation. One of their most visible, if limited, accomplishments to date 
was the adoption of a common position against Israel's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non - 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the lead up to the 1995 NPT review conference.185 More 
recently, in June 1997, the Damascus group called for a revival of the Arab Common 
Market project, a proposal which had been lying dormant since the mid- 1960's. 
Since the 1990 -1991 Gulf War, other regional conflicts have confirmed the 
weakness of the Arab League as an instrument for managing inter -Arab conflicts. In 
February 1992, the Arab League appears to have been dragged along reluctantly (with 
the OAU and the OIC) in UN Secretary -General Boutros -Ghali's ill-fated efforts to 
obtain a cease -fire in Somalia.186 Later in the Somali conflict even this supporting role 
subsided as it became clear that resolving the conflict was not a high priority issue for 
the League's membership. In two more recent conflicts involving Yemen, the Yemeni 
civil war of May July 1994 and the more recent flare up between Eritrea and Yemen 
over the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea, the League failed to play a meaningful role.187 
Is reform possible? 
Between 1991 and 1994, the attempts of Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Esmat 
Abdel Meguid to revive the organisation yielded little progress. Thereafter, there 
emerged a modicum of consensus on the necessity of reforming the League. A 
December 1994 meeting in Alexandria between Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, 
Syrian leader Hafez al- Hassad, and King Fand of Saudi Arabia saw the League's three 
pivotal countries pledge their support for 're- energising' the League. 
Egypt - which both history and geography have placed at the centre of the League - 
has been a major driving force behind attempts to rejuvenate the organisation. In 
March 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary summit of the Arab League, 
president Mubarak proposed a new Code of Honour for Arab Security and Cooperation 
in order to revitalise the organisation and improve its capacity to deal with inter -Arab 
conflicts. In the following months, a committee of experts, which included fifteen of 
the twenty -two League members, developed a set of reform proposals which included, 
inter alia, the creation of an court of justice for the settlement of Arab disputes; 
increased use of the Office of the Arab League Secretary General and Arab League 
structures for the resolution of disputes; the establishment of an Arab League 
peacekeeping force, and; amendments to the Arab League Charter pursuant to the 
objectives adopted through the proposed Code of honour.188 Significantly, the 
proposals did not hint at greater UN -Arab League cooperation, nor of coordination of 
future League activities with the vacillating MEPP, nor does there appear to be any 
interest in developing a League role in the management of internal conflict. Here, one 
can only note the deafening silence of the League on the situation in Algeria, 
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demonstrating once again the unwillingness of Arab political elites to tackle governance 
and human rights issues on a regional basis. 
The reform measures discussed above were reportedly agreed to in principle at 
the June 1996 Arab League summit in Cairo, an event largely designed as a 
demonstration of Arab solidarity in response to the electoral victory of the Likud party 
in Israel.t89 However, given the League's record - its Charter has never been amended 
- one can justifiably question whether the proposed reforms will move ahead. Indeed, 
their full implementation would constitute a radical departure from the divided inter - 
Arab politics of the last forty years and a revival of Arab regionalism the likes of which 
have not been seen since the days of Nasserist Egypt. At this point, the only proposal 
which appears as though it may move forward in the short to mid -term is the proposal 
for an Arab Court of Justice. 
Western countries have very limited faith in the League's ability to play a truly 
constructive political role in the Middle East, and throughout this decade the idea of a 
new Organisation for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (OSCME), of 
variations thereof, has been mooted on several occasions. In the same vein, the now 
defunct Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the MEPP (seven 
rounds of talks were held between 1992 and 1994) also examined a number of 
multilateral confidence -building measures and structures which were partly inspired by 
the CSCE /OSCE experience in Europe. The prospects for these proposals do not 
appear very good since they would imply a major shift in the national security strategies 
of Middle East countries which the current generation of Arab leaders appears 
unprepared to consider. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) 
After a long period of stagnation lasting from the mid -1960s to the late 1980s, the OAS 
is an institution which has regained some credit in terms of legitimacy and authority.190 
As Vaky and Muñoz have noted, the genesis of this change of fortune can probably be 
found in two mutually reinforcing trends which evolved throughout the 1980s: the 
growing convergence of macro- economic policies between Latin and North America, 
and the development of a hemispheric consensus on the desirability, promotion, and 
defence of constitutional democracy.191 
Beyond those trends, a succession of events contributed to the revival of the 
OAS. The Central American peace process of the late 1980's provided the organisation 
with a new sense of relevance in a broad range of spheres, from human rights to 
electoral assistance via the demobilisation of combatants. The Bush Administration's 
embrace of a more multilateralist hemispheric policy after the 1989 Panama invasion 
gave considerable impetus to the renewal of the inter- American system. Finally, 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 180 
Canada's accession to the OAS, in 1990, contributed to a depolarisation of inter - 
American dynamics, notably by diluting the dominating position of the United States 
within the organisation. These developments have had far -reaching consequences, not 
the least of which has been a partial restoration of the OAS collective security rationale 
under the new mandate of defending democracy in the Hemisphere. 
Promoting and defending democracy: new OAS norms 
The basis for the new OAS role in the protection and protection of democracy is found 
in three OAS decisions adopted in 1991 and 1992. In June 1991, the OAS General 
Assembly adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the 
Inter -American System, to which it joined Resolution 1080 on representative 
democracy. In the Santiago Commitment member states pledged to "adopt efficacious, 
timely and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defence of 
representative democracy in keeping with the Charter of the Organization of American 
States ".192 Resolution 1080 called on the OAS Secretary General to convoke an 
emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council "in the event of any occurrences 
giving rise to the sudden, or irregular interruption of the democratic political 
institutional process or of the illegitimate exercise of power by the democratically 
elected government in any of the Organization's member states. "193 The third decision 
is the December 1992 Protocol of Washington which allows the suspension of an OAS 
member state "whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by 
force".194 Also noteworthy was the creation of the Canadian- sponsored OAS Unit for 
the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) established to support democratisation processes 
in the Americas. 
The adoption of these new regional norms, indeed, of these new obligations, 
indicated a shift in the attitude of Latin American governments. By giving the OAS a 
role in the protection and promotion of democratic governance Latin American 
countries not only recognised threats to democracy as a hemispheric security issue, but 
they also effectively agreed to shift the boundaries of OAS responsibility to encompass 
decidedly internal issues. However, while the defence of democracy has provided the 
rationale for OAS initiatives in such countries as Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru, 
the breadth of the new mandate has also raised some difficult issues. 
The OAS Charter does not contain any provisions for imposing economic 
sanctions, nor is the organisation formally mandated to undertake peacekeeping or 
military enforcement tasks.195 Indeed, suggestions to the effect that the OAS should 
become an enforcement agency invariably raise criticism from Latin American 
countries. The organisation is therefore limited in the range of functions it can perform, 
making the task of organising a coherent collective response all the more difficult when 
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confronted with a situation of fait accompli, or when its own membership does not 
comply with voluntary measures. 
Nowhere have the general principles enunciated in the Santiago Commitment 
clashed so flagrantly with the weaknesses of the OAS Charter than in Haiti. In 
late -1992 the ineffectiveness of the U.S. -sponsored (but non -binding) OAS sanctions 
against the Cédras junta was a major factor behind American and Canadian pressures to 
seek UN involvement.196 To a large extent, the Haitian crisis confirmed two trends that 
had been developing ever since the involvement of the OAS in the Central American 
peace process. The first was the somewhat uneasy relationship between the 
organization and the United Nations. The second was the reluctance of Latin American 
governments to move the organisation in the direction of regional enforcement. 
Between 1987 and 1992, UN -OAS cooperation in Central America, though 
ultimately successful in Nicaragua, did not prove to be a particularly positive.197 
Because of the limits of OAS resources and the exclusively civilian nature of its 
involvement the OAS was widely regarded to be a junior partner to the UN. When the 
Haiti crisis was put on the OAS agenda in September 1991 - an obligation incurred 
under Resolution 1080 - many Latin American countries wanted the OAS to provide 
the focal point of diplomatic efforts. This was initially the case. Towards the end of 
1992, however, it became clear that OAS measures were not effective and that more 
decisive UN machinery was needed. With the arrival of the Clinton administration in 
1993 the United States began playing a more active political role in Haiti and effectively 
shifted the locus of decision -making away from the OAS, notably by sponsoring 
mandatory UN sanctions (UNSCR 841 of June 1993) against the illegitimate junta of 
General Raoul Cédras. Several Latin American countries criticised the strong -fisted 
approach adopted by the Clinton administration. However, lacking the capacity to 
decree and enforce sanctions in the face of an obstinate Haitian junta, OAS measures 
had effectively run their course, and the UN, led by Washington, began to play the 
central multilateral role, although great care was taken to ensure the OAS maintained a 
role. 
It is fair to say that both the Central American and the Haitian experiences 
temporarily damaged relations between the OAS and the UN. In 1993, then OAS 
Secretary General Job Baena Soares criticised what he perceived as the 'hub and spoke' 
model of UN- regional organisations relations presented by UN Secretary- General 
Boutros- Ghali.19B His successor, ex- Colombian President César Gaviria, has been less 
strident in demarcating OAS -UN responsibilities. He has been an advocate of better 
coordination between the two organisations, provided they respected the general rules 
enunciated in Chapter VIII of the UN Chapter, notably regarding the recourse to 
regional organisations as the primary locus of regional problem- solving.199 Practical 
UN -OAS cooperation is possible, as evidenced by the joint UN -OAS International Civil 
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Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH - established in April 1993) that served as the locus of 
international efforts to restore some measure of stability and fundamental rights in that 
country.200 In fact, in spite of disappointing results in strengthening democratic 
practices in Haiti, MICIVIH did represent one of the novel ways the UN and a regional 
body could operate on non -military aspects of conflict management. 
The second important trend to emerge out of recent OAS experience is the non- 
military nature of the organisation's involvement in conflict resolution efforts 201 
Almost all OAS missions thus far have been given tasks such as human rights 
monitoring, electoral assistance, observation, fact -finding or mediation202 Through 
these types of activities the OAS has demonstrated a substantially higher level of 
involvement in regional problem -solving than in the past, particularly as regards internal 
situations. However, there is little support within the organisation's membership for 
moving in the direction of regional peacekeeping or enforcement, nor are there any 
plans to amend the OAS Charter to allow it to do so203 Overall, therefore, the 
framework for OAS involvement in conflict resolution remains firmly based on a pacific 
settlement of disputes philosophy relying on the consent of the parties involved. 
The nascent OAS security agenda 
The operating framework described above has also been determinant in the 
development of the OAS regional security agenda. At the OAS General Assembly in 
Nassau, in 1992, the OAS established a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to 
"study and make recommendations on the various aspects of cooperation for 
hemispheric security "200. In Port-Louis (Haiti) in 1995, the OAS General Assembly 
formalised this arrangement by transforming this Special Committee into one of only a 
handful of permanent OAS committees. 
Thus far the OAS regional security agenda has been limited to relatively few 
issues. Arguably, its most important achievements to date have been the adoption of a 
'Western Hemisphere Wide Anti -Personnel Land Mines Free Zone' at the June 1996 
OAS General Assembly in Panama City, the adoption in 1997 of an OAS convention 
on the illicit exportation of small arms, and the constructive promotion of military 
confidence- building measures (CBMs) between certain OAS members. 
Despite these positive developments there is a widespread understanding that 
the OAS membership will only sustain a slow evolution of the organisation's regional 
security role. Inter -American military cooperation, for example, is not on the 
organisation's agenda. Proposals to bring the Inter- American Defense Board (IADB) - 
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an old and thoroughly obsolete body created in 1942 to coordinate Latin America's role 
in the war effort - closer to the fold of the OAS were received very cautiously by Latin 
American countries. In spite of a long -running process aiming to redefine the 
OAS -IADB relationship begun in 1992, and more recent proposals on this question put 
forth by OAS Secretary General Gaviria, the fact of the matter is that the OAS -IADB 
relationship hardly ranks as a priority issue for the vast majority of OAS members.205 
Moreover, it is probably not insignificant to note that a number of events and high -level 
conferences related to inter -American security - notably two defence rninisterials held in 
1995 and 1996 - have taken place outside the organisations framework.206 This tends 
to reinforce the view that even though the OAS has developed a rejuvenated 
constituency since the end of the Cold War, the conduct of hemispheric security 
diplomacy is by no means the organisation's exclusive purview. 
Leaders, follower, and bystanders 
Examples such as the ones presented above underscore the fact that there remain wide 
attitudinal differences within the OAS membership as to the proper role of the 
organisation.207 Countries like Mexico and Brazil have remained in the 
non -interventionist orthodoxy, wary not only of U.S. influence in the organisation, but 
also of the possibility that a stronger OAS might be used to poke its nose into their 
affairs. More 'activist' countries such as Canada and Argentina, on the other hand, have 
generally tended to favour greater OAS cooperation on a range of hemispheric security 
issues. 
It should be pointed out that the perception that Latin American states place a 
low priority on inter -American political cooperation belies a healthy level of regional 
interaction. Both the Latin American Rio Group (which at its foundation in 1986 was 
the offspring of the Contadora initiative) and recent efforts to create a Central American 
political and economic identity demonstrate a political will to create regional 
cooperation frameworks not dominated by U.S. interests. It is possible that a 
strengthening of political regionalism in Latin America may limit the OAS role to that 
of legitimising authority for episodic inter -American initiatives. The current push 
towards a hemispheric trade agreement, however, ultimately militates against the 
formation of a cohesive political and economic Latin American bloc. 
U.S. policy towards the organisation is characterised by a dualist approach. On 
the one hand, the United States remains a key player in the inter- American system, and 
both the Bush and Clinton administrations have respectively led efforts to reinforce 
certain OAS functions, strengthening its role in protecting democratically- elected 
governments and using the organisation to promote stronger national legislation against 
drug- trafficking and money -laundering for example. On the other hand, the United 
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States has historically maintained a rather instrumental vision of the organisation, 
reserving for itself what it sees as a right to unilateral action in the Hemisphere, or 
acting with other states outside the organisation when it considers it to be an 
inappropriate forum for problem -solving. To give one recent example, during the 
1994 -1995 Peru and Ecuador border war Washington strongly insisted that the basis for 
mediation should be the 1942 Rio Protocol, with its system of 'guarantor' countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, United States), rather than OAS dispute resolution 
mechanisms.208 
In spite of what can be considered renewed political dynamism, the bottom line 
seems to be that the OAS does not currently have the commanding position in 
inter- American political affairs that some would like it to have. Rather, its work runs 
parallel with other initiatives in what can only be described as a developing framework 
for hemispheric cooperation in which regional trade, not regional security, is currently 
the most important issue. 
Concluding Remarks 
As evidenced by the case studies in this chapter, the past decade has been a time of 
tremendous institutional and political change for regional organisations, both in terms 
of institutional and normative development. In fact there is not a single period during 
the entire postwar period when so many were experiencing this level of change. Some 
of these developments are directly attributable to the impact of the end of the Cold 
War. This is particularly the case in Europe where institutions such as the 
CSCE /OSCE and NATO have struggled to redefine their role beyond the vanishing 
East -West paradigm and were directly confronted with a spate of conflicts in the 
Balkans and the FSU. In many other cases, however, the repercussions were less 
immediate, and a combination of regional dynamics and domestic political changes were 
primary factors behind institutional change, or lack thereof. 
Many of the cases examined in this chapter suggest that regional institutions are 
not necessarily effective frameworks for preventing, managing and settling local or 
regional conflicts. Some would argue that they are undergoing a period transition, and 
that it is therefore unrealistic to expect them to suddenly become leading conflict 
management agencies in their respective areas. This may be a partial answer in some 
cases. Overall, however, the issues involved run much deeper than the question of 
institutional change. 
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Many large membership regional arrangements lack the cohesion which could 
enable them to play a more effective and timely role. As well, many of them remain 
deeply influenced by the interests of key regional powers and can therefore hardly be 
considered completely neutral parties in third -party conflict management efforts. 
Finally, the question of regional intervention in cases of internal conflict remains 
particularly contentious. Though a number of regional organisations have been 
involved in attempting to manage situations of internal instability in recent times, many, 
if not most, of them are often less well equipped than the UN to deal with such 
problems. Because of their rules upholding territorial inviolability and juridical 
sovereignty, they tend to favour states, and therefore governments of the day, over 
other any other type of actor, insurgent groups for example. 
While the general outlook can hardly be considered satisfactory, it is not entirely 
negative either. Within the limits of their capabilities some regional /sub -regional 
organisations have fared somewhat better on the basis of a functional specialisation, a 
smaller and more cohesive membership, or a convergence of interests around the 
protection of specific principles. Also, the numerous internal conflicts in the 1990s 
compelled many regional institutions to work in conjunction with the UN, with uneven 
results no doubt, but nevertheless more so than during previous periods. 
The multiplication of regional and sub -regional institutions, each with their own 
agendas and rules, has highlighted like never before the question of coordination and 
coherence between regional arrangements. Whether in the former Yugoslavia, in 
Central Africa, the Caucasus, or other locations where conflict occurred in recent years, 
the record of intra- regional cooperation amongst different regional bodies is either 
uninspiring or poor. These problems are largely the result of the competing agendas of 
regional powers. Here again one needs to be reminded that it is impossible to separate 
regional organisation from regional politics. 
The increasing numbers of regional /sub -regional arrangements has multiplied 
the levels of political authority and legitimacy. Whether in Africa, Europe or Latin 
America, governments can now jump from one regional forum to the next in order to 
pursue their foreign policy objectives. In other words, it is becoming more and more 
difficult to talk about the 'regional level' of decision - making when there are now so 
many levels of regional decision- making. 
What also emerges from this review is that very few regional organisations have 
crossed the line between pacific settlement of disputes methods towards more coercive 
means of regional problem -solving. Whether this is good or bad depends very much on 
one's perspective. Nevertheless, it does reflect the fact that a majority of extant regional 
arrangements do not have effective collective instruments going beyond those usually 
found under the pacific settlement of disputes category. 
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Is regionalism failing? Attempts to answer this question simply cannot restrict 
themselves to the examination of regional arrangements or institutions writ large. One 
of the more fascinating paradoxes of regional efforts to resolve conflicts during this 
decade is that the limitations of established regional organisation have spurred on the 
development of new forms of regional /international cooperation and, indeed, of new 
regional organisations. Chapter 6 examines some of these trends and discusses factors 
likely to affect the future role of regional organisations as conflict management agencies. 
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6 
Conflict and the Regional Option: Looking 
Towards the Future 
Numerous factors influence the role and performance of regional organisations as 
conflict management organisations: the nature of the problems at hand, institutional 
rules and constraints, availability of resources, membership cohesion, political 
opportunity and willingness to act. These are issues that all inter- governmental 
organisations have to face, whether they are global or regional in scope. Beyond those 
factors, a number of important issues and trends are likely to influence the political role 
and responsibilities of regional communities and regional organisations over the coming 
years. 
This chapter examines five such issues. The first two fall in the 'big topic' 
category: global U.S. leadership in matters of international security and the effects of 
what is commonly referred to as globalisation. Three other factors seem particularly 
important: the uncertain future of the UN as an international political force, the 
increasing resort to ad hoc or 'self -help' strategies to deal with regional conflicts, and the 
development of new regional groupings and alliances. 
Throughout the 1990s U.S. foreign policy has reflected conflicting trends in 
American leadership; on the one hand a tremendous eagerness to off -load some of the 
burden of maintaining international peace with new actors, on the other a desire to 
maintain global U.S. leadership. Beyond the debate between multilateralism vs 
unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, neo- isolationists and more 'cosmopolitan' political 
forces have been constantly at odds on the U.S. domestic front, leading to considerable 
confusion in terms of policy discourse. Second, the new and very fluid post -Cold War 
international environment does not lend itself easily to all- encompassing doctrines. 
Third, the United States now lives in a world where its interests must be increasingly 
reconciled with those of its allies and as well as with those of a growing number of 
regional powers, all of whom have an increasing say in how both regional and 
international security are conceived of, and maintained. 
The tension between global interests and global responsibility is nowhere more 
evident than in the globalization debate which has emerged as the dominant intellectual 
and policy debate of the 1990s. Globalization, it is argued, is integrating far -flung 
economies into global markets and enhancing information and technology flows, 
breaking down of geographic and cultural barriers in the process. However, as the 
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Asian fmancial crisis has demonstrated, globalization also raises serious questions 
concerning the ability of regions to organise into coherent political and economic units 
that can cope with massive economic shocks. Economic problems cannot be easily 
resolved at the national or regional level if they are caused, in part at least, by 
developments in global fmancial and commodity markets. 
The globalization theme dovetails nicely with the role of the UN inasmuch as 
trying to reinforce, if not rebuild, fragile polities has been one of the principal objectives 
of UN political action since the end of the Cold War. After a period of considerable 
activism lasting roughly from 1988 to 1993, however, the UN peace and security system 
was essentially pushed beyond its functional, conceptual and resource limits. The 
over -extension of the UN peacekeeping operations, disillusionment vis -à -vis its ability 
to manage complex internal conflicts, and the obstacles encountered in trying to reform 
its bureaucratic and decision- making organs have all had significant repercussions, not 
the least of which is a general loss of confidence in the UN as a meaningful decision - 
making body on matters of global importance. 
Another, and perhaps not altogether surprising repercussion of the UN's 
problems is that states are increasingly resorting to all manner of 'self -help' strategies for 
dealing with regional or localised violent conflict. Since the early 1990s ad hoc conflict 
management initiatives have become much more common than during the postwar 
period. Collective will is being expressed outside traditional inter- governmental 
institutions and new groupings are being created partly in reaction to the inadequacies 
of traditional problem -solving mechanisms. These different processes have not been 
confined to one single continent. One can find relevant examples in Africa, Europe, 
Latin America, the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia, and even in the South 
Pacific. Self -help strategies currently represent a major trend in international /regional 
conflict management efforts. Whether they will be more successful than traditional 
approaches relying on international or regional institutions remains to be seen. 
These processes are taking place at a time when a reordering of regional 
relations is taking place on almost every continent. Whether in Central Asia or Central 
Africa, new groupings are emerging which either present a challenge to established 
patterns of regional relations or seek to create some form of regional order were none 
existed before. However, it would be naive to think that the new institutional 
architecture such as it was laid in the 1990s will set the framework of a post -Cold War 
international order permanently, especially since many regional structures have already 
shown their limitations. Furthermore, with answers to questions about the rise of China 
regional and the success of the European project still unclear, it is premature to assert 
that post -Cold War transformations of the international system are over. 
Before proceeding, a note of caution. The issues and trends discussed in this 
chapter are by no means the only factors which will influence the development of 
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regionalism. Asserting so would be presumptuous as there are many variations of 
domestic or regional -level factors which might influence regionalism and regional 
cooperation in the next few years. What I do contend, however, is that the topics 
examined in this chapter are salient issues which have, or will have, a major impact on 
regionalism, regional organisations and the regional approach to problem -solving. 
America, the Reluctant Leader 
The tension between the definition and exercise of U.S. national interests on the one 
hand, and multilateralism on the other, has been of the key dilemmas of contemporary 
U.S. foreign policy. In 1989 -1990, with the ending of the Cold War, the United States 
found itself in an unprecedented geostrategic position. Being the world's only 
remaining superpower, it could contemplate exercising its international power and 
influence unopposed by any major enemies abroad. Paradoxically, with the winding 
down of the Cold War American policymakers found out that the costs of unilateralism 
were also rising sharply. 
This dilemma has weighed heavily upon speculations of a global Pax Americana, 
a popular theme in academic journals and policy discussions at the turn of the decade. 
Within a few years, these speculations have been replaced by a profound skepticism 
over whether the United States is either willing or able to play the role of global leader. 
At issue is not really the 'relative decline' of American power.1 Quite the opposite, in 
fact. Since 1992 -1993 the United States has enjoyed an unprecedented period of 
economic growth which is the envy of OECD governments, and in spite of major cuts 
to the American defence budget the United States still enjoys uncontested military 
superiority over any potential adversary and will do so for the foreseeable future. 
Neither is it the possibility of a return to the type of isolationism which prevailed in the 
United States in the interwar years. Even though neo- isolationist forces have been at 
play in American politics throughout the 1990s, notably in the ultra -conservative wing 
of the Republican Parry, the scale, scope and importance of American interests overseas 
ultimately precludes that option as a realistic possibility. What is really at issue here is 
rather the prospect of United States gradually losing the confidence of some of its most 
trusted allies by constantly bullying them into accepting the American vision of 
international order, while at the same time generating anxiety about the credibility of its 
security commitments. 
LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE 201 
Searching far strategy in the post -Cold War world 
The lack of overarching policy framework and the absence of a clear set of priorities 
have been the two most frequent criticisms addressed towards U.S. foreign policy 
throughout the 1990s.2 Former U.S. Defence Secretary James Schlesinger warned in 
1993 that without clear guideposts for the post -Cold War era U.S. policy would be 
determined by "impulse and image ".3 The problem, he noted, was not the lack of 
foreign policy objectives for the new international environment - he believed that, if 
anything, too much had already been promised - but rather that many U.S. goals were 
often in contradiction with each other, the tensions between U.S. trade and U.S human 
rights policies being a oft -recurring example. Schlesinger raised the apparent problem 
of relating means effectively to desired ends. Unilateral sanctions, for example, have 
been increasingly employed by the United States to bring about change on a wide range 
of issues (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, narco- trafficking, international terrorism, 
human rights). However, not only are they recognised as very blunt policy instruments 
whose effectiveness is often questionable, but their use has been an increasingly 
frequent source of discord between the United States and its allies over the last few 
years.4 
Most commentators on U.S. foreign policy have also noted that extent to which 
the exercise of U.S. leadership in world affairs throughout the 1990s has been selective, 
if not outright opportunistic. In the Balkans, the United States half -heartedly tried to 
save a crumbling Yugoslav state, then pressed EC states to find a 'European solution', 
only to come riding into Bosnia at the eleventh hour when transatlantic solidarity was in 
danger of being irreparably damaged. In Somalia, the United States attempted to show 
the world how it could restore order and stability to a disintegrated country ravaged by 
famine and clan warfare, arguably an over -ambitious task; yet in Rwanda it rejected 
proposals to send troop reinforcements to a beleaguered UN peacekeeping force, an 
action which could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan citizens 
(international remorse is now flowing from all sides). 
Examples such as the ones outlined above considerably dampened enthusiasm 
for the task of creating the 'New World Order' propounded by President Bush in 1990. 
In truth, by 1992 -1993 the idea was already in deep trouble. Despite the start of the 
Middle East Peace Process in 1991, the dramatic increase of American and European 
weapons sales to the Middle East after the Gulf War indicated that any new order in 
that region would be build on decidedly old foundations.5 This was hardly convincing 
evidence of a new, more cooperative way of dealing with regional problems. More 
broadly, it was also becoming increasingly apparent that the United States had little 
interest in granting a stronger voice to developing countries within major international 
political and financial institutions. For the champions of the developing world, 
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countries like India and Malaysia, the very idea of a New World Order' remained fairly 
shallow. They essentially saw it as a Western -driven discourse which showed little 
promise of altering a historical relationship between North and South that they believed 
was detrimental to their interests. 
An important aspect of U.S. foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War was the rapid reduction of the global U.S. military presence abroad, 
particularly in Europe and Asia. In 1990 -1991, a significant proportion of U.S. forces 
deployed to Kuwait from their NATO bases in Europe left their barracks for good, 
coming back to the United States after the war, while major U.S. military installations in 
the Philippines were closed in 1992. The effect on U.S. allies was predictable. In 
Europe, many EC countries debated about the possibility of a post -NATO Europe and 
questioned U.S. leadership. In Asia and the Pacific, U.S. allies worried about the 
strength of U.S. commitments, pondered about future Chinese intentions, and discussed 
possible new security structures in the region. 
The 'New World Order' theme, which closely associated with the Bush 
administration, did not figure prominently in the 1992 Democratic presidential 
campaign. Rather, international trade and economic security were given prominence by 
the Clinton team. International trade, incidentally, was also seen as a means to 
encourage democracy and human rights with America's commercial partners.° There 
were indications that a Democratic presidency would support a strengthened UN, 
especially since the organisation was riding high on a string of successes made possible 
by the nouvelle entente between the members of the Security Council. However, Clinton's 
electoral success was essentially the result of his domestic platform oriented towards 
domestic and economic issues, the Democratic Party having won support from the 
American electorate on such issues as the stagnant state of the U.S. economy under the 
Bush administration (a situation which was turning around in Bush's last year in office) 
and the declining living standards of the American workforce. 
Upon taking the reigns of power the Clinton presidency immediately found itself 
engaged in a crises in Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia for which it was ill- prepared.? 
Multilateralism in policy- making either became a convenient excuse for procrastination 
(Bosnia), a chance to demonstrate U.S. leadership (Somalia /Haiti), or a principle 
occasionally incompatible with the pursuit of American national security interests (Iraq). 
The question of multilateralism would also be the object of a major declaratory policy 
fiasco. 
In early 1992, leaked U.S. Department of Defense plans defining the U.S. 
military role for the post -Cold War were received with incredulity by the U.S. Congress 
and the media. The plans laid out a world full of emerging threats where the United 
States would have to play the role of global policeman.° The issue would come back to 
haunt the Clinton presidency a year later. In April 1993 the administration enunciated 
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its doctrine of 'assertive multilateralism' which proclaimed a U.S. commitment to UN 
peacekeeping under the rationale that international conflict prevention and resolution 
were not issues subject to 'parsimonious interests', but rather constituted fundamental 
U.S. objectives.9 The new doctrine did not survive the eventful summer of 1993 in 
Somalia. In the fall of that year President Clinton would start to talk about the UN that 
"could say no" and U.S. foreign policy rhetoric switched back to trade liberalisation and 
'global democracy' as its two major themes. 
After the 3 October 1993 incident in Mogadishu during which 18 American 
servicemen died, and with the Clinton administration resisting direct U.S. involvement 
in the Bosnian conflict in spite of having itself raised the possibility of unilateral 
intervention, whatever support was left within the State Department, the Pentagon and 
the White House for forceful UN interventions evaporated and relations between the 
United States and the UN took a turn for the worse. Stringent requirements were 
placed on U.S. participation to UN missions under PPD -25, the 1994 presidential 
directive on multilateral peace operations. Furthermore, the new Republican- dominated 
Congress, elected in November 1994, proposed to cut U.S. financial support for UN 
peacekeeping operations and blocked payments of U.S. arrears to the UN budget, a 
bargaining chip which would later be used by the Clinton presidency to extract reforms 
from the UN.10 
The crisis in American -UN relations came to a head in mid -1995 over the 
situation in Bosnia and Croatia. By then Washington was virtually ignoring UN peace 
efforts in the former Yugoslavia, yet the U.S. presidency it was caught in a major foreign 
policy dilemma. A French and British pullout from Bosnia, an increasingly likely 
possibility in light of mounting casualties and lack of progress in EC /UN- sponsored 
peace talks, would compel the U.S. to lead a major NATO operation to help extract UN 
forces, an intervention the United States wanted to avoid at all cost because of the high 
likelihood of troop casualties." However, a U.S. refusal to lead such an intervention 
could cripple NATO politically and poison transatlantic relations. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, U.S. choices were facilitated by the actions of the Bosnian Serb Army against 
UN troops and the Croatian offensive in Krajina (Operation Oluja, August 1995), the 
latter receiving Washington's tacit support. By mid -1995, the main Western 
protagonists in Bosnia had finally decided that their interests would best be served only 
if they took a harder, more proactive stance in order to end the conflict. 
Whether 'image and impulse' accounts for the confused and confusing policies 
of the Bush and Clinton administrations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda has already 
been extensively debated. These crises had important repercussions for the perception 
of American power abroad, placing the United States in an unwelcome position of 
ultimate arbiter in situations where domestic imperatives for action where weak and 
political opinion divided. This stood in contrast with the more proactive approach 
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taken by the Bush and Clinton teams on other 'hot' issues, such as preventing the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, international trade negotiations, bilateral relations with 
Russia, NATO reform, the Middle East Peace Process, or the situation in Iraq. At the 
very least, this strongly suggested that a limited number of issues were identified as 
situations where the United States wanted to be, and be seen, in a leadership position, 
often to the point of discouraging parallel initiatives by its allies. 
Stanley Hoffman noted in 1994 that without the Cold War as an organising 
principle "the world did not lend itself easily to a sweeping vision, or even a simple 
slogan'.i2 That may be so. Yet it is also true that for forty five years the world got into 
the habit of expecting a certain kind of global leadership from the United States, 
inspired both by Wilsonian ideals and reapolitik considerations. It is more than time to 
review those expectations. There have been plenty of indications throughout the 1990s 
that the U.S. approach to global leadership and responsibility remains highly selective. 
U.S. allies, of course, were always aware of this, and, it should be added, benefited 
immensely from U.S. willingness to defend and support them, particularly Western 
Europe and Japan. However, without the unifying bonds hitherto provided by Cold 
War geopolitics many U.S. allies now feel less constrained to acquiesce American global 
primacy and more confident about pursuing their own economic and political interests. 
The absence of a common enemy reduces the incentives for cooperation and increases 
allied skepticism, mostly unspoken, about the reliability of American security guarantees. 
American policymakers have demonstrated a decidedly mixed attitude toward 
signs of greater assertiveness in foreign policy from their allies. The gradual fraying of 
the U.S. -led coalition against Iraq, the constant dissonance between Washington and 
Europe throughout the Bosnian conflict, U.S. resistance to becoming a signatory to the 
anti- personnel landmines treaty, and U.S.- Canadian and U.S.- European rows over trade 
sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya, are all cases in point. In effect, and more often 
than western leaders like to admit, the great liberal- democratic coalition which was 
expected to build a post -Cold War international order finds itself working in fits and 
starts rather than in unison. 
Without getting into the theoretical debate about hegemonic stability, it may 
well be the case that U.S. leadership remains vital on a number of issues. Without the 
United States taking a determined stance against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological 
weapons proliferation, for instance, it is doubtful whether any coalition of 
liberal- democratic states could muster the combination of power, influence and 
technology necessary to control the spread of such weapons. However, on a range of 
other issues - the environment, global trade, social and economic rights - U.S. allies 
often doubt that U.S. leadership is as globally responsible and even -handed as 
Washington claims. 
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The U.S. and regionalism: back to the future? 
Throughout the 1990s the United States played an important if not determinant role in 
the evolution of regional and transatlantic bodies such as NATO, the OSCE and the 
OAS. Its policies also directly or indirectly influenced the direction taken by other 
regional bodies, such as the ARF, the OAU, the WEU and the GCC. Whether in Asia, 
Europe or Africa, the United States has been a major advocate of shifting greater 
responsibility for regional stability towards local allies and selected institutions. This is a 
tendency in U.S. foreign policy that goes back to the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in 
1969. 
Though it has not received the same kind of attention as other (and perhaps 
more appealing) themes like trade liberalisation or 'global democracy', burden- sharing 
has indeed one of the major U.S. foreign policy goals of the 1990s. Of course, this has 
always been an issue in contemporary U.S. -European relations. Throughout the Cold 
War, and more particularly during the 1980s, U.S. policymakers and Congressional 
leaders regularly lashed out at NATO's European members for not dedicating enough 
resources to the transatlantic defence effort against the Soviet Union. Burden sharing 
also became a major issue with Japan during the 1980s as well as during the Gulf War, 
to which the Japanese government refused to participate militarily, but did so through 
'chequebook diplomacy', ostensibly on constitutional grounds. 
Throughout the 1990s, political developments worldwide certainly provided a 
new geopolitical dimension to this question. Many, if not most, emerging conflicts in 
Africa, the Balkans or the CIS did not directly engage major U.S. strategic interests. 
Moreover, just as much as there was a 'crisis of expectations' at the UN, there were 
undue expectations placed on the shoulders of the United States as the major provider 
of political influence and military power for dealing with localised crises and internal 
conflicts.93 
In a 1993 congressional hearing on the future of U.S. foreign policy, former 
editor of Foreign Affairs William Hyland lamented the fact that America's dominating 
position within NATO throughout the Cold War had created an unhealthy 
"psychological" dependence on U.S. leadership on the part of its closest allies.14 Hyland 
also raised questions that have found considerable resonance in Washington throughout 
this decade. What are vital U.S. interests? Where should the United States intervene? 
What issues should be left to others? The answer of U.S. policymakers to these 
questions has been more than a little ambiguous. 
In its relations with Africa, Europe and Japan, the Clinton administration has 
generally pushed for a much greater level of regional responsibility for the maintenance 
of regional peace and stability, expecting more of its allies and tacitly acquiescing the 
role of regional power -brokers. Greater reliance on regional organisations was also seen 
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as part of the solution, although on that front expectations were and remain more 
limited.15 Washington, on the other hand, has remained wary of any regional coalition 
or more permanent regional organisation which might potentially jeopardise U.S. 
strategic advantages, be they political or economic, and that also includes the EC /EU 
with which the United States has always had an uneasy relationship. Moreover, the 
United States has not been shy about engaging in geopolitical games of influence, most 
notably with France in Africa and with Russia in the CIS. In effect, regionalism is a 
principle which America is willing to espouse, but only when it corresponds with its 
own understanding of regional and international security. Here, important parallels can 
and should be drawn between this situation and American affiance policy during the 
postwar era. 
Despite debates about its changing roles and interests the United States retains 
considerable diplomatic and economic influence in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America 
and the Middle East. As the world's only truly global power, what it does and does not 
do, approves or disapproves, continues to influences events far from its shores. This 
unequalled position in world affairs is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, one can not see on the horizon any serious pretender(s) to superpower status, 
whether in Europe, Asia, or anywhere else. 
Globalization: Putting Regionalism Back in the Bottle? 
Globalization, the ubiquitous catch -all concept described by Andrew Hurrell as the 
"sense of increasing interdependence between national economies and 
interconnectedness between societies ", is likely to have a major impact on the 
development of regionalism.16 Globalization conjures up images of unimaginably large 
sums of money moving unfettered across world financial markets, denationalised 
economies in which governments have little apparent ability to conduct effective 
economic policy, and cultures transformed by the marketisation of a new 'MacWorld' 
way of life. As an end of the century phenomenon globalization poses a definitive 
challenge to some of the traditional functions of statehood. It is, however, an uneven 
process whose scope, ramifications, and consequences for national and international 
governance are neither simple nor easily explicable.17 
One might legitimately ask what globalization has to do with the ability of 
regional political or trading arrangements to contribute to regional stability. First, 
globalization raises questions similar to those raised in the old UN universalist - 
regionalist debate. For example, does globalization weaken or strengthen the 
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development of stable and cohesive regional groupings? Second, the very idea of 
globalization (writ large) has become a melting pot for a plethora of current policy and 
academic debates - the future of international trade, the supremacy of the market 
system, the diminishing role of the state, U.S. economic 'imperialism', international 
distributive justice, the development of 'global values', etc. - many of which are directly 
or indirectly relevant to the possible responses of regional groupings in their efforts to 
further regional growth and stability, be it political or economic. 
How doesglobaligation affect regionalism? 
This is a difficult question to answer. First, because is there no agreed definition of 
what globalization is, and second because globalization, as it is widely perceived, 
consists of a variety of processes and trends in which a multitude of state and non -state 
actors play a role yet whose consequences are often difficult to evaluate. Take the 
debate on the information revolution and the diffusion of knowledge, for instance. 
Many in the West believe that increased access to information worldwide will lead to a 
globalization of social and cultural values. However, few would disagree with the 
statement that the diffusion of ideas and values under globalization is essentially a one 
way street; Americans or Europeans are not bombarded in their media by Indian 
culture, or Chinese business philosophy. So, does globalization reinforce the Western 
conception of global interdependence, or does it provide for transnational exchanges on 
a more equitable footing? 
Economists have tended to present a more orderly vision of globalization than 
political scientists in recent years, perhaps because the foundations of mainstream 
(neo- liberal) economic theory have been strengthened rather than weakened over the 
last two decades. Their major claims about the features of economic globalization are as 
follows. First, there are increasing economic links between high- income and low 
income countries. Second, national economies are becoming more integrated through 
trade, finance, production and regimes. Third, multinational corporations play a critical 
role in global trade and in patterns of international production. And finally, there is an 
increasing harmonisation of international economic regimes.'$ This should not be read 
as a univocal endorsement of a unified vision for international trade, however. Does 
anyone remember the great debate of the end of 1980s and early 1990s about the rise of 
regional blocs? There is obviously an inherent tension between research that tends to 
demonstrate the development of regional trading blocs, and thus a regionalisation of the 
world economy, and research that presents arguments about the global integration of 
the world economy." 
In order to try to answer the initial question, we are therefore left with a set of 
hypotheses and arguments based on a mix of hard facts, circumstantial evidence, and 
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informed (and sometimes uninformed) speculation. To confuse matters further, they 
lead in many directions rather than one in particular. Hurrell, for example, makes a 
convincing argument that globalization may in fact act both as an impediment to, and as 
stimulus for, regionalism, presenting the case for a push- and -pull interpretation 20 His 
basic argument is that global interdependence promotes the search for global, rather 
than regional solutions. On the other hand, global problems, or global 'challenges' as 
they are often termed by governments, may stimulate more coherent regional -level 
responses. Both statements may be accurate, but they obviously depend on the nature 
of the issue and the capacity of different entities to respond to them. EU countries, for 
example, have the ability to respond to global issues, including international economic 
competition, on regional terms. More vulnerable African states, on the other hand, rely 
to a much greater extent on international support, and notably on international 
institutions, to help them deal with a range of issues defined as global in scope (e.g. 
environmental problems, pandemics, population movements, etc.). 
Globalization and governance: regionalism as a filter? 
Another key set of arguments in the globalization debate relates to the effects of the 
market system on governance, and on the tensions between the promotion of global 
markets and democracy, tensions which many economists recognise. Jacques Attali, the 
controversial former director of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank 
(EBRD) and long -time adviser to French President François Mitterrand, has warned 
against the rise of a global "market dictatorship" which is dislocating established social 
contracts in industrialised societies and undermining responsible governance in weaker 
polities21 In a similar vein, noted American commentator Robert Kaplan has painted a 
bleak portrait of democracy's future in a world increasingly influenced by an 
international corporate oligarchy.22 
Whether or not democracy is doomed under the tremendous weight of global 
forces remains a highly contested issue. At the very least, it can certainly be argued with 
some authority that globalization is contributing to develop civil society and trans - 
national networks in both established democracies and in countries governed by regimes 
with less than democratic credentials. Moreover, democracy and commitment to 
economic pluralism are inextricably linked while the spread of globalization has been 
matched by an increase, not decrease, in the number of countries with democratic forms 
of governance. What is indisputable, however, is that global market forces are slowly 
gnawing away at the autonomous powers of modern states. Governments ignore or 
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defy the imperatives of the global market at their peril. Challenging them risks incurring 
the wrath of financial markets and international economic institutions. 
How regional entities of all types can respond to such forces is not clear. 
Stronger, more cohesive regional groupings composed of established democracies can 
arguably respond more vigorously to perceived threats to their democratic foundations, 
if only because they can put up more effective and accountable regulatory responses to 
market forces and corporate actions. Weaker polities have a more limited range of 
strategies. As discussed in previous chapters, a number of regional institutions are weak 
or ineffective on matters of regional governance. Governments can raise barriers to 
attempt to protect their political foundations or national culture. However, their 
capacity to control or regulate transnational forces is often limited, and their efforts in 
this regard can be offset by sanctions from much bigger international players or by the 
costs of not opening themselves to wider markets, a route which some states follow 
regardless. Finally, in weak polities societal demands for accountability and 
transparency cannot be channeled upwards as easily as in established democracies, and 
those demands must also compete with a range of powerful pressures: markets forces, 
an objective need for foreign direct investment in the national economy, corruption in 
bureaucracy and in political systems, etc. 
One particularly interesting example of how globalization is playing out on 
regional groupings was provided by the 1997 Asian financial meltdown which clearly 
highlighted the tensions between the forces of globalization and the forces of 
regionalism. It also provided plenty of grist to the mill for both the advocates and 
detractors of 'global markets'. In spite of the long -standing Asian discourse on 
economic self -reliance and 'Asian values' the crisis exposed the high degree of 
susceptibility of East Asian economies to external financial forces. It also demonstrated 
the lack of effective regional instruments for dealing with such situations as neither 
ASEAN nor the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum proved to be 
capable crisis -managing frameworks. Rather, the International Monetary Fund (IMP) 
and the World Bank have been the two core non -state actors throughout the crisis, 
though it should also be mentioned that both organisations have come under very 
severe criticism as a result of their past and current policies toward East Asia. 
At this juncture the conclusion to the Asian financial crisis remains an 
open -ended question. Some have interpreted the crisis as a demonstration of the need 
for greater transparency and accountability in regional economic and political systems. 
Other have concluded that international markets are all powerful, and that any regional 
effrots to manage crises on regional crises are doomed. For others in the region, the 
crisis has highlighted the inter- connectedness of Asian economies and the need to some 
form of regional system in order to better protect against international speculation. The 
fact remains, however, that the so -called 'Asian flu' is having a profound social, 
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economic and political impact on East Asia, and that is has brought about severe, if 
temporary, disruptions in world financial and trade markets, to the extent that G -7 
leaders have openly questioned the ability of international financial institutions to deal 
with such situations. 
Globalization is a fact of life in many sectors of the international economy, it is 
having a major impact on self -conceptions of national and regional identity, and it is 
changing the expectations placed on governments and multilateral bodies. No one can 
predict with certainty how such forces will play out in years to come. As the 90s decade 
is drawing to a close, however, there seems to be a growing, and perhaps healthy, 
recognition of the more negative aspects of globalization and of its consequences for 
political governance and economic stability. Perhaps the ultimate irony in this last 
respect is that some aspects of globalization are increasingly being viewed as a threat to 
the stability of the global economy, and that this, perhaps more than anything else, has 
opened the way for a much needed renewal of the debate on international economic 
governance. 
The UN at a Crossroads, Again 
In 1988, just as there were signs of a UN 'renaissance', the American United Nations 
Association published a book entitled A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow.n 
Innumerable plans for adapting the UN to post -Cold War conditions have been put 
forth since. The book's title, however, captured the very essence of the most important 
challenge facing the UN system: finding a successor vision. Ten years on, one can only 
observe that progress has been very difficult on that front and that no such vision has 
yet jelled permanently. 
Under the stewardship of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and then Boutros 
Boutros -Ghali, the UN saw its fortunes rise and fall. The purposefulness which 
prevailed in the early 1990s has been replaced with deep sense of introspection and a 
general sentiment that, after having burned its fingers once too often in the embers of 
'robust' peacekeeping, the UN had yet to find a clear post -Cold War role. In truth, the 
UN has always represented different things for different governments. Great powers 
have historically used the UN as a mechanism to deal with unforeseen international 
incidents or as a platform to legitimise their own foreign policy actions. Under the 
heading of a 'rules and institutions -based' international order, middle powers have 
sought refuge in the multilateralist principles embodied in the UN system to promote 
their own position and values in world affairs. Small and disempowered states have 
tried to use their numbers to gain leverage on richer industrialised countries. And 
regional powers have shielded themselves behind the UN Charter in order to prevent 
other nations from poking their noses into their affairs. 
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The current existential crisis of the UN is certainly not its first. Indeed, it 
appears to be a cyclical occurrence. One can think, for example, of the UN intervention 
in the Congo (ONUC 1960- 1964), which resulted in a deep political and financial crisis 
and severely restricted the peacekeeping role of the organisation for more than fifteen 
years.24 There was also the great fmancial crisis of the mid- 1980s, brought about by a 
vindictive U.S. Congress that withheld nearly $500 million in U.S. dues to the UN 
between 1985 and 1988.25 
The UN never really overcame the financial difficulties inherited from the 
1980s. From 1988 onwards, with the UN Security Council authorising one 
peacekeeping operation after another, UN finances never really kept up with the 
increased pace of activities. The accumulation of unpaid arrears and the exploding costs 
of peacekeeping operations delivered a shock to the UN budgetary system from which 
it has still to recover.26 The fact is that the UN was effectively kept on the brink of 
financial insolvency by a minority of reluctant payers, most notably Russia and the 
United States. As of January 1998, a staggering $3.1 billion in outstanding contributions 
were owed to the organisation, $1.5 billion to the regular budget and $1.6 billion to the 
peacekeeping operations budget. The United States alone accounts for nearly half of 
owed arrears.27 Late in its first term in office the Clinton administration decided 
unilaterally that the United States would reduce its assessed contributions to the UN 
general budget (from 25% down to 20% of the UN's total budget), as well as its 
contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget (from 31% down to 25 %). This decision 
has been heavily criticised by many countries, but particularly so by Washington's 
European and Canadian allies. From whatever perspective one looked at the state of 
the UN in 1995 -1997, these were not signs of an organisation in good shape. 
What is the UN's role under such circumstances? Is the UN essentially confined 
to the role of international relief agency, with the Security Council continuing to provide 
international legitimacy for all manner of coalitions or regional actions deemed worthy 
of support by a restricted group of major powers? Or is the organisation set to become 
the central node of international cooperation in the 21st century? There are valid 
arguments for both positions. Many UN agencies are doing truly indispensable work 
for humanity, much more so than is appreciated by the habitual detractors of the UN 
system who rarely benefit themselves from the work provided by UN agencies. On the 
other hand, the UN's international political role is being challenged on several fronts. 
The legitimacy of the Security Council is rapidly eroding, and for most of this decade 
there has been growing resentment amongst developing countries that their voice is 
simply not listened to when big UN decisions are made 28 Moreover, in the aftermath 
of the controversial UN interventions in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, there has been a 
general crisis of confidence in the moral authority and effectiveness of UN action. 
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The imperative for internal restructuring is currently a major driving force in 
UN affairs and is likely be so for the entire mandate of Kofi Annan, Boutros -Ghali's 
successor at the helm of the UN. The much -needed rejuvenation of the UN system will 
neither be quick nor easy, and difficult issues like Security Council reform and other 
critical issues which go at the very heart of international order seem unlikely to be fully 
renegotiated by the end of Annañ s tenure. However, this first wave of reform may 
open the way for the real debate about the role of the UN in the 21st century: Is the UN 
simply to be a more efficient and better managed organisation, yet one which essentially 
defends the international status quo? Or can it evolve into a new international 
cooperation mechanism which will truly defend fundamental freedoms, promote good 
international governance and bridge North -South differences ?29 
America's benign virion of the UN 
Throughout the history of the UN the United States has always held a determinant if 
not commanding position over the affairs of the organisation. It is therefore a foregone 
conclusion to assert that any major structural reforms at the UN depend to a 
considerable extent on Washington's imprimatur. It is abundantly clear, however, that 
American policymakers hold on to a rather benign vision of the UN. Indeed, such is 
the gap between the current attitude of American policy elites toward the UN system 
and the global mandate of the organisation that it increasingly difficult to see how the 
two can be reconciled. This is particularly evident with respect to the organisation's 
peace and security mandate, but it also palpable in ongoing attempts to reform UN 
structures30 
Among the list of American grievances towards the UN is the question of 
administrative effectiveness. This issue served as a pretext for the United States to 
scuttle Boutros Boutros -Ghali's bid for a second term the helm of the UN. 
Boutros -Ghali had proposed An Agenda for Peace (1992), An Agenda for Development 
(1994) and An Agenda for Democratisation (1996). However, he has shown comparatively 
litde interest for an agenda for internal reform. His management style - generally 
described as aloof and haughty in the Anglo- American press - was ultimately 
detrimental to the objectives he was pursuing and contributed to a gradual erosion of 
the crucial UN- United States relationship.31 For better or for worse, Boutros -Ghali had 
been at odds with Washington too many times and on too many issues during his 
tenure. In 1996, the opinionated Secretary -General would discover that the Clinton 
administration had no qualms about fronting the rest the world in vetoing his candidacy 
for a second term. 
Coming on the heels of the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the U.S. veto on 
Boutros- Ghali's re- election marked a new low -point in U.S. -UN relations. In a January 
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1996 statement to the UN General Assembly working group on strengthening the UN 
system, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright made a carefully worded 
presentation about U.S. priorities at the organisation. Three years before, under the 
short -lived 'assertive multilateralism' policy, she had proclaimed the United States ready 
and willing to support UN peacekeeping. Albright now declared that the UN should 
focus its efforts on tasks that the organisation was "comparatively well -qualified to 
perform ", noting that the UN was "but one of many instruments available for countries 
seeking to act cooperatively ".32 The central thrust of her statement was the urgent need 
for better internal management at the UN. But she added that the United States wished 
to see the streamlining of UN economic and social programs, the restoration of the UN 
General Assembly (which in her trademark forthright style Albright called a 'global 
sedative') as a forum for substantive debate, and a restructuring of the UN Secretariat to 
transform it into a more efficient international bureaucracy. 
One can easily criticise the peremptory manner in which the United States 
shoved the internal reform agenda down the UN's throat in 1995 -1996. Irrespective of 
the method, however, it is also a fact that most knowledgeable observers of the UN 
have pleaded for years for genuine and meaningful internal reform, not only because 
effectiveness and accountability within the UN system objectively need to be increased, 
but also because bureaucratic entropy had damaged the credibility and authority of the 
organisation over the years. One can certainly speculate as to why an internal reform 
agenda was not initiated earlier by Pérez de Cuéllar or Boutros -Ghali. Though both 
former secretary- generals were not generally regarded as enthusiastic reformers, the 
reason essentially lies with the extremely defensive attitude that both the G -77 
(developing countries) and WEOG (Western Europe and Others Group) groups within 
the UN took towards internal reform in order to protect their national and group 
interests within the organisation. In the end, the resistance to change from large 
portions of the UN membership and from within the UN bureaucracy itself simply set 
the stage for a very determined UN reform drive launched by the United States, the 
UN's biggest financial contributor. 
Kofi Annan, Boutros -Ghali's successor, was all too aware of what was expected 
of him. He spent the first few months of his tenure developing a comprehensive 
reform agenda which he presented to the UN membership in mid -1997. Annan 's team 
proposed major changes to the UN Secretariat's structure and functions, and to UN 
program delivery, financial management and staffing. A new independent Department 
of Disarmament Affairs has been created in order to reenergize the UN disarmament 
agenda. Emergency relief coordination, sustainable development, human rights and 
post -conflict peace -building have been given heightened importance within the 
Secretariat's structure. It is tempting to state that never in the organisation's history has 
such a sweeping agenda for reform been adopted so swiftly. In reality, these reforms 
LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE 214 
have come as result of a drawn out and divisive debate which has lasted for years, and 
the most difficult part, implementation, has yet to be fully played out. 
One aspect of UN reform conspicuously absent from Albright's January 1996 
speech was the question of Security Council reform. Soon after taking office, in early 
1993, the Clinton administration had shown its colours and came out in favour of an 
expanded Security Council with Japan and Germany as new permanent members. 
Many developing countries were outraged that the United States had not come forward 
with a proposal that would also include greater representation from their ranks, 
especially since the Security Council is universally viewed as an anachronism. The 
debate which ensued at the UN (and that is still ongoing today) focussed on the 
composition and powers of new members, and the one major concession of the United 
States, if one can call it a concession, was recognition that it must become a more 
representative body.33 Otherwise, the American position has changed relatively little 
since then; Japan and Germany should become members of an expanded Council, the 
new Council should have no more that 20 or 21 members (5 or 6 more members than 
the current 15), and an expansion of the Council should not change the obligations and 
privileges of the current permanent members.34 What this points to is that the United 
States is in no hurry to reform a Council which has been so favourable to its national 
interests for the last fifty years. American diplomacy knows full well that the process of 
selecting new Council members other than Germany and Japan is bound to be lengthy 
and extremely difficult.35 
Another key aspect of the UN mandate which the United States does not appear 
particularly eager to promote is an enlarged economic and social role for the 
organisation. Over the last few years an extended debate has taken place on the UN's 
international economic role as well as on the increasing distance separating Bretton 
Woods institutions from the UN system. For conservative policymakers and opinion 
leaders in the United States such discussions bring back memories of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) debate of mid -1970s in which the 
underdeveloped South challenged Western economic hegemony.36 Perhaps an 
unavoidable observation here is that over the last decades the United States (as have 
most other OECD countries) has skilfully manoeuvred its trade diplomacy so that the 
UN has come to play an increasingly inconsequential role in international economic 
affairs. 
The NIEO challenge was squarely defeated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
This time around, however, it might prove more difficult for Washington to cast aside 
appeals for a more meaningful UN economic role for several reasons. First, developing 
countries have made important concessions in the process of UN reforms; in return 
they expect international development to be placed once again at the forefront of UN 
concerns. Second, contrary to the 1970s, there is now a declaratory consensus on the 
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importance of market -oriented economic policies and political pluralism as the basis for 
development amongst less developed countries (LDC's).37 It is therefore increasingly 
difficult for the United States to reject demands for a greater UN economic role on the 
basis that LDC's repudiate both the market system and democratic values. Finally, the 
tacit U.S.- Europe coalition which defeated the NIEO does not exist as it did in the 
1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, under the heading of sustainable development EU 
countries now appear to support a greater economic and social role for the UN. In 
early 1997 they proposed an important overhaul of the UN economic and social 
system.38 It is also noteworthy that during the past decade the World Bank's agenda has 
broadened considerably and now embraces many positions that were once the unique 
preserve of the UN, a trend accelerated by the Asian financial crisis. The relationship 
between the Bank and the UN is now closer than it has been for many years. 
'Be careful what you ask for because you might get it', or so the saying goes. In 
a few years time the United States might be placed in a strange situation. The UN will 
perhaps be a leaner and more efficient organisation that Washington might find 
increasingly difficult to criticise because of its wasteful administration and Byzantine 
bureaucracy, and American leaders could come under increasing international pressure 
from many their closest allies to renew their commitment to multilateralism within the 
UN framework. For the UN, this would constitute an optimistic scenario. On the 
other hand, with the United States enjoying global economic and military supremacy, it 
must be recognised there are few structural incentives to bind U.S. power to 
burdensome global multilateral frameworks. As the principal global player, the United 
States enjoys the power to set the international agenda rather than simply following it. 
Saving the state: the UN's most important role? 
Failed states and crumbling states have posed the greatest challenge to the UN peace 
and security system in the 1990s, and it has become obvious that, regardless of 
conceptual frameworks or good intentions, the question of international involvement in 
disintegrating states remains one of the most complex and delicate issues in 
international politics. Indeed, the problems posed by recent UN interventions in civil 
wars have meant that Western industrialised nations have lost their enthusiasm for risky 
peacekeeping operations organised under the UN framework, and the virtues of a more 
traditional approach to peacekeeping have been rediscovered once again. 
The other great lesson from the 1990s is that collapsing states can pose a threat 
to regional security and stability, and possibly to international security as well.39 The 
domino effect of the Rwandan conflict on the Great Lakes region and the regional 
consequences of the Liberian conflict are obvious case in point. Not all the internal 
conflicts of the 1990s have had similar repercussions. In Peru and Colombia, for 
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example, domestic violence and terrorism have not threatened the wider regional order. 
However, regional spillover has been frequent enough to highlight the need for strong 
regional and international measures to prevent state collapse before it occurs. 
At present, the instruments at the disposal of the international community for 
preventing these types of situations are inadequate. Not only does conflict prevention 
require that considerable political resources be mobilised before effective action can be 
taken, but it also requires that a common understanding be reached amongst all 
concerned parties as to what exactly is to be prevented, what agency or coalition is best 
placed to deal with the problem, and an agreement as to what strategies are likely to be 
most effective. These conditions are rarely met. Conflict prevention seems relatively 
straightforward in lecture rooms and at international conferences, but it remains an 
extremely demanding form of action that can only be successful under certain 
conditions.40- 
Western governments clearly understand that a collapsing Russian state would 
be a catastrophe for Europe, if not the rest of the world. Consequently, economic and 
political support for Russia's fledgling 'market democracy' was recognised as a 
geostrategic imperative, an insurance policy against the likelihood that a worst -case 
scenario will develop. On the other hand, the 1990s have provided ample evidence that 
the collapse of smaller states in Africa or Central Asia does not rate very highly on the 
geopolitical scale. Moreover, in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq or Zaire (in 1996- 
1997), internal instability or revolutionary change appears to have been deliberately 
promoted by certain Western powers, either directly or indirectly. What does this tell us 
about the rhetoric of conflict prevention? Probably that it is only possible where key 
local and international players genuinely agree to commit sufficient resources and 
diplomatic know -how to do something about a specific situation. In the reapolitik world 
of international affairs, however, it also means that difficult compromises often have to 
be made between ideal objectives, national interests (broadly and narrowly defined) and 
the possibility of already bad situations sliding into chaos. 
In the 1990s the idea of conflict prevention has developed largely in relation to 
the tremendous costs of international efforts to help rebuild faltering states or mitigate 
the effects of state disintegration on local populations. Within this paradigm, individual 
human beings and well -defined population groups have been propelled closer to the 
centre of international concerns. One can take note, for instance, of concept of 'human 
security' which risen to prominence in a number of international institutions as well as 
in academic and policy circles. That human security is a fundamental factor in the 
achievement of peace and development is undeniable. Indeed, it was so well before the 
concept ever became fashionable. Yet the concern for human security only reinforces 
the need for viable and responsible states, as weak states often constitute the greatest 
threat to civilian populations. Ultimately, it is states who have the responsibility of 
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upholding international norms regarding political, social or human rights, not 
international organisations or NGO's. There is no way of getting around this problem 
by bypassing the state altogether; human security simply cannot be achieved under 
conditions of weak or faltering statehood. This being said, 'human security' is a difficult 
concept for many G -77 to accept because it is seen as implying a level of external 
interference in domestic affairs that is squarely at odds with traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty. 
As discussed previously, the forces of globalization present a major challenge to 
the exercise of state sovereignty and responsibility. With the repercussions of the Asian 
financial crisis considerably more dramatic than anyone had anticipated, many think 
international financial markets are far too volatile, becoming themselves the proverbial 
bull in the china shop of political and economic governance. At the very least, the crisis 
in Asia suggests that the sweeping embrace of market philosophy may well increase 
problems of governance and social fragmentation that exist in both developed and 
under- developed states. If the international community really wants viable and 
responsible states, then, as historian Paul Kennedy argues, it "must prevent the 
sovereignty of [UN] member states being further impinged upon by forces which they 
cannot individually handle ".41 If one adopts this logic, then it not only implies a certain 
urgency in forging a new consensus on how to resolve global problems, but it also 
underlines the need for international statesmanship of the highest order. 
The UN enjoys a unique international position because of its legitimacy and 
representative nature. Efforts to revitalise the UN system need to be supported as 
further erosion of its capabilities and its credibility may well usher in a revised version of 
balance of power politics. However, a UN reform process that stopped short of 
tackling Security Council reform and a meaningful restoration of the UN's economic 
and social role would be (rightly) perceived as a failure. Of course, neither issue is likely 
to be solved in the short -term. But the direction taken on the debate on both issues will 
have an important impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the UN in the coming 
decade. 
With respect to the question of regionalism proper there is another important 
factor that needs to be taken into account when considering the UN's international role. 
The episodic losses of credibility in the UN system have historically proven to be a 
catalyst for the development of alternatives to global approaches to problem -solving. 
The development of a new security -driven regionalism in the 1990s might derive, in 
part, from the UN's own predicament. Sensing that the UN is unable to respond to 
their collective problems or goals, regional communities or other coalescing groups of 
states may well have seen more promise in regional or coalition approaches than in the 
search for solutions through a weakened global organisation. 
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'Self -help' on the rise 
Whether in Albania, Central Africa, the Korean Peninsula, Yugoslavia or the South 
Pacific, the 1990s have seen an increasing resort to contact group politics, informal 
coalitions and ad hoc multilateralism to manage and /or resolve regional tensions and 
conflicts. The motivations for this development are extremely diverse and do not lend 
themselves easily to generalisation. Nevertheless a number of hypotheses can be put 
forward. 
First, the UN is manifestly unable to respond to each and every crisis. 
Throughout the early 1990s the organisation was overwhelmed by the expectations 
placed upon its shoulders, and in turn this has generated a movement towards finding 
other avenues of problem -solving. The corollary argument, of course, is that the UN 
Security Council is in fact not tasked to respond to each and every crisis, but only to 
those threatening international peace and security. Since 1995, a reassessment of the 
Security Council's work has taken place in recognition of the fact that attempts to tackle 
too many difficult situations at once can only lead to disappointment and disillusion. 
Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, many regional organisations have 
taken steps to increase their jurisdictional and functional capabilities in the field of 
conflict management, yet remain limited in what they can do, or are hamstrung by 
cumbersome decision -making rules. For governments that want to act, ad hoc 
approaches or regional 'coalitions of the willing' may provide more flexible and less 
constraining forums for handling regional problems than broad -membership 
institutions. Indeed, regardless of their goals, governments acting within a limited group 
of like- minded states can more easily control the scope, pace and intensity of a common 
initiative than their are able to within larger forums. A corollary argument needs to be 
added here. Not all regions of the globe are covered by regional organisations endowed 
with strong peacemaking or peacekeeping mandates. Therefore, if the UN is not in a 
position to act, and no relevant or effective regional security institution exists, some 
form of ad hoc multilateralism involving states having a direct stake on the issue at hand 
maybe the only pragmatic problem -solving approach. 
Third, after the disasters in Somalia and Yugoslavia and the mixed record of 
CSCE /OSCE involvement in the CIS, key international powers have become extremely 
selective in the range of conflict management functions they will allow multilateral 
organisations to perform. In Africa, for example, the United States and EU 
governments are increasingly inclined to tolerate or even to encourage local 
problem -solving approaches rather than initiate new high level UN action, particularly if 
it might involve risky commitments on their part. In the case of the Albanian crisis of 
1997, so considerable were the political obstacles for UN, NATO or OSCE 
peacekeeping in that country that only a restricted group of 'willing and able' 
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governments led by Italy and France proved willing to send a temporary stabilisation 
force. 
Finally, aside from obvious reasons such as trying to prevent the spread of a 
problem before it gets out of hand, or attempting to transform a conflict through some 
form of multilateral process, playing a greater role in conflict prevention /management 
may present a number of benefits for regional powers or 'coalitions of the willing': 1) 
third party conflict management efforts may either raise or reaffirm the regional and /or 
international status of the governments involved; 2) by demonstrating a willingness to 
pursue a common cause, such efforts may also contribute to reinforce solidarity 
amongst the parties involved; and 3) informal coalitions (and, sometimes, regional 
groupings) may decide that tackling the problem on their own can provide some 
insulation from external involvement in the region, either by the UN or by 
extra -regional powers. 
Regional and sub-regional peacekeeping: more frequent than ever 
One aspect of particular relevance to this study is the development of regional or non - 
UN peacekeeping forces since the end of the Cold War. Resort to such forces has been 
more frequent since 1990 than at any time since peacekeeping was developed as a 
conflict control mechanism in the 1950s. The following are recent instances where non - 
UN peacekeeping forces have been deployed: 
ECOWAS peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) in Liberia (1990 - ); 
CIS /Russian peacekeeping operations in Abbazia, South Ossetia, Moldova 
and Tajikistan (from 1992 on) 
OAU Neutral Military Observation Group (NMOG I /II) in Rwanda - 
Uganda (1992- 1993); 
OAU observation mission (MIOB) in Burundi (1994- 1996); 
Rio Treaty Guarantor's Group military observation mission (MOMEP) along 
the Peru- Ecuador Border (1995 - ); 
NATO force (IFOR /SFOR) in Bosnia -Herzegovina (1995 - ); 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) troop contingent as part of the UN 
Mission in Haiti (1995 -1997); 
Multinational Protection Force (MPF) in Albania (1997); 
Francophone West African force (MISAB) deployed in the Central African 
Republic (1997- 1998), transformed into a UN operation (MINURCA) in 
1998; 
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South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (1994) and Truce Monitoring Group 
(1998 -) on Bougainville Island (Papua -New Guinea); 
ECOWAS force (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone (1997 - ) 42 
Nato force (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999 -) 
In addition, there are now numerous examples of multinational military forces 
established specifically for contingency /peace operations, both within and outside the 
framework of the UN. Within NATO, a variety of land, air and naval formations can 
be used for that purpose, notably under the framework of the new Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) concept.43 Of note are also the new EUROFOR /EUROMARFOR 
forces recently set up by number of European countries under the WEU.44 NATO and, 
perhaps in theory only, the WEU constitute exceptions with regard to the scope of 
capabilities they can potentially bring to bear, though NATO truly remains in a class of 
its own in terms of actual capabilities. All other multinational military forces being 
established are smaller and more limited in scope and in capabilities. Some are standing 
forces while others are meant to be stand -by arrangements. Some already exist, others 
are projects currently under discussion. They include the following: 
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBATT), composed of troops from 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; 
Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAI 1), composed of troops from 
Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan; 
The U.S. African Conflict Resolution initiative (ACRI), which has already led 
to U.S.- sponsored peacekeeping training in a number of African countries; 
The French RECAMP initiative (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien 
de la paix) under which a West African regional peacekeeping exercise 
(Exercise Guidimakha) was held at the Senegal -Mauritania -Mali border in 
early 1998; 
Stand -by High -Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative piloted by Canada 
and Denmark, to be eventually used for UN peace operations (not, however, 
for enforcement actions); 
SADC peacekeeping force, which held it first ever military exercise (Exercise 
Blue Hungve) in early 1997; 
ANAD peacekeeping force in francophone West Africa, of which the first 
operational deployment may have been the MISAB force (1997 -1998) in the 
Central African Republic; 
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Trilateral Peacekeeping Brigade, recently established between Italy, Hungary 
and Slovenia; 
Joint Hungarian -Rumanian Peacekeeping Battalion, also a recent project; 
Multinational Peace Force South -Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), a recently 
created military formation composed of seven Southeastern European 
countries. 
It should be noted that all of the latter initiatives have received some measure of 
political and /or military support from Western countries or flow from proposals by 
NATO countries.45 
The foregoing examples might suggest that states are more willing than ever to 
find alternatives to UN- organised peacekeeping. Before making a definitive assessment, 
however, we need to take a sober look at the evidence. First, most of these new 
regional /multinational forces either constitute ad hoc responses to particular situations 
or are functional adjuncts to larger political endeavours. Second, a number of these 
projects are not tagged for use by one specific organisation to the exclusion of all others 
and could conceivably be activated under a mandate emanating from the UN, or from a 
relevant regional organisation. Finally, whether in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda or 
Yugoslavia (in 1991- 1992), it needs to be remembered that a number of recent regional 
peacekeeping experiences have not proven to be particularly effective in terms of 
helping to resolve conflict, reminding policymakers that the peacekeeping 'band -aid' is 
usually ineffective when opposing parties are determined to fight. 
When examining the performance of regional peacekeeping forces all the 
conventional criteria related to peacekeeping in general need to be taken into account 
(i.e. legitimacy, consent, neutrality, use of force policy, clarity of mandate, etc.). The 
international community, however, will have to live with the fact regional peacekeeping 
may not necessarily have the same character as conventional UN peacekeeping. Some 
third- parties may be far less than neutral when making the decision to intervene under 
the peacekeeping mantle. On the other hand, it is also clear that the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council have adopted pragmatism as the guiding principle 
as regards the deployment of regional or coalition -based peacekeeping forces. 
Should the fact that the Security Council is unwilling to send blue -helmeted 
forces to particular flash points prevent local actors or coalitions from attempting 
control the situation on their own? The current answer to that question is 
non -equivocally negative. Western countries may be uneasy about Russian intentions in 
Central Asia or the Caucasus, but they tacitly recognise that a Russian peacekeeping 
presence there may be better than none at all. The same argument motivated the UN 
and some Western countries to support ECOWAS peacemaking /peacekeeping efforts 
in Liberia in spite Nigeria's rather blatant lack of neutrality in the conflict. 
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In the aftermath of Somalia and Yugoslavia many have deplored the decline of 
the UN as a peacekeeping agency. The facts certainly point in that direction. Between 
1995 and 1999 only three new UN operations were approved by the Security Council 
two small civilian missions in El Salvador (MINUSAL) and Guatemala (MINUGUA) 
and a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). Moreover, a 
majority of the troops currently deployed around the world for peacekeeping purposes 
are not under the command of the UN. Rather, they are deployed under the aegis of a 
regional security organisation, under that of other regional bodies, or under the 
authority of ad hoc coalitions. 
In reviewing the situation it should not be forgotten that peacekeeping was a 
mechanism conceived under particular Cold War conditions in order to prevent 
localised clashes from degenerating into a wider international conflict. Few of today's 
localised conflicts threaten global order. The major rationale for peacekeeping as it was 
conceived in the postwar period has therefore largely disappeared. However, the 
substitute justification for the 'new' peacekeeping, humanitarianism and rebuilding 
faltering states, has thus far not proven to be as compelling as the previous one, 
especially inasmuch as it has divided UN members and confronted them with extremely 
difficult operational and moral choices. Under these conditions, the loss of enthusiasm 
for 'robust' peacekeeping was perhaps not altogether unexpected. One needs to put the 
current situation in perspective by comparing it to what happened to the UN as a result 
of its military role in the Congo in the early 1960s. . 
The ongoing evolution of wide variety of regional peacekeeping forces strongly 
supports the hypothesis that there has been a shift of peacekeeping responsibility from 
the global to the regional. What is at least as significant is the manner in which this has 
been done, either ad hoc responses to local problems by coalitions of the 'willing and 
able', or plans to create multinational military capabilities for use by a variety of 
inter -governmental bodies, both regional or global. Advocates of a UN standing 
military force might be disappointed by the latter development. In the end, however, 
delinking multinational military cooperation from the politics of large -membership 
international organisations might give policymakers more 'hard' options than 
interminable debates about the pros and cons of a UN army. 
Foreign policy by posse: the way of the future? 
Is 'foreign policy by posse', as Richard Haas calls informal multilateralism, set to replace 
more traditional forms of multilateralism such as standing alliances and international 
organisationsj46 Even though informal multikateralism seems to be enjoying a surge of 
popularity as a diplomatic mechanism, this seems unlikely All key international players 
place considerable importance on the stabilising role of affiances and international 
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organisations. As the classical (neo- liberal institutionalist) argument goes, in an 
international system based on solely on adhocery and informalism, transactions costs 
would increase exponentially. Moreover, without the 'rules of the road' and boundaries 
provided by institutions and alliances, such a system would be prone to instability and 
unpredictability. 
There is also another important reason why the informal approach may only 
complement, rather than completely replace, more traditional forms of multilateralism. 
Although informal coalitions may offer more flexible and /or timely problem -solving 
possibilities for participating governments, they may not always carry the same level of 
international legitimacy as more formal action by existing inter- governmental bodies, 
thus the need for wider external support. In the case of IGAD -sponsored dialogue and 
mediation efforts in the Sudan, for example, increased legitimacy for regional initiatives 
was provided by a wider 'Friends of IGAD' group. In other cases, the contact group on 
the former Yugoslavia and francophone West African efforts to stabilise the situation in 
the Central African Republic, for example, wider support for informal efforts came 
from the UN Security Council itself. 
Informal coalitions constitute a very significant feature of post -Cold War 
international diplomacy. For some, this signals a return of the concert approach in 
international politics, albeit in a revised form. For others, informal coalitions constitute 
diplomacy's response to an increasingly fast -paced world where promptness and 
flexibility are needed. Whatever one's interpretation, the fact should not be lost that 
informal coalitions organised on a regional basis constitute a form of regionalism They 
may offer more flexibility for the participants involved, but they can also suffer from the 
same 'ailments' as other regionalist endeavours because of the inherent limitations of the 
regional approach. 
Regional Dynamics and the New Regionalism 
Stating that regionalism has an impact on regionalism might appear thoroughly 
tautological. Yet is it also the case that new regional cooperation processes evolve in 
part as a result of the problems or deficiencies of other such efforts. It goes without 
saying that not all regionalist endeavours have been successful. Some have polarised 
regions, others have collapsed, and yet others never really got off the ground. Inversely, 
emerging poles of cooperation can have important repercussions for regional and 
international order. NATO and the European Community, for example, established a 
long -term pattern of stability and security in Europe which transformed the continent. 
On a different scale, ASEAN helped to normalise relations between Southeast Asian 
countries in the late 1960s, and it provided a foundation for regional stability and 
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economic development. The point is that the basis for regional cooperation is not set in 
concrete; it can and does evolve with time and new circumstances. 
Ascribing success and failure on such matters is, and will remain, a delicate 
exercise. What is officially declared a success by governments will not necessarily seem 
so to outside analysts. What analysts might declare unsuccessful at any one point might 
turn out to be more successful than they thought a few years down the road. What no 
one can deny, however, is that many new regional decision -making forums are 
emerging, and that this has created an element of confusion as to how new regional 
divisions of labour can be negotiated or renegotiated. In the end, we have to investigate 
the goals of governments who support those forums to see if they are compatible, and 
examine the resource they are willing to invest in them and the mechanisms they seek to 
use to resolve the real problems. 
The following sections discuss current trends in regional dynamics. The 
purpose here is to highlight important developments likely to have an impact on 
regional security and regional institutions in coming years. 
Eurasia 
NATO and the EU are poised to take their biggest leap forward (literally) in decades, 
and the consequences of these changes, while already appreciable, will only become 
clear at the beginning of the next century. The start of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), it is hoped, will breathe new air into continental Europe's deflated economic 
lungs by reducing the costs of doing business amongst EU members. However, it is 
easy to paint a rosy picture of EMU, as the European Commission does very 
professionally, without mentioning the risks involved. EMU will considerably reduce 
national autonomy in matters of macro -economic policy, and there is an ongoing debate 
about the democratic accountability of the new European Central Bank which will reign 
over the new euro- currency and determine European interest rates. This has raised 
once again the question of the democratic deficit within EC /EU institutions, and, more 
precisely, the possibility that further bold steps towards integration will engender a 
backlash against the European ideal and fuel a return to nationalist sentiments across 
the EU's established membership.47 Proceeding with EU enlargement might also prove 
to be a major political headache, particularly because involves making difficult decisions 
about new members (e.g. Turkey, Cyprus) as well as unpopular changes to the EC's 
most cherished programs, notably the Common Agricultural Policy which has kept 
European farmers happy for decades. 
As for NATO expansion, the first tranche of enlargement, comprising Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, is already a fait accompli. Despite the objection of 
ultra -nationalist forces inside Russia, Russian leaders de facto agreed to it in 1997, at the 
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price of establishing the NATO -Russia Council (note: the Council is already 
dysfunctional as a result of the Kosovo crisis). In reality, there is little they could 
realistically have done to stop it even if they had wanted to. Given Russia's reaction to 
the NATO military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the 
Kosovo 'problem', and the marginalization of the UN Security Council early on in the 
crisis, Russian policymakers are likely to see future discussions on enlargement eastward 
in an even more negative light than before 
Before the Kosovo crisis the Affiance was already facing a long list of external 
challenges, such as how to maintain long -term stability in Bosnia, managing regional 
expectations with respect to enlargement, and determining how best to sustain a 
cooperative relationship with Russia. It was also facing two important internal 
challenges: how to give more concrete meaning to the European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) within the framework of the Affiance, and renewing its 1991 Strategic 
Concept. Some hurdles have been crossed. At the Washington summit of April 1999, 
for example, NATO governments endorsed a new strategic concept and avoided 
divisive debates over ESDI and nuclear doctrine. Most of the challenges mentioned 
above lie ahead for NATO, however. The Kosovo crisis has rekindled the debate on 
European military capabilities, though probably in terms more favourable to NATO 
than in the early 1990s, and NATO -Russia relations are once again at the forefront of 
Affiance concerns. 
With the adoption of a new strategic concept NATO countries are now 
beholden to an expanded mandate. In particular, NATO governments have pledged to 
become more active in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
This raises the thorny issue of the Alliance's role beyond Europe, and that of its 
members' divergent interests with regard to actual and potential 'proliferators'. 
Moreover, it has now become obvious that NATO will probably have to remain actively 
involved in trying to maintain stability in Southeast Europe for a lengthy period of time. 
These two roles alone raise key issues expected to have an important impact on the 
Affiance in the coming decade. This is particularly the case with respect to the apparent 
willingness of NATO members to take on tasks going beyond the Alliances traditional 
collective defence functions, but also with regard to the practical necessity of developing 
greater coherence between transatlantic /European organisations in common 
endeavours. 
The rise of numerous mini- lateral European forums, the 'cinderellas' of 
European politics as one British analyst calls them, should not go unmentioned here 48 
Not only to they demonstrate the rapid development of various interests organised 
along sub -group lines on the continent, but they might prove to be useful complements 
to larger institutions, creating alternative channels for discussion if the other ones are 
deadlocked. 
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The other major grouping on the Eurasian landmass is the CIS. As a regional 
cooperation framework the CIS has elicited considerable skepticism ever since its hasty 
establishment in 1992. Not only is it thoroughly dominated by Russian interests and 
used by Moscow to maintain Russia's influence over the territory of the former Soviet 
Union (with the exception of the Baltic states), but as evidenced by the recurrent crises 
in intra -CIS relations, it is also a rather volatile arrangement. Indeed, the new post - 
Soviet regional order appears to be neither fully stable nor satisfactory for the players 
involved. Given its dismal economic situation and its deteriorating military capability, 
Russia's ability to maintain its conception of order in the FSU is questionable, especially 
since many of its most important CIS partners have been increasingly looking elsewhere 
for assistance, investment and political support. 
The 'soft underbelly' of the CIS, the Caucasus and Central Asia, has been the 
stage of a modern day version of the Great Game throughout the 1990s.49 Turkey's 
attempt to bolster pan -Turkic regionalism and Iran's interest in regional trade and 
politics have been a considerable source of concern for Russia, explaining in part why it 
has been so keen to maintain a military presence across the CIS southern border. As a 
result of civil war in Tajikistan, the integrity of the CIS has also been challenged along 
the border with Afghanistan, heightening Russia's ever -present apprehensiveness about 
the 'Muslim factor' in the former soviet republics. Regional sources of instability are not 
the only concern for Russian leaders. Western countries have been increasingly 
assertive in defining both national and collective interests in the newly independent 
states of the FSU. Western oil corporations, for instance, are getting heavily involved in 
Azerbaijan and Central Asia, threatening a sector historically controlled by Russian 
interests, and NATO is developing closer relations with Central Asían countries, a 
gesture partly made as a show of support for their independent status.50 Overall, the 
picture that emerges from the Caucasus and Central Asia is that of unstable areas 
subjected to important external and internal pressures. 
Latin America 
Over the last few years economic integration and cooperation have become dominant 
themes in both Latin American and inter- American relations. MERCOSUR and the 
Rio Group are gaining influence as credible cooperation forums, and Central American 
leaders are embarking once again in a regional cooperation scheme. Moreover, because 
of its growing (yet fragile) economy, Brazil appears set to become the Latin American 
giant of the 21st century. However, barring a more pronounced convergence of 
interests between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and, possibly Mexico, Latin American 
regionalism might not be as potent as it could potentially become. Both the scope of 
U.S. interests in the region and the eventual establishment of a hemispheric trade 
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agreement - the current project is to establish a free -trade area of the Americas (FTAA) 
by the year 2005 - ultimately militate against the formation of a cohesive Latin 
American blocs' 
The optimistic vision of a Latin American continent free of conflict has been 
recited by American and Canadian leaders many times over during the 90s decade, 
sometimes to the point where it was presented as a statement of fact. As anyone 
familiar with Latin American affairs knows, however, there remain numerous sources of 
domestic and regional conflict on the continent. Here the situation in Colombia 
epitomises the full range of problems confronting many of the countries of the region in 
one way or another. The complex internal conflict in that country is linked to issues of 
governance, ethnicity, socio- economic injustice, narco- trafficking, the environment and 
territory. Therefore, painting a rosy picture of Latin America's future only through the 
prism of regional trade simply obfuscates a much more complex reality, and many, if 
not most, Latin American democracies remain fragile polities in spite of the democratic 
advances of the last decade. 
Africa 
Sub -saharan Africa is currently witnessing important geopolitical changes and an 
opportunity to establish a modicum of stability and development exists in a number of 
African sub -regions. There have been a number of democratic advances in such 
countries as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger and South Africa, and positive developments 
towards growth and political liberalisation have taken place in a number of other 
countries, most recently in Nigeria. SADC has gained in credibility as a sub -regional 
cooperation framework, and in francophone West Africa, the relatively stable CEAO 
states are moving to solidify their economic and political ties in order to gain a stronger 
regional and international voice, especially now that Paris has decided to downgrade the 
strategic importance of its relations with the continent (an indirect result of its 
intervention in Rwanda in 1994).52 Developments in both Southern Africa and West 
Africa seem to strengthen the view that infra- regional interactions are growing within 
Africa's sub- regions.53 
Whatever hopes some have of witnessing the birth of an 'African renaissance', 
however, the fact remains that the early post -Cold War period has also seen Africa go 
through a series of terrible humanitarian and political disasters equal if not larger in 
scope to the worst moments of its contemporary history.54 There is universal 
agreement on the net result. Many areas have major setbacks in terms of economic 
growth and social development, and though there are a few 'islands' of stability, a state 
of continental insecurity prevails. The magnitude of Africa's problems has put the 
OAU, the tired embodiment of the pan -African ideal of the 1960s, in a difficult 
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position. Not only does it not have the means to cope with these problems, but for 
most governments on the continent it has yet to become a credible forum of first, or 
even second, resort. 
The situation in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa remains particularly 
worrisome. In the aftermath of the Rwanda tragedy of 1994 this region continues to be 
embroiled in a spiral of ethnic violence and humanitarian disasters. As these lines were 
written an agreement was struck in Lusaka, Zambia, between the governments involved 
in the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and there was a faint 
hope that some stability might be restored to the region. Political developments inside 
the new Congo over the next year or two will show whether these hopes are truly 
founded. Being the essential example of a disintegrated state, the former Zaire has been 
a net exporter of regional instability for years. Until such time as its borders are secured, 
some semblance of internal democratic order is established, and lasting regional political 
arrangements can be agreed to - admittedly a very optimistic scenario - the situation in 
that country and adjacent areas will impact negatively on the whole of sub -saharan 
Africa. 
The former Zaire is but one example of a long list of African conflicts that have 
contributed to deflate the already low level of international assistance to the continent. 
These conflicts have also had the detrimental effects of shifting international assistance 
away from development in order to fund peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, 
introducing a political logic whereby the most conflict -ridden countries have often 
received more assistance from international agencies than those who have succeeded in 
maintaining stability. John Stedman, the well known American africanist, has argued 
that if the international community really wants to make a positive contribution to 
Africa it should redirect its assistance to those countries which already show promise of 
stability and responsibility.55 Indeed, the World Bank's new aid philosophy takes a not 
too dissimilar line. This, of course, remains a difficult ethical choice. But in many cases 
it is one that is perhaps unavoidable given both the practical and the political difficulties 
of providing assistance to disintegrating states. 
The Middle East 
Though not all recent regional developments in sub -saharan Africa have been positive, 
the fact that some positive regional developments did take place contrasts with the 
rather moribund state of Arab regionalism. Charles Tripp, an observer of Middle East 
politics, recently wrote of Arab regional organisations that one of their chief 
characteristics was their lack of solidity, which replicates the highly centralised and 
personalised organisation of power within Arab states.56 A review of recent inter -Arab 
dynamics largely bears him out. Middle Eastern regionalism remains a largely (but 
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highly) symbolic issue, the substance of regional cooperation being negotiated through 
private diplomacy 'between friends' rather than on basis of established and open 
regional frameworks. Moreover, the formation of sub -regional groupings in the Gulf 
region and North Africa in the 1980s and the failed attempt to establish the Arab 
Cooperation Council (ACC) prior to the Kuwait conflict are all indicators of a 
fragmented Arab world. 
In the early 1990s some Western countries sought to promote a form of 
cooperative security in the region, notably through the Arms Control and Regional 
Security (ACRES) group of the Middle East Peace Process. For a variety of reasons 
meaningful progress on that front is unlikely to take place for some time. Why? First 
because it would require an extraordinary convergence of interests amongst key Arab 
players, chiefly Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, all of which compete for regional 
leadership in one way of the other. Second, before and until substantial progress is 
made in Arab- Israeli relations - on difficult issues such as the Palestinian question, the 
Golan Heights, Lebanon, the West bank, etc. - key Arab countries are unlikely to view 
cooperative security as concept of real value for the whole of the region. Third, the 
bilateralism that characterises Western defence agreements with Israel as well as a 
number of Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates) 
militates against a general approach to security in the region. For the West, and 
especially the United States, truly cooperative security in the Middle East also raises the 
thorny issues of relations with Iraq and Iran, a source of discord both within the West 
and with the countries of the Middle East. Finally, cooperative security is hardly a 
homegrown Arab concept. Historically, Arab political elites have shown considerable 
reluctance to adopt Western ideas about national governance and regional security. In 
this respect, the Arab League's reluctance to confront internal governance issues hardly 
suggest that it is a promising forum for resolving internal instability and managing 
political change within Arab states. Generational change in the leadership of key Arab 
countries might perhaps facilitate experimentation with new types of regional 
cooperation processes in the future, but it is unlikely to bring dramatic changes on those 
areas where governing elites remain most sensitive and conservative: national security, 
governance, and human rights. 
The single most important incentive towards more stable (if not entirely 
amicable) relations in the region might be provided by economics. Arab populations 
have been growing steadily for more than fifty years. However, regional per capita GDP 
has been in sharp decline since the early 1980s, and under- development and 
under -employment are both recognised as major regional problems. By sowing the 
seeds of social upheaval and extremism they constitute an underlying security issue both 
at the national and regional levels. There is therefore a case to be made for region -wide 
economic initiatives, supported both by the international community and richer Arab 
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nations, which would also include Israel. Some are already under way, for example the 
Middle East Development Bank, but they are more than likely to be subjected to 
existing regional tensions. However, there is an increasing recognition that the rising 
social and political costs of the economic status quo in the Middle East can not be 
supported eternally 
Asia - Pacific 
Developments in East Asia and the Pacific since the late 1980s point towards what can 
be called 'region formation', a vast movement towards the creation of a more organised 
region in terms of economic networks, institutions, and inter- governmental relations, 
under the heading of the new 'Asia- Pacific'. If only from a historical perspective, the 
results thus far have been significant for such a vast and heterogeneous area with a 
history of regional and sub -regional confrontation. From a theoretical standpoint, the 
situation in the Asia -Pacific would also seem to strengthen the view that increased 
linkages do indeed promote increased institutionalisation in order to reduce information 
and transactions costs. 
However, if the Asia -Pacific has been the scene of more regional dialogue and 
cooperation than ever, the fact remains that neither political nor economic integration 
have been a central theme of the new Asia -Pacific regionalism, far from it. On the 
political front, truly regional cohesion is undermined by divergent attitudes on a wide 
range of issues, ranging from governance and human rights, to the regional role of the 
United States and the international role of the UN. 
Within smaller groups like ASEAN, sustained action on such regional political 
issues as Burma and Cambodia has proven extremely problematic, partly a result of the 
non -interventionist creed the organisation was founded on, partly because ASEAN 
governments remain very uncomfortable with Western pressures to tackle issues related 
to governance and fundamental freedoms. On such matters, the position of ASEAN 
countries (Malaysia and Indonesia in particular) is often closer to that of China than 
many of their western allies would prefer. 
On the economic front, the Asia -Pacific area remains characterised by a 
cooperation -competition dynamic (e.g. Japan -United States), and new forums such as 
the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) do not demonstrate a shift towards 
regional integration. Rather, APEC is perhaps better described as a region -wide 
initiative to clarify the rules of economic competition in the Asia -Pacific with the long- 
term objective of creating a free trade area.57 However, in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, hopes that APEC would propel the Asia- Pacific towards an era of 'open 
regionalism' have been essentially put on hold. APEC is now facing a major identity 
crisis. Not only is the APEC forum not structured to deal with major financial crises, 
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but after half a decade of summitry and inter -governmental discussions there has been 
very little real movement forward on key elements of its trade liberalisation program. 
Additionally, the impending start of the next round of negotiations of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has almost completely shifted bureaucratic and political attention 
away from APEC issues. 
APEC's woes, coupled with the internal turmoil in a number of East Asian 
countries, notably in Indonesia, have raised important question for the establishment of 
an Asia -Pacific community. With the launch of the Asia -Europe Meetings (ASEM), in 
Bangkok, in March 1996, participating East Asian governments had already signalled to 
APEC's non -Asian members that they should not expect an exclusive regional 
relationship. As a first attempt to demonstrate a collective East Asian identity, the 
symbolism of ASEM was important. ASEM could be read as an attempt by East Asian 
governments to dilute U.S. influence on the regional economic agenda, and for EU 
countries to promote their collective interests in East Asia in a forum not dominated by 
Washington. In the view of some, the exclusively Asian nature of Asia's participation in 
ASEM (Australia wanted 'in' but was never invited) also indicated that East Asian 
governments, including China, were now developing a stronger sense of 'Asian' 
collective interests.58 Given the region's cultural and political diversity, and the 
numerous outstanding security problems in East Asia, however, the rise of a 
non -hyphenated Asian community seems by no means assured. 
ASEAN cohesion has arguably been one of the first casualty of the 'Asian flu'. 
Devoid of effective financial management instruments, ASEAN appeared weak and 
almost irrelevant to the unfolding of events in 1997 -1998. The aftermath of crisis itself 
has not played in ASEAN's favour either. First, some bilateral animosities within 
ASEAN were rekindled, and this in turn exposed some of the organisation's 
long -standing political weaknesses, in particular the difficulty for ASEAN governments 
to agree to measures that would have direct impact on the internal affairs of their 
neighbours. Second, ASEAN governments are now absorbed by domestic political and 
economic issues; building effective regional architecture is not their first political 
priority. Finally, the difficult transition to a new post - Suharto order in Indonesia will 
likely employ political energies in that country for some time thus leaving more 
interventionist ASEAN governments (Thailand, Philippines) to face off 
ASEAN -traditionalists (Malaysia, Singapore). Given a number of unresolved bilateral 
problems amongst this group, the likelihood of developing a strong ASEAN voice on 
regional and international matters without a strong or otherwise fully engaged Indonesia 
seems diminished 
A major geopolitical feature of the region remains the network of bilateral 
alliances maintained by the U.S. with its allies in East Asia and the Pacific. For 
Washington these alliances constitute the most potent demonstration of American 
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engagement in Asia and remain the true pillars of stability in the region, notably as they 
relate to Northeast Asian stability. U.S. willingness to maintain its military presence in 
the region is not in doubt. However, with the exception of Korea, Japan, and Australia, 
regional support for maintaining U.S. bases in the region has been fickle, and it is fair to 
state that East and Southeast Asian regional leaders maintain a certain ambivalence 
towards the continuation a U.S. -led security order in the region. For ASEAN countries 
in particular, the juggling act between support for US military presence in Asia on the 
one hand, and support for broader political and economic engagement with China on 
the other, often implies that they can never fully satisfy both objectives. This 
geopolitical dilemma is in essence their permanent strategic condition. Though they 
have been thus far reluctant to develop, or commit to, concrete 'preventive diplomacy' 
measures within the framework of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ultimately the often 
stormy relations between the United States and China may slowly move them in this 
direction in the future. 
Faced with the challenge of having to manage relations with a confident China, 
with an insecure Japan faced with a major recession, with South Korean and ASEAN 
governments confronted with economic and political turmoil, and with an aggressive 
North Korea demonstrably able to threaten its neighbours with long -range missiles, U.S. 
policymakers are having to thread a very delicate line in East Asia. The tremendous 
importance of these issues ensures that considerable demands will be placed on U.S. 
economic and political leadership in the next few years. However, none of Asia's 
problems are amenable to resolution through the unilateral exercise of American power. 
Ultimately the United States has a considerable interest in promoting greater burden - 
sharing and regional cooperation in the region. Whether it is interested in power - 
sharing, however, is a matter that is not yet resolved. 
Concluding Remarks 
The 1990s has certainly provided many examples of the dilemmas regional communities 
confront in seeking to deal with emerging or protracted regional conflict. Whether in 
organising regional -level responses to conflicts in their own 'neighbourhood', or in 
formulating projects for establishing stability and growth, regional communities are all 
influenced in one way or another by the different issues discussed in this chapter: U.S. 
influence in world affairs, the processes of globalization, the state of the UN and its role 
in international security, ad hoc multilateralism and the rise of self -help in the post -Cold 
War, and trends in regional dynamics. 
The influence of these factors is not unidirectional. The problems of the UN, 
for example, have given impetus to the rise of alternative approaches to 
problem -solving, many based on the 'coalition of the able and willing' approach, others 
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organised around more traditional classical regional lines. Similarly, economic 
globalization may promote, albeit in different ways, both the erosion of regional barriers 
and their reinforcement. But then, as the 90s decade demonstrated time and time over, 
international politics rarely conforms to one elegant theoretical line of argument. 
One of the conclusions that emerges from this discussion is that the traditional 
form of international political organisation, the permanent conference formula 
embodied in established international and regional organisations, is often inadequate to 
the task of mobilising political will and organising collective action to prevent and 
manage violent conflict. In the post -Cold War environment collective decision -making 
centres are multiplying, following an irregular path between the fulfilment (or 
protection) of national and collective interests, the need for wider recognition and 
legitimacy, and the search for effectiveness. In the best of worlds, these requirements 
should intersect. In reality, they only do so on certain occasions, and when they do 
there cannot be any guarantee that collective conflict prevention or conflict control 
efforts will be successful. 
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7 
Conclusion: A Revised View of the 
Regional Option 
When research on this study began the outlook for the development of a UN- centered 
approach to managing conflicts around the globe appeared to be positive. With the 
UN more active than ever, including through a number of joint ventures with regional 
groupings, many commentators and policymakers described the UN peace and security 
system as "finally working the way it was originally intended to ". This optimism has 
now largely subsided, not only because the interventionism which prevailed in the early 
1990s quickly turned into political and military overreach for the UN, but also because 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in a number of recent conflicts 
has been repeatedly marred by confusion, and sometimes open discord, over division 
of labour issues. 
Whether this could have been predicted remains an open -ended question. 
However, as do Inis Claude, Robert Keohane and John Lewis Gaddis, the author 
believes IR scholars should be more aware of the limits of the IR field, and especially 
those of theory, in extending accurate forecasts on extremely complex issues.' Another 
way of looking at this is simply to state that international affairs have become extremely 
volatile since the end of the Cold War, to the extent that some scholars now propose 
that turbulence, chaos and disorder are fundamental objects of theoretical study in 
world politics? Nevertheless, as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, it is also clear that 
there already existed a vast reservoir of scholarly research and historical experience 
which could have alerted both scholars and policymakers of the dangers of being 
seduced by a momentary convergence of interests, by fleeting concepts, or by the 
reading of theory as self -fulfilling prophecy. 
The question we are concerned with is whether regional organisations and, 
more broadly, regionalism, have demonstrated to be a promising avenue for preventing, 
managing, and resolving conflict in the early post -Cold War period. As argued in the 
introduction, this is a question that cannot be resolved in the abstract. Any serious 
assessment must be grounded on a thoughtful and nuanced assessment of recent 
experiences. But we also have to keep in mind the fact that regionalism is a concept 
bestowed with different meanings in a variety of contexts and that there is not one, but 
many bodies of theoretical and empirical research which can contribute to explain it.' 
The problem not only stems from the complexity of the manifestations and 
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mechanisms that go under the name of regionalism, but also from the fact that the 
diversity of regional experiences has never lent itself easily to systematic generalisation. 
Some may therefore dissent with my own conclusions. Judging by the dissonance in 
the literature and the ambiguities which still surrounds the role of regional communities 
in preserving and maintaining peace, however, it seems hard to disagree with Louise 
Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell who concluded in a recent study that regionalism was "far 
from being a 'unified concept' " and thus, they argued, "far from being the organizing 
principle for any new global system. "4 
General Assessment 
This study finds that the case for a regional approach to conflict management in the 
1990s has generally been over -stated and that oft -repeated suggestions that the UN 
should 'contract out' conflict -control tasks to regional organisations rest on shallow 
arguments which do not accurately reflect the complexity of the issues involved. In this 
respect, and although many experiments in cooperation have been carried out, I do not 
share the optimism shared by some relating to the possibility of establishing what Alan 
Henrikson calls a new 'global- regional peacemaking system'.5 Others have concluded 
similarly. For example, David Malone, Canada's deputy ambassador to the UN in the 
early 1990s, wrote recently that "the fashionable emphasis in the mid -1990s on the 
importance of regional organizations may have represented attachment to an ideal, a 
flight from reality - or both.ió In a similar vein, the Carnegie Commission on the 
Prevention of Deadly Conflict concluded in its final report that regional organisations 
"may not always be the most appropriate forum through which states should engage in 
or mediate an incipient conflict because of the competing goals of their member states 
or the suspicions of those in the conflict. "' 
Even where mandates have been more carefully thought through and 
institutional machinery has been improved, strictly regional approaches to managing 
conflict too often suffer from problems of legitimacy and partiality, lack of resources, 
or quarrelsome regional politics. Moreover, this study finds that some regional 
organisations remain thoroughly dominated by the interests of a major regional power 
(e.g. CIS, ECOWAS), remain so divided that they appear structurally unable to address 
regional problems effectively and positively (e.g. Arab League), or otherwise cannot 
escape a wider geopolitical context in which their role is limited (e.g. OAS, WEU, 
OAU, OSCE, ASEAN -ARF, SAARC). 
From the perspective of many under- developed or developing countries there is 
certainly a good case for 'democratising' the international system, as Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali argued in An Agenda for Peace. Now Secretary General of the Organisation 
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internationale de la Francophone, the francophone grouping which aspires to become a sort 
of Commonwealth equivalent in the French -speaking world, Boutros -Ghali continues 
to argue that regional arrangements constitute a form of international democracy within 
the international state system.' There is another side to the coin, however. Absent a 
vision of post -Cold War international order and collective responsibility truly shared by 
a representative plurality of the international community, 'democratising the 
international system by delegating more power to regional bodies may also give 
authoritarian regimes or dominant regional powers a freer hand in shaping regional 
politics or in interfering with legitimate international efforts to deal with regional 
problems. This is not a hypothetical possibility. This is a situation Western countries 
have already had to deal with in relation to Nigerian 'peacemaking efforts in West 
Africa and Russian 'peace- restoring actions in the CIS. 
This being said, regional communities undeniably play a more salient role in 
international affairs today than they did during the Cold War. The reasons for this are 
simple enough. The end of global superpower confrontation compelled regional 
communities to reconsider the conditions of regional and global order and reassess 
their common goals and interests. As a result, new multilateral processes have been 
mushrooming in almost every region of the world. As discussed in the case studies 
developed in Chapter 5, some are based on well -established foundations, others are 
trying to lay out new ones; some cohere with well- defined geopolitical contexts, others 
seek to escape from them. Also, in the early 1990s some regional communities were 
confronted with a quick rise in the number of localised armed conflicts, the great 
majority of them internal in nature, which either posed a threat to regional stability and 
security or challenged regional norms of state behaviour. In certain cases collective 
conflict control efforts were organised around the UN or existing regional machinery, 
in others ad hoc responses were developed in order to try deal with the situation or 
simply evolved out of the difficulties of finding effective and timely solutions through 
institutional means. 
The following sections seek to draw together the findings of this study 
concerning the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of the regional approach to conflict management. 
The Relationship between the UN and Regional Organisations 
In 1990 -1992, the UN, which was already involved in major peacekeeping efforts in 
Africa, Europe and Southeast Asia, strongly encouraged regional organisations to play a 
role in problem -solving under the rubric of burden -sharing. The over -extension of UN 
responsibilities around the gobe certainly created a situation where alternatives to UN 
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action were urgently needed. Between 1993 and 1995, however, the UN Security 
Council spent considerable time and energy attempting to deal with the failure of a 
number regional peace initiatives whilst simultaneously facing major peacekeeping 
problems of its own. Overall, it is fair to say that the experience of UN- regional 
organisations cooperation during this period was not a terribly happy experience. 
The result of UN debates (1992 -1998) 
Despite six years (1992 -1998) of official discussions genuine progress was slow to 
emerge in the debate on UN- regional organisations relations. Beyond accepted 
propositions that there should be more effective cooperation between both 
institutional levels important obstacles stood in the way of forming truly effective 
institutional partnerships. In particular, it became apparent that establishing a clear 
division of labour which would go beyond the vague terms of Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter was, and remains, a complex and sometimes controversial issue. Indeed, as 
pointed out in Chapter 4, Chapter VIII provisions have been rarely invoked in recent 
UN Security Council resolutions in spite of a very significant rise in the number of 
regional actions. This fact has been overlooked in much of the recent literature. Yet it 
points to real and continuing problems in the use or invocation of Chapter VIII 
provisions. 
Essentially, what has emerged from the institutional debate on UN- regional 
organisations relations is a set of principles guiding cooperation between the two levels. 
These principles evolved chiefly through the consultations which followed the 
publications of An Agenda for Peace (1992), the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995), 
and the two UN- regional organisations summits (August 1994, February 1996). A third 
UN- regional organizations summit took place in July 1998, but it did not significantly 
alter the conclusions reached below. They are as follows: 
Cooperation between UN Security Council and regional organisations 
should be based on the primacy of the UN; 
Regional organisations and the UN should aim for consistency in dealing 
with a common problem involving both levels of organisation; 
The division of labour must be clearly defined in order to avoid overlap and 
institutional rivalry. There is also a recognition of the problem of 
sponsoring too many mediators from different inter -governmental 
organisations; 
Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established but need not be 
formal. 
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Lack of resources was also identified as a major impediment limiting the 
operational capacity of many regional organisations. As the UN Secretariat itself 
recognised, the differences between the wide range of regional organisations in terms of 
capabilities and mandates militate against a universal approach to UN- regional 
organisations relations. 
Beyond broad agreement on principles, cooperation between the UN and 
regional organisations has evolved largely out of experience and diplomatic compromise 
than as a consequence of legal doctrine or theoretical conceptions of international 
order. This too was implicitly recognised in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace 
which identified the different forms of cooperation between the two levels: (1) 
consultation, (2) diplomatic support, (3) operational support, (4) co- deployment, (5) 
joint operations. The UN later added a sixth category, technical support, to this list. 
The Supplement sought to clarify the relationship between the UN and regional 
organisations like no other UN document did before and, as such, it remains an 
important policy statement. 
Importantly, the Supplement also recognised that the UN did not have the 
capacity to deploy, direct, command and control major enforcement operations, and 
stated that coalitions of the 'willing and able' or major security organisations such as 
NATO were often better placed than the UN to carry out such actions. However, the 
document also deemed that, in the enforcement role, UN- authorised coalitions were 
"greatly preferable" to unilateral actions.' This being said, it needs to be pointed out 
that unilateral action with UN approval is, at least on certain occasions, acceptable to 
the permanent membership of the Security Council. After all, in spite of strong 
reservations from many quarters, the Council did authorise U.S. and French 
interventions in Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. 
To sum up, one can only conclude that there has been only a partial realization 
of Boutros -Ghali s vision as enunciated in the Agenda for Peace. Regional arrangements 
certainly have come to play a much more prominent role in the 1990s, but not 
necessarily because Chapter VIII of the Charter suddenly emerged as the new modus 
operandi of conflict management. Rather they did so because, either by default of by 
design, they often were the first locus of political action in trying to deal with regional 
problems. Second, new forms of cooperation did emerge between the UN and 
regional organisations, but one can question whether they truly attenuated the 
competing agendas of key regional and international players in dealing with regional 
conflicts or whether this always facilitated conflict resolution. 
No doubt part of this new dynamic emerged as a result of the desire of 
industrialised countries, mainly the United States and European countries, to off -load 
some conflict management tasks to developing regional bodies. However, the 
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development of regional -level institutions and /or capabilities should also be regarded as 
a foreign policy objective in its own right, either to buttress claims to regional 
leadership as is the case of Russia with the CIS, to consolidate political -military links 
with new security groupings in the case of the United States, or to pursue the 
construction of a more credible political -military architecture in the case of the 
European Union. 
Beyond the Agenda for Peace, understanding the role of the UN Security Council 
in delineating the division of labour between the UN and regional bodies is pivotal to 
the dynamic that emerged during the 1990s. Here is can be argued that the Security 
Council de facto introduced a three -tiered logic of cooperation with regional 
organisations and coalitions. The first implies that the UN can support the 
peacekeeping /peacemaking initiatives of regional organisations, both politically and 
materially. The second, that the Security Council may want to maintain certain 
oversight privileges on actions either envisaged or taken by regional organisations or 
coalitions, notably by the dispatch of UN observer missions alongside regional 
peacekeeping or stabilisation missions . And the third, that major security organisations 
like NATO, ad hoc coalitions of the 'willing and able', or even individual states, can be 
authorised to perform actions the UN is either unable or too divided to undertake 
itself, should the Security Council decide so. However, as the Kosovo conflict 
demonstrated once again, the absence of a formal authorisation or supporting 
resolution by the Security Council is hardly a sufficient deterrent for regional groupings 
determined to take coercive action. 
An issue to be resolved? 
Between the ideal of synergy between the UN and regional organisations and the 
practice of inter -institutional cooperation there subsist. Numerous obstacles need to be 
carefully negotiated: resources constraints, institutional differences, conflicting 
geopolitical interests, and regional problem -solving culture. Thus, it is perhaps not 
surprising that relations between the UN and regional organisations relations were 
marked by tensions and institutional rivalry in numerous recent cases. The rivalry over 
institutional primacy sometimes extended to relations amongst regional organisations as 
well. Here the tacit competition which took place in the early 1990s between NATO 
and the EU /WEU, which can perhaps be more accurately described as a contest 
between atlanticist and european ist conceptions of European security, readily comes to 
mind. 
With this in mind, it is time to put to rest the argument that the UN has the 
ability 'contract out conflict management tasks to regional organisations, especially 
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inasmuch as it implies that the UN Security Council can direct the actions of regional 
organisation. The fact is that in the 1990s there has not been a single clear cut case 
where the UN Security Council directed a regional organisation to perform 
peacekeeping or enforcement tasks that these groupings were not already 
contemplating or undertaking themselves. In Yugoslavia, it took several months before 
NATO countries consented to enforce the UN ban on military flights over Bosnian 
airspace, and a joint WEU /NATO naval surveillance mission in the Adriatic was already 
under way when the Security Council decreed a naval embargo in the zone of conflict. 
Similarly, the disastrous UN 'safe area policy was never fully enforced by either the UN 
or NATO. NATO played did play a crucial role in putting an end to the conflict in 
Bosnia in 1995, but only after all non -coercive strategies had played themselves out and 
the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance was threatened as a result of the severe 
deterioration of military situation on the ground. .In the cases of Liberia and conflicts 
in the CIS, the Council gave its conditional support, and therefore some degree of 
legitimacy, to ECOWAS and certain Russian peacekeeping efforts, but only ex post facto. 
And in yet other less publicised cases, Australian and New Zealand -led 
peacemaking /peacekeeping actions on Bougainville Island for example, regional 
operations were put in motion without reference to the Security Council. It should not 
be forgotten that, in theory, regional organisations do not need the express consent of 
the Security Council to undertake peacekeeping operations. 
The question of Security Council authority over regional organisations remains a 
highly sensitive issue. Some regional organisations have made it clear that they did not 
support a hierarchic model of UN- regional organisations, and intimations that the 
Security Council should be able to veto decisions made by regional bodies invariably 
raise considerable controversy within the regional groups which form the UN's 
membership. Overall, it is fair to say that regional organisations have maintained a 
fairly high degree of autonomy vis -à -vis the Council over the last few years. 
The bottom line seems to be that the UN Security Council might have a 
theoretical right to direct regional organisations to take certain actions under Articles 
52(3) or 53 of the UN Charter, but it arguably does not command the political 
authority to do so, nor, it seems, are the members of the UN ready to fund regional 
peacekeeping operations through UN- assessed contributions. As argued above, what 
the Council does have is the privilege to oversee regional actions if it feels they might 
be inconsistent which UN Charter principles, and it also retains the privilege to assist 
regional actions if its members feels they could benefit from UN help and assistance. 
Finally, it can give international legitimacy to certain enforcement actions. However, it 
is important to note that, barring a willingness of the P5 to take active measures to stop 
regional enforcement actions, such as imposing sanctions or authorising military 
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measures, for example, there is little the Council can actually do to stop such actions 
beyond the adoption of resolutions. 
This last point certainly underlines the limits of the UN system, indeed, that of 
international law, in dealing with determined regional groupings. Whether in Kosovo 
or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the disjunction between regional 
decisions and UN decision- making (or lack thereof) has highlighted a disquieting trend: 
the erosion of the authority of the UN Security Council as the ultimate forum for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. How can the Council maintain its 
credibility in the future if governments, including those who, rhetorically at least, most 
insist upon the centrality of its international role, make decisions on the use of force 
without clear UN Security Council mandates? This question goes at the very heart of 
the challenge facing the UN with regard to international peace and security. That 
challenge is really threefold: the organisation must find a clear role for itself in the 
constellation of post -Cold War security institutions, it has to regain some sense of 
credibility and higher moral authority, and, perhaps most important (and difficult) of 
all, it has to ensure that it is a cooperation framework still capable of mobilising 
international political will. 
In the end, it is difficult to differ with Inis Claude when he argued years ago that 
the relationship between the UN and regional organisations was not to a problem to be 
solved but an issue to be managed.10 However imperfect, regional organisations form 
an integral and important part of the international state system. All UN members must 
deal with that reality, and they must balance their decisions between what is ideally 
desirable and what is practically achievable. On that count, we can only note that 
governments are increasingly willing to adopt the coalition /contact group approach in 
order to mitigate some of the problems associated with institutional problem -solving. 
Reflections on the early post -Cold War experience 
The proximity to conflict' issue 
Theoretically, the greatest strength of regional organisations lies in their interest in and 
knowledge of local conditions and in their proximity to regional problems and conflicts. 
This 'proximity', in fact, forms one of the core arguments buttressing the regional 
approach to problem -solving. Since the problem is literally in their backyard, so the 
argument goes, countries of the regional community concerned should in principle be 
better able to gain the political, and with it, the material and financial commitment of its 
members needed to deal with local disputes or conflicts. 
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In practice, however, the political value of this proximity varies. Some 
members of the regional community concerned may not be completely neutral among 
disputants, thus complicating the search for a collective solution. More powerful states 
may seek to influence the outcome of the conflict in order to suit their geopolitical 
interests. Finally, in many regions governments may lack the financial or military 
resources to contribute to the search for peace, no matter how strong their motivation 
to do so. 
In certain cases, however, there may not be any alternative to 
regional /sub -regional or coalition conflict management efforts. This is especially the 
case when the international community at large, and the members of the UN Security 
Council in particular, show little or no interest in taking effective measures to prevent 
conflict from developing or in dealing with situations which have already deteriorated 
to the point where armed conflict has occured. In such cases, members of a regional 
community or a coalition of interested states might feel compelled to resort to 'self - 
help', either because they have a direct stake in seeing the situation contained or 
resolved, because important regional norms have been openly challenged, or because 
the situation affords them an opportunity to demonstrate regional leadership and /or 
unity. 
The physical reality of 'proximity' varies also. Some regional organisations have 
an enormous geographic reach. For example, more states belong to the OSCE and the 
OAU today than to the UN at its foundation. Not only does this make collective 
decision -making difficult because of the large number of states involved, but the 
crossing of multiple layers of geographical, political and cultural boundaries within large 
membership political organisations often promotes a lowest common denominator 
approach to problem -solving. 
Sovereignty still a limit, but... 
International legal hurdles to external intervention and the difficulties of forging 
regionally and locally accepted solutions have always presented major difficulties for 
regional bodies in cases of internal conflict. Their Cold War record in the regulation of 
internal conflict is largely characterised by powerlessness, failure or irrelevance. The 
doctrines of national sovereignty and non -intervention in domestic affairs were either 
deemed to be insurmountable obstacles or conveniently justified inaction. 
Clearly, there have been some dramatic shifts on this issue in the 1990s, not 
only from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, but also from the 
international community at large which, in a number of recent cases, have accepted a 
more liberal interpretation of UN Charter provisions on sovereignty to facilitate 
humanitarian action. In certain situations state sovereignty was overridden and 
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international intervention launched without the full consent of states or belligerent 
parties. Indeed, in such places as Somalia and Liberia there was no working state left to 
grant or deny such permission. Given the considerable political and military problems 
associated with such interventions, however, is seems highly unlikely that this will ever 
become a common UN practice, even less so if the action considered involves potential 
conflict with a large and powerful state. The Security Council's refusal to intervene 
militarily in Rwanda and in strife -torn Burundi in 1995 -1996, and the 'fence- sitting' of 
the P5 during the 1997 Congolese civil war, simply underscored the new conservatism 
which developed in the wake of setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia. In this respect, one 
can certainly venture the opinion that many Western observers and policymakers were 
perhaps too quick in hailing the emergence of new, globally- accepted principles of 
intervention. The Security Council certainly retains the privilege of authorising 
humanitarian interventions, but, as ever, it is only likely to exercise it on a case -by -case 
basis. 
Regional organisations have shown even more reluctance than the UN to take 
bold steps on this issue. Indeed, for bodies like ASEAN or the Arab League, collective 
intervention in the internal affairs of one their own officially remains a regional taboo. 
Yet there has also been significant movement amongst some regional bodies. There 
are clear indications, for example, that OAS and OAU orthodoxy have been shaken off. 
Attempting to deal with internal conflict is a priority of the OAU Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, and the OAS has changed it statutes 
so that it can assume greater responsibility for protecting democratically elected 
governments in the Americas. In Europe, the OSCE has also developed an elaborate 
array of mechanisms to deal with internal situations related to national minorities and 
human rights which have proved useful in a number of situations. It is clear, however, 
that crisis resolution and stopping shooting wars are not the strong point of these 
regional institutions. 
It is doubtful whether weaker regional bodies command the moral authority and 
political legitimacy to override state sovereignty without the consent from belligerent 
parties. In the one obvious relevant and recent case, the ECOMOG deployment in 
Liberia, the peacekeeping contingent was deployed without the consent of the most 
powerful military faction. Although it later received the mantle of UN legitimacy 
through Security Council resolutions, a special UN contribution fund, and the presence 
of UN observers, the ECOMOG force never fully recovered from the muscular 
approach it adopted early in the conflict and suffered from the perception of lack of 
neutrality for most of its troubled stay in the country. 
In the majority of recent cases where regional bodies have gotten involved in 
the regulation and resolution of internal conflict they did so with the partial or full 
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consent of belligerent parties under preventive diplomacy, conflict stabilisation or 
mediation /conflict resolution mandates. In most cases this has imposed severe 
restrictions on their role. In others, consent and quiet diplomacy was exactly what 
permitted small successes and breakthroughs. Overall, the degree of influence of 
regional organisations seems to have been determined by five principal factors: I) the 
nature of the conflict they were dealing with (ethnic /religious, political /constitutional, 
non -violent /violent); 2) the extent to which the parties in the area of tension were 
amenable to exterior influence; 3) the selection of appropriate conflict control strategies 
and the depth of national and international support for those strategies; 4) the timing of 
third -party efforts in relation to the development of the conflict, and; 5) the level and 
nature of support belligerents received from outside the area of conflict. In this last 
respect, we can only note that external mediation efforts appear to be most effective 
when belligerent parties are exhausted or have reached a position of 'hurting 
stalemate'» 
Peacekeeping is not a universal panacea 
Previous to the period examined in this study the record had shown that peacekeeping 
had rarely succeeded in solving the underlying causes of conflict between belligerents. 
There were some successes in limiting armed conflict in the Middle East with the 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I /II), but it was largely attributable to the 
interest of the Permanent 5 in avoiding a wider confrontation that could draw them 
directly into the conflict. Overall, however, the peacekeeping tool had shown 
persistent limitations in getting belligerent parties to negotiate lasting peace 
agreements.'Z 
In the 1990s peacekeeping became more complex as a result of widened 
mandates and considerably more complicated to carry out due to the internal nature of 
conflicts that needed to be addressed. To a certain degree, the policy emphasis placed 
on peacekeeping as a tool of regional and international conflict resolution resulted in a 
conflation of the political and military requirements of peace. Throughout operational 
deployments this often produced glaring contradictions between diplomatic and 
military strategies, irrespective of whether peace missions were carried out by the UN, a 
single power like Russia, or a regional organisation. With its complex mix of force and 
diplomacy, NATO's coercive actions in Bosnia in 1995 clearly shifted the debate on 
peacekeeping. Since then there has been a noticeable recoil away from the notion that, 
as a concept, peacekeeping can usefully cover the entire range of multinational military 
operations short of war. Furthermore, an important reassessment of how and when 
peacekeeping troops should be deployed has taken place, notably in the UN Security 
Council. 
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Negotiating peace agreements has also proven to be a considerable challenge. 
In conditions of internal conflict conventional methods of diplomatic negotiations 
could often not be applied or were subjected to constant battlefield developments, 
unlike the Cold War years when standing cease -fires gave negotiators and interested 
parties breathing room for diplomacy. Moreover, the high tempo of military 
operations required to deal with constant military contingencies on the ground' often 
overshadowed the efforts to try to gain agreement on long -lasting solutions. For third 
parties intervening with peacekeeping forces this was often a key factor in determining 
whether or not 'staying involved' was really worth the risk to soldiers. 
For all the emphasis on developing better peacekeeping methods and 
organisation, the point that needs re- emphasizing is that peacekeeping is a tool, not an 
end unto itself. Moreover, it is now more clearly understood that peacekeeping has 
inherent practical limitations, not the least of which is that, in the absence of a clear 
path for finding political solutions peacekeeping may buy time, but it will not resolve or 
even settle conflict. In the context of what Alan James has referred to as the 
'contingent' (non- enforcement) mode of action, we are again reminded that 
peacekeeping efforts can only be effective when disputing parties are willing to make 
peace, or at least prepared to stop using violent means to pursue their ends.13 There is 
no reasons to believe that peaceful, long -lasting solutions can be reached otherwise 
through regional or other means. 
Availabiligy of resources and effective decision -making processes 
The UN's long- running financial difficulties have highlighted the great vulnerability of 
international institutions to financial 'starving', the under- financing of international 
organisations by their membership. Regional organisations haven't been immune to 
this problem. Rather than being secondary issues, financial considerations act as a 
major determinant of the type of activities regional bodies can plan for and undertake. 
For example, establishing regional norms in the security field can be considerably less 
expensive than sending intervention forces or marshalling financial resources to help 
rebuild war -torn countries. To a large extent this is why many regional organisations 
have sought external financial assistance for their peacekeeping activities or have 
recognised the central role of international financial institutions and specialised UN 
agencies as providers of funds and technical help for post -conflict recovery efforts. 
The critical state of the OAU's finances in the mid -1990s gives an idea of the 
budgetary problems confronting some regional organisations. Out of its regular 
1994/1995 budget of US $26.7 million, the OAU Secretariat had only received 
contributions amounting to $3.5 million by December 1994. Moreover, as of this date 
the sum of arrears due from member states represented more than two consecutive 
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assessed regular budgets of the organisation." The OAU's finances have since 
improved somewhat, notably because of the increasing level of international assistance 
for the organisation. However, the fact remains that any discussion of a potential OAU 
role in conducting major peacekeeping operations has a distinctly academic flavour 
given the considerable costs of such undertakings and the high level of military 
planning and preparation needed to carry them out.15 
Inadequacy of financial resources is certainly not the only constraint for regional 
organisations. Needless to say, decision -making processes and the power of initiative 
accorded to their respective secretariats are critically important aspects of their 
functioning. Many regional bodies have slow, sometimes Byzantine decision -making 
processes, and some advocates of stronger regionalism in the security field have 
lamented the absence of regional Security Council equivalents.16 The experience of 
European organisations with regard to the situation in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s 
certainly highlighted the difficulties of taking decisive action under consensus 
decision -making regimes. There are two sides to this issue, however. The consensus 
rule in the OSCE can be extremely cumbersome, but on the other hand once a 
decision is taken no member state can claim that it was taken against its will. This 
consensual form of decision -making, as well as the OSCE's flexibility, have helped the 
organisation to look into infra -state conflict in a way that no other regional organisation 
has been capable of. 
Finally, in examining national choices about regional institutions we cannot 
overlook two important issues which are invariably raised in all multilateral institutions. 
First, the degree to which each organisation is effective in its normal operations and 
accountable to its member states will obviously have an major impact on its credibility. 
Second, national over -representation in the staff of certain organisations can lead to 
profound misgivings about national influence over bureaucratic agendas. 
Formal institutions or looser arrangements? 
In recent years ad hoc or informal multilateralism has often acted as a substitute for 
formal action through major regional and international bodies or as parallel diplomacy 
acting in support of the latter. The expressions of informal multilateralism are 
manifold: contact group diplomacy, temporary coalitions, 'Friends of the Secretary - 
General' groupings at the UN. The main advantage of theses approaches is that they 
can potentially provide governments most interested in resolving particular situations 
with a framework for coordination, and sometimes for action, when formal institutional 
approaches are insufficient or dead -locked. 
Given that non -institutionalised processes have occasionally facilitated conflict 
resolution breakthroughs in the past (e.g. Namibia, Central America, Cambodia) there 
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are clearly some merits to flexibility. Perhaps the most important lesson to retain from 
this informal multilateralism is that formal institutions do not have the monopoly on 
conflict management processes. States, either individually or in small groups, can play a 
crucial part in peacemaking when their efforts to deal with issues through institutional 
means fail to deliver a positive outcome. Non -state actors can also help in the 
peacemaking process, particularly in situations of internal strife, by creating back - 
channels for discussion when belligerents feel that formal institutions cannot protect 
their interests. 
The question of informal multilateralism is an issue which is not very well 
developed in the literature. Because of its significance in recent, and perhaps future, 
peacemaking endeavours the issue clearly deserves more consideration. It is 
conceptually distinct from the well -known concept of 'bandwagoning', whereby state 
actors support or follow a lead player in order to maximise their gains at minimum cost, 
and it also different from the concept of 'concert', which, at least in the traditional 
European sense, evokes a non -institutionalised yet semi -permanent arrangement 
between leading actors in a given system for the purpose maintaining stability. Perhaps 
one way of looking at informal multilateralism in the sense discussed in this study is to 
view this phenomenon as manifestations of temporary and process- oriented regimes. 
Following Arthur Stein's arguments, regimes develop for the purpose of collaboration, 
i.e. trying to reach a formal settlement on an issue of particular relevance to a 
determinate group of actors, or for the purpose of facilitating coordination, i.e. 
collectively trying to avoid particular outcomes through less than formal agreements." 
A number of recent manifestations of informal multilateralism have had as goals either 
collaboration or coordination. Some, however, were developed to further both goals 
simultaneously, trying to ensure or enhance coordination within a given sub -group as 
well as attempting to develop a formal solution on a particular issue with a wider group 
that included disputing parties. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are limitations and potential drawbacks to 
informal approaches. As was indirectly suggested by Feld, Jordan, and Hurwitz, ad hoc 
or informal approaches can undermine the credibility of institutions.18 When a 
coalition take over a peace process because the UN or a regional organisation appears 
weak or is unable to take decisive measures, it is also sending a message about their 
adequacy and effectiveness. Another possible drawback to the ad hoc approach is that 
regional powers may be tempted to reassert de facto zones of influence or to obtain a 
favourable political position outside of the usual oversight provided by formal 
inter -governmental bodies. Russian peacemaking ventures in its self -declared 'near 
abroad' or Nigeria's heavy- handedness in Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, have 
certainly raised regional and international concerns as to the real motives sustaining 
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intervention. In that respect, the international community has to ensure that 
peacekeeping interventions led by important regional powers comply with UN Charter 
principles and other fundamentals of international law. In particular, it needs to pay 
attention to humanitarian needs, human rights and the respect of international laws 
governing armed conflict when resort to force is inevitable. 
There is another aspect of this question that deserves attention. Although 
informal groupings have played an important peacemaking role in a number of recent 
conflicts, recent experience seems to demonstrate that the burden of implementing 
peace settlements and post- conflict recovery efforts more often than not rest on the 
shoulders of international rather than regional agencies, especially when those efforts 
take place outside the European setting. Individual states, ad hoc groups and coalitions 
seldom have the wherewithal or the will to carry the whole conflict management 
process through on their own, particularly in developing or under- developed regions on 
the world. 
The approach adopted by Western countries in organising the implementation 
of the Dayton agreement (signed in December 1995) illustrates how the issues of 
international legitimacy, effectiveness, national and collective interests can be addressed 
with an non -institutionalised peacemaking approach as a starting point. As agreed to 
by NATO members and the Bosnian disputants, the UN Security Council provided 
legitimacy for the agreement and authorised the deployment of a NATO force under a 
Chapter VII resolution (SC Res. 1031); a broad -based Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) established the priorities of post- conflict recovery efforts and was to oversee the 
implementation of the peace process; acting under a steering group composed of the 
G7 countries and Russia, a High Representative for Bosnia was named to act as 
pointman and chief coordinator of international efforts; and different international and 
regional institutions were directed to carry out specific tasks (NATO, EU, OSCE, UN) 
or coordinated their work with the priorities set by the PIC (IMF, World Bank, 
International Red Cross). 
Can this become a new model for the organisation of international conflict 
resolution and post- conflict recovery efforts? Probably not. Places like Rwanda, 
Liberia or Cambodia have only been allotted a fraction of the resources dedicated by 
the international community, and by Europe and the United States in particular, to 
Bosnian recovery. After years of NATO and EU dithering in Bosnia, maintaining the 
peace in the former Yugoslav republic is now touted as a showcase example of 
transatlantic resolve. That resolve, however, is sorely lacking in numerous other zones 
of conflict, particularly in Africa. 
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Despite problems, regional peacekeong capabilities are developing 
For all intents and purposes the UN's quasi -monopoly on international peacekeeping is 
now a thing of the past. The last decade has seen a dramatic rise in the number of 
non -UN peacekeeping deployments, and numerous initiatives are currently under way 
to improve regional, sub -regional or coalition -based peacekeeping capabilities, notably 
in Europe, in Africa, and in Central Asia. 
The experience of the early 1990s showed that regional communities were not 
well prepared to undertake peacekeeping tasks. To one degree or another, most, if not 
all, the regional bodies which undertook peace operations in order to defuse regional 
conflicts suffered from lack of experience in collective control efforts, imprecise 
mandates in terms of their conflict management functions, problems of leadership and 
followership, financial and military constraints, and coordination difficulties with other 
organisations. Given the scope and nature of many of the conflicts they were facing, 
and the fact that quite a number of regional organisations were themselves in the 
middle of complex institutional reforms, many of these problems were probably 
inevitable. Yet they also highlighted structural issues which have been at play for a long 
time. 
This being said, not only has it become clear that there are alternatives to UN 
peacekeeping, but there is also a growing recognition of the role regional peacekeeping 
forces might play, either acting on their own or in support of the UN. Many Western 
countries now actively support many such initiatives, particularly (but not exclusively) in 
Africa, either through financial assistance, technical support, military education and 
training, or logistical support for operational deployments.19 In the process, some 
traditional peacekeeping principles are being turned upside down. For the sake of 
neutrality, it used to be that only those countries far removed from a particular conflict 
were selected to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions. In the context of regional 
peacekeeping neutrality still remains a fundamental consideration. However, instead of 
having outsiders policing the block, as with traditional UN peacekeeping missions, the 
members of regional 'neighbourhoods' are increasingly doing it themselves. 
In considering the evolution of peacekeeping as an international conflict control 
mechanism it is always difficult to think in terms of ideal situations. Peacekeeping 
forces, by definition almost, deal with controversial situations and are never dispatched 
because things are going well. However, it can probably be argued that the best case 
situation for regional peacekeeping deployments rests on what might be termed the 
'three consensus scenario': 
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consent from all belligerent parties for the presence and mandate of a 
regional peacekeeping force after a cessation of hostilities has been agreed 
to and a modicum of commitment to peace and order has been expressed; 
agreement within the regional community concerned that a regional force is 
both a necessary and practicable response to a particular situation, and 
agreement on the mandate and operational concept of the regional force 
within a larger mediation framework; 
support by the international community, and more explicitly by the UN, for 
the aims and methods of a regional peace initiative, and /or for the 
composition and mandate of a regional peacekeeping force 
It needs to be reminded that, under the UN Charter, Security Council 
authorisation for undertaking regional peacekeeping actions is not compulsory unless 
they involve the use of force. From a political point of view, however, Security Council 
support for any type of regional peacekeeping action can only be considered as 
extremely desirable. The distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement has often 
been difficult to maintain in recent peacekeeping experience, and the real issue has not 
been whether an enforcement action was undertaken without the Council's control, but 
rather in what context enforcement and use of force was taking place. 
Admittedly, the three consensus scenario outlined above is an ideal situation. 
Some regional deployments may be preventive and try to stabilise a situation before it 
gets out of hand. Others may come in more forcefully to separate exhausted 
belligerents. Commentators and observers of UN peacekeeping often point out that 
no two situations are alike. Yet they also accept that there are some principles to which 
the UN must adhere to, perhaps more so now than ever, if new peacekeeping efforts 
are to be successful. No two situations will be alike for regional communities 
considering peacekeeping actions either. However, non -observance of the principles 
enunciated above can only lead to claims of partiality, illegitimate intervention, or 
muscle -flexing by regional powers or interested neighbours. 
A Question of Responsibility 
It would be a tremendous mistake to sweep aside the lessons and experience gained 
throughout the different international and regional peacemaking and peacekeeping 
experiences of the 1990s. It will be remembered as a time of considerable upheaval 
where the UN took on too much with too little and regionalism (re)emerged as a 
important if often inadequate force in international politics. If, as Ramesh Thakur 
notes, peacekeeping has proven to be a remarkably resilient instrument of conflict 
control over the years, the bitter experiences of Somalia and Bosnia are nevertheless 
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likely to influence the UN's future role in that field for the foreseeable future, with the 
Security Council showing itself extremely reticent to dispatch new peacekeeping forces 
to areas where belligerents have not yet shown a commitment to peace.20 For reasons 
discussed in this study, the prognosis for regional peacekeeping is not so unambiguous. 
Some regional powers may be tempted to launch interventions in order to demonstrate 
their political 'weight', and in spite of limited resources some regional groupings may 
want to show to the rest of the world how responsible they are by taking on situations 
which the UN is uninterested in taking on itself. 
As argued above, there are signs that a more flexible and fluid form of 
international conflict control diplomacy is being developed. In the absence of clear 
international norms on how to handle certain types of conflicts, informal 
multilateralism may prove to be more than a passing fad. The organisation of the 
Western response to the conflict in Kosovo, which saw the reactivation of the Contact 
Group on the former Yugoslavia, and later the political management of the conflict 
through the G8, has once again pointed in this direction. However, it should certainly 
not be assumed that this approach will be universally adopted - it is certainly unlikely to 
be by key regional powers such as China and India who adhere to a rigorously 
orthodox style of international diplomacy - or that it can be successful in all cases. If 
we may perhaps welcome the advent of a new flexible and problem -solving diplomacy 
in matters of conflict management, it is not so sure that the extension of this approach 
to decisions concerning the use of force by regional groupings will do much to restore 
the UN's credibility in matters of high politics. 
We should not forget that regionalism essentially remains an instrument of 
statecraft. Governments engage in regional cooperation to further certain objectives or 
protect specific interests. They also compete to promote their vision of regional or 
sub -regional order. A combination of diplomacy and economics, and a more or less 
developed sense of regional community, is the oil which lubricates the friction between 
cooperation and competition. However, outside the different areas of the globe where 
democracy already has a strong foothold, civil society does not yet play a very 
important part in that dynamic, and what ultimately constitutes the 'regional agenda' is 
generally decided by governments of the day which have more than a passing interest in 
maintaining exclusive contról over how that agenda is defined. 
Float to do? 
Since it is axiomatic that multilateral institutions are only as effective as their members 
allow them to be, the development of regional leadership on peace and security issues 
constitutes a cornerstone of any strategy designed to increase regional conflict 
management capabilities. Here external assistance in developing the capabilities of 
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regional institutions can be of great value. However, this needs to be carefully balanced 
with the equally important task of supporting those countries which at the regional level 
play a stabilising and responsible role. 
Recent experience in Africa has highlighted a range of parallel strategies which 
can be put in motion simultaneously to improve regional capabilities. Institution -to- 
institution support can enhance the legitimacy of regional efforts and provide needed 
technical help and financial assistance, as can state -to- institution support. State -to -state 
support can also increase regional capabilities. However, as evidenced by the lack of 
coordination of Western countries in trying to enhance African peacekeeping 
capabilities after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the formulation of too many national 
initiatives may also present some problems, not the least of which are the pursuit of 
competing national agendas. No doubt, part of these efforts stem from the desire of 
industrialised countries to avoid direct intervention in conflicts regarded as marginal to 
their own security. In effect, many such efforts can be likened to substitution 
strategies. However, it is clear that this could be extremely damaging to the role of the 
UN and the idea of global security if such efforts became organised strategies of 
disengagement. 
So- called 'second -track' processes similar to CSCAP in the Asia -Pacific region 
may also play a useful role. By promoting non -committal exchanges on sensitive 
security issues, high -level unofficial dialogue may contribute to a gradual change in 
threat perceptions and help building a common understanding of security problems 
and their possible solutions in a given region. These processes have their limitations, 
however, and they should not be viewed as substitutes for decision- making forums. 
If regional communities can be helped in developing mechanisms to deal with 
regional conflict, we also have to be mindful of the fact that there is a limit to what can 
realistically be done from the outside. Ultimately, regional communities must bear the 
primary responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness of their efforts and that of their 
common institutions.' Perhaps an inescapable comment here is that the most effective 
multilateral fora are usually those that can meet the needs of the moment rather than 
those that reflect the realities of the past. 
The regionalisation of security politics which has occurred since the end of the 
Cold War is putting much greater responsibility on regional levels of decision. 
However, any discussion about regionalism and security must also acknowledge the 
often shallow nature of multilateralism in the developing world, both in the economic 
and the security area. There have been too many failed or weak regional institutions in 
Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia to embark again on the wholesale 
promotion of ineffectual structures, be they regional or global in scope. Understanding 
the conditions under which multilateralism can successfully deal with both regional and 
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instrastate conflict is a question that needs more research. What is also clear, however, 
is that a pragmatic outlook must be kept in addressing the issues involved. 
At a time when the UN is experiencing major financial difficulties there is an 
indisputable attraction in the idea that the UN should off -load more conflict 
management tasks to regional organisations. Evidence does indeed suggest that 
regional organisations and groupings are increasingly getting involved in different 
aspects of conflict management or are looking at ways to improve their organisational 
capabilities in that field. Yet, their recent record, much like their Cold War 
performance, is unimpressive. Indeed, the rhetoric of regionalism appears to be far 
ahead of its actual accomplishments in preventing, managing and resolving conflict. 
Since the present structural and operational weaknesses of many regional organisations 
- whilst certainly not immutable - are unlikely to change dramatically in the near future, 
urging for a radical reordering of the division of labour between the UN and regional 
organisations on the basis of some kind of global subsidiarity principle is a rather 
simplistic and reductionist proposition. 
Whatever the circumstances, resolving regional and international conflict has 
never been easy task and never will be. There are no magic recipes and no conceptual 
reformulations that can easily overcome the problems associated with trying to find 
short and long -term solutions to deeply- seated conflicts rooted in ethnicity, territoriality 
or dysfunctional governance. Any sober assessment of recent international experiences 
in trying to resolve conflict shows that successes have been few and far apart, that 
societies cannot be changed overnight as a result external intervention, and that 
disputants more than anyone else decide when peace is possible and desirable. 
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